The age of sail (16th century to 19th century) ushered in a new era in world history with the rise of sailing trade and warfare. The age of sail provided the old world with the products and goods of the new, goods that were otherwise unknown to most cultures. The discovery and import of these goods led to huge economic booms for their nations, developed societies, and shaped the world as we know it. Sailors traveled thousands of miles to distant places no European had ever seen in search of exotic goods, and trade relationships with these nations. Sailors were truly the astronauts of their day, putting their fears and anxieties behind them to make the voyages necessary for the growth of their country.

In this article, Avery Scott aims to examine the daily lives of the sailors that helped to shape so much of the world. Beginning with the areas in which merchant vessels, navy vessels, and pirates/privateers are similar and then looking at some differences depending upon the type of vessel one served on.

A painting of the 1571 Battle of Lepanto.

The Sailors Life

Rations

The diet of almost all sailing vessels was the same. The men subsisted on salted pork, fish, or beef, ships biscuits, and a limited supply of vegetables such as peas. Additionally, sailors received unwanted calories from the weevils and other insects that burrowed their way into the ship’s biscuits while the vessel was out to sea, thus making an awful ration even worse. In some cases, sailors would have live animals aboard ship to assist in providing fresh food to the crew, however livestock tend to struggle on oceanic voyages and therefore they did not always last very long. Eventually it was learned that fresh fruit and vegetables, specifically vitamin C, were helpful in reducing cases of scurvy – a disease that ravished ships for years. Once this was discovered, rations of citrus fruit would be kept aboard. By doing so, ships were spared the ravages of scurvy.

Food rations were vital to the health and wellness of crews on a voyage, but alcohol played an equally significant role as a morale boost to the crew. Alcohol choices varied depending upon the location, distance, and time at sea. But the most common aboard were beer or ale, wine, and rum. Water was also kept aboard ship in large casks, but the water became undrinkable very quickly into voyage. Therefore, the men subsisted mostly on rations of alcohol.  A persistent habit of sailors was to keep the ration of rum given throughout the day and drink the total of a day's rations at one time becoming very drunk. In answer to this, Admiral Edward Vernon (known as “Old Grog” due to the grogram coats he frequently wore) required his sailors mix their ration of rum with water. This reduced the drunkenness aboard and helped to improve the overall health of the crew, even if it did not make them particularly fond of him.

Routine

Sailing ships during the age of sail more resembled a small city than a ship. Everything needed for the voyage would be packed aboard, as well as the men with the skills necessary to keep the ship moving. Movements were all controlled like clockwork. This was done to ensure order, cleanliness, and avoid idle hands that often became drunk and disorderly. Ships all used a similar watch schedule, although it may change slightly depending upon the size of the crew, but more on that in a later section. Watches were broken down into four-hour blocks of time, with two dog watches of two hours a piece. First watch was from 8:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Middle watch was from 12:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. Morning watch was 4:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. Forenoon watch 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Afternoon watch from 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. And two dog watches from 4 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Some sailors, such as coopers, blacksmiths, and surgeons did not work based upon the watch schedule, and they worked during the day and were able to sleep during the evenings. Each watch was noted by a bell and the bosuns’ whistle. If men were below in their hammocks they would be alerted to the start of their watch, and often “started” by a bosun hitting them with a piece of tar-dipped rope. Additionally, sleepy-headed sailors would be hurried along by cutting down the ropes of their hammocks, allowing them to tumble to the deck.

Most days would begin by cleaning the ship with holy stones to ensure the grime and dirt would be scrubbed off, this was especially important after a battle, and to keep the detritus from the live animals mentioned above to a minimum. Scrubbing the deck would be followed by swabbing and rinsing. Many captains were very particular about the cleanliness of their ships and would have the ship scrubbed with vinegar to reduce sickness. Other daily tasks were different depending upon the role a sailor filled within the vessel. Gunners would be maintaining the guns, topmen would be working the sails, officers would oversee navigation, and those special trades would be involved in their work such as carpentry or making barrels.

 

Money

Sailors were notoriously financially irresponsible. However, much of this may be because they were often not paid until a voyage was completed. This method was thought to reduce desertion (although it did not appear to be successful). This meant that they often went months without pay, and then received a considerable sum at one time. The men would often spend a large chunk of this money of alcohol, women, and gambling – sometimes becoming so poor they had no choice but to go aboard another vessel to ensure they had food to eat. Some sailors did manage to amass some financial means while at sea, typically through prize money – something exclusive to navy, pirate, and privateering vessels. Additionally, if men had families at home, they could have some money sent to their families or paid out by the ship’s owners from their home port. This ensured their family had money to subsist on in the sailor’s absence. If a sailor were to die at sea, their sea chest (their collection of personal effects) would be auctioned off on deck, and the money sent home to the family.

 

Differences

Despite the inherent similarities between the various sea trades, sailors did live different lives depending upon the vessel that they served on. In this section, I will break down some of the specifics of life aboard a merchant ship, navy vessel, and a pirate and privateer.

 

Merchant Ships

Merchant vessels were designed to carry massive amounts of cargo, to earn the highest revenues for the owners. This meant that ships would be very heavily laden, scarcely armed, and undermanned. These ships had little chance of standing up to a dangerous enemy as they had little resources to defend themselves with. Additionally, because manpower is expensive, ship owners would not allow for more crew than were necessary to operate a ship on a voyage. For the crew this meant each man would be required to take on additional tasks that would typically be spread between many men. These men received less sleep for their work as they were more frequently required to be on deck to handle the ship. Also, to maximize profit, the victualers for a merchant ship would be more inclined to obtain subpar or insufficient rations for the voyage.

A positive for merchant sailors was they typically did not have as strict of discipline as a navy vessel would, and this could make their lives more enjoyable while at sea. Discipline could still be hard, but flogging and other punishments were less likely to be handed down. And since the men were onboard willingly, they were more frequently allowed shore leave when in port. Finally, since merchant sailors were not engaged in any military activity, they were not as likely to be killed in a battle, although the presence of disease was an ever-present threat to all ships.

 

Navy Ships

Navy ships were often described as “hell” to the men that crewed the vessels. Class distinctions were ever present, and punishment for the smallest infractions could be excruciating. The crew lived and worked in constant fear of the cat-of-nine-tales, as the captain and officers were always willing to pass down punishment in the name of order. Ships would have been cramped as navy vessels required larger crews to staff the guns, account for death in battle, and the man prizes that were captured at sea. The advantage to this larger crew size is it meant less work per sailor, but it also meant disease could more rapidly spread through the ship. Many navy vessels struggled to fill their ranks and were forced to use impressment to obtain the necessary sailors. The press gangs would rove waterfront streets, taverns, incoming ships, or vessels at sea to impress men for service. Because of this method of recruitment, officers had to be constantly vigilant for signs of mutiny. The fear of mutiny was so great that most naval ships had a detachment of marines aboard to help protect the officers from mutiny. Marines also acted as regular troops during battle and could inflict considerable damage from small arms fire. Life    aboard a navy ship did offer the chance of a financial reward in the form of prize money. Because the crew were entitled to prize money if they captured a belligerent nation's vessel and could successfully plunder the cargo from the other vessel.  While this money was often small in comparison to the cost of life and limb, it was a motivating factor for the men.

 

Pirates and Privateers

While pirates and privateers have some obvious differences, they share many of the same traits. Much like Navy vessels, these ships would be heavily manned to ensure prizes could be sailed, battles fought, and crew left for the continuation of the voyage after a battle. Pirates and privateers all made a living from battle, and this increased the risk of death. Also, if captured pirates were sure to be hung for their crimes, and often led short lives for this. Additionally, privateers were considered to be pirates by the nations with which they were at war – so a similar fate would befall them if captured.  Pirates also had limited access to resources as many places were patrolled by navy vessels looking to take down a pirate ship. Pirates did, however, have the benefit of being more democratic than their aristocratic partners in navy and privateer vessels and therefore could elect or depose their captains and officers if they felt they were not doing a good job.  Additionally, pirate vessels wrote their own ships articles in conjunction with the entire crew. By doing so, rules were established for the common good – not just those of the owners and officers. Finally, pirates and privateers had the possibility to earn huge sums of prize money, but also risked no money if prizes were not captured.

 

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On July 26, 1815, a 20-year-old woman named Elisabeth Fenning dressed in a white high-waist muslin gown. She had personally made it for her wedding to her fiancé Edward, a day that would have begun a new chapter in her life. Sadly the day never came. Instead the dress was being worn for the final chapter of her life, her death. She was preparing for the gallows where she was going to die for a crime she most likely didn't commit. Her story is one of the worst cases of miscarriage of justice in Britain.

Nonye Ugo explains.

A dpecition of Elizabeth Fenning awaiting her execution. This is from the 1912 book William Hone: His Life and Times. Image in the Public Domain.

Elizabeth “Eliza” Fenning was born on June 10, 1793 in the Caribbean island of Dominica.

Her parents William and Mary Fenning had a total of ten children, but only Elizabeth survived to adulthood, a common occurrence due to the high infant mortality rate at the time.

Her father had been a soldier. Upon his discharge, the family settled in London and he transitioned to selling potatoes.

The family was very poor, as such there were very few opportunities available to Elizabeth. She learnt to read and write, and by the age of 14 she entered service, working as a domestic servant.

By 23 she got a job as a cook to the wealthy Turner family, joining a staff that consisted of a maid, Sarah, and two male apprentices.

Olibar Turner, a wealthy tradesman lived at Chancery Lane, London with his wife, Margret, son Robert, and daughter in law Charlotte. Elizabeth was an easy going, dedicated worker, but a few weeks into her employment she had a falling out with Charlotte Turner, who threatened her with dismissal, for entering the room of an apprentice, partially dressed, to borrow a candle. Given the morals of the time partially dressed could even mean not wearing her stockings.

 

Dumplings

Elizabeth was hurt by what she considered a questioning of her morals and confided her feeling to Sarah, hinting that she now disliked Charlotte.

On March 21, Elizabeth asked to showcase her dumpling making skills and was granted permission to make dumplings and potatoes for the family lunch, and steak pie for the servants.

The Turner’s, with the exception of Margret who was absent, immediately became violently ill after eating the pudding. Elizabeth and an apprentice who had also eaten the pudding became just as sick.  A doctor was called. He diagnosed arsenic poisoning and after a brief investigation, concluded it had been mixed in the dumplings.

On April 11 while the family was recovering from the effects of the poison, a still unwell Elizabeth was arrested and tried for attempted murder.

The  case was presided by Sir John Sylvester at the Old Bailey. The evidence against Elizabeth was circumstantial, the state claimed she had motive, (revenge against Charlotte who had earlier reprimanded her) opportunity, (being alone in the kitchen) and means, (access to arsenic, normally used to kill rats, kept in the apprentice room drawer). Despite all their evidence being countered by facts, such as that Elizabeth had also eaten the dumplings and become sick, the drawer containing the arsenic was assessable to every member of the household, no arsenic had been found in the flour used to prepare the dumplings, and five witnesses who testified to Elizabeth’s good and honest character, the jury sentenced her to death by hanging, the then punishment for attempted murder.

Working people, angered by the injustice of the trial and convinced of her innocence, started a petition to have her reprieved. Even the Turners doubted her guilt and were ready to sign the petition but changed their minds, after being warned that they would be investigated for the crime if Elizabeth was reprieved. The reprieve was denied.

 

Death

So on July 26, wearing what was originally intended as a wedding dress, Elizabeth Fenning was hanged. She maintained her innocence till the end. Her funeral was held on July 31.

Immediately after, an angry mob surrounded the Turner home threatening to burn it down. They were dispersed by police, who remained days after to prevent harm to the family.

But the hatred of the Turners remained. They eventually went bankrupt and Robert Turner ended up in a workhouse. People, especially the working class, saw the injustice of her death. They knew it was a message to the poor servants: Don’t ever even think of harming your rich masters.

So did Elizabeth Fenning really try to poison the Turners?

I strongly believe that she did not. One, there was no real evidence of the sickness being caused by arsenic poisoning. The doctor, Dr. John Marshall, only assumed it was because, arsenic was in the home, and the cutlery used in eating the pudding had turned black, which he claimed was the result of arsenic on silver. That claim was later proved to be false. For all anyone knew the Turners may have been suffering food poisoning. And, just before the trial Elizabeth was given a choice - trial or deportation to a colony. She chose going to trial, obviously because she knew she was innocent and felt it would be proven.

Two, if arsenic was used Elizabeth wasn’t the only one with access to it. The two apprentices and maid Sarah did too, and Elizabeth did leave briefly to go to the butcher shop while the dumplings were being prepared. Anyone in the household could have poisoned them in her absence.

So if the Turners were poisoned, who did it?

Maybe Sarah, taking advantage of Elizabeth’s strained relationship with Charlotte, tried to poison the family knowing Elizabeth would be accused. Robert Turner on his death bed was said to have admitted to the crime.

Whatever the truth, the fact remains there was no evidence against Elizabeth Fenning. She was convicted because she was a poor Irish servant and her supposed victims were a rich English family. Her sentence and execution was one of the worst miscarriages of British justice.

 

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One man links two of the most notorious crimes of the nineteenth century – an Irish American by the name of Francis Tumblety. It stretches credulity but this individual, arrested in 1865, as a suspected member of the gang behind the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, was also detained by Scotland Yard in 1888 over the Jack the Ripper case.

Tony McMahon, author of a related book (Amazon US | Amazon UK), explains.

Francis Tumblety in a military uniform.

