In the Shadows of the Himalayas: The Rebels of India’s North-East Frontier Agency

Nestled in the northeastern frontier of India, the region now known as Arunachal Pradesh has long been a mosaic of cultures, languages, and traditions. Historically referred to as the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), this area has been home to myriad indigenous tribes, each with its distinct identity and way of life. Among these, the Tani people have etched their legacy into the land, enduring the harsh terrains and the tumultuous tides of history. It is from this resilient stock that Tako Mra, a name now synonymous with courage and foresight, emerged as a warrior, leader, and symbol of cultural preservation. His life and vision, shaped by personal experiences and key alliances, offer profound insights into the challenges of nation-building and cultural integration.

By Tadak Esso and Pupy Rigia.

The North-East Frontier Agency in 1954.

The Integration of Northeast India

The history of NEFA, and by extension Arunachal Pradesh, is deeply intertwined with the broader narrative of India's struggle for independence and its subsequent nation-building efforts. The northeastern territories, with their strategic significance and rich cultural diversity, presented a unique challenge to the nascent Indian state. As the British Empire began its retreat from the Indian subcontinent, the future of these remote regions became a focal point of India's territorial consolidation efforts.

Following the Partition of India in 1947, the integration of the northeastern territories was pursued with vigor. The region, characterized by its complex ethnic tapestry and relative isolation, had largely remained unadministered during British rule. This lack of formal governance left a vacuum that the Indian government sought to fill, albeit with significant resistance from the indigenous tribes.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, recognizing the strategic importance of NEFA, emphasized the need for its integration, stating, "We must win the hearts of the frontier people and make them feel a part of India." However, this approach often clashed with the aspirations of the local tribes, who viewed these efforts as a continuation of colonial domination.

Early Life and Leadership of Tako Mra

Tako Mra was born in 1925 in the rugged hills of NEFA, an area teeming with the vibrant cultures of its various tribes. Growing up in the Sadiya region, Mra was exposed to the rich traditions of the Tani people from an early age. His education, marked by brilliance and an innate sense of leadership, set him apart. From his youth, it was evident that Mra was destined for a path that transcended the ordinary.

The tumultuous backdrop of World War II brought Mra into the fold of the British Indian Army. In 1943, he enlisted and soon found himself leading an infantry in the dense jungles of Yangon (present-day Myanmar). His strategic prowess and courage in the face of adversity earned him high honors from the British. However, the war left a lasting impact on Mra—both physically, as he suffered paralysis in his left arm, and mentally, as it sharpened his resolve for the autonomy of his people.

Reflecting on his wartime experiences, Mra later wrote, “The forests taught me resilience, and the war showed me the cost of freedom. We, too, must fight for our own freedom, not against a foreign empire but against the loss of our identity.”

The post-war period was a transformative time for Tako Mra, marked by his political awakening and growing involvement in the struggle for indigenous autonomy. A pivotal moment in this journey was his encounter with Zapu Phizo, the charismatic Naga leader who championed the cause of a free and autonomous Northeast. The relationship between Phizo and Mra was not merely one of ideological alignment; it was a deep and strategic partnership forged in the crucible of shared struggle and vision.

Phizo, known for his sharp intellect and persuasive oratory, saw in Mra a kindred spirit—a leader with the military acumen and grassroots connection necessary to galvanize resistance. For Mra, Phizo represented a broader framework for the aspirations of the Northeast. Their discussions, often held in secret amidst dense jungles and remote villages, touched on the preservation of tribal cultures, resistance to forced integration, and the dream of a unified hill tribe nation.

Mra’s later writings reveal the profound influence of these exchanges: “Phizo opened my eyes to the possibility of unity among the hills. He believed in a nation not defined by borders but by the spirit of its people.” This partnership was instrumental in shaping Mra’s political strategy, as he began to envision a Northeast where cultural preservation was not just a goal but a right.

Buoyed by his alliance with Phizo, Mra’s growing concern for the cultural and political future of his people led him to engage in correspondence with key Indian leaders and colonial authorities. In 1947, Mra wrote to the Viceroy of India, advocating for the exclusion of the hill tribes from the Indian Union and their establishment as a Crown Colony. He argued that the unique cultural and geographic realities of the region necessitated a different approach, warning that forced integration would only lead to unrest.

In 1948, Mra followed this with a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, cautioning against the incorporation of NEFA into the Indian Union. He warned Nehru that if India persisted in its efforts to incorporate the Abor Hills, his people would resist. Mra’s words were unambiguous: “If India pushes to incorporate the Abor Hills, my men will fight back. We cannot go from being ruled by an elite in Britain to one in New Delhi.”

These letters underscore Mra’s foresight and his deep-seated belief in cultural preservation and political autonomy. His assertion that NEFA was never Indian to begin with highlighted the distinct identity of the region. Scholars today recognize this as an early articulation of what has become a persistent tension in Indian nation-building—the challenge of integrating diverse cultural identities without erasing them.

The 1953 Achingmori Incident

The tensions between the indigenous tribes and the Indian government culminated in the Achingmori incident of 1953, a defining moment in the history of NEFA. The incident occurred when a group of Daphla tribals from the Tagin community, under Mra’s leadership, attacked an Indian government party. The assault resulted in the death of 47 individuals, including Assam Rifles personnel and tribal porters, during an administrative tour in Achingmori, present-day Arunachal Pradesh.

Mra’s leadership in this incident was shaped by his military experience and his unwavering commitment to the autonomy of his people. His war-time tactics were evident in the precision and coordination of the attack, reflecting his deep understanding of guerrilla warfare.

To many in NEFA, the Achingmori incident was not merely an act of rebellion; it was a statement of defiance against the imposition of external authority. It was, in Mra’s words, “a fight to ensure that our children inherit a culture, not a colony.”

Prime Minister Nehru, addressing the Parliament in 1953, acknowledged the complexities of administering such remote regions. He stated, "The fact that that place is not an administered area does not mean that it is outside the territory of the Indian Union. These are virgin forests in between, and the question does not arise of their considering in a constitutional sense what their position is."

The aftermath of Achingmori saw further internal strife among the tribal communities. The Galong (now Galo) tribe, who were also affected by the massacre, sought retribution. In a tragic turn of events, Mra was betrayed by a Galo girl who poisoned his drink. This act of betrayal, possibly stemming from the complex inter-tribal dynamics and the perceived short-lived victory of Achingmori, led to Mra’s untimely death in 1954 at the age of 29.

His death marked the end of an era, but it also cemented his place in the annals of history as a symbol of resistance and the quest for autonomy.

Legacy and Contemporary Relevance

Despite his premature demise, Tako Mra’s legacy endures as a symbol of resistance and the quest for autonomy. His warnings about cultural assimilation and the loss of identity resonate with contemporary struggles faced by indigenous communities across the globe. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the ongoing push for greater autonomy under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution are contemporary manifestations of the tensions Mra foresaw.

Mra’s vision of a unified, autonomous hill tribe nation remains a poignant aspiration. His life serves as a reminder of the importance of cultural preservation and the right to self-determination in the face of modern state-building efforts. His story, though often relegated to the margins of history, offers valuable insights into the broader narrative of nationhood and the enduring quest for identity.

As historian A.K. Baruah aptly puts it, “Tako Mra was not just a leader of the Tani people but a visionary who understood the fragility of cultural identity in the face of political assimilation.” His life and vision underscore the importance of self-determination and the preservation of cultural identity in the ever-evolving narrative of nationhood.

