Causes of Southern Secession in the U.S. Civil War - The Upper South

The second wave of states to leave the Union were the Upper South states. These included Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and pro-confederate Kentucky and Missouri, who held divided loyalties. The Upper South states of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas had a more extensive free population than the deep South and made up most of the Confederacy. Here, Jeb Smith looks at the causes for the seccession of these states.

This is part 2 in a series of extended articles form the author related to the US Civil War. Part 1 on Abraham Lincoln and White Supremacy is here.

Henry Massey Rector, Governor of Arkansas at the time of secession.

"If centralism is ultimately to prevail; if our entire system of free Institutions as established by our common ancestors is to be subverted, and an Empire is to be established in their stead; if that is to be the last scene of the great tragic drama now being enacted: then, be assured, that we of the South will be acquitted, not only in our own consciences, but in the judgment of mankind, of all responsibility for so terrible a catastrophe, and from all guilt of so great a crime against humanity." 

-Alexander Stephens  

In general, there was a difference in the causes of secession between the original seven seceding "Cotton States" of the Deep South and the remaining Upper South.[1] When the Cotton States left the Union, the Upper South either turned down voting on withdrawal from the Union or voted against secession. Historian E. Merton Coulter writes, "The Majority sentiment in the Upper South had been unionist until Lincoln's call for troops...Upper South…had cried equally against coercion as secession." 

When many historians talk about secession, they almost always ignore the Upper South; they unanimously point instead to the Cotton States. I believe this omission is because connecting slavery as a cause with the Upper South would be much more difficult. Further, looking at their causes of secession exposes the transformation of our Union into a centralized nation under Lincoln. 

Lincoln's Call for Volunteers

"The South maintained with the depth of religious conviction that the Union formed under the Constitution was a Union of consent and not of force; that the original States were not the creatures but the creators of the Union; that these States had gained their independence, their freedom, and their sovereignty from the mother country, and had not surrendered these on entering the Union; that by the express terms of the Constitution all rights and powers not delegated were reserved to the States; and the South challenged the North to find one trace of authority in that Constitution for invading and coercing a sovereign State."

-Confederate General John B. Gordon Reminiscences of the Civil War New York Charles Scribner's Sons Atlanta The Martin  & Hoyt Co.1904

Like the Cotton States, the Upper South saw itself as a collection of sovereign states joined by a contract, the Constitution; if that contract was violated or not upheld, it could and should be discarded. Many believed that peaceful secession would be allowed to occur and that the principles of the Declaration of Independence would be allowed to play out peacefully. DiLorenzo quotes the reactions of multiple northern newspapers as showing substantial support for secession. Many in the North perceived that this war was one of the self-governing states versus a controlling central federal government. In Lincoln Unmasked, DiLorenzo tells us that before being deported by Lincoln, northern politician Clement Vallandigham accurately describes Lincoln's purpose for war.

"Overthrow the present form of Federal-republican government, and to establish a strong centralized government in its stead...national banks, bankrupt laws, a vast and permanent public debt, high tariffs, heavy direct taxation, enormous expenditure, gigantic and stupendous peculation . . . No more state lines, no more state governments, but a consolidated monarchy or vast centralized military despotism." 

-Clement L. Vallandigham D-Ohio 

The North's support for secession was strong before it became clear how much of an impact secession would have on government funding, as the South was the North's "piggy bank." Further, free trade policies in the South would dominate the transatlantic trade since the North desired higher tariffs. If the South had been allowed to form their Confederacy, free trade policies in the South would have drawn even more commerce to Southern ports rather than Northern. So the North would lose the primary contributor to their economic plans, and they would lose out further due to their higher tax rates, and Europeans would trade with the free trade Confederacy. Not a good situation when you are looking to expand central spending. 

Lincoln's call for volunteers to suppress the "rebellion" of the Cotton States caused the secession of the Upper South. The Cotton States felt that the federal government violated their agreement, and the Upper South believed that they had every right to leave, even if the Upper South disagreed with their reasons for leaving. As R. L. Dabney explained, "However wrongfully any State might resume its Independence without just cause, the only remedy was conciliation, and not force, that therefore the coercion of a sovereign State was unlawful, mischievous, and must be resisted. There Virginia took her stand."