If the story rested on the bizarre coincidence of the arrests in 1865 and 1888, that would be compelling enough. But during my research, I encountered an extraordinary figure whose life consisted of a series of crises and scandals. It included two manslaughter cases; violent assaults; arrests for gross indecency; and accusations of business fraud. Then add to that being arrested as a suspected co-conspirator in the Lincoln assassination and Scotland Yard drawing up charges in relation to the Jack the Ripper case.

Even after the 1888 arrest over the Ripper murders - when Tumblety jumped bail and escaped to New York - he was soon in court for striking a young man while Manhattan later shuddered in horror at news of a copycat Ripper killing in a hotel. New Yorkers were convinced the Whitechapel murderer was in their midst and the newspapers pointed an accusing finger at Tumblety.

Tumblety did not operate in the shadows. Far from it. Styling himself the Indian Herb Doctor, he was a high-profile medicine man skillfully using the emerging mass circulation newspapers to transform himself into a nineteenth century celebrity, known throughout north America (Canada and the United States). In fact, his celebrity, and the networks he developed in high society, played a key role in protecting him from imprisonment on multiple occasions. It may also explain why he was not extradited from the United States to face the Ripper charges in London after absconding.

 

Tumblety’s sexuality

As an LGBT historian, I am fascinated by Tumblety’s very open homosexuality. The term was yet to be popularized in the mid-nineteenth century but nobody needed sodomy to be defined. Gay men were recognized in clubs, theatres, and taverns. Journalists commented on the doctor's nocturnal cruising and very literal clashes with younger men he picked up, then fell out with bitterly. He supplied great copy for the gossip columns of the newspapers given his repeat brushes with the police and courts. For decades he was tailed by the Pinkerton detective agency who seemed obsessed by the doctor’s man problems.

While he has been recognized as a Ripper suspect since his arrest, Tumblety’s sexuality has often been skirted around, maybe to save the blushes of some Ripperologists. Also because it raises awkward questions about his motives in the Ripper murders, which I set out to tackle in the book. To understand the kind of life he led and how he came to be implicated in these two enormous crimes, it’s impossible not to put his homosexuality center stage.

Tumblety claimed to be disinterested in the opposite sex after marrying a woman he then discovered was a prostitute. I suspect this story, told by Tumblety in his multi-edition slim autobiography, may not be true. It offered a cover for his same sex preference coupled with a violent misogyny noted by the American police and shared by them with Scotland Yard. The London police were further convinced he was Jack the Ripper after reports in the American press that Tumblety owned a grotesque collection of uteruses in glass jars which he displayed at his all-male dinner parties. The Ripper’s second victim, Annie Chapman, was missing her uterus when her body was discovered.

 

America

This intriguing figure began his life in Dublin but like many Irish at the time, including many of my ancestors, he boarded a ship for a new life in America. His family set up home in Rochester, New York, and the Irish teenager lived in miserable poverty. But he was growing up in a country experiencing rapid growth where hucksters and opportunists changed their backstory, adopted a glamorous persona, and fleeced the vulnerable, making considerable fortunes. This was capitalism at its most unregulated and freewheeling.

Clearly not without talent, Tumblety set himself up as a completely unqualified doctor with a flamboyant persona. To promote his dubious medical business, he processed down main street on a circus horse with a plumed helmet and assistant dressed as a native American handing out leaflets. With bombastic language, he declared war on mainstream physicians and claimed his herbal cures could tackle everything from pimples to cancer.

The association with Lincoln began with an astonishing appearance on horseback behind Lincoln’s carriage when the newly elected president processed through New York, having just been elected president in early 1861. Journalists were aghast at this unlikely vision, as the herb doctor was embroiled at that moment in a rather sordid legal case involving one of his young male assistants. Yet Tumblety ignored the brouhaha and set out to ingratiate himself with the president by moving to Washington DC, attending Lincoln’s public appearances.

However, he seems to have been playing a double game. I’ve uncovered evidence linking Tumblety to at least two members of the gang that plotted Lincoln’s assassination and a newspaper article from 1914 that proves he knew the man who fired the fatal bullet: John Wilkes Booth. Little wonder that Tumblety was arrested and held at the Old Capitol Prison in the aftermath of the presidential slaying. Somehow, though, he was able to walk out of jail a free man.

 

After Lincoln

The quarter of a century between the Lincoln killing and the Ripper murders saw Tumblety flitting between America and Europe. The police and Pinkerton agency continuing to keep tabs on this strange character. I believe he contracted syphilis at some point and that the condition impacted both his physical and mental health as we approach 1888. The alleged manslaughter of a patient in Liverpool led to no conviction, possibly the result of an out-of-court settlement. Then the herb doctor was arrested over gross indecency with four men. While he was being held, Scotland Yard changed tack, realizing he was Jack the Ripper.

Without giving too much away, he ends up back in the United States and it’s his last years, neglected up until now, that are very revelatory. There is clear proof that Tumblety had cultivated networks in the Irish American diaspora and what passed for a gay community. In two cases, respected political figures rescued him from criminal convictions – but for what reason?

 

Conclusion

American journalists had no doubt that Tumblety was the notorious serial killer who had struck terror into the streets of Whitechapel. I share some ideas, based on his life experience and character, that explain why a gay man would have committed such heinous acts. His sexuality does not rule him out at all. Reporters speculated on other crimes that he may have been linked to and the possibility that one of his “valets” – young male employees – could have helped him on his murder spree.

To me, Tumblety presents a far more intriguing prospect as Jack the Ripper than a rogue member of the Royal Family or a conspiracy by Freemasons. He was a rags to riches story that guides us through Civil War America, the Gilded Age, and on to the streets of Victorian London. His life was turbulent, violent, and scandalous. What he did was unforgivable and sheds so much light on the sexual politics, media landscape, and precarious existence that millions of people led during this period.

 

Tony McMahon’s new book Jack the Ripper and Abraham Lincoln: One man links the two greatest crimes of the 19th century is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

In the twilight of the 19th century, the world watched as China convulsed in a tumultuous uprising known as the Boxer Rebellion. This cataclysmic event, which erupted in 1900, was not merely a clash of arms, but a collision of civilizations, ideologies, and ambitions. At its core, the Boxer Rebellion was a struggle for the soul of China, pitting traditional values against encroaching foreign influence.

Here Terry Bailey delves into the multifaceted dimensions of the rebellion, outline the foreign powers involved, their political aims, the valor recognized through decorations like the Victoria Cross and Congressional Medal of Honor, and the perspectives of the Chinese Boxers, including the pivotal role played by Empress Dowager Cixi.

The photo shows foreign forces inside the Forbidden City in Beijing in November 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion.

Origins of the Boxer Movement

To comprehend the Boxer Rebellion, one must understand its roots deeply entwined with China's history of internal strife and external pressures. The late 19th century saw China reeling from a series of humiliations at the hands of foreign powers, compounded by internal turmoil and economic distress. The Boxers, officially known as the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists, emerged as a grassroots movement fueled by resentment towards foreign domination and perceived cultural erosion.

 

The International Response

As the Boxer movement gained momentum, foreign nationals and missionaries in China became targets of violent attacks, triggering international alarm. In response, an Eight-Nation Alliance composed of troops from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom intervened to quell the rebellion and protect their interests in China.

Each member of the alliance had its own political aims and agendas driving their involvement in the conflict. For instance, European powers sought to safeguard their economic privileges and spheres of influence in China, while Japan seized the opportunity to assert its growing regional power. The United States, keen on preserving its ‘Open Door Policy’ and ensuring the safety of American citizens, also joined the intervention force.

 

The Boxers' Perspective

Contrary to portrayals by Western accounts, the Boxers were not merely mindless fanatics but individuals driven by a complex blend of nationalism, religious fervor, and socio-economic grievances. Comprising primarily of peasants and martial artists, the Boxers perceived themselves as defenders of Chinese tradition against the encroachment of Western imperialism and Christian missionary activities.

For the Boxers, their struggle was not just against foreign powers but also against the corruption and decadence of the Qing dynasty. Their rallying cry, "Support the Qing, destroy the foreigners," encapsulated their belief in restoring China's glory by expelling foreign influence and purging the nation of perceived traitors.

 

Empress Dowager Cixi's Role

At the heart of the Boxer Rebellion stood Empress Dowager Cixi, a formidable figure whose political maneuvering would shape the course of Chinese history. Initially hesitant to openly support the Boxers, Cixi eventually threw her support behind the movement, viewing it as a means to bolster her own waning authority and expel foreign influences.

Cixi's decision to align with the Boxers proved fateful, leading to a declaration of war against the Eight-Nation Alliance. Despite her efforts to galvanize Chinese forces, the coalition's superior firepower and logistical prowess ultimately overwhelmed the Boxer forces and brought about the collapse of their rebellion.

 

Legacy of the Boxer Rebellion

The Boxer Rebellion left an indelible mark on China and the world, reshaping geopolitical dynamics and fueling nationalist sentiments. While the intervention of the Eight-Nation Alliance temporarily quelled the uprising, it also deepened China's resentment towards foreign powers and sowed the seeds of future conflicts, in addition to further internal strife.

The rebellion's aftermath witnessed the imposition of harsh indemnities on China, further weakening the Qing dynasty and hastening its eventual collapse. The events of 1900 served as a stark reminder of the perils of imperialism and the enduring struggle for national sovereignty.

Sun Yat-sen, known in China as Sun Zhongshan was the eventual galvanized the popular overthrow of the imperial dynasty through his force of personality. Which occurred on the 19th of October 1911. At the time of the eventual successful overthrow of the 2000 year old dynasty Sun Yat-sen was in America attempting to raise funds for the future of China.

He was a highly educated individual who was strongly opposed to the actions of the Boxers before and during the rebellion, knowing that violent offensive action against the strong foreign powers would be detrimental to China’s future.

 

In conclusion

The Boxer Rebellion is an outstanding example of the complexities of history, where competing interests, ideologies, and aspirations converge in a crucible of conflict. Reflecting on this turbulent chapter, it is possible to be reminded of the enduring quest for dignity, autonomy, and justice that transcends borders and generations.

 

Additionally, the history of the Boxer rebellion should provide a stark reminder for any nation that decides to intervene into another nation’s concerns where the intervening power has hidden political agenda residing below the surface.

This reminder should be dealt to all nations, not only where a political fueled agenda influences an intervention by military force but any intervention that the preservation and protection of life is not the prime concern of military action.

 

“war is a continuation of politics by other means,”

Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, 1st of July 1780 – 16th of November 1831

 

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Victoria Cross and Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients

The Boxer Rebellion witnessed acts of exceptional bravery and heroism, recognized through prestigious military decorations such as the Victoria Cross and Congressional Medal of Honor, for soldier of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America.

 

Victoria Cross recipients

General Sir Lewis Stratford Tollemache Halliday VC, KCB

General Sir Lewis Stratford Tollemache Halliday VC, KCB (14th of May 1870 – 9th of March 1966) was an English recipient of the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and Commonwealth forces.

Rank when awarded VC (and later highest rank): Captain RMLI, (later General)

 

His citation reads:

Captain (now Brevet Major) Lewis Stratford Tollemache Halliday, Royal Marine Light Infantry, on the 24th June, 1900. The enemy, consisting of Boxers and Imperial troops, made a fierce attack on the west wall of the British Legation, setting fire to the West Gate of the south stable quarters, and taking cover in the buildings which adjoined the wall. The fire, which spread to part of the stables, and through which and the smoke a galling fire was kept up by the Imperial troops, was with difficulty extinguished, and as the presence of the enemy in the adjoining buildings was a grave danger to the Legation, a sortie was organized to drive them out.

 A hole was made in the Legation Wall, and Captain Halliday, in command of twenty Marines, led the way into the buildings and almost immediately engaged a party of the enemy. Before he could use his revolver, however, he was shot through the left shoulder, at point blank range, the bullet fracturing the shoulder and carrying away part of the lung.

Notwithstanding the extremely severe nature of his wound, Captain Halliday killed three of his assailants, and telling his men to "carry on and not mind him," walked back unaided to the hospital, refusing escort and aid so as not to diminish the number of men engaged in the sortie.

 

Commander Basil John Douglas Guy VC, DSO

Commander Basil John Douglas Guy VC, DSO (9th of May 1882 – 29th of December 1956) was an English recipient of the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and Commonwealth forces.

Rank when awarded VC (and later highest rank): Midshipman RN, (later Commander)

 

London Gazette citation

“Mr, (read Midshipman), Basil John Douglas Guy, Midshipman of Her Majesty’s Ship “Barfleur”.

 

On 19th July, 1900, during the attack on Tientsin City, a very heavy cross-fire was brought to bear on the Naval Brigade, and there were several casualties. Among those who fell was one A.B.I. McCarthy, shot about 50 yards short of cover.

Mr. Guy stopped with him, and, after seeing what the injury was, attempted to lift him up and carry him in, but was not strong enough, so after binding up the wound Mr. Guy ran to get assistance.

In the meantime the remainder of the company had passed in under cover, and the entire fire from the city wall was concentrated on Mr. Guy and McCarthy. Shortly after Mr. Guy had got in under cover the stretchers came up, and again Mr. Guy dashed out and assisted in placing McCarthy on the stretcher and carrying him in.

The wounded man was however shot dead just as he was being carried into safety. During the whole time a very heavy fire had been brought to bear upon Mr. Guy, and the ground around him was absolutely ploughed up.

 

Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients

During the Boxer rebellion, 59 American servicemen received the Medal of Honor for their actions. Four of these were for Army personnel, twenty-two went to navy sailors and the remaining thirty-three went to Marines. Harry Fisher was the first Marine to receive the medal posthumously and the only posthumous recipient for this conflict.