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Suggested Reading

1. “Escaping the Land” : Mamang Dai

2. The Assam Rifles Securing the Frontier, 1954–55.

3. The Battle of NEFA--the undeclared war : Bhargava

Britain’s Failure in the Indian Subcontinent: Events that led to the Partition of India

The Partition of India in 1947 led to major implications took place after the British ended their rule of India. It had huge impacts, including the creation of two countries, around one million deaths, and the displacement of over ten million people (estimates vary on the exact amount). Romaan Anwar explains the events that led up to the Partition.

A refugee train on a journey to the Punjab, Pakistan in 1947.

Imagine this: two brothers are prisoners shackled in a cell in 1947. Now, they are free, and chains are broken. However, instead of enjoying their freedom, they are practically fighting each other to the death! This is the case for partition between India and Pakistan.

Prior to the independence of both nations in 1947, the fight for self-determination dominated the minds of the inhabitants within the Subcontinent. Possibly, the independence of both countries is the most defining moment for both since their freedom. Manifest in conflicts such as that in Kashmir, as well as the most recent major war known as the Bangladeshi Liberation War of 1971, the effects of partition are clearly still felt to this day. Not only did self-determination shape the future of those residing in the Subcontinent, but it also struck a huge blow to British prestige. Many speak of the partition and its consequences; however, many also do not fully grasp the events which led to the partition. From Gandhi’s Quit India movement in 1942, to Direct Action Day in 1946, I will shed light on key events which occurred shortly before Indian and Pakistani independence. I believe these events were the most pivotal in shaping how the partition played out.

Quit India Movement and the Cripps Mission, 1942

Before the climax of the Second World War in 1945, Indian demands for independence were very much in full swing. In a meeting with Congress in 1942, Gandhi instructed other Indian leaders that it was the perfect time to seize power.He demanded that Britain departs from India and grants independence to the country. Congress would then agree on a peaceful mass movement and passed the “Quit India Resolution”, thus giving birth to the Quit India movement.[1]This was done in response to a failed mission by Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Chancellor at the time. Within the same year, Cripps was sent by Churchill to make terms with the Indian Congress. He offered that if India gives full support for the war effort, Britain will grant India complete independence once the war concluded. Congress overestimated British desperation in the war and rejected. They countered with the demand that India gains instant independence, which Churchill and Lord Linlithgow would not grant.[2] The Cripps mission completely broke down, and this event shows how stern Congress was in demanding immediate independence. By this point, the Indian people were exhausted, and had enough of fighting in the war for the British. This sentiment only intensified when the Japanese were gaining traction during their Southeast Asian conquests and were beginning to encroach on Burma.

Furthermore, Gandhi’s arrest by British authorities increased dissent within the population of the Subcontinent. Particularly in regions such as Bengal, there was a significant upsurge in anti-British sentiment within the rural areas especially. The Quit India Movement of 1942 has been compared by historians to the Great Revolt of 1857 in terms of sheer scale.[3] The arrest of Gandhi and other Congress leaders had also given the more extreme nationalists less restraint. Bolstering their confidence, a violent offensive was launched in what is known as the ‘August Revolution’. Telephone wires were cut, train rails were destroyed, police stations were stormed, and Congress flags were planted on key government offices. Multiple districts were seized and were occupied by the nationalist rebels. An ever-increasing number of peasants had also joined the fray, and uproar against British rule was surging. The government was rapidly losing control of the situation. However, the allies were gaining traction in the war against Japan, and the revolution gradually dwindled up until the end of August.[4]

Failure of the Simla Conference, 1945

Transitioning over to June 1945, the Simla conference was another example of the British failure to maintain their authority over India, and a contributor to their eventual departure. Viceroy Lord Wavell was eager to solve India’s communal and political problems due to World War Two almost concluding. He wanted representatives of India to agree on a national government to resolve disputes particularly between Jinnah’s Muslim League and the Congress. Yet another example of British failure in India, the conference proved unsuccessful. Jinnah had demands for nominations exclusively for members of the Muslim League as ministers. However, when Wavell tried to create a government, himself mainly consisting of Muslim league members, Jinnah rejected this proposal. In response, Wavell created the ‘Breakdown Plan’ which threatened to restrict Pakistan just to Punjab and the Bengal. However, British policy regarding India was indecisive and unclear seeing as Clement Atlee was unhappy with Wavell’s proposals in the Simla conference. He sent a cabinet mission to remedy the situation in India, but due to the unclear decision from Britain’s end, the conference negotiations broke down.[5] The rejection from Jinnah shows that political leaders in India were less willing to entertain British proposals, and aimed to manifest their own ideas of how an independent India should be structured. Therefore, it is evident that increased movements toward independence contributed toward British decolonisation between 1945 and 1970, especially in context of Indian independence.

Increase of Communal Violence: Direct Action Day, 1946

Additionally, the sheer intensity of communal violence within British India had escalated, adding pressure on the British government to decide regarding partition. Under the leadership of Ali Jinnah, the Muslim League called for the ‘Direct Action Day’ in August 1946. Initially meant to be a peaceful demonstration to affirm the demand for a separate Muslim state, it transformed into a massacre in Calcutta in the form of looting, arson and fighting between Muslim and Hindu mobs. Many ordinary people going about their daily lives were killed, beaten, or robbed. This solidified the idea that Muslims and Hindus cannot possibly co-exist in a single state, and potentially unintentionally aided Jinnah’s efforts to create Pakistan. It was a prelude to the partition massacres that would unfold later.[6] Overall, the increase in communal hostility between Muslims and Hindus highlighted Britain’s inability to control the situation in India. It was clear that Britain had been losing authority as was manifested through its ineffective response to the killings.

Mountbatten Plan and Partition, 1947

By 1947, tensions had reached an absolute boiling point. Major cities in Punjab were practically on fire. Gangs walked the streets of various major cities in the region and continuously fired weapons, threw rocks, and set shops on fire. In Bombay, Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh communities became increasingly paranoid regarding approaching each other’s ‘zones’, even when there was a delay in episodic stabbings. Most families had to acquire basic arms and barricade their houses to protect themselves from the raging violence. On the political scale, Jinnah and the Muslim League were still vocal about their demands for a separate state for Muslims, known as Pakistan. Louis Mountbatten was sent to India as the next and final Viceroy to attempt a partition plan.[7] The British administration could barely manage the Indian political situation at the time, and Clement Atlee (Who was then the Prime Minister) famously remarked that British rule would end there “a date not later than June 1948”. Considered to be the champion of Muslim minority rights in India, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was renowned for demanding extra political rights for the Muslims. Hence, this would evolve into a demand for an entirely new state.[8] Mountbatten knew that partition had to occur, as by this point, the idea that Muslims and Hindus could co-exist in one state had long been thrown out due to the sheer intensity of communal violence. Cyril Radcliffe, a British lawyer who had never even visited India, was commissioned with the arduous task of drawing the borders between India and Pakistan. This was to be done purely on religious grounds.[9]Once this was done on August 17, 1947 (two days after the independence of both countries), a massive diaspora would occur. Many refugees and locals would struggle due to this change, and they had to take the perilous journey of migrating to a completely new homeland based on their faith.[10] Thus, the modern states of India and Pakistan were born through bloodshed, diaspora and political turmoil.