According to many Republican politicians, the Union was not a voluntary contract between sovereign self-governing states governed by a constitution, but rather a centralized nation. Washington D.C., rather than "we the people," was the authority. The states, the people, were subjects, servants, and pupils of the state. In his first inaugural address, Lincoln said that the Union predated the Constitution. He referred to the Union as a "national government," and a "government proper," a "national union." Lincoln said, "The Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it." He argued that the Union was not "an association of States in the nature of contract." His opinion was that "No State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union." 

The choice given to the Upper South was clear. They could either remain under the Republican-ruled coercive national government or join the Confederacy, whose Constitution maintained the Union and a compact of sovereign states. On June 4, 1861, The Western Democrat of Charlotte, North Carolina, said the Confederacy was "The only Republic now existing in America." The old Republic had become a democracy ruled by King Numbers. This was an easy choice for the Upper South. 

The Upper South saw Lincoln's call for volunteers as a violation of the Constitution, a metamorphosis in government, and a violation of their states’ sovereignty. In 1863, the Address to Christians Throughout the World by the Clergy of the Confederate States of America suggested that the yankees, "Fight not to recover seceding states, but to subjugate them." This was a war of self-governing sovereign states versus a federal government that was willing to use military force against its own population to keep them under its jurisdiction. The Union was no longer a collection of self-governing bodies based on consent but a nation controlled by a dictatorial oligarchy. Consent of the governed was eliminated. The Upper South could not go along with what they viewed as oppressive actions by Lincoln and this transformation of the Republic.

"Subjection under an arbitrary and military authority, there being no law of Congress authorizing such calling of troops, and no constitutional right to use them....it is the fixed purpose of the government…to wage a cruel war against the seceding states...to reduce its inhabitants to absolute subjection and abject slavery...Lincoln...is now governing by military rule alone ...without any authority of law, having set aside all constitutional and legal restraints, and made all constitutional and legal rights dependent upon his mere pleasure...all his unconstitutional illegal and oppressive acts, all his wicked and diabolical purposes...in his present position of usurper and military dictator, he has been and is encouraged and supported by the great body of the people of the non slave holding States." 

-Journal of the Convention of the People of North Carolina May 20, 1861, pp11-12

Professor of History at Longwood University Bevin Alexander wrote in his book, Such Troops as These, "Forced to choose between Lincoln's demand and what they believed to be morally correct and honorable, four Upper South states…seceded as well." The Upper South refused to become slaves to any government of unlimited power. In State Sovereignty and the Doctrine of Cohesion, J. K Spaulding wrote in 1860, "Hapless would be the condition of these states if their only alternative lay between submission to a self-construed  government, or, in other words, unlimited powers and the certainty of coercion."

"Virginia...was not willing to secede hastily; but the demand of President Lincoln that she furnish troops to fight her sister States, ended all hesitation...preferring to fight in defence of liberty...to place themselves as barriers in the way of a fanatical Administration, and, if possible, stay the bloody effort to coerce independent states to remain in the Union." 

-Address to Christians Throughout the World by the Clergy of the Confederate States of America Assembled at Richmond, VA April 1863

Preserving the Constitutional Republic

"All that the South has ever desired was that the Union, as established by our forefathers, should be preserved, and that the government as originally organized should be administered in purity and truth."

 -Gen. Robert E. Lee quoted in The Enduring Relevance of Robert E Lee The Ideological Warfare Underpinning the American Civil War, Marshall DeRosa, Lexington Books 2014

"It is said slavery is all we are fighting for, and if we give it up we give up all. Even if this were true, which we deny, slavery is not all our enemies are fighting for. It is merely the pretense to establish sectional superiority and a more centralized form of government, and to deprive us of our rights and liberties." 

-Confederate General Patrick Cleburne 1864 

Lincoln and the Republican party had transformed the Union from a confederation of sovereign states to a centralized nation controlled by the majority. He endeavored to expand the central Government beyond its scope in order to achieve a political agenda. The North had abandoned the Constitution and the Republic and replaced them with a centralized democracy; in other words, a limitless government. The Upper South had no choice but to join the Confederate Constitution, which maintained the "original compact" theory of the Union. 

It was believed in the South that it was the North that should secede. Quoting Henry Wise of Virginia, historian James McPherson  says, "Logically the union belongs to those who have kept, not those who have broken, its covenants...the North should do the seceding for the South represented more truly the nation which the federal government had set up in 1789." The South saw the growing majority of the North interfering with the culture within their states and violating the Constitution. They observed that democracy and mob rule would take over America. The South wished to restore America to its original Constitution, a Republic of confederated states, in order to preserve liberty and self-government.

