The Crimean War – Part 1: Prelude

The Crimean War (1853–1856) stands as a defining chapter in the history of 19th-century Europe, encapsulating the tumultuous interplay of imperial ambition, religious contention, and the decline of long-established powers. Often described as the first "modern war," it bridged the era of traditional conflict with the rapid technological and political evolution that would reshape global dynamics in the decades to follow.

Terry Bailey explains.

The Battle of Sinope by Alexey Bogolyubov.

At its core, the Crimean War was a crucible of competing interests. It stemmed from the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, a once-mighty force now referred to as the "Sick Man of Europe." The war's genesis lay not only in disputes over the Christian holy sites of Palestine but also in the broader geopolitical struggle to control key territories and trade routes, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. As Russia pressed forward with its imperial ambitions, the uneasy alliance of Britain and France sought to maintain the European balance of power, while Austria and Prussia trod cautiously, torn between geographic proximity and diplomatic neutrality.

This war, however, was more than a clash of empires; it was a reflection of an evolving Europe. It marked the end of the Concert of Europe, the fragile diplomatic framework established after the Napoleonic Wars, and introduced new elements of warfare and international relations.

Railroads and telegraphs revolutionized logistics and communication, while war correspondents brought the realities of battle into the public consciousness for the first time. The Crimean War also revealed the limitations of existing military strategies and forced nations to rethink their approaches to both war and governance, with significant consequences for domestic and international policy.

In examining the Crimean War, it is possible to delve into the political, diplomatic, and ideological forces that set the stage for one of the 19th century's most consequential conflicts. It explores the fragile alliances, deep-seated rivalries, and unfolding events that led to this watershed moment in European history.

Beyond its immediate outcomes, the Crimean War's legacy serves as a prelude to the seismic shifts that would shape the modern world, from the collapse of empires to the rise of nationalist movements and the ever-increasing complexities of international relations.

By the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire, once a dominant force stretching from the Middle East to Southeastern Europe, was in a state of gradual decline. Weakened by administrative corruption, economic stagnation, and military defeats, hence why the empire was often described as the "Sick Man of Europe." Its territorial losses in the Balkans and mounting internal unrest posed a question that gripped European diplomacy: what would happen to the vast Ottoman territories if the empire collapsed?

Russia

For Russia, the decline of the Ottoman Empire presented an opportunity. Czar Nicholas I sought to expand Russian influence over the Black Sea and into the Balkans. His ambitions, however, alarmed other European powers, particularly Britain and France, who feared that unchecked Russian expansion would upset the balance of power and threaten their interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Russia's relationship with the Ottoman Empire was marked by a mix of hostility and opportunism. The two empires had clashed in previous wars, with Russia seeking access to warm-water ports and control over strategic territories. However, the Crimean War's immediate spark lay in religious disputes over Christian holy sites in Palestine, then under Ottoman control. The holy sites were sacred to various Christian denominations, including Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Christians. A longstanding rivalry over their custodianship intensified in the 1840s, with France backing the Catholic claims and Russia championing the Orthodox cause. When Sultan Abdulmejid I granted concessions to the Catholics under French pressure, Nicholas I protested vehemently, demanding recognition of Russia's historical rights and protection for Orthodox Christians within Ottoman lands.

Diplomatic exchanges soon turned confrontational. In 1853, Nicholas referred to the Ottoman Empire as "a dying man" and proposed to Britain a secret deal to partition its territories. Britain, however, rejected the offer, fearing the implications of Russian dominance in the region. Relations between Russia and the Ottomans soured further, culminating in Nicholas's ultimatum demanding formal recognition of Russian authority over Orthodox Christians, a demand the Ottomans refused.

While Russia sought to exploit the Ottoman Empire's weakness, Britain and France were determined to curtail Russian expansion. Britain's primary concern was safeguarding its trade routes and colonial interests, particularly the overland route to India. France, under Emperor Napoleon III, aimed to bolster its international standing and assert its leadership in European affairs. Austria, geographically close to the Balkans, faced its own challenges in maintaining stability in its territories and sought to prevent any major power from gaining an upper hand in the region.