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[1] Boissoneault, Lorraine. “The Speech That Brought India to the Brink of Independence”. Smithsonian Magazine. 2017. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/speech-brought-india-brink-independence-180964366/

[2] McLeod, John. “The History of India. Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations.” (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group: 2002.) p 122

[3] Chatterjee, Pranab Kumar. “QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT OF 1942 AND THE NATURE OF URBAN RESPONSE IN BENGAL.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, vol. 43, 1982: 687–94. pp 687-688

[4] Kulke, Hermann and Dietmar Rothermund. “A History of India.” Sixth edition. (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group: 2016). p 251.

[5] Kulke, Hermann and Dietmar Rothermund. “A History of India.” Sixth edition. (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group: 2016). pp 256-257

[6] Khan, Yasmin. “The Great Partition: the making of India and Pakistan”. New edition. (New Haven; London, Yale University Press: 2017). pp 63-66

[7] Khan, Yasmin. “The Great Partition: the making of India and Pakistan”. New edition. (New Haven; London, Yale University Press: 2017). pp 83-87

[8] Philips, Sean. “Why was British India Partitioned in 1947? Considering the role of Muhammad Ali Jinnah” University of Oxford. https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/why-was-british-india-partitioned-in-1947-considering-the-role-of-muhammad-ali-0

[9] Menon, Jisha. “The Performance of Nationalism : India, Pakistan, and the Memory of Partition”. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). p 29

[10] Singh, Amritjit, Iyer, Nalini, and Gairola, Rahul K., editors. “Revisiting India's Partition : New Essays on Memory, Culture, and Politics.” (Blue Ridge Summit: Lexington Books/Fortress Academic, 2016). pp 165-166

India: A Nation since Time Immemorial

In this article, Apeksha Srivastava highlights the territorial and cultural continuity in the idea of India centuries before the British colonized it.

Sir John Strachey on the left with his brother Sir Richard in 1876.

Sir John Strachey, an English civil servant in British India, had said at the University of Cambridge in 1888, “What is India? ... There is no such country, and this is the first and most essential fact about India that can be learned. India is a name, which we give to a great region including a multitude of different countries. There is no general Indian term that corresponds to it.”[1]

Such statements bring us face to face with the Europe of the past times that represented non-western cultures as a series of ‘lacks’ that it supposedly possessed. Since India lacked several progressive qualities, it was the White Man’s Burden to civilize this barbaric, non-white Other. It was upon the British to modernize and unify India for the first time. According to historian David Ludden, “... India was never what it is today in a geographical, demographic, or cultural sense, before 1947”[1].

The Indian Notion of Nation

Providing arguments against this misassumption, Dr. Shonaleeka Kaul [2,3] (Associate Professor, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University) talked about texts like the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, and Mahapuranas (starting 5th century BCE), Chinese pilgrim Xuan Zang, Shankaracharya’s voyages, Greek ambassador Megasthenes, geographer Ptolemy (Roman Empire), the Tamil epic Silappadikaram, astronomer Varahamihira (Brihat-Samhita), Arab traveler Al-Biruni, Mughal historian Abu Fazl (16th century CE), Jain and Tibetan texts. All of them have emphasized a significant territorial and cultural continuity in the idea of India across centuries (Bharata, Bharatvarsha, Yindu, Indu, Indika, Indói, Hind, Jambudvipa [name given by Ashoka], Hindustan, Bharatakshetra, Bharata Khanda, Phags-Yul, [French-Inde; Dutch-Indië]). Their definitions of the Indian notion of nation talk about a vast and diverse land surrounded by lofty mountains and seas/oceans. India has been one entity centuries before the British.

Timeless Indianness

According to some scholars, one of the oldest names associated with the Indian subcontinent was Meluhha. It was mentioned in the Akkadian texts of ancient Mesopotamia in terms of the trade relations of the Harappans (3rd millennium BCE). In the words of archaeologist Jane R. McIntosh, “The imports from Meluha mentioned in Sumerian and Akkadian texts, such as timbers, carnelian, and ivory, match the resources of the Harappan realms.”[4] This timeless Indianness traveled all the way to pre-colonial India, strengthened as one entity. As stated by the Chinese pilgrim Li Daoyuan (527 CE), “From here (Mathura) to the south all (the country) is Middle-India (Madhyadeśa).”[5]. Marco Polo, a Venetian merchant, explorer, and writer who traveled through Asia along the Silk Route in the 1270s, mentioned, “... the great province of Maabar ... a part of the continent of greater India, as it is termed, being the noblest and richest country in the world”[6].

Majestic & Sacred

Turning landmarks into sacred spots have been a powerful device in unifying the idea of India. The strategic placement of a majority of mahā Shaktipīthas and upapīthas across India has broadly identified this nation with the divine body of Sati (the Mother Goddess)[7]. According to the legend, Daksha, Sati’s father, did not invite her to a yagna (religious ceremony). Although her husband, God Shiva, tried to convince her not to go, she went to the ceremony. There, Daksha insulted Shiva in front of her. Unable to bear this, Sati jumped into the sacred fire of the yagna. Later, a livid Shiva carried Sati’s burnt body and roamed around the universe with it, out of grief and sorrow. To prevent the destruction of the universe because of Shiva’s anger, Vishnu used his Sudarshana Chakra (weapon) to cut Sati’s body, parts of which fell on the Indian subcontinent to become sacred sites.

India: A Sacred Geography by Diana Eck “investigates a particular idea of India that is shaped ... by the extensive and intricate interrelation of geography and mythology that has produced this vast landscape of tīrthas ... at least 2000 years old, ... enacted in the practice of pilgrimage for many centuries”[1]. The Chār Dhām (visiting these four pilgrimage sites in India is believed to help achieve salvation), Kumbhamela (celebrated approximately every 12 years at four river-bank pilgrimage places in India), 12 Jyotirlingas (devotional representations of god Shiva), Sapta puri (seven holy pilgrimage centers in India), and others trace Bharatavarsha way before the British. The Bhārāta Mātā Temples in Varanasi (1936) and Hardvār (1983) contain maps of India, indicating its holy places. Above the Hardvār-temple map is the image of Mother India (the Nation’s Goddess). Radhakumud Mookerji, an Indian historian and a noted Indian nationalist during British colonial rule, associated the Rigveda (dated roughly between 1500–1000 BCE) river hymns with the “first national conception of Indian unity such as it was.” Furthermore, there are several overlaps and intersects between India’s Hindu and Muslim sacred landscapes. The Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and Christians also developed several shrines in India over centuries, emphasizing the religious unanimity of this land.

Unity & Pluralism: Two Sides of a Coin

According to the British ethnographer and colonial administrator, Sir Herbert Hope Risley, “underlying uniformity of life from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, there is in fact an Indian character, a general Indian personality, which we cannot resolve into its component elements”[8]. In India, unity and pluralism are inseparable. This aspect is visible today on Indian currency notes containing several scripts, the national emblem (an adaptation of the Lion Capital of Ashoka from 280 BCE), postage stamps with images of stupas (hemispherical structures containing relics of Buddhist monks or nuns), and other artifacts. These diverse ancient symbols denote a unified India for us.