"If they [the North] prevail, the whole character of the Government will be changed, and instead of a federal republic, the common agent of sovereign and independent States, we shall have a central despotism, with the notion of States forever abolished, deriving its powers from the will, and shaping its policy according to the wishes, of a numerical majority of the people; we shall have, in other words, a supreme, irresponsible democracy. The Government does not now recognize itself as an ordinance of God...They have put their Constitution under their feet; they have annulled its most sacred provisions."

-Dr. James Henley Thornwell of South Carolina, Our Danger and our Duty Columbia, S. C.: Southern Guardian Steam-power Press, 1862

True unreconstructed Southerners carried no blind patriotism for a tyrannical democracy like "America." In a Democracy, not even the Constitution or the Declaration could protect people from the mob. Decades after the war, Major James Randolph wrote the popular southern folk song, "I'm a good old rebel." Here are some of the lyrics. 

O I'm a good old rebel,

Now that's just what I am.

For this "fair land of freedom"

I do not care a damn...

I hates the Constitution,

This great republic too,...

I hates the Yankees nation

And everything they do,

I hates the Declaration,

Of Independence, too.

I hates the glorious Union-

'Tis dripping with our blood-

I hates their striped banner,

...

And I don't want no pardon

For what I was and am.

I won't be reconstructed,

And I don't care a damn

That was the old southerner. Propaganda like "land of the free," "home of the brave," meant nothing to a people who had their government toppled, their self-governance eradicated, their former ways of life destroyed.

State Secession Documents

With their actions and words, the states of the Upper South made it clear that Lincoln's call for volunteers, state sovereignty, and self-government were the primary causes of secession. 

Arkansas

"If we go to the North we become instruments in the hands of Lincoln to coerce the seceding states. To this a large number of the people will never consent." 

-The True Democrat Little Rock Arkansas March 15, 1861

Before Lincoln's call for volunteers, the people of Arkansas voted to stay in the Union by a vote of 23,626 to 17,927. On March 4, 1861, the Arkansas convention, led by a unionist president, voted to remain in the Union. However on March 12, 1861, The True Democrat Little Rock Arkansas warned "If Lincoln attempts to carry out the doctrines of his inauguration and to coerce the seceding states, that forces us at once to take our position by their side."

On May 6, 1861, after Lincoln's call for men, Arkansas officials gathered to revote. This time the result was 65-5 in favor of secession. In response to Lincoln's call for volunteers, Henry Rector, the Governor of Arkansas, said, "The people of this commonwealth are free men, not slaves, and will defend to the last extremity, their honor, lives, and property, against northern mendacity and usurpation." Arkansans' before and after votes and their declaration for secession demonstrate their motives for joining the Confederacy. The relevant section of the secession ordinance reads:

Whereas…Lincoln…has, in the face of resolutions passed by this convention, pledging the State of Arkansas to resist to the last extremity any attempt on the part of such power to coerce any State that had seceded from the old Union, proclaimed to the world that war should be waged against such States until they should be compelled to submit to their rule, and large forces to accomplish this have by this same power been called out, and are now being marshaled to carry out this inhuman design; and to longer submit to such rule, or remain in the old Union of the United States, would be disgraceful and ruinous to the State of Arkansas. 

-Arkansas State Convention

Virginia

"Secession placed no State in so embarrassing a position as the great Commonwealth of

Virginia…There is no doubt that the great body of its citizens were opposed to the state’s seceding, but they were equally opposed to the coercion of the States which had already seceded." 

-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864 BiblioBazaar 2008

After the secession of South Carolina, Virginia stayed in the Union working to restore the seceding states back into the Union. However, on January 7, 1861, Virginia passed an anti-coercion resolution, by a vote of 112-5, describing the right of secession and state sovereignty. This declared that Virginia would oppose any attempt at coercion by the federal government. The resolution declares, "We will resist the same by all the means in our power." The state Governor declared, "I will regard an attempt to pass federal troops across the territory of Virginia, for the purpose of coercing a southern seceding state, as an act of invasion, which should be met and repelled." The general assembly "Resolved... that the basis of all just government is the "consent of the governed," and that such consent is the sanction of free, as force is the sanction of despotic, governments. That where this consent exists, there, whatever the form of the government, is liberty, and where it is wanting, there, whatever the form of the government, is tyranny." However, on April 4, 1861, Virginia voted to stay in the Union by a 2-1 margin. 