The interplay of these powers created a volatile environment. Austria, although wary of Russia's ambitions, hesitated to act decisively, while Britain and France moved toward a more confrontational stance. The French Emperor, eager to assert his nation's influence, supported military action against Russia. Meanwhile, Britain's government, led by Lord Aberdeen, reluctantly prepared for war, driven by public pressure and strategic imperatives.

By mid-1853, diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis had failed. Russia escalated tensions by invading the Danubian Principalities (modern-day Romania), then under Ottoman suzerainty. This act was a direct challenge to Ottoman sovereignty and a provocative move toward Europe. In response, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia in October 1853.

The first major clash occurred at the Battle of Sinope in November 1853, when the Russian Black Sea fleet destroyed an Ottoman squadron. The attack shocked Europe, prompting Britain and France to take decisive action. While religious disputes over the holy sites in Palestine served as a catalyst, as indicated, in reality, the Crimean War was fundamentally a struggle for geopolitical dominance. It was a war shaped by the ambitions of empires, the fragility of the Ottoman state, and the broader dynamics of 19th-century European politics. The war's early stages revealed the deep divisions and competing priorities of the involved powers. For Britain and France, the conflict was about preserving the balance of power; for Russia, it was about expanding influence; and for the Ottoman Empire, it was a desperate fight for survival.

Conclusion

The Crimean War's significance lies not only in its immediate geopolitical ramifications but also in the broader historical transformations it precipitated. This conflict exposed the fragility of alliances, the volatility of power dynamics, and the complex interplay between religion, politics, and imperial ambition in 19th-century Europe.

The war marked the decline of traditional forms of diplomacy and heralded a new era of modern warfare, characterized by the use of advanced technology, including railways and telegraphs, and the growing influence of public opinion shaped by war correspondents and photographs. For the Ottoman Empire, the war underscored its precarious position as a declining power entangled in the ambitions of stronger states.

Despite its nominal victory alongside Britain and France, the empire emerged weakened, its dependence on European support more evident than ever. For Russia, the conflict was a humbling experience that highlighted its military and administrative shortcomings, prompting internal reforms under Alexander II, including the emancipation of the serfs.

Britain and France, though triumphant, expended significant resources, and their alliance, rooted in mutual distrust of Russia, would prove to be temporary.

Ultimately, the Crimean War served as a prelude to later conflicts that would continue to shape Europe, such as the unification movements in Italy and Germany and the eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century.

It revealed the limitations of the Concert of Europe, an earlier framework for maintaining stability, and demonstrated that the balance of power in Europe was increasingly precarious. In many ways, the Crimean War was a turning point, a harbinger of the profound political, social, and technological changes that would define the latter half of the 19th century and the early phases of the 20th century.

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Note:

Lord Aberdeen

Lord Aberdeen's coalition government fell in 1855 over its handling of the Crimean War, Lord Palmerston was the only man able to sustain a majority in Parliament, and he became prime minister for Britain in the latter half of the Crimean War.

Nicholas I

Nicholas I, 6 July [O.S. 25 June], 1796 – 2 March [O.S. 18 February], 1855) was Emperor of Russia, King of Congress Poland, and Grand Duke of Finland from 1825 to 1855, however, died before the war was concluded and Alexander II ascended to the Throne

The Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire was one of the largest and longest-lasting empires in world history, spanning three continents at its height. It originated in the late 13th century as a small principality in northwestern Anatolia, founded by Osman I. Over the centuries, it expanded through military conquests, strategic alliances, and a sophisticated system of governance, reaching its zenith during the 16th and 17th centuries under the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent.

At its territorial peak in 1683, the Ottoman Empire encompassed approximately 5.2 million square kilometers (2 million square miles). Its domains stretched from southeastern Europe, including large swaths of the Balkans and parts of modern-day Hungary, to North Africa, covering areas such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt. In the east, the empire included much of the Middle East, incorporating regions like modern-day Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and parts of the Arabian Peninsula. To the north, it reached into the Crimean Peninsula, while in the south, it extended deep into the Sudanese Red Sea territories.