Trees have also defined India since times immemorial. There are references to it since the Indus Civilization. According to the Puranas, the Bargad or banyan tree, native to the Indian subcontinent, symbolizes the Trimūrti: Gods Brahma (roots), Vishnu (bark), and Shiva (branches)[9]. The tree represents longevity and fertility. Married women celebrate the Vat-Savitri vrat, a religious ritual involving Banyan worship, for their husbands’ long and prosperous life in several regions of India. Buddhist scriptures mention its self-arising nature comparable to the way kāma overcomes humans [10]. Alexander was amazed to see this tree, during his plunder journey in India, that provided shelter to his large army of 7,000 men [11]. Ayurveda talks about its medicinal properties. Banyan trees offer a vast canopy of leaves that block out the sun and have been serving as natural meeting places in many Indian villages for a very long time. Today, the Banyan is the national tree of India, unifying the past and present. 

The idea of India is ancient. It is a diverse thought unified by one consciousness. Although not exactly the same in boundaries and concepts during different times, there seems to be a lot in common about this notion of India as a nation held by various religions, residents, foreign travelers, and chroniclers. The Indian concept of oneness has time and time again embraced that vast diversity, which some people thought would never let India be united as one entity.

You can read more from Apeksha on feminine national personification in the UK, India, and France here.

Apeksha Srivastava completed her Master’s degree from the Indian Institute of Technology Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India. She is currently an aspiring writer and a second-year Ph.D. student at this institute. This article is from an assignment she submitted for the semester-long course, Perspectives on Indian Civilization.

References

1.     Eck, D. L. (2012). India: A sacred geography. Harmony.

2.     The New Indian Express. The Idea of India: A Historical Corrective. Retrieved on 18 January 2022.

3.     The New Indian Express. The Idea of India: A Historical Corrective-II. Retrieved on 18 January 2022.

4.     The Indian Express. From Meluha to Hindustan, the many names of India and Bharat. Retrieved on 19 January 2022.

5.     Sen, T. (2006). The travel records of Chinese pilgrims Faxian, Xuanzang, and Yijing. Education about Asia, 11(3), 24-33.

6.     Polo, M. (1854). The Travels of Marco Polo the Venetian: The Translation of Marsden Revised with a Selection of His Notes(No. 33). Bohn.

7.     The New Indian Express. Motherlodes of Power: The story of India's 'Shakti Peethas.' Retrieved on 19 January 2022.

8.     Risley, H., & Crooke, W. (1999). The people of India. Asian Educational Services.

9.     Cultural India. National Tree. Retrieved on 19 January 2022.

10.  KÛLAVAGGA. (5) SÛKILOMASUTTA. Retrieved from https://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/sbe10/sbe1034.htm.

11.  Varanasi, S., & Narayana, A. (2007). Medico-historical review of Nyagrŏdha (Ficus bengalensis Linn.). Bulletin of the Indian Institute of History of Medicine (Hyderabad), 37(2), 167–178.

The Modern Military History of India: Part 2 - The 1961 Battle of Mormugao Harbour

India’s military history is rich, long and storied yet there is criminally little written about it and it is hideously ignored in many debates on military history of the 19th century. This perhaps is because Indians themselves know very little about what the Indian Army did in the years between 1858 and 1910. In these few decades, the Indian Army became one of the most combat experienced forces in the world as it fought alongside the British Army from Egypt to Afghanistan. The Indian Army (though officially known as the British Indian Army, it was always referred to as the Indian Army), which was already one of the most professional and most well-equipped forces in the world, by the time the Great War rolled around, had become arguably the single most experienced armed force in the world alongside the British Army.

Siddhant A. Joshi continues his series of the modern military history of India by looking at The Battle of Mormugao Harbour in 1961, which was a battle between the Indian Army and Portugal. At the time, Portugal still held Goa, India as a colony.

You can read part 1 on the Indian Campaigns of 1897 and the Bravery of the Sikh Infantry here.

The NRP Afonso de Albuquerque. Source: Chanthujohnson, available here.

The names INS Betwa and NRP Afonso de Albuquerque mean nothing to most people and yet these two ships, pawns on the chessboard of a small and historically insignificant war1, became the forgotten sentries of a now dead era. On the 18thof December 1961 – one day into the Indian attack on the Portuguese colony of Goa – the NRP Afonoso de Albuquerque would spot the vanguard of the Indian Navy’s carrier force, led by the frigate INS Betwa, and – unbeknownst to the crew of either vessel – they would both make history.

1961, in many ways, saw the completion of India. It would mark the culmination of India’s effort to rid itself of the past and begin anew. In the years previous and immediately following independence in 1947, India set about trying to carve its own, fresh identity. This meant complete unification of the new nation. In 1947 it invaded and annexed the small kingdom of Junagadh in modern day Gujarat, in 1948 it annexed the Kingdom of Hyderabad in modern day Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. In 1954 it took the small Portuguese colony of Dadra and Nagar Haveli.

A nation

By the end of the 1950s, the newborn Republic of India had – for the most part – united itself into one cohesive nation. The Portuguese colony of Goa, the now famous holiday destination on India’s western coast, stuck out like a sore thumb.

Initially, India wanted to avoid invasion and confrontation at all cost since it wanted to keep international favor for which it could not be seen as an aggressor and because, it must be mentioned, Portugal was very much a part of NATO. The effort to annex Goa had been for a decade (1950-1960) entirely diplomatic with moves such as the introduction of visa restrictions which made it almost impossible for Portuguese Goans to enter India and ending consular services in the colony. By 1961, however, it had become evident that Portugal was not going to let Goa go without a fight. The Portuguese army mistakenly shelled an Indian ferry vessel believing it to be a landing craft in November of that year. That, many people believe, was the straw that broke the camel’s back.

In December, India invaded and within 3 days the Portuguese would surrender. There would be no NATO outcry, no shouting at the UN, no international condemnation. The 3-day war would become part of the footnotes of history. And yet, NRP Afonso de Albuquerque and the squadron led by INS Betwa would fight the last of a dead form of battle – the last ship-to-ship exchange of cannon fire.

 

The 2 Forces in Comparison – 1961

There was, from the offset and in every field, a massive disparity between the Portuguese and the Indians. The Portuguese had a total of 5,000 military and police personnel – barely the size of an Indian infantry brigade. While their native infantry, native marines and Portuguese infantry were well trained and well equipped, their police personnel were simply not up to the task. They also had no combat experience and for many this would be their first fight.

The Indians on the other hand showed up with the 17th Infantry Division and the 50th Parachute Brigade – some 45,000 in all. The Indian Air Force had attached to these, 20 English Electric Canberra B(I) heavy bombers and over 20 different state-of-the-art fighter and attack aircraft. Crucially, the Indian troops were extremely well trained, extremely well equipped and – most importantly – highly experienced with every single high-ranking officer having fought in World War 2 and the first Indo-Pakistan War.

This disparity, which lent itself to the obvious result, extended very heavily to naval forces as well. The Portuguese had 3 light patrol boats reinforced by the light frigate NRP Afonso de Albuquerque. The Indian Navy, on the other hand, had mobilized the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and her escort force which consisted of 2 cruisers, 1 destroyer, 8 frigates and 4 minesweepers.

While the aircraft carrier saw almost no action, its forward screening vessels did. INS Delhi, one of the cruisers, shelled Diu Fortress in the opening hours of the invasion. INS Mysore, the second cruiser, and INS Trishul, one of the frigates, launched an amphibious assault on Anjidiv Fort and supported the Indian marines with sustained firing on the island-fort. But, apart from INS Delhi opening fire with her machine guns on a Portuguese patrol boat, none of the Indian vessels encountered any naval resistance – except when INS Betwa and INS Beas, both of which were Leopard Class frigates, sailed into the entrance of Mormugao Harbour where they would find the PNR Afonso de Albuquerque.