Likewise, decades earlier, during the tariff controversy between South Carolina and the federal government the then Governor of Virginia said if any federal soldiers were to step on the soil of Virginia to coerce South Carolina to obey the federal tariffs they had nullified, it would happen only over his dead body. Such was the conviction of Virginian men against tyranny; it was no different in 1860. By calling for volunteers, Lincoln was ignoring Virginia's stance and resolve. 

So when Lincoln called upon Virginia to supply troops to invade the Cotton States, Virginia's decision was predictable. Like most Virginians, Robert E Lee expressed his distaste for coercion when he wrote to his son George Washington Custis Lee in 1861, "A union that can be only maintained by swords and bayonets...has no charm for me." To Virginians, it was a clear distinction between government cohesion and liberty.

"As soon as it was known, that it was the intention of the northern president to usurp war-making powers, and wage war against sovereign states of the confederacy and that Virginia was called on to contribute men and money....no one doubted what her action would be...when the union became an engine for oppression...she could not hesitate to throw herself on the side of freedom."

-Richmond Whig Editorial April 19, 1861, Sic Semper Tyrannis State Independence Quoted in Virginia Iliad H.V Traywick, Jr Dementi Milestone Publishing INC 2016

Virginia voters gathered again after Lincoln's call for troops, and by a vote of 126,000 to 20,400, they left the Union. In his book, Reluctant Confederates, Daniel Crofts shows the great impact Lincoln's call for volunteers had on Virginians. Croft reports on the celebration of Virginians in Rockbridge County, who, after Fort Sumter, put up a confederate flag in celebration. In response, pro-unionist Virginians, who were by far the more numerous, erected a new, more enormous flagpole and put an American eagle on it. However, after Lincoln's call for volunteers, those same Unionists who had put the pole up with the American eagle threw it down. Rockbridge County, which had been majority unionist, then voted 1,728 to 1 for secession.

In the book, Three Months in the Southern States, Englishman Lt.-Colonel Arthur J. Fremantle wrote about a conversation he had with a Virginia woman who said that: "She had stuck fast to the Union until Lincoln's proclamation calling out 75,000 men to coerce the South, which converted her and such a number of others into strong Secessionists." Likewise, confederate artilleryman William Thomas Poague wrote, "Had Lincoln not made war upon the south, Virginia would not have left the union."

"Let us consider for a moment the results of a consolidated government, resting on force, as proposed by the dominant party at the north....a consolidated despotism, upheld by the sword and cemented by fear....now it [the union] has been seized upon by a sectional party, it is claimed that its powers are omnipotent, its will absolute, and it must and will maintain its supremacy, in spite of states and people, at the point of the sword." 

-Richmond Whig Editorial A Government of Force April 10 1861 Quoted in Virginia Iliad H.V Traywick, Jr Dementi Milestone Publishing INC

Moreover, Governor John Letcher, (who wanted Virginia to abolish slavery) opposed secession before Lincoln's call for volunteers. After Lincoln's call, however, he became a firm secessionist.  

"The President of the United States, in plain violation of the Constitution, issued a proclamation calling for a force of seventy-five thousand men, to cause the laws of the United states to be duly executed over a people who are no longer a part of the Union, and in said proclamation threatens to exert this unusual force to compel obedience to his mandates; and whereas, the General Assembly of Virginia, by a majority approaching to entire unanimity, declared at its last session that the State of Virginia would consider such an exertion of force as a virtual declaration of war, to be resisted by all the power at the command of Virginia."

-John Letcher Governor of Virginia 

Virginia did not give a lengthy declaration of why it left the Union, just a short ordinance of secession and a mention of Lincoln's call for men.

The people of Virginia, in their ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America…declared that the powers granted under the said Constitution were derived from the people of the United States, and might be resumed whensoever the same should be perverted to their injury and oppression; and the Federal Government, having perverted said powers, not only to the injury of the people of Virginia but to the oppression of the Southern slaveholding States."

It was not northern coercion alone that Virginia objected to. When South Carolina and Mississippi were considering passing laws that would negatively affect Virginia financially unless they joined the Confederacy, Governor Letcher said, "I will resist the coercion of Virginia into the adoption of a line of policy, whenever the attempt is made by northern or southern states."