The empire's size allowed it to control vital trade routes connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa. The cities of Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul), Cairo, and Baghdad became major cultural and economic hubs. Despite its vast size, the Ottoman administration managed a highly diverse population of Christians, Muslims, and Jews through a system of "millets," or semi-autonomous religious communities, which helped maintain relative internal stability.

This vast expanse, however, also brought challenges. The sheer size of the empire required an extensive bureaucracy and a formidable military to maintain control over its territories. Communication and logistics across such a wide area were often strained, and local autonomy was sometimes granted to distant provinces to ensure their loyalty. Over time, these factors, combined with external pressures and internal struggles, contributed to the gradual decline of the empire, which ultimately dissolved in the aftermath of the First World War.

The 1897 Greco-Turkish War: A Minor War with Major Consequences

The 1897 Greco-Turkish War took place over 32 days from April to May 1897. Greece and the Turkish Ottoman Empire fought, primarily over the question of the status of Crete. However, the war had lasting consequences. Rama Narendra explains.

The Battle of Domeke in the 1897 Greco-Turkish War. Painting by Fausto Zonaro.

The 1897 Greco-Turkish War is a war few remember or even know about outside of the countries involved. The war was relatively short, involved two relatively minor players in the European Concert, and is completely overshadowed by wars and crises happening shortly after it like the Agadir Crisis, the Italo-Turkish War, The Balkan Wars, and World War I. However, the war still had major, but subtle consequences for both countries which, like dominoes, led to the Balkan Wars in the 20thcentury.

Background

Just like other Empires at the time, the Ottoman Empire was troubled with nationalist revolts in the 19th century. One particular hotbed for nationalist fervor was Crete, with its Greek-speaking majority demanding autonomy or even self-rule. To escalate the situation, King George of Greece was of one mind with Greek nationalists in wishing to annex the island, and frequently sent arms and men to support Cretan nationalists. 1897, however, would prove to be a fateful year as the over-confident Greek leadership saw the chance to annex Crete or even expanding on the mainland further north. This overconfidence was fueled by the humiliation of the Ottoman armed forces back in the 1877 Russo-Turkish War, and an exaggerated view of the internal problems of the Ottomans, especially regarding the Armenian rebellions.

The Ottoman military, though, was far from what the Greek leadership had imagined. Sultan Abdülhamid II has been working closely with German advisors to reform and improve the Ottoman army. The mission led by Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz in 1886 had particularly lasting effects on Ottoman leadership and planning. He not only drastically improved the Ottoman education and training system, but also changed the overall status of the general staff officer corps within the army. Close cooperation with German firms also ensured that the Ottomans were armed with modern bolt-action rifles.

Escalating Tensions

On February 15, 1897 two regular Greek battalions, joined by local rebels landed on the shores of Crete. Within two weeks, Greek semi-official gangs, called the Ethnike Hetairia, reinforced with regular officers and soldiers, began to launch raids into Ottoman Thessaly. On April 9 Greek raiders, with some Italian volunteers, attacked Ottoman border towers and defeated a border company in Kranya. They were repulsed by Ottoman border guards the next day, and even though the Ottoman government were reluctant to enter a full-blown war, intense public pressure eventually pushed the Ottomans to declare war on Greece on April 17.

The war was fought in two separate theaters: Alasonya-Thessaly and Yanya-Epirus. However, most of the fighting was done in the Thessaly Front. During the war, the Ottomans used plans devised by none other than Von der Goltz himself. The plan was to force the Greeks to overstretch their defensive lines, which were very near to the border. The main body of the Ottoman Army at Alasonya would then try to encircle the Greeks before they were able to retreat back to the Yenisehir line. Von der Goltz expected that the Great Powers would not let the Greeks be beaten and would intervene in the conflict in less than 15 days. So the Greek army had to be crushed in less than two weeks.

The War

The first stage of the war (April 16–22) was marked by border clashes and the occupation of mountain passes. This stage also shows that despite the reforms the Ottoman army still had glaring shortcomings. Officers and soldiers sometimes ran towards the enemy as if in a race without paying attention to combat tactics and techniques, and as a result officers suffered abnormally high casualty levels. Instead of conducting the encirclement maneuver as planned, most units simply tried to push the Greek defenders back by frontal assaults. Confusion, delay, and lack of coordination and communication were the norms until the Ottoman forward units reached weakly defended Yenisehir two days after the Greeks withdrew from the town.