The Leopard Class vs the Afonso de Albuqeurque – Technical Comparison

The two vessels were horribly mismatched. The Leopard Class frigates were modern, radar armed and extremely reliable vessels. The Afonso de Albuquerque was, by 1961, almost 30 years old – having been commissioned into service in 1934. In comparison, the Betwa and Beas were just a year old, having been ordered in 1954 and commissioned in 1960. Afonso had no radar and her 120mm guns, although she had 4 of them, were old and clunky.

In comparison, the Indian vessels were armed with modern NATO standard radar systems, the brand spanking new QF 4.5-inch Mk.6 naval guns and, significantly, an experienced and well-trained crew.

The 4 120mm cannons of the Portuguese vessel, though of a larger caliber than the Indian (120 as opposed to 113), fired only 2 rounds per minute (some sources say 5). The QF 4.5- inch Mk.6 fired 16-24 per minute (depending on if they were hand loaded or power loaded). The shells the Portuguese fired were of World War 1 vintage and their fuses were unreliable. The Indian shells were far superior with excellent fuses.

The nearly 50-year-old Portuguese cannons were also horribly inaccurate. The QF 4.5-inch Mk.6 was lethally accurate.

By the time the Indian vessels were spotted by the Afonso, she had been given orders to act as a radio station, relaying messages back and forth, and nothing more. She had not spotted the Indian squadron approaching and when she did see the Indian vessels, they had already positioned themselves on either side of her and were waiting for orders to open fire.

But, NRP Afonso de Albuquerque, with everything against her, chose not to go quietly into the night. When she was asked to surrender by INS Beas, she quietly weighed anchor, slipped her moorings and headed out to fight.

The Battle of Mormugao Harbour – 70 Minutes of Glory

By 1100hrs on the 18th of December, the Indian frigates had entered the harbor and had blocked the only way in and out. NRP Afonso de Albuquerque had very little room left in which to maneuver. At 1200hrs, INS Beas fired warning shots across the bow of the NRP Afonso de Albuquerque and transmitted requests for surrender.

It must also be mentioned that just a few minutes before the request for surrender, IAF aircraft had bombed port facilities at Mormugao Harbour and the psychological effects of air strikes against which the Portuguese could do nothing must not be ignored. Everybody onboard knew this was an unwinnable fight. That the enemy could hit them from the air. That they were outnumbered, outclassed and outgunned. That they had no room left, no way to escape, nowhere to run. They knew that, should they surrender, no one would blame them.

Yet, at about 1202hrs, NRP Afonso de Albuquerque fired back and thus begun the Battle of Mormugao Harbour – the final vestige of a bygone era. Within the first minute, the crippling fire superiority of the Indian vessels became obvious as Afonso struggled to keep up with their rate of fire. Her old guns also failed her in the relatively long ranges of combat (7,500yd or almost 7km/4miles) where they struggled to hit the Indian vessels while the accurate Indian guns did not struggle whatsoever and scored hit after hit.2

In fact, the damage done to the superstructure of Afonso is plainly visible at https://laststandonzombieisland.com/tag/afonso-de-albuquerque/ where they have some excellent photographs of the battle (which, unfortunately, I cannot use here due to copyright reasons).

The first casualties came at 1215hrs when Afonso took a direct hit to the bridge, injuring the weapons officer. All the while, Afonso attempted to close the range and return fire. It is unclear how close she was to her opponents when she took her first KIA when, at 1225hrs, another direct hit killed the radio officer and severely wounded her commander, Captain António da Cunha Aragão. In the same salvo, her propulsion and steering system was heavily damaged and it was becoming increasingly clear to the crew of the ship that they would not be able to close the distance to the Indian vessels.

Within 10 minutes of this salvo, at 1235hrs, Afonso swung 180 degrees (it is not known whether to port or starboard) and ran herself aground at Bambolim Beach. From here, she would continue to fire on the Indian frigates. At some point now, the Sergeant-in-Charge of Signals disobeyed a direct order from Captain Aragão and ordered the white flag to be raised.

However, as per the official Portuguese records, ‘But as no one had actually given the order to surrender, the flag was lowered again. The flag was not seen by any means by the Indians because of the windy and smoky conditions.’3

By 1250hrs, the fate of the ship had been sealed. She had lost 5 of her crew and 13 injured. She had fired between 350 and 400 shells and any damage on the Indian vessels had been negligible at best. The order was given to abandon ship. Once again, per official Portuguese records ‘Most of the personnel complied with the order to abandon ship, while the fire from the Indian ships continued, reaching the ship and the surrounding area, with the clear intention of hitting the men who were already on the bank.’4

By 1310hrs, the ship had been abandoned. The Battle of Mormugao Harbour was officially over and with it, the book finally closed on the story of naval shot and shell.

In Conclusion

The small 3-day-long Indian campaign in Goa saw a lot of firsts for South Asia. It marked the first time a South Asian navy used an aircraft carrier, the famous INS Vikrant, in combat operations – regardless of the fact that the carrier and her air wing did not actually see combat. It marked the first use of a jet bomber by a South Asian nation in combat when IAF Canberra bombers struck the airport at Panjim. It marked India’s first amphibious operation – the storming of Anjidiv Fort.

It is fitting then that it should also see the last battle of a bygone era. Perhaps it is poetic as well. You see, NRP Afonso de Albuquerque was named after Afonso de Albuquerque who was a Portuguese general that, in 1510, conquered Goa for the Portuguese crown. The vessel named after the man who conquered Goa struck down on the day that Goa is made free. The world has a funny way of righting itself.

What do you think of the Battle of Mormugao Harbour? Let us know below.

1 I must here mention, coming from a military family, that no war is insignificant no matter how small it is. It has a profound and very long-lasting effect on the people that fight it and the people that are directly affected by it. That being said, the 1961 Indian Annexation/Invasion of Goa was a war that was historically insignificant

– i.e it achieved nothing of historical importance, did not swing the fate of countries or continents, but merely liberated a small Portuguese Colonial enclave.

2 https://laststandonzombieisland.com/tag/afonso-de-albuquerque/

3 https://web.archive.org/web/20150317124204/http://www.areamilitar.net/DIRECTORIO/NAV.aspx?nn=128 ‘Entretanto o Sargento de sinais terá dado ordem para que fosse içada uma bandeira branca, o que foi feito. Mas como na realidade ninguém tinha dado ordem de rendição, a bandeira voltou a ser arriada. A bandeira não foi de qualquer das formas avistada pelos indianos por causa das condições de vento e fumo.’, translated by Google Translate

4 https://web.archive.org/web/20150317124204/http://www.areamilitar.net/DIRECTORIO/NAV.aspx?nn=128 ‘A maioria do pessoal cumpre a ordem de abandonar o navio, enquanto o fogo dos navios indianos continua, a atingir o navio e a área circundante, no claro propósito de atingir os homens que já se encontravam na margem.’, translated by Google Translate

The Modern Military History of India: Part 1 - The Indian Campaigns of 1897 and the Bravery of the Sikh Infantry

India’s military history is rich, long and storied yet there is criminally little written about it and it is hideously ignored in many debates on military history of the 19th century. This perhaps is because Indians themselves know very little about what the Indian Army did in the years between 1858 and 1910. In these few decades, the Indian Army became one of the most combat experienced forces in the world as it fought alongside the British Army from Egypt to Afghanistan. The Indian Army (though officially known as the British Indian Army, it was always referred to as the Indian Army), which was already one of the most professional and most well-equipped forces in the world, by the time the Great War rolled around, had become arguably the single most experienced armed force in the world alongside the British Army.