 

Side note:

Total number Victoria Crosses awarded

Since the inception of the Victoria Cross in 1856, there have been 1,358 VCs awarded. This total includes three bars granted to soldiers who won a second VC and the cross awarded to the unknown American soldier.

The most recent was awarded to Lance Corporal Joshua Leakey of 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment, whose VC was gazetted in February 2015, following an action in Afghanistan on 22nd of August 2013, this information was correct at the time of writing.

 

Total number of Congressional Medal of Honor, (MOH), awarded

Since the inception of the MOH in, 1861 there have been 3,536 MOH awarded.

The most recent was awarded was made to former Army Capt. Larry L. Taylor during a ceremony at the White House, by President Joe Biden, Sept. 5, 2023, this information was correct at the time of writing.

The Medal of Honor was introduced for the Naval Service in 1861, followed in 1862 a version for the Army.

In perhaps the pivotal moment of the Civil War, on July 3 at 1 pm, about 12,000 men charged across a field about a mile in length and were cut down in an extraordinary artillery barrage. The infantry attack was named after Confederate General George Pickett, who led the charge of his division from the south portion of the field. Generals Pettigrew and Trimble also led their divisions in the charge from the northern part of the field.  These divisions advanced toward the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, encountering fierce resistance in the form of intense artillery and rifle fire from Union troops strategically placed on higher ground.. Only men from Pickett’s division made it to the Angle and pierced the Union line; Pettigrew and Trimble never crossed the Emmitsburg Pike.

Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened during Pickett’s Charge.

If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here, and part 3 on day 2 of the battle is here, and part 4 on Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field here.

Pickett's Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Meade Staff Meeting

Late in the evening of July 2nd,, General Meade held a council of war to decide what should be done after two days of intense warfare. Probably Meade had already decided this issue and was using the meeting not as a formal council of war, but as a way to achieve consensus among officers he had commanded for less than a week. His senior staff officers and corps commanders concurred that, despite the significant losses suffered by the army, the most prudent course of action was to maintain their current position and await the enemy's attack.  As the meeting ended, Meade took aside Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, in command of the II Corps, and predicted, "If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be in your front. ... he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed and if he concludes to try it again, it will be on our center."

 

Lee’s Plan

In contrast, General Lee did not convene a similar council of war, and his subsequent reports indicate that no alternative course of action was seriously considered. General Lee had intended for an early morning assault to coincide with the attack on Culp's Hill, but the arrival of Pickett's forces was delayed. The reasons behind this delay have been a topic of debate among historians ever since, and it remains a point of contention.

Longstreet’s intent to try a flank attack further around the Union right was immediately denied by Lee that morning, who insisted on an infantry attack on the Union center. Longstreet considered the attack unlikely to succeed, and according to his memoirs, he told Lee so in the moment. His reluctance to order Pickett’s Charge is one of the most renowned anecdotes of the Civil War. His memoirs describe that he told Lee: “General,” said Longstreet, “I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know as well as anyone what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.” His reluctance and doubt have reverberated in history.

 

Pre-Attack Bombardment

The July 3 bombardment before Pickett’s Charge was the largest of the war, with hundreds of cannons from both sides firing along the lines for one hour, starting around 1 p.m. The Confederate artillery, numbering between 150 to 170 guns, unleashed a barrage along a two-mile line, aiming to weaken the Union defenses and silence their artillery. The cannonade is believed to be the most intense artillery attack in history up to that moment.  Despite the massive scale of the bombardment, its impact was limited.

The Confederate guns inflicted some damage on the Union batteries, but they largely overshot their targets. Part of the reason the Confederate bombardment was ineffective was that Confederate artillerymen missed their marks due to poor visibility from the smoke on the battlefield. July 3, 1863, was an extremely hot, windless day and the smoke from the guns hid the lines from the Confederate gunners, who thus could not adjust their range. The smoke from the firing hung low over the battlefield during the summer heat so no one could see what the effect on the defense line was and to make adjustments. Another factor was that It was usual to aim over the heads of the enemy so the explosion would maximize the shrapnel below. Further, at Cemetery Ridge, the line was very narrow, so there was little room for error. For these reasons most of the shells sailed over the heads of the line into the rear, causing mostly unimportant damage.

Fuses. But the most significant problem was that the fuses used burned longer than expected. The fuses used were not the usual ones; these had an extra second burn before detonating. The reason for this originated in a fire in the Richmond arsenal producing the fuses. An explosion in Richmond Harbor in April 1863 blew up the fuse manufacturing area, which led to a deficiency of the usual artillery fuses, so replacement ones had to be used from ordnance supplies manufactured in Selma and Charleston. These new fuses took 1 second longer than what the artillery commanders were used to, delaying detonation.

The Bormann fuse was the most common fuse used on smoothbore field artillery ammunition during the war. Both sides used this design.  Bormann fuses were notoriously unreliable and were often replaced with copper fuse adaptors to accept the standard paper time fuse. The Confederates adopted the Bormann fuse, a mechanical fuse, in 1861 and immediately began having problems.

The inferiority of the Bormann fuse combined with the intentional overhead trajectory led to the inefficiency of the artillery. If firing overhead and the fuse explosion is delayed by a second, it will not explode until it has gone past the target. Today, manufactured products are tested for effectiveness before they are sent to the supplier. After Gettysburg, Lt James Dinwiddie working for the Ordnance Dept investigated the fuses and it was found that they contained a resin filler that would soften and mix with the powder in humid warm weather such as that in the first days of July. The filler mixing with the powder was the cause of the longer burning fuses and non-detonating shells.

The CSA artillerymen had no idea that there was a problem with the fuses coming out of Selma and Charleston that would make them burn longer than a fuse of the same length coming out of Richmond. The design modification was intended to make the fuses burn slower, but no one had informed the Confederate artillery commanders.

A week after the battle, tests were conducted on the various fuses supplied from around the Confederacy at the Richmond Laboratories. The findings showed that those fuses in shells intended to explode over the Federal position at Gettysburg ranged anywhere from 150 to 200 yards further to the rear before exploding. A 4-inch fuse would burn at the rate as a Richmond fuse one cut to 5 inches. Why this product testing wasn’t carried out sooner isn’t known.

 

The Confederate Artillery: Organization and Position

Focusing on the Confederate artillery positioning, the Confederate cannons are placed in a wide perimeter. While those focused on Culps Hill make sense, you will note how many batteries are placed north and northwest of town where no troops are going to charge. Confederate authority dictated that artillery remain under the control of their corps command. Thus, Alexander had to organize his artillery without other help. As a result, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective.

The Confederate officer responsible for this configuration was Lee's artillery chief, Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton. Although he was Lee’s friend, his major contribution to Pickett’s Charge was to obstruct the effective placement of artillery from the two corps besides Longstreet.  The responsibility for the artillery cannonade to start the charge was given to Longstreet’s Corps Artillery chief, the outstanding young artillerist, Col. Edward Porter Alexander, who had effective command of the field.

Confederate authority dictated that artillery remain under the control of their corps command. As a result, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective. When Lee reorganized after Chancellorsville and Jackson’s mortal wounding, creating 3 Corps instead of 2, the army’s reserve artillery was disbanded and its batteries reassigned to the infantry corps. This provided each corps with five artillery battalions and the flexibility of assigning battalions to the infantry divisions or keeping them under corps command. This seemingly trivial command structure change had huge implications on July 3rd.

Note that the Confederate configuration is based on the corps location. The artillery stayed with their commander. The Union placement is based on intuitive defense. Aside from the command arrangement, geography factored in: the Confederates were occupying a wider area and many of their artillery placements were based on the needs of the previous two days and what grounds they had suitable for artillery placement.

Alexander did not have full confidence that all the enemy's guns were silenced and that the Confederate ammunition was almost exhausted. Longstreet ordered Alexander to stop Pickett, but the young colonel explained that replenishing his ammunition from the trains in the rear would take over an hour, and this delay would nullify any advantage the previous barrage had given them. The infantry assault went forward without the Confederate artillery close support that had been originally planned. When the Union artillery died down, General Alexander believed that the time to charge had arrived.

 

 

The Union Artillery Organization and Position

Were it not for General Henry J Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, the Union might have lost the battle and perhaps the war.

Before the war, General Hunt was a member of a team that had revised the drill and tactics for the artillery arm of the US Army. He was the lead proponent of a radical organization concept: instead of allowing artillery batteries to be commanded by the infantry command, where they were used only to protect troops, he proposed strategic control by artillery commanders. The idea was that artillery could do much more than protect: they could attack, both on offense and defense.

On the morning of July 3, while inspecting the Union lines, he found an elevated vantage point from which he observed something whose importance only an expert in artillery tactics would grasp: the Rebel batteries were forming in line or going into position along a line that stretched from the Peach Orchard to the edge of town to the north. He alone knew what that meant. He also observed hurried activity in the Confederate infantry lines.

General Hunt understood that these were signs of an impending enormous attack. And, he knew from Colonel Sharpe of BMI that General Pickett commanded a division that had not yet seen action. Convinced that a massive infantry assault was imminent, Hunt rode back along the Union position, directing his battery commanders to reserve fire and avoid an artillery duel, which would simply exhaust the ammunition supply before the infantry’s appearance.

He lined the artillery up to catch the invasion in a crossfire. His idea was to create enfilading fire along the lines of the invading troops rather than face-on. Consequently, when he fired, entire lines of men disappeared. Hunt had only about 80 guns available to conduct counter-battery fire; the geographic features of the Union line had limited areas for effective gun emplacement. He also ordered that firing cease to conserve ammunition but to fool Alexander, Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt was also saving his ammunition for the infantry charge rather than long-distance firing.

But Pendleton ran out of ammunition; Longstreet inquired if this should delay the attack, but Pendleton’s supply wagons would have required over an hour delay, by which time all of the firing benefits from the bombardment already undertaken would have been lost.

Hunt, the best-known artillerist of his day, had argued for years that a single commander of artillery should be in charge. The Confederates never accepted Hunt’s command ideas, so each division and regiment had their own artillery under the division leader’s command. Hunt had full authority over his army's artillery while the ANV's artillery was directed by the three corps artillery chiefs (note- Alexander at this time was not the 1st corps artillery chief, he was technically just a battalion commander. Putting him in charge of the bombardment was a huge breach of protocol).

This caused the flanks of the attack to be pushed toward the center of the Union line: The Angle. Note how Alonzo Cushing’s battery just north of the Copse of Trees becomes the central focus. He was at the center not by intentional design but rather because the two Confederate flanks converged on his position to escape the crossfire.

Next, he ordered the last four batteries of the artillery reserve to start moving toward the Union battle line. He arranged his lines of fire from the sides of the line to aim toward the center, creating crossfire and plunging fire lanes. And he insisted that the batteries hold their fire when the Confederate batteries began their barrage – to conserve ammunition for what he knew was coming. And, he could so order, despite General Hancock ordering them to fire because he was the artillery commander independent of the Infantry. His theory of command was proven in practice.

He also ordered that firing cease to conserve ammunition, but to fool Alexander, Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt was also saving his ammunition for the infantry charge rather than long distance firing. The diminishment in US artillery fire was intentionally designed by Hunt (CO of the Artillery reserve) to create the impression among the rebels that the US artillery had been silenced and therefor would be unable to respond effectively to Pickett's charge. There was actually a substantial row between Hancock, who wanted the artillery firing to boost the morale of his troops, and Hunt who wanted to gull the rebels.

As the barrage continued, Hunt gave orders that deceived the Confederates; he directed several batteries to withdraw near the center of the line, causing the Confederates to think the batteries were destroyed. However, Hunt replaced the withdrawn batteries with artillerymen and cannons from the reserve, making sure the artillery line stayed strong along the ridge.

When the Confederate infantry broke the Union lines at The Angle, Hunt rushed forward, directly into the fray, firing away with a pistol at the advancing Rebels until his horse was shot, pinning him to the ground, but with no serious injury.

Hunt’s artillery knowledge, determination, and brilliant tactics ensured the Union line’s cannons had ammunition to fire when the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Charge began. Trusted by Meade and forceful enough to inspire his artillerymen to obey his orders rather than Hancock’s, General Hunt garners huge admiration from those who understand his contributions. Hunt was able to control the Union artillery as a single force which Pendleton could not do on the Confederate side Because Hunt was in charge of all of the artillery separate from Corps command, he was able to create this deception. Hunt had to resist the strong arguments of Hancock, who demanded Union fire to lift the spirits of the infantrymen pinned down by Alexander's bombardment.

General Hunt anticipated the infantry attack across the field connecting Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge in the afternoon of July 3. As the map shows, he lined the artillery up to catch the invasion in a crossfire and plunging fire. His idea was to fire along the lines of the invading troops rather than face-on. Consequently, when he fired, entire lines of men disappeared. See the map which shows the lines of fire Hunt placed the Union artillery in position for, while the Confederate line of fire was straight ahead.

 

The Infantry Charge

Approximately 12,500 men in nine infantry brigades advanced over open fields for three-quarters of a mile under heavy Union artillery and rifle fire.

The charge was made by 3 divisions. Pickett’s division led the charge. General Pettigrew led Heth’s division (of Hill’s Corps), who had been injured on Day 1. General Trimble led Pender’s division, who had been killed on Day 2. Two brigades from Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division (Hill's Corps) was to support the attack on the right flank: Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox and Col. David Lang (Perry's brigade). Hill’s illness precluded him from selecting who would attack from his corps; surprisingly, his troops who had fought heavily on Day 1 were chosen but those lightly used were not.