Tennessee

On February 9, Tennessee voters turned down secession by a 4-1 margin. However, things transformed radically after Lincoln's call for volunteers. Governor Isham Harris wrote President Lincoln saying that if the Federal Government would "coerce" the seceded states into returning, Tennessee had no choice but to join its Southern neighbors. He wrote "Tennessee will not furnish a single man for purposes of coercion, but 50,000 if necessary for the defense of our rights, and those of our southern brothers." 

Harper’s Weekly quotes the Nashville Dispatch on April 13, saying, "An enthusiastic public meeting was held here tonight. Resolutions were unanimously adopted, condemning the Administration for the present state of affairs, and sympathizing with the South." Harper’s Weekly also quoted a Memphis paper saying, "There are no Union men now here." On May 9, in an address to the people of Tennessee, Governor Harris said, "Force, when attempted, changes the whole character of the Government; making it a military despotism, and those that submit become the abject slaves of power. The people of Tennessee have fully understood this important fact, and hence their anxiety to stay the hand of coercion. They well know that the subjugation of the seceded States involved their own destruction." 

Harris and the people of Tennessee realized that cooperating in the subjugation of the Cotton States meant accepting their own future subjugation. Governor Harris recalled the Tennessee legislature on May 6 for another vote; voters would then approve secession on June 8 by a 2-1 margin. Reconciliation with a coercive government was out of the question; the Union was no longer. The founder's republic had vanished.

"If ever thus restored, it must, by the very act, cease to be a Union of free and independent States, such as our fathers established. It will become a consolidated centralized Government, without liberty or equality, in which some will reign and others serve the few tyrannize and the many suffer. It would be the greatest folly to hope for the reconstruction of a peaceful Union…The Federal Union of the States, thus practically dissolved, can never be restored."

-Isham G Harris, Senate Journal of the Second Extra Session of the Thirty-Third General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, which Convened at Nashville on Thursday, the 25th day of April, A.D 1861 Nashville J.O Griffith and Company, Public Printers 1861

North Carolina

"I have to say in reply that I regard the levy of troops made by the Administration for the purpose of subjugating the States of the South, as in violation of the Constitution and a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina."

-John Ellis, Governor of North Carolina Raleigh April 15, 1861, quoted in Harper's Weekly April 27, 1861

Before Lincoln's call to invade the Cotton States, support for the Union was overwhelming in North Carolina; they did not even vote on secession. However, after Lincoln's call for war, they unanimously adopted a secession ordinance. The same issue of Harper's Weekly quoted a dispatch from Wilmington North Carolina; "The Proclamation is received with perfect contempt and indignation. The Union men openly denounce the Administration. The greatest possible unanimity prevails." The effects were felt across political lines. McPherson  writes, "Even the previously unionist mountain counties, seemed to favor secession." 

Governor Ellis' proclamation on April 17 clarified why North Carolina stood with the South; "Lincoln has made a call for 75,000 men to be employed for the invasion of the peaceful homes of the South, and for the violent subversion of the liberties of a free people…this high-handed act of tyrannical outrage is not only in violation of all constitutional law, in utter disregard of every sentiment of humanity and Christian civilization…but is a direct step towards the subjugation of the whole South, and the conversion of a free Republic, inherited from our fathers, into a military despotism." 

Missouri

"Sir...Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and can not be complied with. Not one man will, of the State of Missouri, furnish or carry on such an unholy crusade."

-Missouri Governor Claiborne Jackson Jefferson City April 17, 1861 Quote in Harper's Weekly April 27, 1861

Missouri was almost entirely pro-union. When confederates sent delegates to Missouri to convince the state to join the South, they were booed and jeered so loudly that none could hear them. On March 21, 1861, the Missouri convention voted 98-1 against secession, but they, like Kentucky, kept their neutrality. 

However, many in the state became outraged that their state sovereignty had been violated during the "Camp Jackson Affair." Union commander Nathaniel Lyon arrested the Missouri State Brigade, whom he feared were planning to seize the arsenal in St. Louis, and federal soldiers killed dozens of citizens during ensuing riots. Since the federal government violated the state's neutral position, support for secession grew within the state. James McPherson  wrote, "The events in St Louis pushed many conditional unionists into the ranks of secessionists." Lyon then pushed the Governor and state legislature out of Jefferson City, creating more anti-union sentiment. These events led to the end of neutrality, which resulted in both a pro-confederate and pro-union government within the state. On November 28, the Confederate Congress accepted Missouri as the 12th confederate state. Pro-confederate Missouri's reasons for secession centered around constitutional violations by the Lincoln administration.