Siddhant A. Joshi starts his series of the modern military history of India by looking at Indian Campaigns of 1897 and the Bravery of the Sikh Infantry.

Subadars (Sikhs) and Gunners (Punjabi Muslims) in the 1890s..

Introduction

Since the British and Indian Armies rarely fought alone, the technologies, techniques and tactics used by either one of them became commonplace in both. Not only that, but their military history also became inextricably interlinked and both armies developed processes that were born of their shared experience – processes and doctrines and traditions that stand to this day. The British Army commemorates the many contributions, sacrifices and stories of Indian soldiers with just as many memorials to Indians as there are to Brits. The Indian Army too does the same and has, in fact, kept many units that were raised by the British.

However, not many outside the armed forces know of this. That is the aim of this – to bring to light that which should long ago have been known.

The Frontier Campaign – Beginnings

To understand this little-known campaign, one must first understand an area of the Indian Subcontinent that was then called the North West Frontier Province or the NWFP. It was an area that had formed just south of the intersection of the Karakorum and Pamir Mountains and just north of the Hindu Kush Mountains and had long been used as a gateway for invasions since it stood between mountains that have been impassable for large armies for centuries. It quickly became the frontier of British India – lands ungoverned by any state and occupied only by tribes of armed Pashtuns.

It was the natural path into India from Afghanistan and its existence posed a threat to the existence of British Rule in India for one reason alone – the Great Game. During this period, the Russians and the British were playing a long-running and high-stakes chess match in Afghanistan for control of the country. Whoever controlled Afghanistan would control not only India’s North Western border but Russia’s southern border.

Afghanistan quickly became the linchpin for the two powers’ plans and prospects in Asia. And, sure as the sun rises every day, one of the most important chess pieces became the North Western Frontier Province. And, in the NWFP there stood a mountain pass – the infamous Khyber Pass –which was of immense strategic value in safeguarding the approach into the subcontinent (a value it still holds!). To guard this pass, the British had recruited a small regiment composed entirely of Pashtun Tribesmen from the neighbouring Tirah and Malakand regions since they knew the land the best.

However, Tirah itself was not of much importance. Colonel T. H. Holdich, writing a few months after the end of hostilities in the campaign, says ‘It is a species of cul de sac, possessing little or no strategic value.’[1] And Malakand was much the same.

If that were true, why did the British and Indians spend months fighting the tribesmen of the regions and mobilise well over 100,000 troops for the cause? It is simple. The tribes guarding the Khyber Pass revolted, attacked their own men and took up positions all along the Khyber. While of utmost importance was the Khyber Pass, securing it was of no use unless the rebellion was put down.

The Frontier Campaign – 1897-1898

‘Our little wars attract far less attention among the people of this country than they deserve. They are frequently carried out in circumstances of the most adverse kind. Our enemies, although ignorant of military discipline, are, as a rule, extremely brave and are thoroughly capable of using the natural advantages of their country.’ These were words written by author G. A. Henty when describing the Tirah and Malakand Offensives.[2]

Neville Chamberlain (yes, that Neville Chamberlain) wrote on the matter and Winston Churchill (yes, that Winston Churchill) was a young Second Lieutenant in the campaign and he too wrote on the matter extensively. It is their works that the remaining part of this article will rely upon.

The thing that is of utmost importance to understand is that the Tirah Campaign was one part of a larger conflict referred to as the ‘Frontier Matter’ by Churchill, with the entire conflict revolving around suppressing tribal rebellions in the NFWP. The Tirah Campaign which was an offensive against the Afridi tribes would take place simultaneously with the offensives against Pashtun tribes in Malakand and the offensive against the Mohamand tribes.

To tackle these rebellions, the Indian Army set up 2 distinct forces – the Tirah Field Force and the Malakand Field Force.

Composition of British Indian Forces

1.     Tirah Field Force - General William Lockhart, KCB[3]

a.     1st Division – Brigadier General William Symons

                                               i.     1st Brigade
- 2nd Bn The Derbyshire Regiment
- 1st Bn The Devonshire Regiment
- 2nd/1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 30th (Punjab) Regiment 
- No. 6 British Field Hospital
- No. 34 Native Field Hospital

                                             ii.     2nd Brigade
- 2nd Bn The Yorkshire Regiment
- 1st Bn Royal West Surrey Regiment
- 2nd Bn 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry
- Sections A, B No. 8 British Field Hospital
- Sections A, C No. 14 British Field Hospital
- No. 51 Native Hospital

                                            iii.     Divisional Troops
- Gurkha Scouts
- No. 1 Mountain Battery 
- No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery 
- No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery
- 18th Regiment Bengal Lancers
- 28th Regiment, Bombay Infantry (Pioneers)
- Two companies, Bombay Sappers and Miners
- Karpurthala Regiment
- Maler Kotla Imperial Service Sappers
- No. 13 British Field Hospital
- No. 63 Native Field Hospital

b.     2nd Division – Major General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs

                                               i.     3rd Brigade
- 1st Bn The Gordon Highlanders
- 1st Bn The Dorsetshire Regiment
- 1st Bn 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 15th (The Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment
- No. 24 British Field Hospital
- No. 44 Native Field Hospital

                                             ii.     4th Brigade
- 2nd Bn, The King's Own Scottish Borderers
- 1st Bn The Northamptonshire Regiment
- 1st Bn 3rd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment
- 36th (Sikh) Regiment Of Bengal Infantry
- Sections C, D No. 9 Field Hospital
- Sections A, B No, 23 British Field Hospital
- No. 48 Native Field Hospital

                                            iii.     Divisional Troops
- No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery
- No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery
- No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery
- Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers
- 18th Regiment Bengal Lancers
- 21st Regiment Of Madras Infantry (Pioneers)
- No. 4 Company Madras Sappers And Miners
- Jhind Regiment 
- Sirmur Sappers
- Section B Of No. 13 British Field Hospital
- No. 43 Native Field Hospital

2.     Malakand Field Force – Major General Bindon Blood[4]

a.     The MFF had no divisions

b.     1st Brigade
- Royal West Kent Regiment
- Highland Light Infantry
- 31st Punjab Infantry
- 24th Punjab Infantry
- 45th Sikhs
- No. 7 Mountain Battery

c.     2nd Brigade
- The Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment)
- 35th Sikhs
- 38th Dogras
- Guides Infantry
- 4 Company Bengal Sappers
- No. 7 Mountain Battery

d.     3rd Brigade
- The Queen’s Regiment
- 22nd Punjab Infantry
- 39th Punjab Infantry
- 3 Company Bombay Sappers
- No. 1 Mountain Battery

e.     Cavalry
- 11th Bengal Lancers

 

The Tirah Field Force – Bravery of the Sikh Troops

To get to Tirah, the Force had to march through demanding terrain and the feats of bravery in combat and mountaineering of the Indian Army have been well recorded. In one instance, some 250 men of an unspecified Indian artillery regiment were told to move their guns across a mountain pass. G. A. Henty, referencing the event, describes it as a ‘splendid feat’ when the 250 Indians led by 2 British officers brought the guns by hand (their horses having gone lame or died) through the mountain pass in just a few days through immensely deep snow.