The second stage (April 23–May 4) was marked by the battle of Mati-Deliler and the occupation of Tırnova and Yenisehir. The second stage proceeded almost the same way as the first stage, with Ottoman units pushing the Greek defenders back without attempting encirclement maneuvers, and the Greeks safely evacuated their defenses and retreated to their last defensive line.

The third and last stage (May 5–17) was marked by the decisive battles of Velestin, Catalca, and Domeke, in front of the last Greek defensive line. The first battle of Velestin was a disaster for the Ottomans. In this encounter, a forced reconnaissance turned into a futile and bloody assault, and the Greek lines held firm against Ottoman cavalry and infantry charges. However, the Ottomans eventually pushed through Greek lines in the second battle. The Ottoman army finally decisively beat the Greeks at the battles of Catalca and Domeke. The Greek defenders were thoroughly beaten and the road to Athens was opened.

Conclusion and Consequences

However, as Von der Goltz had predicted, the Great Powers intervened and Greece was saved from further humiliation. Even though the Ottomans militarily won the war, they did not gain much from the victory. The Great Powers forced the Ottomans to give Crete autonomy and refused an Ottoman plea to obtain the region of Thessaly, previously lost in the aftermath of the 1877 Russo-Turkish War. Greece, however, was required to pay a heavy war indemnity to compensate the Ottomans for the territory won by them in Thessaly and returned under the terms of the peace. The victorious Ottoman troops retreated as if defeated, and Abdülhamid spent several tense months trying to explain to the public why the war had been won in the battlefield but lost at the diplomatic table.

So what were the consequences of this short war? As it turned out, they were big. In the Ottoman Empire, despite the disappointing result, the victory gave the Ottomans a public morale boost and confidence after being humiliated by the European powers for decades. This confidence is what eventually drove an overwhelmingly pro-war public opinion on the eve of the 1912-13 Balkan Wars. If their armed forces had beaten Greece in 1897, what prevented them from doing it again? Yaşasın harb! (Long live War!), cried the pro-war demonstrators in 1912.

In Greece, the defeat was seen as disgraceful and humiliating, mostly due to the rapid and unexpected advance of the Ottoman army. This defeat though, fueled the country’s irredentist policy of the Megali Idea (Greater Greece) and led Greece to reform its politics and economy, redefine its international alliances, and prepare the military and naval forces that helped Greece double its territory over the next 20 years.

If you enjoyed this article, you can read about the Megali Idea and how it shaped the modern Greek state here.

References

Ginio, E. (2016). The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Katsikas, S., & Krinaki, A. (2020). Reflections on an" Ignominious Defeat": Reappraising the Effects of the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 on Greek Politics. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 38(1), 109-130.

Uyar, M., & Erickson, E. J. (2009). A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Ataturk: From Osman to Ataturk. ABC-CLIO.

The 1914-23 Armenian Genocide – Why is it so Little Remembered?

Everyone has heard of the atrocities associated with the Holocaust that killed countless people of Jewish ancestry and wreaked havoc upon the populations of Europe during World War II. However few people have heard of the genocide that occurred over 1914 to 1923, the Armenian Genocide. There are multiple reasons that the Armenian Genocide is not widely studied or spoken of as its historical context continues to affect modern geopolitics. Regardless of the sensitive nature of current geopolitical relations, the truth of the countless lives lost must be examined before a larger audience to allow their memory to not be forgotten. Roy Williams explains.

Armenian people are marched to a nearby prison in Mezireh by armed Ottoman soldiers. Kharpert, Ottoman Empire, April 1915. Source: here.