Whereas the Government of the United States…has wantonly violated the compact originally made between said Government and the State of Missouri, by invading with hostile armies the soil of the State, attacking and making prisoners the militia while legally assembled under the State laws, forcibly occupying the State capitol, and attempting through the instrumentality of domestic traitors to usurp the State government, seizing and destroying private property, and murdering with fiendish malignity peaceable citizens, men, women, and children, together with other acts of atrocity, indicating a deep-settled hostility toward the people of Missouri and their institutions; and Whereas the present Administration of the Government of the United States has utterly ignored the Constitution, subverted the Government as constructed and intended by its makers, and established a despotic and arbitrary power instead thereof. 

-Missouri Causes of Secession 

Kentucky

By a 3 to 1 margin, Kentucky voted to remain neutral, but after Lincoln's call for volunteers, support for the South began to spread. The Kentucky Governor wrote, "President Lincoln, I will send not a man nor a dollar for the wicked purpose of subduing my sister southern states." On April 16, 1861 Governor B. Magoffin wrote to Simon Cameron, Secretary of War saying "Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say emphatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."

However, the state's neutrality stance was violated by southern troops. In reaction, Kentucky would officially support the Union. Yet a pro-confederate government was established on December 10, 1861, and was accepted into the Confederacy by President Jefferson Davis as the 13th Confederate state. This Confederate government gave its causes of secession centered on limited government, Northern violations of the Constitution, and states’ rights. 

Whereas, the Federal Constitution, which created the Government of the United States, was declared by the framers thereof to be the supreme law of the land, and was intended to limit and did expressly limit the powers of said Government to certain general specified purposes, and did expressly reserve to the States and people all other powers whatever, and the President and Congress have treated this supreme law of the Union with contempt and usurped to themselves the power to interfere with the rights and liberties of the States and the people against the expressed provisions of the Constitution, and have thus substituted for the highest forms of national liberty and constitutional government a central despotism founded upon the ignorant prejudices of the masses of Northern society, and instead of giving protection with the Constitution to the people of fifteen States of this Union have turned loose upon them the unrestrained and raging passions of mobs and fanatics, and because we now seek to hold our liberties, our property, our homes, and our families under the protection of the reserved powers of the States, have blockaded our ports, invaded our soil, and waged war upon our people for the purpose of subjugating us to their will; and Whereas, our honor and our duty to posterity demand that we shall not relinquish our own liberty and shall not abandon the right of our descendants and the world to the inestimable blessings of constitutional government.: therefore, be it ordained, that we do hereby forever sever our connection with the Government of the United States.

 -Declaration of Causes of Secession Kentucky 

Slavery's Impact on the Secession of the Upper South

"It was necessary to put the South at a moral disadvantage by transforming the contest from a war waged against States fighting for their Independence into a war waged against States fighting for the maintenance and extension of slavery…and the world, it might be hoped, would see it a moral war, not a political; and the sympathy of nations would begin to run for the North, not for the South."

-Woodrow Wilson, "A History of The American People" HardPress Publishing 2013

Slavery's involvement as a cause for secession in the Upper South is overstated. The states of the Upper South had protection for their slave property whether they stayed in the Union or joined the Confederacy. When the Deep South states left the Union, more slave states remained in the Union than joined the Confederacy. Most Upper South state declarations did not even mention slavery; if they did, it was only in passing and usually associated with violations of state's rights or the Constitution. Instead, they heavily spoke on state's rights, state sovereignty, and Lincoln's call for volunteers as the reasons for secession. Those states had previously chosen to stay with the Union before Lincoln's call but could no longer remain under a government of force. 

Slavery was Safer in the Union Than the Confederacy 

"Seven-tenths of our people owned no slaves at all, and to say the least of it, felt no great and enduring enthusiasm for its preservation, especially when it seemed to them that it was in no danger.'" 

-John G. Barrett, The Civil War in North Carolina U of North Carolina Press 1995

The Union would protect slavery better than a Confederacy. Slavery was constitutionally protected in both the northern and southern states for the entirety of the civil war. Moreover, Lincoln and the North supported the Corwin Amendment, which would permanently enshrine slavery in the U.S. Constitution. In his first inaugural address, Lincoln said this of the proposed amendment, "To the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to service...holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable."