In another incident, Chamberlain describes an attack by two unspecified Indian infantry brigades on a ridgeline (Dagrai Heights) thought to be impregnable on October 18, 1897. It took the two brigades a few hours to link up but when they did, it was found that they had only taken 9 or 10 casualties. He describes also the action of 3 regiments on October 20, 1897 – the Gordon Highlanders, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and the 15th Sikhs whom he credits with saving a retirement of an infantry brigade from an overwhelming counterattack by the tribesmen saying ‘the retirement was only saved from being a disaster by the coolness under fire of those fine regiments’. 

It is here worth noting that the 15th Sikhs and the Gordons had taken heavy losses in a surprise attack that very day suffering some 250 casualties among them. [5]

In another instance of bravery and complete dominance by Indian troops, a Sikh battalion was given the order to secure another height from the tribesmen. Led by a Punjabi officer with a British 2IC (2nd in Command), the Battalion overwhelmed the enemy position though they were outnumbered 5 to 1.

The Malakand Field Force – Sikh Troops Shine Again

Churchill[6] – known for his admiration of Indian and ANZAC troops in WW2 – narrates an amazing incident where a 62-man Sikh unit was surrounded and outnumbered by the enemy. The only nearby friendly force, some British cavalry, was unable to breakthrough and rescue the Sikhs. It appears that having accepted death, the bugle sounded charge and the outnumbered men rose out of their positions and – swords drawn – charged the pathans (general word for Afghan tribesmen). Not expecting this, the pathans simply ran for no known reason and the small Sikh unit cut down hundreds of the retreating Pathans.

Churchill also describes in detail the actions of a company of the 35th Sikhs which, during a defence, had become surrounded by the pathans. With the assistance of a squadron of cavalry, the Sikh troops of the 35th broke the encirclement and drove the vastly outnumbering Pathans into a small mountainous gulley where they were massacred by the Sikhs and the cavalry.

Henty, regarding the Malakand Campaign, relays the famous story of the handful of men from the 36th Sikhs that defended Fort Saragarhi against 10,000 tribesmen. However, that story deserves its own article!

 

In Conclusion

First things first; while I have only discussed Sikh troops here, they by no means were the only brave soldiers. They were simply the ones I chose to focus on. Many different regiments were named and many soldiers were equally as brave. Secondly, the point of this article, as ever, is simply to shine a light on that which was not known and to exemplify the bravery of those unsung heroes.

What do you think of the Indian Campaigns of 1897? Let us know below.

[1] Col. T. H. Holdich, ‘Tirah’, The Geographical Journal, 12:4 (October, 1898)

[2] G. A. Henty, A Story of Chitral, Tirah and Ashantee (Blackie and Son; London, 1904)

[3] https://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armycampaigns/indiancampaigns/tirah.htm

[4] Churchill’s work

[5] Neville Chamberlain, ‘The Tirah Campaign’, Fortnightly Review, 63:375 (March, 1898)

[6] Winston Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (Longmans; London, 1898)

The Partition of India and the World’s Largest Forced Migration

The 1947 Partition of India followed the end of British rule in India. It divided India up to a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan. Here, Rezaul Karim Reza explains how this happened and the long-term implications.

A refugee train traveling to Punjab in Pakistan.

Whenever I pay a visit to Hili, the nearest border that divides India and Bangladesh, I kick the dirt below my boot, and inculpate the British lawyer, Cyril Radcliffe who drew the lines that divided India in 1947. The partition now does not allow me to meet the people who speak the same language, wear the same clothes, and smell the same air in Bengal. 

Although I criticize Cyril Radcliffe mostly, it was not actually Radcliffe alone to demarcate India. It was the then British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and the last Viceroy of India, Mountbatten. And it was the Indian politicians - Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

The End of the British Raj 

Britain faced financial hardship and lack of resources to control its overextended empire in India in 1947, just after the end of WWII, when British Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided to end the two hundred year long British colonial rule in India. Attlee sent Mountbatten as the last Viceroy of India, where he would soon transfer power to the Indian leaders. 

By then, people in the subcontinent came to know that the British were leaving, and they were going to be free soon. But a fear and suspicion swept through the Indian Muslim community, a sizable minority in the region. They thought that they would be discriminated and tortured under the Hindu dominant India, so they wanted a separate country. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of Indian Muslim League, a political party established in 1906, took this opportunity. He urged the Muslims to unite for a separate country. His focus ultimately shifted on creating ‘Pakistan.’

On the other hand, the Hindus disliked the idea of breaking up India. Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the leaders of the Indian National Congress, which was established in 1885, disagreed with the Muslims. The disagreement between the two party leaders and the contradiction among the people resulted in violent riots and clashes between Hindus and Muslims. One such brutal clash occurred in Calcutta, the capital of the British Indian province of Bengal in 1946.

The Great Calcutta Killing

‘The Great Calcutta Killing’ or ‘The Direct Action Day’ turned the city of Calcutta into war-ravaged havoc in 1946. Corpses strewn, houses burnt, and businesses vandalized. The Muslims attacked the Hindus and the Hindus the Muslims. They abducted, raped, and killed underage girls, young ladies, and old women in broad daylight. During the four day –long violence, the death toll was between 5,000 and 10,000, with 15,000 wounded. After Calcutta, the riot passed through many other major cities across India, including Mumbai, Delhi, and Lucknow. The Hindu – Muslim riot shook the British and they thought Partition was inevitable. So, Mountbatten decided to declare ‘Partition’ and leave India in 1947, a year before planned, thinking the more they waited, the more disagreements arose.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was happy with partition, hoping to be prime minister of newly created ‘Pakistan.’ Jawaharlal Nehru reluctantly agreed. Gandhi disagreed but it was too late because the British were in a hurry. Now, the leaders were ready to make partition happen. Mountbatten called upon Radcliffe to divide the country upon religious demography.

Radcliffe had little idea about India. He did not know anything of Bengal and Punjab. Yet, a man of such inexperience was given only five weeks to draw a map that eventually displaced millions of people. From the outdated maps and census data, he drew the map dividing Muslim majority Pakistan and Hindu majority India. But his pen cut through two key provinces of British India - Bengal and Punjab.

Divide Bengal and Punjab

Muslim majority East Bengal (Bangladesh today) joined Pakistan and the Hindu majority West Bengal went with India. In the Punjab, Sikh and Hindu majority East Punjab joined India while the Muslim majority West Punjab went with Pakistan. Now the so-called borders were set, creating two new countries – India and Pakistan. But, all of a sudden, a mass migration shook the two countries.

Forced Migration

Ethnic cleansing, arson, riots, looting, vandalism – fresh violence erupted across India and Pakistan. People started moving. Villagers started selling up and moving on. They were moving with their cattle, cats, and clothes. Women were moving with their babies in their laps and men with their belongings packed in sacks on their soldiers. Some peaceful Hindus and Muslims hugged each other and shook hands. Tears rolled down their cheeks. They said good-bye to their century old parental houses for a destination unknown. A desperate journey began. The peaceful unpaved country roads suddenly turned into migrant roads. They were all moving – Hindus to India and Muslims to Pakistan.

The displaced migrants walked on foot, rode in bullock carts, and travelled by trains. Many people walked for days and weeks to reach their unknown destiny. During the desperate journey, children starved to death, while old people coughed frequently and stopped breathing suddenly.  People died and dead bodies scattered by roadside ditches were torn apart by vultures. 