During the assault, the Confederates started to bunch up towards the center of the line. This was precisely at a bend in the Union line called the Angle.  At this location, the Union line formed a 90-degree angle behind a stone wall. The 71st and 69th PA Regiments were positioned on this wall, with support from the 1st NY Battery. Under Gen. Armistead, the Confederates overran the 71st and 69th PA before reaching the 1st NY Battery

 

What was the landmark that was the objective of the attack?

Although traditionally the Copse of Trees near the Angle has been cited since Bachelder as the visual landmark of the attack, this is probably mythical. Lee’s objective was very likely on July 3 exactly what his original objective on July 2 was: the actual focus of the attack was Cemetery Hill and the trees they were keying on were those of Ziegler’s Grove, which was much more prominent then. Lee’s attacks on both days were intended for the Union center. It was much more strategically significant than the open area where the Copse of Trees was. It was more elevated and a perfect artillery platform (hence why the Union had artillery there) and it would command the road network.

Cemetery Hill was the key to the fishhook position. Lee saw this July 1 from Seminary Ridge and his goal never wavered for 3 days. The fundamental problem was that the town of Gettysburg is right beneath that hill, and there remains no direct route even today, you have to go by Culps Hill or Cemetery Ridge. Today’s Steinwehr Avenue runs close but perpendicular to where you’d need to go. The only possible staging area would be the old Cyclotron site, and imagine that with artillery blasting the whole time from there. Washington Street does get near, but it goes directly into the center of the town. So, Lee either has to get his army up Emmitsburg Road onto Steinwehr, then make a right turn onto Washington Street or nearby, or take Culps Hill or Cemetery Ridge.

If Ziegler’s Grove was the intended focus of the attack to crush Cemetery Hill, how did the attack end up at the Angle at Cemetery Ridge instead? Hunt’s placement of his weapons forced the charge to go south. This caused the flanks of the attack to be pushed toward the center of the Union line: The Angle. Note how Alonzo Cushing’s battery just north of the Copse of Trees becomes the central focus. He was at the center not by intentional design but rather because the two Confederate flanks converged on his position to escape the crossfire.

 

The fences on Emmitsburg Turnpike

To cross from their positions on Seminary Ridge, the infantry had to cross Emmitsburg Turnpike about 100 yards before Cemetery Ridge. Witnesses noted that Pickett’s men crossed the road without problem from the southern end of the attack and were the ones who made it to Cemetery Ridge.  However, Trimble and Pettigrew’s men were caught in the road and very few moved further east. Hess first identified that a significant part of the problem was that the fences on either side of the road posed an obstacle to cross. Many were killed trying to get over the fence. But on the southern part of the road, these fence posts had been removed the day before during the July 2 battle, so they didn’t pose a problem for Pickett.

 

The fences on both sides of the road on the south part of the field were down from the action of July 2nd but not on the north side and this proved to be a huge obstruction. After crossing Emmitsburg Road, Kemper’s brigade was hit by flanking fire, driving it to the left and disrupting the cohesion of the assault. General Hunt had arranged his artillery to create crossfires and plunging fires on the south end. On the north part of the field, the Emmitsburg Pike was lined with fences which became huge obstacles to cross during the battle. The casualties piled up where men attempted to cross, only to be shot in the act. Many of the troops just took cover in the road.  Pettigrew’s men were in a similar situation although at least some of his men were caught in artillery at the start of the battle, and panic developed. Meanwhile, those fence posts had been removed on the South part of the field in the Rebel attack on July 2. There was no problem for Pickett to get to the wall, but then Stannard and artillery units opened up firing on the flank, forcing the attack to the north.

 

Hancock

Winfield Scott Hancock was one of the heroes of the Battle of Gettysburg, Hancock's leadership and bravery were conspicuous during Pickett's Charge. As the Confederate forces prepared for Pickett's Charge, Hancock rode along the Union lines, boosting the morale of his troops. He famously told his men, "There is no reason why any man should be nervous...I shall lead you through this battle!"

Hancock was himself wounded during the Charge and needed to be assisted off the field after the attack was over. It was a severe wound caused by a bullet striking the pommel of his saddle, entering his inner right thigh along with wood fragments and a large bent nail. He was helped from his horse by aides, and with a tourniquet applied to staunch the bleeding, The nail wasn’t removed for over a month despite repeated attempts. A surgeon finally was able to remove it by having him assume the position he was in when wounded sitting on his horse. He suffered from its effects for the remainder of the war and for the rest of his life, carrying a cane.

On July 3rd, his Corps was positioned on Cemetery Ridge and therefore commanded the Union center. Hancock recognized the Confederates' intentions to launch a major assault and anticipated that the Confederate attack would focus on Cemetery Ridge and made preparations to defend against it. He coordinated with other Union generals to reinforce the defensive line and prepare for the Confederate assault.

Hancock was himself wounded during the Charge and needed to be assisted off the field after the attack was over. It was a severe wound caused by a bullet striking the pommel of his saddle, entering his inner right thigh along with wood fragments and a large bent nail. He was helped from his horse by aides, and with a tourniquet applied to staunch the bleeding, The nail wasn’t removed for over a month despite repeated attempts. A surgeon finally was able to remove it by having him assume the position he was in when wounded sitting on his horse. He suffered from its effects for the remainder of the war, and for the rest of his life.

He almost died. Although he was wounded during the assault, he remained on the field until the Confederate attack was repulsed. When the fighting ended, the general was taken by stretcher and ambulance to a field hospital. He journeyed through Pennsylvania to Philadelphia and then Norristown to convalesce. His wound gave Hancock enough trouble, especially when riding a horse, that he was forced to give up active command at Petersburg in 1864, and it bothered him for the rest of his life. 

 

General Gibbon, who had been warned the night before, commanded the 2nd Division, II Corps. Gibbon's division bore the brunt of Pickett's Charge, where Gibbon was wounded. His leadership at the Angle was instrumental in the victory.

Alexander S. Webb was the brigade leader at the Copse of Trees. The 71st PA stopped the Confederate advance and forced the Confederates to seek cover behind a stone wall. Hand-to-hand fighting began in the Angle, and 2 companies fell back. Webb ordered a charge by the neighboring 72nd to drive the Confederates back, but the regiment refused the order. He then went to lead the 69th PA but was wounded in the thigh and groin. By this time, Col. Devereux's 19th MA Regiment and the 42nd NY Regiment rushed in and drove the Confederates out. He received the MOH in 1891.

Armistead

Brig Gen Lewis Armistead is esteemed as leading Pickett’s Division on the south end of the attack. He led his brigade from in front, through the artillery attack, hat on his sword, toward the Angle, over the stone wall, before being mortally wounded. Armistead embodied every positive attribute a courageous American military leader could display in a desperate moment.

Armistead of course was pre-war friends with General Hancock, his opponent that day. Armistead was the older man by seven years, so their paths never crossed at West Point, but army records show they met for the first time while serving on the frontier in 1844. After working together for 16 months in the remote outposts of modern-day Oklahoma, they fought in the same regiment and experienced some of the same battles in the Mexican War, where both were breveted for gallantry. Then, for a brief period after the war, as the U.S. Army occupied Mexico, Armistead commanded a small company and Hancock was one of his lieutenants. Captain Armistead was in command of the small garrison at the New San Diego Depot in San Diego, which was occupied in 1860. He was a close friend of Winfield Scott Hancock, serving with him as a quartermaster in Los Angeles, before the Civil War.  He was However, during the Battle of Gettysburg, they found themselves on opposing sides of Pickett's Charge, with Armistead leading Confederate forces and Hancock defending the Union position.

It is reported that he was struck by multiple bullets as he and his men reached the stone wall. Traditionally, it is said that he was shot with 3 bullets. Armistead's wounds were not believed to be mortal; he had been shot in the fleshy part of the arm and below the knee, and according to the surgeon who tended him, none of the wounds caused bone, artery, or nerve damage. Other accounts suggest the wounds were located in the upper thigh or groin area. The exact details of his wounds may vary in different accounts, but it is generally agreed upon that he suffered injuries to his lower body.

He was then taken to a Union field hospital at the George Spangler Farm where he died two days later. Dr. Daniel Brinton, the chief surgeon at the Union hospital there, had expected Armistead to survive because he characterized the bullet wounds as not of a "serious character." He wrote that the death "was not from his wounds directly but from secondary bacterium, fever, and prostration.”  One hears frequent discussions of Stonewall Jackson’s death from non-mortal wounds, but rarely Armistead’s. Infection and sepsis were the main causes of battlefield death if the initial wound was not itself mortal. Although this death would not have happened after penicillin was discovered in the mid-1930s, it was a common story in this war. Hancock wasn’t at Gettysburg long enough to see his friend and was in sufficient distress that it wouldn’t have been possible anyway. He might not even have known at the moment.

 

How many would have been needed to carry the position?

Longstreet ordered nine infantry brigades to make the charge on July 3. Five more brigades were held in reserve, which Longstreet never ordered to advance. Longstreet states in his autobiography that he estimated that it would have required 30,000 men to take Cemetery Ridge.

Mathematical modeling based on the Lanchester equations developed during the First World War to determine the numbers necessary for successful assaults demonstrates that with the commitment of one to three more infantry brigades to the nine brigades in the initial force, Pickett’s Charge would probably have taken the Union position and altered the battle’s outcome.  If he had put most of those reserves into the charge, the model estimated it would have captured the Union position. However, the Confederates would have been unable to exploit such a success without the commitment of still more troops.

Calculations based on the Lancaster Formula which was developed in World War I suggest that 20,000 men would have been needed to make a lodgment, but perhaps 5-10,000 more would have been needed to defeat the inevitable counterattack, which is not far off from the number Longstreet hypothesized.  The authors do not include Wilcox’s and Lang’s brigades in the initial force.  If these troops and Anderson’s entire division had attacked with the initial force, this would have supplied five additional brigades and around 5,000 more men, making the attack force fourteen brigades and from 15,000 to 18,000 men. These numbers would have guaranteed a lodgment at the Angle.  Another five brigades and one regiment scheduled for the second wave of Pickett’s Charge from Pender’s and Rodes’ divisions, as well as at least another brigade from McLaws’ division, were also available.  Had all of these men been brought into the attack column, the total would be nearer to the 30,000 men Longstreet thought necessary.

However, assuming the same rate of casualties, the cost would have been about half, or 15,000 casualties. There would have been insufficient fresh troops left to take advantage of that success. And what about the next hill and the next one? Various regiments might have been recruited for this effort: essentially, all of Longstreet and all of Hill’s Corps. But, assuming the 50% casualty rate on this additional number, and realizing that Lee only had 60,000 men at this point, while it’s theoretically possible they might have held this line, the cost would have been intolerable. Add another 10,000 casualties and it’s hard to see how Lee could have continued the war after taking that ridge.

This illustration shows the Union line kneeling and firing, with only the officers standing. The destroyed artillery from earlier bombardment is seen in the foreground. The rebel attack is coming from the southern or left side, very accurate since Armistead was originally placed far in that direction. It shows a large contingent of southern troops in the Emmitsburg Road just as suggested by Hess in his book and as I noted in my Pickett’s charge challenges. It shows the heavy smoke from the weaponry and seminary ridge in the background.  Note also the Codori Farm at the top left.

 

Casualty Rate

Between 10-15,000 infantry made the charge. The duration of Pickett’s Charge was 50 minutes. Total Confederate losses during the attack were 6,555, of which 1,123 Confederates were killed on the battlefield, 4,019 were wounded, and 3750 were captured including many of those listed as wounded. Many of the “wounded” died over the next days to weeks. Do the math: that’s 22 killed and 80 wounded per minute; about 1.7 casualties per second.

The casualty rate of Pickett’s Charge is typically given as 50-60%, with 10% killed on the

battlefield and 30% wounded with another 30% captured, many overlapping the wounded category. The Union loss is thought to be 1500 casualties. Pickett's division suffered 2,655 casualties (498 killed, 643 wounded, 833 wounded and captured, and 681 captured, unwounded). Pettigrew's losses are estimated to be about 2,700 (470 killed, 1,893 wounded, 337 captured). Trimble's two brigades lost 885 (155 killed, 650 wounded, and 80 captured). Wilcox's brigade reported losses of 200, Lang's about 400.

These figures are similar to the famed Charge of the Light Brigade (Crimean War, 1854) where, a British cavalry unit attacked Russian forces. The casualty rate was exceptionally high, with around 40% killed or wounded. These rates surpass the Assault on the Great Redoubt (Battle of Borodino, Napoleonic Wars, 1812), where The French Grand Army's assault on the Russian Great Redoubt during the Battle of Borodino resulted in high casualties; estimates suggest casualty rates of around 30%, and also the Assault on Marye's Heights (Battle of Fredericksburg, 1862), where the casualty rates for the Union troops were estimated to be around 15-20%.

The Confederate Army lost many of its top officers. Brigadier General Armistead was mortally wounded and captured. Garnett was killed in action; his body was never recovered and is believed to be buried with his men in Richmond, Virginia. Kemper was wounded and taken prisoner by the Union. Although the newspapers reported he was killed in the battle, his family did not believe it and were able to free Kemper from the Union prison.

 

Was Pickett’s Charge a Bad Decision?

The criticisms often directed at Lee for Pickett’s Charge are unwarranted. What else could he do under the circumstances? He had tried both flanks. He couldn’t go left because it led further away from any viable target. He couldn’t go right because it lengthened his supply line and he was out of artillery ammunition. If he turned around and declared victory, he wouldn’t have changed anything in the trajectory of the war and he’d be right where he started.

The Gettysburg campaign was a roll of the dice at a crucial moment.. You have to see it as a desperate final try to win the war on the battlefield. Despite all of Lee’s victories, the Union had not given up and in fact, were winning in the Western theater. The west was being lost and the confederacy was running out of time. Resources are dwindling. Davis and Lee know that things aren’t looking promising. He was a riverboat gambler who rolled the dice in every battle. From that perspective, it starts to make sense.