"No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State."

-Corwin Amendment 

The U.S. supreme court supported the fugitive slave laws, allowing federally funded agents to return runaway slaves to their masters. On the other hand, the Confederacy was unable to protect slaveowners when slaves fled to the North. In his inaugural address, Lincoln pointed this out, saying, "while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other." 

The 1860 Republican platform Plank 4 said that slavery was a state issue, and they would not interfere with it in states that already had slaves. In his inaugural address, Lincoln said, "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." Likewise, on May 26, 1861, General MClellan said, "Not only will we abstain from all such interference (with slaves), we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand crush any attempt at insurrection on their part." It is no wonder a leader of the Whig Party in Missouri said, "Howard County is true to the Union. Our slaveholders think it is the sure bulwark of our slave property."

Even after the deep South left the Union, the federal government decided it would not end slavery, in the House in February and the Senate on March 2, 1861. On July 22, 1861, Congress declared, "This war is not waged, nor (the) purpose of overthrowing… the rights or established institutions of those states." On October 8, 1861, the Washington D.C. newspaper, The National Intelligencer, said, "The existing war had no direct relation to slavery." On November 7, 1861, Commanding General McClellan said, "The issue for which we are fighting, that issue is the preservation of the Union... I express the feelings and opinions of the president when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union." On August 15, 1864, long after the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln said, "So long as I am President. It shall be carried on for the sole purpose of restoring the Union." 

This is not to say that no one in the Upper South was upset over the Republican's intrusion into the states' rights on this issue in the western territories. There was a minor secession movement within the Upper South on the issue of slavery, especially in Virginia and Arkansas, but they were a minority. In fact, after Lincoln's call for troops, many slave owners in the Upper South argued to stay in the Union since Lincoln was powerless to interfere with slavery. 

"Is there any good reason why we should change our position? I believe that so far as the North is concerned, the prospect for the full recognition of Southern rights is better than it was at the time of Lincoln's election, or at any time within several years before. The Governors of several Northern States, including the great States of New York and Pennsylvania, have recommended the faithful observance of all the laws intended for the protection of slave property, and the repeal of all the personal liberty bills... Lincoln's administration is powerless to harm us. Before its close, his party will be scattered into fragments."

-Rep. Thomas N. Crumpler of Ashe County N.C to the House of Commons on January 10, 1861

Jeb Smith is the author of Missing Monarchy: What Americans Get Wrong About Monarchy, Democracy, Feudalism, And Liberty (Amazon US | Amazon UK) and Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War (written under the name Isaac. C. Bishop) - Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can contact Jeb at jackson18611096@gmail.com

[1] This article was taken with permission from a section of Defending Dixie’s Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War.

The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 5: Pickett’s Charge, July 3

In perhaps the pivotal moment of the Civil War, on July 3 at 1 pm, about 12,000 men charged across a field about a mile in length and were cut down in an extraordinary artillery barrage. The infantry attack was named after Confederate General George Pickett, who led the charge of his division from the south portion of the field. Generals Pettigrew and Trimble also led their divisions in the charge from the northern part of the field.  These divisions advanced toward the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, encountering fierce resistance in the form of intense artillery and rifle fire from Union troops strategically placed on higher ground.. Only men from Pickett’s division made it to the Angle and pierced the Union line; Pettigrew and Trimble never crossed the Emmitsburg Pike.

Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened during Pickett’s Charge.

If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here, and part 3 on day 2 of the battle is here, and part 4 on Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field here.

Pickett's Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Meade Staff Meeting

Late in the evening of July 2nd,, General Meade held a council of war to decide what should be done after two days of intense warfare. Probably Meade had already decided this issue and was using the meeting not as a formal council of war, but as a way to achieve consensus among officers he had commanded for less than a week. His senior staff officers and corps commanders concurred that, despite the significant losses suffered by the army, the most prudent course of action was to maintain their current position and await the enemy's attack.  As the meeting ended, Meade took aside Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, in command of the II Corps, and predicted, "If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be in your front. ... he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed and if he concludes to try it again, it will be on our center."

Lee’s Plan

In contrast, General Lee did not convene a similar council of war, and his subsequent reports indicate that no alternative course of action was seriously considered. General Lee had intended for an early morning assault to coincide with the attack on Culp's Hill, but the arrival of Pickett's forces was delayed. The reasons behind this delay have been a topic of debate among historians ever since, and it remains a point of contention.