They became homeless overnight and found their shacks in the refugee camps. Diseases soon swept across those unhealthy camps and the death toll soared. The partition displaced about 15 million people, killed more than 1 million, and thousands of women were abducted and raped. Besides the brutal British legacy of ‘Divide and Rule,’ the partition kept India and Pakistan in a long-term enmity that has resulted in three major wars between the two countries. 

War

One such war broke out in 1971 when Bangladesh was eventually created in East Pakistan, some 1,200 miles from West Pakistan. Now, Bangladesh borders India. Despite having strong ties, and lasting friendship, Indian border security forces killed their Bangladeshi counterparts. The victims ranged from cattle traders to smugglers and innocent civilians. Once a friend, India is now a foe to many people in Bangladesh, especially to those who are living in the border areas.   

Prior to the Bangladesh War, India and Pakistan had two more major wars in Kashmir. Radcliffe did not draw a map for Kashmir because the Kashmiri, unlike many other Princely States, wanted to be an independent country. But it failed to be so and the dispute over Kashmir sparked tension that resulted in the first Indo –Pak War in 1947, just after the partition, and the second one in 1965.

Although the two countries have maintained a ceasefire since 2003, border skirmishes create panic among the people on both sides frequently. The legacy of the British Raj has now created enmity among the three countries – India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. 

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

Rezaul is a substitute English teacher, a history enthusiast, and a freelance contributor based in Rangpur, Bangladesh. His works have appeared in the Christian Science Monitor and Reader’s Digest. 

The First Indian Mughal Emperor: Babur, Descendant of the Mongols

The Mughals have left an undeniable imprint upon the Indian landscape; their legacy is seen in the form of culture, architecture and art. Their rule lasted for more than 300 years, from 1526 to 1857. There have been a whole brood of Mughal emperors, but none stood out as much as the first six, the creators of the Mughal legacy. Many of their descendants would take advantage of the riches and power that they had inherited. However, infighting among them paved the way for other princes and ultimately the British to take control.

The one who started it all was a warlord with some Mongol ancestry, Babur. Throughout his life, he faced constant threats from all around him. It was his past experience that helped him achieve victory in future battles and seize the land of Hindustan (India). In the first of a series on the early Mughal emperors, Khadija Tauseef explains.

You can also read Khadija’s first article for the site on Lahore Fort here.

A 17th century depiction of Babur.

Royal Beginnings

Babur was born in 1483, and his father, Umar Shaykh, was a direct descendant of Timur, and his mother was the daughter of Yunus Khan, a descendant of Chingiz Khan. So, from the start one could say that he had warrior’s blood flowing through his veins. At the tender age twelve, Babur’s father passed away. Thus, in June 1494, Babur inherited the province of Ferghana, a small but fertile province around modern-day Uzbekistan. Soon a threat emerged for control of Ferghana, not by outsiders but by his own Timurid-Mongol uncles who wished to seize power from their young nephew. For ten years Babur was consumed by constant warfare. His was a turbulent life, never knowing if he would live to see the next day. At the age of 19 he wrote:

“…I endured such hardship and misery. I had no realm—and no hope of any realm…I had had all I could take of homelessness and alienation. ‘With such difficulties,’ I said to myself, ‘it would be better to go off on my own so long as I am alive, and with such deprivation and wretchedness [wander] wherever my, feet will carry me, even to the ends of the earth.’” (Fisher, 2015)

In the end, Babur lost his throne and travelled to Kabul, where he seized control, and it became his stronghold. Then in 1505, Babur journeyed into India, for the first time; traversing through Kohat and Bannu. Accompanying Babur was a small force, who aided him in fighting against the Afghans; Babur later wrote that the Afghans surrendered to him ‘with grass between their teeth’. Babur seemed to have inherited certain traits from his Mongolian ancestors. “Babur upheld Timur’s tradition of constructing towers with the skulls of vanquished enemies on these occasions” (Schimmel, 2004).

After returning from India, Babur decided to visit his distant uncle, Husayn Bayqara, in Herat for the first time in 1506. For the next few years, Babur spent time preparing an army to march on India. Initially the campaigns into India were primarily pillaging raids; however, this changed in 1519, after the birth of his son Hindal, a name that means ‘Take India’. Babur saw this as a good omen and his excursions into India intensified. At the time of Babur’s conquest, India was a divided country; various princes were vying for control, so they were weak against an outside invader.

India

Babur’s advance into India increased gradually. Until in 1526, Babur faced off against the army of Ibrahim Lodhi, at the battlefield of Panipat. An army of 1,500 well-trained soldiers faced of against the massive forces of the Lodhi prince. Despite the odds against him, Babur remained undaunted, because he had something that his adversary lacked - firearms. Babur’s men were equipped with matchlocks and field artillery firearms, which easily broke though the cavalry charges of the Lodhi Army. After a fierce battle Babur’s forces emerged victorious, and the death of Ibrahim Lodhi and many of his important nobles allowed Babur to take over Delhi unchallenged. Seizing the royal palaces and treasury, the riches were used to fund further expeditions and keep his soldiers happy.

Once the battle was over, Babur travelled to Delhi in order to visit the mausoleums of two holy men; the Chishti master Nizamuddin Auliya (died in 1325) and his predecessor, Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki (died 1235). After paying his respects Babur turned his focus to improving his newly acquired territory. He ordered the construction of gardens that included cascading fountains and a hamam (a public Islamic bath) – even though Babur and his soldiers were not great admirers of the hot Indian weather and craved the cool land of Kabul. 

However, Babur’s control of India was filled with problems. Rana Sangha enthroned another Lodhi prince in order to seize back Delhi. They went up against Babur at Khanwa in 1527, where Babur won another decisive victory. He was able to defeat the most powerful Hindu prince of the region and thus adopted the title of Ghazi—fighter for the faith. He travelled to Agra where he established his base, leaving Delhi behind. It is also said that while Babur had been visiting Gwalior, the sight of the naked Jain Holy men, greatly disturbed him. 

Babur also ordered the construction of a route from Agra to Kabul that included markings along the route; this may have been done as a sign to show his possession of India.

Gone too soon

Once Babur had assumed control of India, he devoted most of his time to his family, but this peaceful time was short lived. Soon, his favorite son, Humayun, fell gravely ill and everyone feared that he would not be able to survive. It was then that Babur performed a ritual in which he prayed while circling his bed seven times. He prayed that his son be cured, and the illness possess him instead. His wish was granted as Humayun got better and Babur’s condition worsened - the father gave his life so that his son could live.  

On the December 26, 1530, Babur died aged forty-six. Although most of his life had been consumed with fighting, there was more to him than just being a warrior; he was also a scholar and a man of letters. Much of our knowledge regarding his reign comes from his own memoirs, the Baburnama.

“For Babur was also a man of letters, whose works on the metre of Persian poetry, on Hanafi law and other themes are important works of Chaghatay-Turkish. He even invented his own form of writing, the khatt-i baburi” (Schimmel, 2004).

Many are left wondering how much more he could have achieved had he lived, but more than an emperor or conqueror, he was a father. In the end he selflessly gave his life so that his son, Humayun, would carry forward his legacy and built an empire he never could.

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Bibliography

Schimmel, Annemarie. The Empire of the Great Mughals. Reaktion Books: London, 2004.

Ziad, Zeenut. The Magnificent Mughals. Oxford University Press: USA, 2002.

Balabanlilar, Lisa. Imperial Identity in the Mughal Empire. Bloomsbury Publishing: London, 2012.

Fisher, Michael. A Short History of the Mughal Empire. Bloomsbury Academic: London, 2015.