One hears suggestions that General Lee was ill and that he had heart disease, weakening his judgment. A contemporary analysis shows no reason for this suspicion. Heart attacks do not lead to poor judgment 2 months after they occur.

Faced with circumstances on July 3, Lee had no other options but to attack, and no other place to attack than the center.  If he retreated then the campaign would be a failure. The salient on Cemetery Hill is the obvious place to attack. Ewell is stalled on the left. Longstreet tried on the right the day before. He wants to go further to the right but there is no road there and no supply line. Hill is sick. Longstreet is being obstinate. Stuart had gotten nowhere that morning. General Lee is all alone. Where Lee miscalculated is that Hunt had created a deadly crossfire with artillery that had never been done like that before. Lee had not anticipated as devastating an artillery defense and indeed, none like it had ever been organized. Lee lost that day but look at all the other gambles he won.

 

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Further Reading:

·       Hess, Earl, Pickett's Charge--The Last Attack at Gettysburg.  UNC Press, 2010.

·       J David Petruzzi, The Complete Gettysburg Guide. SavasBeattie, 2009.

·       Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels: The Classic Novel of the Civil War (Civil War Trilogy).Modern Library, 2004.

·       Stephen W Sears, Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.

·       Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People. University of North Carolina Press, 2017.

·       William A. Frassanito, Gettysburg: A Journey in Time. Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975.

·       https://theconversation.com/picketts-charge-what-modern-mathematics-teaches-us-about-civil-war-battle-78982

·       Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

·       James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. 2nd edition, Lippincott, 1912. Accessed at: http://www.wtj.com/archives/longstreet/

·       Michael J. Armstrong and Steven E. Soderbergh, “Refighting Pickett’s Charge:  mathematical modeling of the Civil War battlefield,” Social Science Quarterly 96, No. 4 (May 14, 2015), 1153-1168. 

·       Richard Rollins, “The Second Wave of Pickett’s Charge,” Gettysburg Magazine, No. 18, July 1998, 104-110.

·       Lloyd W Klein and Eric J Wittenberg, “Did General Lee’s heart attack impact the conduct of the Battle of Gettysburg?” Gettysburg Magazine 67:July 2022; 62-75.

·       James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

·       Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volumes 1-3. Random House, 1963.

·       https://emergingcivilwar.com/2018/06/26/artillery-henry-j-hunt-chief-of-artillery-for-the-army-of-the-potomac/

·       https://militaryhistorynow.com/2022/11/27/armistead-and-hancock-rethinking-the-storied-friendship-between-opposing-generals-at-gettysburg/amp/

·       Lloyd W Klein,  “Why Pickett’s Charge Failed”. The Civil War Center. https://thecivilwarcenter.com/2022/06/29/why-picketts-charge-failed-analysis-and-significance/

The 1862 Emancipation Proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln took place during the US Civil War. Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at what the Emancipation Proclamation was and the moral and political motivations for it.

First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln. By Francis Bicknell Carpenter, 1864.

“Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We -- even we here -- hold the power, and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free -- honorable alike in what we give, and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just -- a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.”

Abraham Lincoln, December 1862 Annual Message to Congress

 

The earth laughs, the sun laughs

over every wise harvest of man,

over man looking toward peace

by the light of the hard old teaching:

“We must disenthrall ourselves.”

Carl Sandburg, From “The Long Shadow of Lincoln: A Litany”

 

 

Carl Sandburg the poet, and lover of words, recognized that Lincoln’s use of the word “disenthrall” in this context was intentional and multi-layered. The word means “to set free” or “to liberate” and Lincoln chose this word on purpose. Lincoln’s genius was in his ability to find new solutions to complicated problems by “thinking outside the box”, which is Lincoln’s literal meaning here.  But he was also “setting free” the slaves. Moreover, crafting the goal of “setting free” the slaves into a war aim meant changing the war’s purpose. It meant giving a new reason to fight the war, adding to our resolve to carry it through. Also, we see that by doing so, the country was going to change – we were setting ourselves free from what the country had been before and would become something new; there was no going backward. “A new birth of freedom”, as he would say a year later. And in doing so, we were liberating ourselves from an immoral practice. As a nation that enslaved humans, we were ourselves enslaved to defend its existence, and now we would be “set free” of that burden, America’s Original Sin.

Lincoln, a highly astute and practical statesman, adeptly maneuvered through the political landscape by employing a pragmatic approach to problem-solving. He relied on empirical evidence to determine effective solutions that would not only maintain his position of authority but also garner sufficient support from the public to bring his government along. Lincoln's profound comprehension of the gravity of the situation, coupled with his remarkable skill in articulating his ideas, reverberates throughout history. The Emancipation Proclamation, hailed as a momentous moral decision, also aligns with this interpretation, further highlighting Lincoln's pragmatic political leadership.

Sandburg’s insight is founded on Lincoln’s 1862 Annual Message to Congress, introducing the Emancipation Proclamation:

“The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.”

 

There is no doubt that Lincoln didn’t solve all of the problems of his, or our, times, especially connected with race. But neither have the next 30 presidents. Lincoln won the war, but that didn’t mean everyone agreed on what should be done after the war; there were as many views as people on that subject. And then, of course, he was assassinated right as the war ended.

 

What Were Lincoln’s Views On Slavery?

Lincoln's primary objective was to preserve the unity of the nation, a goal he successfully achieved. This accomplishment was unparalleled, as no other individual could have accomplished this feat. Lincoln's journey towards emancipation was far from simple, as it required more than a mere proclamation. The process necessitated a constitutional amendment and political consensus, both of which were absent at the onset of the war. Furthermore, there was widespread disagreement regarding emancipation, with individuals from both the northern and southern regions expressing dissent. Nevertheless, Lincoln devised a strategy to bring about this significant transformation, a feat that undoubtedly warrants immense recognition. It is important to acknowledge that although the Southerners found ways to circumvent certain laws after the war, and true equality wasn’t a reality until the Civil Rights era, slavery did end. Lincoln deserves credit for this achievement. In the northern states, black individuals were granted voting rights, legal freedom, and equality, a truly remarkable accomplishment.

Throughout his public and private addresses, Lincoln consistently voiced his moral opposition to slavery. He made it clear that he held an inherent aversion to the institution, firmly stating, "I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong." "I can not remember when I did not so think, and feel”, he noted.  However, the challenge lay in determining the appropriate course of action to address slavery's existence and bring about its demise. Slavery was deeply entrenched within the nation's constitutional framework and played a significant role in the country's economy. Consequently, finding a solution to this complex problem proved to be politically challenging.

In addition, there was the question of what would become of the four million slaves if liberated: how they would earn a living in a society that had long rejected and marginalized them. His proposition to send African Americans to colonies in Africa rather than keeping them in America, although criticized, stemmed from his recognition of the deeply ingrained prejudice within the American character, prevalent in both the North and the South. Lincoln believed that African Americans would prefer to return to their ancestral homeland due to the pervasive discrimination they faced. However, it was through his friendship with Frederick Douglass and his acknowledgment of the bravery displayed by black troops that Lincoln came to understand that America was indeed their homeland. African Americans desired equality within their own country and had no desire to be relocated elsewhere. This realization challenged Lincoln's previous notions and highlighted the importance of achieving equality within the United States.

Lincoln also had to balance the necessity and emphasis on saving the Union relative to freeing the slaves. His response to Horace Greely’s editorial calling on Lincoln to free the enslaved people is definitive in this regard; he clearly says that his primary goal is to save the Union, and everything that he does, or doesn’t, do is based on his analysis of that test. The last paragraph states: "I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.” Often this response is quoted out of context to suggest that Lincoln didn’t care about slavery. Its intent however is to demonstrate that while Lincoln the man hated slavery, his role as president meant he had to remain focused on what his primary job responsibility – saving the Union -- required.

One month later he released the preliminary emancipation proclamation having determined that freeing the slaves was a necessary goal of the war, which the majority in the Union now supported.

Eric Foner's book, The Fiery Trial, delves into Abraham Lincoln's evolving perspective on race and slavery throughout his lifetime. Foner has said, “I have never called Lincoln a racist. He shared some of the prejudices of his time. Was Lincoln an anti-racist? No not really. Was he an egalitarian in the modern sense? No. Race was not a major concern of Lincoln. He didn’t think about race very much. To ask if he’s a racist is the wrong question. And if you ask the wrong question, you’re going to get the wrong answer.”  While Lincoln always recognized the immorality of slavery and supported the freedom of slaves, his stance on rights shifted in accordance with the changing sentiments of the Republican Party and the North. As a politician, Lincoln strategically positioned himself in the middle ground of prevailing opinions to secure electoral success. It is important to note that he did not lead the way, as Frederick Douglass astutely observed. Despite being influenced by figures like Douglass, Lincoln's stated views on race indicate that he did not truly consider African Americans as his social equals. Foner distinguishes between Lincoln's belief in equal natural rights, his eventual acceptance of legal rights, and his likely lack of support for social acceptance, which he probably never did favor, a sentiment shared by many white individuals in the 19th century.

 

What was the Emancipation Proclamation?

The issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln on January 1, 1863, marked a significant moment in American history. This executive order, which came at a time of great political turmoil, demonstrated a remarkable display of political courage. It was a decision that Lincoln believed to be morally right and necessary for the nation's progress. The Battle of Fredericksburg had dealt a severe blow to Northern morale, plunging the country into a state of despair. In response to the victory at Antietam on September 22, 1862, Lincoln took the opportunity to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, setting the stage for the eventual liberation of millions of enslaved individuals.

As the commander-in-chief, Lincoln strategically employed the Emancipation Proclamation as a war tactic. By emancipating enslaved people, he aimed to weaken the South's labor force and disrupt their war efforts. However, Lincoln was not oblivious to the potential consequences of his actions. He recognized the deep-rooted racial divisions within the nation and feared the long-lasting impact of his decision. Nevertheless, during his second presidential campaign, Lincoln boldly advocated for the permanent abolition of slavery through a constitutional amendment. The Emancipation Proclamation effectively altered the legal status of over 3.5 million enslaved African Americans in the Confederate states, granting them freedom once they escaped their enslavers' control and sought refuge with Union forces.  The 13th Amendment to the Constitution made this the law of the land.

The Emancipation Proclamation did not free all slaves. It only applied to the ten states that were still in rebellion on January 1, 1863 and did not extend to the approximately 500,000 slaves in the border states of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware, as well as parts of Virginia and Louisiana that were no longer in rebellion. This has led to debates regarding the effectiveness and impact of the proclamation. Rather than being a definitive act of liberation, it should be understood as a policy announcement that guided the actions of the army and declared freedom as the Union forces advanced.

Lincoln understood that the federal government's authority to abolish slavery during peacetime was limited by the Constitution, which assigned the issue to individual states before 1865. However, during the Civil War, Lincoln utilized his authority as the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy" under Article II, section 2 of the United States Constitution to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. In doing so, he claimed the power to emancipate slaves in the rebellious states as a necessary measure to suppress the rebellion. Lincoln also referenced the Confiscation Act of 1861 and the Confiscation Act of 1862 as additional sources of authority in the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation of 1862 as sources for his authority in the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.

While the immediate aim of the Emancipation Proclamation was to weaken the Confederacy's war effort, its broader significance was evident. The document signaled that the United States would no longer support the enslavement of individuals based on their race, a practice deeply ingrained in the nation's history. Furthermore, it opened the door for Black men to participate in national affairs on equal terms. Lincoln actively encouraged Black Americans to join the U.S. Army, which traditionally served as a pathway to citizenship, and urged them to work diligently for fair wages. In this way, the Emancipation Proclamation not only sought to undermine the Confederacy but also aimed to redefine the principles and values of the United States.

 

Political Versus Moral Motivations

Martin Luther King Jr once said that “the ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy.” As previously noted, December 1862 was one of the darkest moments in our history. After two years of battle and hundreds of thousands of casualties, the Union appeared to be losing the war. People were losing hope and disaster loomed. Lincoln at this moment made an extraordinary paradigm-shattering decision to shift the focus of the war slightly from saving the union to freeing the slaves, arguing they were one and the same.

But although it was presented chiefly as a military measure, the proclamation marked a crucial shift in Lincoln’s views on slavery. By declaring emancipation, the focus of the Civil War shifted from preserving the Union to abolishing slavery, thereby setting a definitive path for the nation's future after the war.

The Republican abolitionists in the North were elated by Lincoln's wholehearted support for their cause, which they had elected him to champion. Although the enslaved individuals in the South did not immediately rise in rebellion upon the proclamation's signing, they gradually began to emancipate themselves as Union forces advanced into Confederate territory. Towards the end of the war, a substantial number of enslaved people left their former masters in large numbers. They actively contributed to the Union Army by engaging in combat, cultivating crops, undertaking various military roles, and working in the mills of the North. While the proclamation did not receive unanimous praise from all northerners, particularly white workers and troops who feared job competition from the influx of formerly enslaved individuals, it did have the distinct advantage of dissuading Britain and France from establishing official diplomatic relations with the Confederacy.

 

Conclusion

The mythological Lincoln on Mt Rushmore is America's greatest president. We desire our heroes to have been just and motivated to do the right thing. The real Lincoln indeed was, but he was also doing the politically intelligent thing as well. Whichever motive you think was primary and which secondary (although his response to Horace Greeley seems definitive in favor of the political), he found the solution by “disenthralling” ourselves from our past.Morality aside, it was a brilliant political maneuver, perhaps the most magnificent achievement in American history, and it saved our country.