The Armenian Genocide occurred from 1914 to 1923 coinciding with the events of World War I. The ethnic Armenians of the eastern regions of the Turkish Ottoman Empire had long been treated as a scapegoat for issues that plagued the Ottoman Empire. With the rapid decline of Ottoman Turkish authority, power was consolidated in the Triumvirate of power that included a man known as Talat Pasha who had disdain for the Armenian people. To stop the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey began implementing nationalist measures to ensure that Turkey and all its lands were for the Turkish rather than ethnic or religious minorities. The Christian Armenians became the target of intense scorn and soon would be cleansed from the Ottoman territory to ensure Turkish dominance. From 1914 to 1923, over 1.5 million Armenians were systematically slaughtered in the first modern genocide of the 20th century. Methods of genocide included marching people through the desert without food and water to await their deaths, as well as firing squad executions and burying the dead in mass graves. These mass graves can still be seen throughout this region of Anatolia as a grim reminder to the dark past that the Turkish authorities refuse to acknowledge. Many people in Europe and the United States condemned these atrocities and asked for the governments of the free world to assist in stopping them. Sadly, no unified effort presented itself in stopping the atrocities of the Armenian Genocide. Later with the rise of the Nazis in Germany, Hitler infamously mentioned in his Obersalzberg Speech, speaking proudly of his plans to cleanse Poland, ”Who, after all, speaks of the annihilation of the Armenians?” (Adolf Hitler, 1939) This leads to the direct conclusion that Hitler and the Nazi party of Germany realized they could theoretically commit genocide without any repercussions. 20

Multiple primary source accounts exist from individuals who witnessed the massacre or saw the Turkish government plans to exterminate the Armenians. These accounts range from Armenian victims to government officials who admitted to the slaughter in one form or another. The Ambassador for England, Henry Morgenthau, recorded his encounters with Talat and his dealings with the Armenian people, describing the obvious and overbearing nature of the Turkish animosity towards the Armenian people. On July 16, 1915, Henry Morgenthau in his ‘Report That Ottoman Turkey Is Seeking to Exterminate the Armenian Nation’ detailed the mass deportations and the use of racial extermination. “Have you received my 841? Deportation of and excesses against peaceful Armenians is increasing and from harrowing reports of eyewitness it appears that a campaign of race extermination is in progress under a pretext of reprisal against rebellion.”

Little remembered

The question remains, why is the Armenian Genocide a forgotten part of the history of the West? Why would something so traumatic and historically significant be brushed to the side as an insignificant part of the tragedy of World War I? The reasons for this forgotten part of history are largely intentional. The current government of Turkey outwardly denies the atrocity that occurred in the Armenian Genocide. Turkey holds that the casualties of the Armenian Genocide were not an act of intentional genocide but casualties of World War I that were largely the fault of Armenians who allied themselves with Russia. The geopolitical balance of the Middle East currently relies heavily upon the countries of Turkey and Israel as two of the nations who largely have favorable relations with Europe and the United States. Turkey refuses to accept responsibility for the events of the Armenian Genocide and in this regard does not like the United States from criticizing them for their historical atrocity. Many nations do not recognize the Armenian Genocide as genocide. The US only recognized the Armenian Genocide in late 2019, while Israel still does not recognize it. Israel’s refusal to acknowledge the mass suffering of the Armenian genocide is perplexing as the Armenian Genocide parallels the Holocaust in many significant ways. The United States’ only very recent of the Armenian Genocide stems from a careful balance of keeping Turkey as a tentative ally. 

The Armenian Genocide was one of the darkest moments of the 20th century. Countless lives were lost in the Turkish purge that was based on keeping Turkey Turkish. In some ways, the genocide may have also influenced the way that Adolf Hitler went about orchestrating the Holocaust. Though the modern day government of Turkey does not wish to accept responsibility for this heinous atrocity, it is the responsibility for the free people of the world to recognize genocide and condemn anyone who attempts to deny the memory of the countless souls that were lost. As the adage goes, “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing” (commonly attributed to Edmund Burke, see here).

Editor’s note: The quote from Hitler referenced in the article is disputed – see here. In addition, the exact number of deaths in the genocide remains disputed – see here.

Why do you think the Armenian Genocide is not better remembered? Let us know below.

Can it be true? Did Austria really attack itself?

If you ever feel like you’ve made a huge mistake, just remember: it’s probably not bigger than the Battle of Karansebes, during which the Austrian army broke into two and ended up mistakenly fighting itself. At least, that’s what supposedly happened. There actually isn’t much direct evidence to suggest that the Battle of Karansebes is anything more than a legend. Connor Martin of histori.org explains…

An image from the Austro-Turkish War (1788-1791). Here the Ottoman army is advancing towards Sofia, Bulgaria.