The signing of the Emancipation Proclamation symbolized Lincoln’s unwavering determination to preserve the Union at any cost, while simultaneously finding moral virtue. This act held both political and ethical significance, as it transformed emancipation into a war objective. It is crucial to acknowledge that human beings, including Lincoln, are imperfect, intricate, and often contradictory. Contrary to the idealized image of Lincoln, he was not immune to the complexities of human nature. Ultimately, the limitations of Lincoln’s racial perspectives are an indictment of the larger society. To truly comprehend our identity, it is imperative to examine the unvarnished reality of American history, rather than subscribing to an appealing fairy tale. The intricate and inconsistent nature of human experiences provides a more accurate depiction of our racist past than superficial notions. Just as the romanticized portrayal of Robert E. Lee as the "Marble Man" should be rejected,  so should the myth of Lincoln as the "Great Liberator Father Abraham." A comprehensive understanding necessitates recognizing the arduous journey Lincoln undertook to achieve greatness. This genuine narrative, rather than the oversimplified fable, is truly inspiring and represents the authentic story of our nation.

 

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Thomas Jefferson, the third President of the United States, played a pivotal role in one of the most famous and consequential explorations in American history – the Lewis and Clark Expedition. This expedition, also known as the Corps of Discovery, was commissioned by Jefferson in 1803 with the goal of exploring and mapping the newly acquired Louisiana Territory and finding a practical route to the Pacific Ocean. Led by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, the expedition lasted from 1804 to 1806 and covered over 8,000 miles of uncharted territory, leaving a lasting impact on American history and geography.

Richard Bluttal explains.

Thomas Jefferson in later life. Portrait by Thomas Sully.

Thomas Jefferson's interest in the exploration of the American West can be traced back to his early years as a young surveyor and land speculator in Virginia. He understood the strategic importance of expanding American territory westward and believed in the potential for economic growth and scientific discovery in the vast wilderness beyond the Mississippi River. Jefferson's vision for the future of the United States included a nation that stretched from coast to coast, with access to valuable resources and trade routes.

In 1803, Jefferson seized the opportunity to expand the nation's territory when he negotiated the Louisiana Purchase with France, effectively doubling the size of the United States overnight. The acquisition of the Louisiana Territory presented Jefferson with a unique opportunity to explore and map the uncharted lands west of the Mississippi River, which inspired him to commission the Lewis and Clark Expedition.

Meriwether Lewis, a trusted confidant of Jefferson, was chosen to lead the expedition due to his background in the military and his experience as Jefferson's personal secretary. Lewis, in turn, selected William Clark, a seasoned frontiersman and skilled mapmaker, to serve as his co-leader. Together, Lewis and Clark assembled a diverse team of soldiers, interpreters, hunters, and tradesmen to accompany them on their journey into the unknown.

 

Expedition begins

The Lewis and Clark expedition began in St. Louis, Missouri, where the Corps of Discovery set out on their journey up the Missouri River. The expedition consisted of a diverse group of individuals, including soldiers, boatmen, interpreters, and hunters, as well as Sacagawea, a Shoshone woman who served as a guide and interpreter. Throughout their journey, Lewis and Clark meticulously documented their observations and discoveries, keeping detailed journals that provided valuable insights into the natural and cultural landscape of the American West.

One of the most significant achievements of the Lewis and Clark expedition was the successful establishment of diplomatic relations with Native American tribes along their route. The expedition encountered numerous Native American groups, including the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Shoshone, and engaged in trade and diplomacy with them. Sacagawea's presence was particularly valuable in facilitating communication with the Shoshone tribe, as she was able to interpret and negotiate on behalf of the expedition.

 

Challenges 

Lewis and Clark faced a myriad of challenges during their historic exploration of the uncharted American West. Venturing into unknown territory presented numerous obstacles that tested the resilience and resourcefulness of the Corps of Discovery. Some of the key challenges they encountered included:

1. Geographic obstacles: The American West was characterized by rugged terrain, dense forests, and wide rivers, making travel difficult and slow. The expedition had to navigate through mountain ranges, cross rivers, and traverse dense forests, often without clear paths or landmarks to guide them.

2. Harsh weather conditions: The expedition faced extreme weather conditions, including scorching heat in the summer and freezing temperatures in the winter. The unpredictable weather made travel challenging and required the expedition to adapt to changing conditions.

3. Limited supplies: The expedition had to contend with limited supplies of food, water, and ammunition, which had to be carefully rationed to ensure the survival of the group. Hunting, fishing, and foraging became essential tasks to supplement their provisions.

4. Encounters with Native American tribes: The expedition encountered numerous Native American tribes along their route, some of whom were initially hostile to the explorers. Communication barriers, cultural differences, and misunderstandings often led to tense interactions, requiring diplomacy and negotiation to maintain peace.

5. Sickness and injuries: Members of the expedition fell ill due to exposure, fatigue, and poor sanitation, with some suffering from injuries sustained during their journey. Medical supplies were limited, and the expedition had to rely on the expertise of their physician, Dr. John Potts, to treat illnesses and injuries.

6. Mapping and navigation: The expedition had to create accurate maps of the region as they traveled through uncharted territory. Lewis and Clark relied on rudimentary instruments, such as compasses and sextants, to determine their position and chart their course, a challenging task in the vast and unfamiliar landscape of the American West.

 

The expedition also made important scientific discoveries, documenting and collecting specimens of previously unknown plants and animals. The expedition's naturalists, including Meriwether Lewis and William Clark themselves, collected samples of flora and fauna, providing valuable information about the biodiversity of the American West. The expedition also mapped the geography of the region, creating detailed maps that would later be used by settlers and explorers.

 

Expedition ends

The Lewis and Clark expedition persevered and successfully reached the Pacific Ocean in November 1805. The expedition spent the winter at Fort Clatsop in present-day Oregon before beginning their journey back to St. Louis in the spring of 1806. Along the way, they retraced their steps and encountered new challenges, but ultimately returned to St. Louis in September 1806, completing their historic journey.

 

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During the years that Impressionism was at the forefront of Parisian artistic expression, Edgar Degas’ work was amongst the best known. He was famous for painting scenes of the ballet, and could frequently be found backstage after performances or watching rehearsals at the Paris Opera, where many young girls went to train in the hopes of becoming revered dancers. Degas was also a sculptor and his famous statue, ‘The Little Fourteen-Year-Old Dancer,’ is known the world over, yet unlike its creator, little is known about the model behind it.

Here, Erin Bienvenu looks at the life of the ‘little dancer’, Marie Geneviève van Goethem.

The Little Fourteen-Year-Old Dancer by Edgar Degas. Source: H. O. Havemeyer Collection, Bequest of Mrs. H. O. Havemeyer, 1929. Available here.

Her name was Marie Geneviève van Goethem and she was born to Belgian parents in Paris on June 7, 1865. Marie had two sisters, the older Antionette and younger Louise-Joséphine. Their mother was a laundress, and their father a tailor, though he disappeared early from his daughters’ lives. Consequently, the van Goethem’s were poor and moved frequently to avoid their debts.

 

Dancer at the Paris Opera

Desperate for money, Marie’s mother pushed her daughters to become dancers at the Paris Opera, at the time a way many families with young girls earned extra money. But it was a difficult life, the girls, known as ‘Little Rats’ earned little and worked around twelve hours a day, six days a week. Marie walked to and from her classes, her feet often bleeding from the intensive sessions, compounded by the poor nutritional value of the food she ate at home, and the fact that the van Goethem’s did not have running water in their house.

As money was a constant concern for many, the opera also operated a secondary, unofficial trade, which revealed a much darker side to the façade of beautiful dancers- prostitution. Backstage, after performances, the dancers were encouraged to find wealthy male ‘protectors’-their mothers often aiding and encouraging these introductions. Marie’s mother was soon offering up her daughters to these rich, usually older, men. 

Marie and her younger sister were accepted into the school around 1878, at which stage Antionette was already attending classes. Marie made her stage debut, a walk on part, in the ballet La Korrigane, but she never progressed through the levels of the ballet, throughout her time there she remained in the lowest rank.

 

Model for Degas

To earn some extra income Antionette was also posing for artists, including Edgar Degas, already well known as a painter of ballerinas and it was probably through her sister that Marie met the artist. Soon she was posing for him as well, earning more money than she did at the Paris Opera (four francs as opposed to the two earned from the ballet), and in a less taxing environment. She lived close to his studio and would have walked there for the sessions. Though it was easier work than the ballet sometimes Marie would have to stand for hours in one pose, not moving a muscle. Neither Degas, nor Marie, left any written record of their working relationship, but he did use her as a model for numerous artworks, both paintings and sculptures, the most famous being the ‘Little Dancer.’

 

‘Little Dancer’ Exhibited

The wax sculpture was dressed in a real tutu, bodice and ballet slippers, and had a wig of real hair, it was exhibited at the Sixth Impressionist Exhibition in 1881. The first and only time Degas put it on public display. It caused a certain amount of controversy. For many it was too lifelike and was criticised for being ugly. One critic described it as displaying “the lowest depths of dance” and another accused it of “bad instincts and vicious tendencies.”

Wax was an unusual choice in sculpture at the time as was Degas decision to dress his piece in real clothes, and display it in a glass case-these unusual aspects added fuel to the critic’s fire. Though at least one believed it to be “the only really modern attempt that I know of in sculpture.”

The reactions to the piece displayed a shocking amount of classism, particularly prominent at the time owing to the popular idea of physiognomy as applied to criminals- the belief that criminals bore similar features, such as large noses and jaws, and were generally believed to be of the lower classes. The idea had recently been in the news thanks to a murder case involving three young men, who were described as ‘bestial,’ a word also applied to the Little Dancer. Similarly, the fact that in Paris dance and prostitution were seen as synonymous led many to believe a ballerina was unworthy of being celebrated in such a way.  In many respects Degas statue was simply too revolutionary for the time.

 

Later Life

As for Marie, she had begun missing classes at the ballet, and was fined for her absences. It’s not known if she knew about the furore the statue caused, and if she did, how it would have made her feel. She was often seen in the Montmartre Cafés and cabarets, many of which were open all night. They were popular with the bohemian and artistic sets, but were unsuitable for a young girl. Eventually she was dismissed from the ballet for missing too many classes.

The last recorded sighting of Marie comes in 1882, the same year as her dismissal from the opera. Her sister, Antionette had stolen seven hundred francs from a ‘client’ and was attempting to flee to Belgium. She was found waiting at a train station with her mother and Marie, and was arrested. Antionette was sentenced to three months in prison, but afterwards lived a quiet life, passing away at the age of thirty-seven. The youngest of the van Goethem girls, Louise-Joséphine, had a long career at the ballet, becoming an instructor there and passing away in 1945.

Following his death Degas sculpture of Marie was cast in bronze and replicated, it also gained a new appreciation from critics and the general public alike. The Little Dancer can be found in galleries around the world and is much loved.

Marie, however, disappeared from the historical record following her sister’s arrest. Her subsequent life and fate remain unknown. She remains a mystery, a young woman forever immortalised as a fourteen-year-old dancer.

 

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References

https://mediatheque.cnd.fr/?Van-Goethem-Charlotte,213

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/degas-and-his-dancers-79455990/

Laurens, Camille (2018), Little Dancer Aged Fourteen: The True Story Behind Degas’s Masterpiece. New York: Other Press

Loyrette, Henri (2016), Degas: A New Vision. Melbourne: National Gallery of Victoria

Culp's Hill is a frequently overlooked area of the Gettysburg battle and played a crucial role in the Union's victory. Situated about three-quarters of a mile south of Gettysburg, it formed the tip of a fishhook-shaped series of hills and ridges that made up the Union lines. The significance of Culp's Hill lay in its strategic location. It guarded the main Union supply line on the Baltimore Pike and protected the rear and right flank of the Union army positioned on Cemetery Ridge.

Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened at Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field.

If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here, and part 3 on day 2 of the battle is here.

Scene behind the breastworks on Culp’s Hill, morning of July 3rd 1863. By Edwin Forbes.

Cemetery and Culp’s Hills

The configuration of the Union lines, with Cemetery Hill at its center, provided a strong defensive position known as the "fishhook." This layout allowed the Union forces to benefit from interior lines, making it easier to reinforce and support different sections of the line. Cemetery Hill, situated behind the town, offered a natural defense as attacks could not be launched directly from the streets. To reach Cemetery Hill, attackers had to either capture Culp's Hill on the East or the northern section of Cemetery Ridge on the west. General Lee's strategy relied on attacking the flanks, while the Union's strategy focused on defending these hills to protect the center.

Culp's Hill itself consists of two distinct peaks, an upper hill and a lower hill, separated by a narrow saddle. The higher peak, densely covered in trees, rises to an elevation of 630 feet above sea level, while the lower peak is approximately 100 feet shorter. The eastern slope of Culp's Hill descends towards Rock Creek, while the western slope leads to a saddle with Stevens Knoll. This topography provided natural advantages for defenders, making it challenging for attackers to gain a foothold on the hill.

 

July 1st

Following the retreat of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps regrouped at Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were positioned to safeguard the withdrawal. Meanwhile, Wadsworth’s division hurried to Culp’s Hill to protect the right flank, and additional reinforcements were on their way. By 4:30 p.m., 500 troops from the 7th Indiana and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps had arrived, with Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger’s 1st Division taking up position behind Cemetery Hill. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm, adding 8,000 fresh troops to the Union forces, bringing their total strength to around 20,000 soldiers combined with the XI Corps. The Federals, in addition to the reinforcements, had managed to salvage most of their artillery pieces during the retreat, with almost 40 guns joining Smith’s six guns atop Cemetery Hill.