Here’s how the story goes: in 1788, Austria was at war with Turkey, fighting for control of the Danube River. About 100,000 Austrian troops had set up camp near Karansebes, a village that is now located in present-day Romania. Some scouts were sent ahead to see if they could find any Turks. Rather than find evidence of the opposing army, they found gypsies who had a lot of alcohol to sell, and they bought it.

The scouts brought the alcohol back to camp and started drinking - since the best thing to do the night before a big battle is get very, very drunk. As their little party became louder and more obnoxious, it attracted the attention of several foot soldiers who wanted to join in. The scouts were not open to sharing their find, and being drunk, they didn’t express this with a lot of tact.

An argument broke out, which soon escalated. The alcohol was confiscated, more people joined in, punches were thrown, and a shot rang out. Amidst the mayhem, someone shouted that the Turks had arrived.

Caught unawares and unprepared, most soldiers fled the scene immediately. Others got into formation and charged at the supposed enemy. Shots were fired, cavalry was assembled, and the defecting soldiers were killing every man they saw without thinking.

Needless to say, the Turkish army had not arrived. They wandered into Karansebes two days later and found 10,000 dead or wounded Austrian soldiers. A little confused by this turn of events, they were nonetheless delighted to take Karansebes without any effort at all.

The truth?

Believers in the battle claim that the army could very easily have become confused. At the time, the Austrian army was made up of people who spoke German, Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovakian, among other languages. This resulted in a lot of confusion and miscommunication as many troops and officers weren’t able to understand each other. One story claims that as the soldiers were running away, a colonel shouted, “Halt!” in German, but some of the troops who didn’t speak German thought he was saying “Allah!” which only solidified the idea that the Turks had arrived.

Okay, so the battle wasn’t impossible, but given that there is no known record of it until 1831, some 40 years after the event, it doesn’t seem likely. That source is the Austrian Military Magazine. Other sources include the well-titled The History of the 18th Century through the 19th till the overthrow of the French empire, with particular reference to mental cultivation and progress by F.C. Schlosser, which was published in 1843. The best source about the battle comes from the German Geschichte Josephs des Zweiten by A. J. Gross-Hoffinger, and while it’s often cited by people when referring to the battle, it was also written nearly 60 years after the fact. That means there was plenty of time for the facts to become skewed.

While the Battle of Karansebes makes for a good story, there just isn’t enough documented evidence for it to be entirely believable.

Now, what do you think? Tell us below...

Connor Martin is the founder and historian of histori.org.

The Italian invasion of Libya - Una Fatalia Storica

This article was previewed on the site for a time and the full article is now in the magazine. Click here for more information!

Meanwhile the next articles in this series are here: 

The Libyan Experiment and Italian Subjugation under Mussolini

Fourth Shore - The Italian Colonization of Libya

And here is the start of the Italian invasion of Libya article...

The Derna, a cargo ship, departed from Turkey in September 1911. Its cargo hold was filled with 20,000 rifles, 2 million rounds of ammunition, and machineguns. These arms were destined for the Ottoman-Libyan port of Tripoli, where they would be distributed amongst loyal Libyan tribesmen. On September 24, Italy caught wind of the ship’s journey and issued a warning to the Ottomans that “sending war materials to Tripoli was an obvious threat to the status quo” and endangered the Italian community in Libya. The ship started unloading its cargo at Tripoli harbor on September 26. Infuriated, the Italian government issued a 24-hour ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire on the 28th: let the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica fall under Italian jurisdiction and military occupation or else war would be declared. The Ottomans gave a reasonable and conciliatory reply but Italy would have none of it. On September 29, Italy declared war on Ottoman Libya, a decision described by the Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti as fulfilling una fatalia storica – a historical destiny.

And remember, the follow-up articles are here: 

The Libyan Experiment and Italian Subjugation under Mussolini

Fourth Shore - The Italian Colonization of Libya

The Italian siege of Tobruk