Ewell's missed opportunity to seize Culp's Hill/Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often regarded as a critical moment in the battle. When Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's third division arrived, he was instructed to take the hill if it was not already occupied. However, Johnson hesitated and decided against the attack, sending a small party to scout the area. This party encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, leading to a skirmish that forced them to retreat. By 7 pm, Culp's Hill was well-defended, with the Iron Brigade and other units in position, making it a challenging target for the Confederates.

Pfanz concluded that Ewell had made the best decision, citing the failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk, but was it as prepared at 5 pm? It was less well-defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, General Gordon wrote in his memoirs that he was ready, but his men had seen significant action.  Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. Moreover, the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.

Ewell did consider taking Culp's Hill, which would have made the Union position on Cemetery Hill untenable Given the discretionary and inherently contradictory order he received from General Lee, General Ewell chose not to attempt the assault. The three main reasons most often given include: 1) the battle fatigue of his men in the late afternoon, as his men had marched a great distance and were exhausted 2) the difficulty of assaulting the hill through the narrow corridors afforded by the streets of Gettysburg immediately to the north, and 3) that after the battle at Barlow’s Knoll and the attacks through the town, there had been enough casualties and mixing of lines to severely weaken command and control. He might also have realized that although he might have been able to take Culps Hill, he couldn’t hold it with a single division after a counterattack from East Cemetery Hill.

And surely that would require a general engagement. It’s possible that Ewell may have felt that it was practicable to take the hill, but did not see how he could do so without bringing on a general engagement. He only had 1 division on hand, it was getting dark, and he wasn't going to receive any backup in any attack. He wanted support and none was available.. However, Jubal Early opposed the idea when it was reported that Union troops (probably Slocum's XII Corps) were approaching the York Pike, and he sent the brigades of John B. Gordon and Brig. Gen. William "Extra Billy" Smith to block that perceived threat.  "Allegheny" Johnson's division of Ewell's Corps was within an hour of arriving on the battlefield and Early urged waiting for Johnson's division to take the hill. After Johnson's division arrived via the Chambersburg Pike, it maneuvered toward the east of town in preparation to take the hill, but a small reconnaissance party sent in advance encountered a picket line of the 7th Indiana Infantry, which opened fire and captured a Confederate officer and soldier. The remainder of the Confederates fled and attempts to seize Culp's Hill on July 1 came to an end.

Although Ewell has been blamed for not aggressively pursuing the Union line on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, which left the Union on high ground, most military authorities and historians who have looked into the matter have pretty routinely concluded that Culp's Hill would not have been easy to capture on July 1st. Some historians say that it's 20/20 hindsight that Ewell could have easily pushed the Union line from the high ground; others say he was too timid. Stephen W. Sears has suggested that Gen. Meade would have invoked his original plan for a defensive line on Pipe Creek and withdrawn the Army of the Potomac, although that movement would have been a dangerous operation under pressure from Lee.

But, a real conundrum exists in whether or not Lee and Ewell were talking about the same hill. Lee was on Seminary Ridge and may have been looking at East Cemetery Hill while Ewell was at the base of Culp’s Hill. It’s unclear whether Lee & Ewell had a map that showed this.

Lost Cause Reinterpretation? Although the “If practicable order” story is a central part of Gettysburg lore, appearing in many books about the Civil War — it is also greatly negative against Ewell, and perhaps purposely so. The story may have been concocted by Lee’s apologists in a postwar attempt to shift the blame for losing the battle from their hero onto Ewell. In truth, Lee sent no definitive orders directing Ewell to pursue the enemy when the Union lines broke in front of the town, and Ewell was not benumbed by indecision when he defeated them in the town and on Barlow’s Knoll.

It was not until after the war, and Lee’s death, that Lost Cause supporters sought to explain how the infallible general was defeated at Gettysburg. Confederate veterans like John B. Gordon, Isaac Trimble, and Randolph H. McKim insinuated in their postwar writings that it was Ewell’s timidity that had cost Lee the victory. Postwar proponents of the Lost Cause movement, assigned to Ewell's staff during the battle, criticized him bitterly to deflect any blame for losing the battle on Robert E. Lee. Part of their argument was that the Federal soldiers were demoralized by their defeat earlier in the day. McKim’s 1915 article in The Southern Historical Society Papers stated. “Here then we find still another of General Lee’s lieutenants, the gallant and usually energetic Ewell, failing at a critical moment to recognize what ought to be done,” he wrote. “Had the advance on Cemetery Hill been pushed forward promptly that afternoon we now know beyond any possible question that the hill was feebly occupied and could have been easily taken, and Meade would have been forced to retreat.”

Walter H. Taylor, Lee’s former aide, also sided with the anti-Ewell faction in his memoir “Four Years With General Lee.” Taylor wrote that Ewell voiced no objection to the order he brought from Lee to take the high ground “if possible,” and that he returned to Lee under the impression Ewell would attack.

But there is another side to the story. Maj. Campbell Brown, Ewell’s stepson, and aide, observed that the “discovery that this lost us the battle is one of those frequently-recurring but tardy strokes of military genius of which one hears long after the minute circumstances that rendered them at the time impracticable, are forgotten.” And while Taylor’s story became an important part of the controversy, Brown was adamant that he never brought such orders. In an 1885 letter to Gen. Henry Jackson Hunt, the former chief of artillery for the Army of the Potomac, Brown wrote, “I say broadly that Col. Taylor’s account of this battle is utterly worthless — that he carried no such order to Gen. Ewell ... I do not impugn his veracity but his memory has been trusted and has deceived him.”

Major General Isaac Trimble, who was attached on special duty to Ewell’s command during the battle, was among those who tried to dismiss Lee’s warning. Writing for the Southern Historical Society (SHS) years after both Lee and Ewell had died, Trimble recalled his attempt to persuade Ewell to attack:

“The battle was over and we had won it handsomely. General Ewell moved about uneasily, a good deal excited, and seemed to me to be undecided about what to do next. I approached him and said: "Well, General, we have had a grand success; are you not going to follow it up and push our advantage?"

 

He replied that General Lee had instructed him not to bring on a general engagement without orders and that he would wait for them.

 

I said, "That hardly applies to the present state of things, as we have fought a hard battle already, and should secure the advantage gained". He made no rejoinder but was far from composure. I was deeply impressed with the conviction that it was a critical moment for us and made a remark to that effect.

 

As no movement seemed immediate, I rode off to our left, north of the town, to reconnoiter, and noticed conspicuously the wooded hill northeast of Gettysburg (Culp's), and a half mile distant, and of an elevation to command the country for miles each way, and overlooking Cemetery Hill above the town. Returning to see General Ewell, who was still under much embarrassment, I said, "General, There," pointing to Culp's Hill, "is an eminence of commanding position, and not now occupied, as it ought to be by us or the enemy soon. I advise you to send a brigade and hold it if we are to remain here." He said: "Are you sure it commands the town?" [I replied,] "Certainly it does, as you can see, and it ought to be held by us at once." General Ewell made some impatient reply, and the conversation dropped.”

 

— Isaac R. Trimble, "The Battle and Campaign of Gettysburg." Southern Historical Society Papers 26 (1898).

 

 

Observers at the scene later reported that the "impatient reply" was, "When I need advice from a junior officer I generally ask for it." They also stated that Trimble threw down his sword in disgust and stormed off.

Did this happen as it is stated? No one knows. Trimble was certainly upset that he was without a command on July 1. He would lose a leg and be captured 2 days later as he led a division in Pickett’s Charge, never to return to command. So, he certainly had plenty of scores to settle in 1898, 35 years later. Ewell never wrote or spoke about the matter in the 7 years he survived after the war.

 

July 2nd

On day 2, Lee’s plan was for Longstreet to attack north along Emmitsburg Turnpike to Cemetery Ridge combined with a simultaneous pincer move on Culp's Hill by  Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson’s division from Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corp. But Longstreet's brigades of McLaw and Hood were delayed and then got tangled up at Little Round Top and Sickles in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield. The attack ended at the south section of Cemetery Ridge.

An acoustic shadow at Gettysburg on Day 2 occurred when Ewell was supposed to attack Culp’s Hill when Longstreet’s artillery started firing, but he never heard it, allowing Meade to shift some of the forces on Culp’s Hill to his left flank.

Alpheus Williams led the 1st Division. Due to a mix-up in the command structure, General Williams played a prominent role because of a miscommunication between General Meade and Williams’s superior officer. This miscommunication resulted in Williams commanding the XII Corps. Meanwhile, Maj Gen Henry Slocum believed he was in command of the right wing, consisting of the 11th and 12th Corps, and considered Williams as merely the temporary corps commander of the 12th. Slocum held the Union right from Culp's Hill to across the Baltimore Pike. With Longstreet’s attack, Meade ordered relocating XII Corps from Culps Hill. Williams successfully convinced Meade to leave a single brigade on Culps Hill instead of relocating everyone, to defend the entire right flank. This suggestion ultimately saved the position when the Confederate left wing launched an attack that evening. Despite leading two days of intense fighting on the Union's extreme right, Williams did not receive any official credit, as Slocum was late turning in his report, and Meade already submitted his report to the war department.

Maj Gen George Sears Greene At about 6 pm July 2nd, Meade shifted almost the entire XII Corps from the Union right to strengthen the left flank. Culp’s Hill was weakened to defend Cemetery Ridge against Longstreet’s attack on the left. Brig Gen George S Greene was a brigade commander in the division of Maj. Gen. John W. Geary.. His lone brigade of 1,350 New Yorkers (five regiments) was left to defend a one-half-mile line on Culp's Hill when an entire Confederate division attacked. Fortunately, Greene, a civil engineer, had insisted that his troops construct strong field fortifications. These preparations proved decisive and his brigade held off multiple attacks for hours. With the shift of troops, Greene was left with 5 regiments (1350 troops) to defend ½ mile of front against an entire Confederate corps.

Maj Gen George Sears Greene, a 62-year-old with an impressive war record, found himself continually overlooked for promotion due to his age. On the morning of July 2, he insisted that his men entrench on Culp’s Hill. As a former West Point professor of mathematics and engineering, Greene approached the situation with a strategic mindset that differed from his counterparts. General John Geary and General Henry Slocum did not share Greene's belief in the importance of entrenching on Culp’s Hill, but Greene's foresight would prove crucial in the upcoming battle. Neither General John Geary, a former Mayor of San Francisco, nor General Henry Slocum thought it would matter much.Geary’s division covered the lower hill, near Spangler’s Spring, Kane’s brigade to his right; then on the upper hill was Greene’s division, then Candy’s brigade, followed by a portion of Ruger’s division.

 

As twilight fell, the fighting on the Union left came to a close, but the assault on the Union right flank continued. Gen. Richard Ewell's forces pressed on, with Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's Confederate division launching an attack on Culp’s Hill. Greene's brigade, consisting of around 1,400 New Yorkers, faced off against Johnson's 4,700 Confederates. Greene understood the significance of holding the extreme right flank of the Union army and protecting vital supply lines. Despite being outnumbered, Greene's men were charged with holding the extreme right flank of the Union army and protecting its supply and communication artery, the nearby Baltimore Pike. Greene extended his line to the right to cover part of the lower slope, but his 1,400 men were dangerously overextended since they were only able to form a single battle line, without reserves.

Johnson's Confederate forces encountered fierce resistance as they charged up the slopes of Culp’s Hill. Greene's men had constructed formidable breastworks that halted the Confederate advance. Although Gen. George "Maryland" Steuart's brigade managed to outflank the Federal right flank, Greene's strategic positioning and defensive measures proved effective. The natural obstacles provided by the hill hindered the Confederate forces' progress, showcasing Greene's tactical acumen and the importance of his decision to entrench on Culp’s Hill.

At 7 pm with darkness gathering, Ewell initiated a significant infantry attack. He deployed three brigades, consisting of approximately 4,700 soldiers, from the division led by Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson. These troops crossed Rock Creek and ascended the eastern slope of Culp's Hill. However, Greene's entrenched position played a crucial role in the outcome of the assault. It allowed for reinforcements from the I Corps and XI Corps to come to his aid from the left. Wadsworth dispatched three regiments, while Howard on Cemetery Hill sent four, totaling around 750 men. Greene issued orders to hold the position under any circumstances. Despite four subsequent attacks made in the darkness, the line to his right remained threatened but was bolstered by additional reinforcements. The assaults persisted until 11 pm and resumed the following morning.

On the far right flank of the Union army, Col. David Ireland of the 137th New York faced a formidable attack. Under intense pressure, the New Yorkers were compelled to retreat and occupy a traversing trench engineered by Greene, which faced south. Despite sustaining heavy casualties, they valiantly held their ground and safeguarded the flank. Unbeknownst to Steuart's men, due to the darkness and the heroic defense of Greene's brigade, they failed to realize that they had nearly unrestricted access to the Union army's primary communication line, the Baltimore Pike, which lay only 600 yards ahead. Ireland and his men averted a potential catastrophe.

Adelbert Ames, though not as famous as Chamberlain, who took over his position after his promotion, performed exceptionally well in the difficult circumstances at Gettysburg. During the intense attack led by Ewell on July 1, 1863, Ames, under the command of Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, positioned his division in front of other units of the XI Corps on Barlow's Knoll. This exposed location was quickly overrun, leading to Barlow's capture and injury. Ames then took charge of the division and skillfully orchestrated a retreat through Gettysburg, eventually establishing a defensive position on Cemetery Hill. On July 2, during the second day of battle, Ames's division faced the brunt of the assault on East Cemetery Hill by Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early but managed to hold the crucial position with support from neighboring units. Ames even engaged in hand-to-hand combat at one point. Following the battle, the soldiers of the 20th Maine honored Ames by presenting him with their battle flag as a symbol of their respect.

When the XII Corps returned to the right flank late that night, Confederate forces had taken over parts of the Union defensive line on the southeastern slope of the hill, near Spangler's Spring. Union soldiers, disoriented in the darkness, found enemy troops in the positions they had left. Gen. Williams instructed his men to occupy the open field in front of the woods and await daylight. While Steuart's brigade managed to hold onto the lower heights precariously, Johnson's other two brigades were withdrawn from the hill to wait for daylight as well. Geary's troops came back to reinforce Greene, ensuring the defense of the position.

 

July 3rd.

The idea that the Copse was the focus was Batchelder’s incorrect and misleading attempt to bring attention to the area on the field where the attack went, not what was the real objective. Lee’s plan for both days 2 & 3 was the union center. That’s why a coordinated attack at Culp’s Hill was so necessary.

As General Lee stated in his official report, "The general plan was unchanged". The commanding position on the battlefield was Cemetery Hill. Piercing the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge was NOT the objective; Zeigler Grove was the large clump of trees in 1863, not the tiny thin saplings of the Copse. Those large trees were used for lumber many years after the battle and before John B. Bachelder's promoting and marking the high-water mark. This combined with a simultaneous pincer move on Culp's Hill by  Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson’s division from Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corp was the real plan.

At dawn, five Union batteries opened fire on Steuart's brigade in the positions they had captured and kept them pinned down for 30 minutes before an attack by two of Geary's brigades. Simultaneously, the Confederates initiated their own attack, resulting in a prolonged engagement that lasted well into the morning, marked by three unsuccessful offensives by Johnson's troops. Despite facing relentless charges from Ewell's entire corps on the night of July 2nd and throughout the following morning of July 3rd, Greene managed to maintain control of the hill, fending off repeated assaults from 4,700 Confederate soldiers and securing the upper summit.

Although Greene's contributions to the Union victory at Gettysburg were significant, his heroism is often overshadowed by other more well-known figures from the battle. As the oldest surviving Union general and West Point graduate, Greene's legacy deserves to be remembered and honored. His monument on Culps Hill serves as a reminder of his bravery and dedication to the Union cause during one of the most critical battles of the Civil War.

In addition to Greene, General John Geary also played a pivotal role in the defense of Culps Hill. His bold counterattack on July 3, 1863, helped drive the Confederates from their positions and protected the Union Army's vital supply line, the Baltimore Pike. Geary's decisive actions at Culps Hill exemplified the courage and determination of Union forces in securing a crucial victory at Gettysburg.

 

East Cavalry Field

A classic cavalry engagement occurred four miles east of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 3, 1863. The strategic significance of the vacant field was heightened by the presence of two important roads: the York Pike to the north and the Hanover Road to the south. Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg's Union cavalry, positioned on the Hanover Road, guarded the rear of the Army of the Potomac. Recognizing the threat posed by Confederate control of the Hanover Road and the intersecting Low Dutch Road to the Union's supply line along the Baltimore Pike, Gregg was reinforced by 1,900 Michigan cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. George A. Custer. Together, Gregg and Custer established a defensive line at the intersection, supported by 10 artillery pieces.

Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart led 5,000 Confederate cavalrymen to the northern side of the field. Contrary to previous teaching, there is no concrete evidence suggesting that Stuart and Lee coordinated this assault with Pickett's Charge. Stuart's initial orders were to safeguard the flank of the Army of Northern Virginia, but he later admitted that his true intention was to launch a surprise attack on the enemy's rear. Stuart's charge was met with a countercharge by General Custer, effectively halting the assault. A subsequent charge led by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton with 2,000 mounted men was also repelled by Custer and the 7th Michigan regiment. Throughout the engagement, Gregg maintained his position. Although not strategically significant, the battle showcased the Union cavalry's growing prowess as a formidable fighting force, reminiscent of their performance at Brandy Station.

 

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Further Reading

·       Himmer, Robert, "New Light on Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's Conduct on the First Day at Gettysburg". Gettysburg Magazine. 43, July 2010.

·       Troy D Harman, “In Defense of Henry Slocum on July 1.”
http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay3.pdf

·       Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign; a study in command. New York: Scribner's, 1968. 

·       Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3 – June 13, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. 

·       Murray, R. L. A Perfect Storm of Lead, George Sears Greene's New York Brigade in Defense of Culp's Hill. Wolcott, NY: Benedum Books, 2000. 

·       Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009. 

·       Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. 

·       Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/custers-stand-east-cavalry-field

·       John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. Louisiana State University Press, 1993.

Klein, Lloyd W,https://thecivilwarcenter.org/2023/07/04/general-lees-if-practicable-order-to-general-ewell-on-july-1-at-gettysburg/

For several months now, polls have suggested a sweeping victory for the Labour Party at the next British general election; an alarming prospect for the government and one that recently led some Conservatives to openly call for a change of leader in the hope that this will remove the likelihood of electoral armageddon and the end of 14 years of Conservative governance. Here, Vittorio Trevitt considers this in a historical context – and looks at what could happen in the future.

Benjamin Disraeli, circa 1873.

Much of the Conservative administration’s polling plight is arguably the result of the increased levels of poverty and wage stagnation that the party has presided over. Throughout its history, however, and in comparison to the current and more recent Conservative ministries, the Conservative Party has on many occasions upheld a noteworthy tradition that champions a degree of governmental action to lessen inequalities and elevate opportunity. That tradition is the One Nation brand of British Conservatism.

The origins of this tradition can be traced to the one-time Conservative leader Benjamin Disraeli, who spoke of England in a novel he composed, “Sybil,” as being made up “of two nations – one rich, one poor,” and as prime minister introduced a wide range of reforms aimed at bridging that gap. Amongst these included measures to improve the legal status of unions, improvements in living conditions and sanitation in urban areas, food safety standards, and restrictions on the working hours of women and children. The term “One Nation” came to be associated with members of the Conservative Party who believed that Conservatism should reach out to all sections of British society.

The principles of One Nation Conservatism were evident in the social policies of Disraeli’s successors, who utilised the power of the state to mitigate numerous social evils. The 1887 Truck Amendment Act broadened the range of workers protected by legislation ensuring that they be paid in coins rather than in tickets or goods that could only be used at employer-owned shops. The 1889 Cotton Cloth Factories Act regulated the degree of humidity and temperature in such establishments, while the 1890 Housing of the Working Classes Act encouraged local authority public housing schemes. An Education Act of 1891 provided, as noted by one study, “grants for schools willing to abolish fees for children between three and fifteen years of age.” The 1891 Factory and Workshop Act included various provisions aimed at safeguarding labour including an expansion of sanitary regulations, and the following year a Shop Hours Regulation Act sought to limit the weekly working hours of shop assistants under the age of 18 to 74, which included times for meals. In 1897, an important Workmen’s Compensation Act was passed that, while not universal, nevertheless legally obligated employers to pay compensation to workers when accidents occurred.

 

Early 19th century

The early Twentieth Century also witnessed the passage of much legislation bearing the stamp of One Nation Conservatism. Arthur Balfour’s 1902-1905 administration passed legislation setting up Distress Committees to reduce the hardships suffered by those experiencing unemployment by means of supporting such individuals in finding employment. A 1923 Industrial Insurance Act offered safeguards for millions of policyholders, while the 1925 Merchant Shipping (International Labour Convention) Act provided improved rights for seamen. That same year, a permanent Food Council was set up to prevent food price profiteering, and the Lead Paint (Protection Against Poisoning) Act from the following year sought to protect paint trade workers from lead poisoning. A Mining Act introduced that same year provided for a 5% levy on royalties to help support the installation of pithead baths. For people in rural areas, the 1926 Housing (rural workers') act entitled owners of rural cottages to loans and grants for home improvements, while the 1928 Agricultural Credits Act furnished farmers with a loan system to help them in purchasing their farms.

This reforming trend would continue throughout the Thirties, in spite of the social and economic turmoil of the Great Depression. New housing laws were passed with the intention of alleviating bad housing, and in 1934 a Milk in School scheme was launched that over 2 million children benefited from. The 1936 Agriculture Act set up an unemployment insurance scheme for agricultural workers, while the 1937 National Health Insurance (Juvenile Contributors and Young Persons) Act allowed for medical treatment to be provided for juveniles the moment they entered insurable employment, instead of waiting until the full health insurance age of 16 to receive such care. Also that year, a Widows’, Orphans’ and Old Age Contributory Pensions (Voluntary Contributions) Act was passed that offered voluntary insurance to those left out of a previous scheme for beneficiaries of such benefits. The 1938 Poor Law Amendment Act provided for the payment of cash allowances to inmates aged 65 and over, while a Blind Persons Actpassed that same year reduced the old age pension eligibility age from 50 to 40 years for blind persons. Other measures included the 1939 Cancer Act, which improved facilities for the treating people with cancer, the 1937 Factory Act (which enhanced workplace safety standards), and the granting of paid holidays to about an additional 1 million workers via the 1938 Holidays with Pay Act.

 

Post-war period

The values of One-Nation Conservatism were also evident in many of the policies carried out by successive Conservative governments following the end of the Second World War. Although responsible for dubious decisions including the re-introduction of prescription charges (which was legislated for but never implemented under the previous Labour administration) and the 1957 Rent Act (which decontrolled rents throughout much of the private sector), they also carried out notable reforms such as a major housebuilding programme (which produced 300,000 homes per annum), grants to encourage home improvements, and new social entitlements such as a severe disablement occupational allowance for war pensioners and a home confinement grant for new mothers. A Small Farmer Scheme was also set up in 1959 to assist such farmers, with one historian asserting that, while the scheme only received a modest amount of money, the principle was novel “since it offered assistance only to those farmers whose businesses were not economic yet were capable of becoming so.” Edward Heath’s 1970-74 ministry, although maligned with justification for abolishing free milk for primary school children between the ages of 8 and 11, introduced such innovations as rent allowances, an invalidity benefit for those with severe disabilities, and the Family Income Supplement; a top-up benefit for those earning low wages. In addition, the fair rents system that the 1964-70 Labour government introduced for private tenants was extended to those in the public sector.

The 1971 Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act made oil tanker owners liable for any oil pollution they caused, while the Motor Vehicle (Passenger Insurance) Act of that year brought all passengers under liability insurance coverage. The 1971 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, in the words of one study, provided “that in assessing the claim of a widow neither her prospects of remarriage nor her actual remarriage would be taken into account,” while the 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act provided financial support “for parties to marriage and children of family.” A comprehensiveLand Compensation Act was also passed in 1973, designed to offer compensation to individuals whose properties had been negatively impacted by road and redevelopment schemes or had been compulsorily purchased. This included special home loss payments to occupiers in addition to any entitlement to normal market value payment, advance compensation payments of up to 90% of the amount the acquiring authority estimated, a legal bar on the practice whereby compensation was lowered in cases where local councils rehoused persons in a council house and, for the first time, the right of certain business tenants to compensation for removal expenses and trade loss.

 

Thatcher era

In many respects, the Heath Ministry represented the swansong of One Nation Conservatism, despite having been elected on a platform calling for reduced economic state intervention. The onset of Thatcherism undeniably sounded the death-knell of the Party’s One Nation tradition as a driving force in policy-making. Margaret Thatcher’s rise to the Conservative leadership in 1975 signalled an ideological turn to the Right; one that would find substance in the numerous ministries she led from 1979 onwards. Adhering to the belief that the State should limit its role in social and economic affairs as much as possible, Thatcherism presided over de-industrialisation on a large scale together with curbs on benefit rights. Paradoxically, while average living standards rose, the percentage of Britons living in povertyalso went up. The succeeding New Labour governments, while maintaining Thatcherite economic reforms and presiding over tests for certain benefits, facilitated a steady drop in poverty during most of their time in office; a positive development arguably attributable to new social programmes like pensioner and working family tax credits. Ironically, it was measures such as these that pre-Thatcherite Conservative ministries often rolled out themselves.

 

To the present

Given the circumstances, it may be time for the Conservative Party to reclaim the “One Nation” mantle and adopt a more activist strategy aimed at making greater use of the state as a force for social change if it hopes to remain in office after 2024.

More can be done to stimulate the social housing sector; a move that a 2023 poll suggested would be very popularamongst Conservative voters. A long-term care insurance system like the one established in Holland under the right-of-centre De Jong cabinet in 1968 (which remains in place to this day) could alleviate the financial burden of households in providing care for elderly relatives. The adequacy of sick pay need addressing, with Britain ranking amongst the lowest in Europe in this category. In addition, income poverty can be tackled by raising the level of unemployment payments, with the UKs replacement rate far below most OECD members like Luxembourg, Iceland and Slovenia. The Conservatives could also improve the family benefits system by introducing new social programmes for families. A Recreational Allowance could assist families with paying for family activities such as going to the cinema, while a Family Holiday Allowance could help pay towards the cost of holiday activities. In education, the Conservative Party could follow the example of Jamaica’s governing centre-right Labour Party, which recently announced the goal of providing free tuition for all public university students; a move that would make Jamaica the first Caribbean nation to do so.

There is, therefore, much in the One Nation tradition that the modern day Conservative Party can learn from, while there exist a number of policy options consistent with that tradition which either the current or a future Conservative administration could introduce. Adopting a more progressive policy agenda would not only be beneficial to the Conservative Party in political terms and in keeping with its historical heritage, but by tackling disadvantage and raising levels of personal health and wellbeing, it would be beneficial to the British people as a whole.

 

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