Longstreet’s intent to try a flank attack further around the Union right was immediately denied by Lee that morning, who insisted on an infantry attack on the Union center. Longstreet considered the attack unlikely to succeed, and according to his memoirs, he told Lee so in the moment. His reluctance to order Pickett’s Charge is one of the most renowned anecdotes of the Civil War. His memoirs describe that he told Lee: “General,” said Longstreet, “I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know as well as anyone what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.” His reluctance and doubt have reverberated in history.

Pre-Attack Bombardment

The July 3 bombardment before Pickett’s Charge was the largest of the war, with hundreds of cannons from both sides firing along the lines for one hour, starting around 1 p.m. The Confederate artillery, numbering between 150 to 170 guns, unleashed a barrage along a two-mile line, aiming to weaken the Union defenses and silence their artillery. The cannonade is believed to be the most intense artillery attack in history up to that moment.  Despite the massive scale of the bombardment, its impact was limited.

The Confederate guns inflicted some damage on the Union batteries, but they largely overshot their targets. Part of the reason the Confederate bombardment was ineffective was that Confederate artillerymen missed their marks due to poor visibility from the smoke on the battlefield. July 3, 1863, was an extremely hot, windless day and the smoke from the guns hid the lines from the Confederate gunners, who thus could not adjust their range. The smoke from the firing hung low over the battlefield during the summer heat so no one could see what the effect on the defense line was and to make adjustments. Another factor was that It was usual to aim over the heads of the enemy so the explosion would maximize the shrapnel below. Further, at Cemetery Ridge, the line was very narrow, so there was little room for error. For these reasons most of the shells sailed over the heads of the line into the rear, causing mostly unimportant damage.

Fuses. But the most significant problem was that the fuses used burned longer than expected. The fuses used were not the usual ones; these had an extra second burn before detonating. The reason for this originated in a fire in the Richmond arsenal producing the fuses. An explosion in Richmond Harbor in April 1863 blew up the fuse manufacturing area, which led to a deficiency of the usual artillery fuses, so replacement ones had to be used from ordnance supplies manufactured in Selma and Charleston. These new fuses took 1 second longer than what the artillery commanders were used to, delaying detonation.

The Bormann fuse was the most common fuse used on smoothbore field artillery ammunition during the war. Both sides used this design.  Bormann fuses were notoriously unreliable and were often replaced with copper fuse adaptors to accept the standard paper time fuse. The Confederates adopted the Bormann fuse, a mechanical fuse, in 1861 and immediately began having problems.

The inferiority of the Bormann fuse combined with the intentional overhead trajectory led to the inefficiency of the artillery. If firing overhead and the fuse explosion is delayed by a second, it will not explode until it has gone past the target. Today, manufactured products are tested for effectiveness before they are sent to the supplier. After Gettysburg, Lt James Dinwiddie working for the Ordnance Dept investigated the fuses and it was found that they contained a resin filler that would soften and mix with the powder in humid warm weather such as that in the first days of July. The filler mixing with the powder was the cause of the longer burning fuses and non-detonating shells.

The CSA artillerymen had no idea that there was a problem with the fuses coming out of Selma and Charleston that would make them burn longer than a fuse of the same length coming out of Richmond. The design modification was intended to make the fuses burn slower, but no one had informed the Confederate artillery commanders.

A week after the battle, tests were conducted on the various fuses supplied from around the Confederacy at the Richmond Laboratories. The findings showed that those fuses in shells intended to explode over the Federal position at Gettysburg ranged anywhere from 150 to 200 yards further to the rear before exploding. A 4-inch fuse would burn at the rate as a Richmond fuse one cut to 5 inches. Why this product testing wasn’t carried out sooner isn’t known.

The Confederate Artillery: Organization and Position

Focusing on the Confederate artillery positioning, the Confederate cannons are placed in a wide perimeter. While those focused on Culps Hill make sense, you will note how many batteries are placed north and northwest of town where no troops are going to charge. Confederate authority dictated that artillery remain under the control of their corps command. Thus, Alexander had to organize his artillery without other help. As a result, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective.

The Confederate officer responsible for this configuration was Lee's artillery chief, Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton. Although he was Lee’s friend, his major contribution to Pickett’s Charge was to obstruct the effective placement of artillery from the two corps besides Longstreet.  The responsibility for the artillery cannonade to start the charge was given to Longstreet’s Corps Artillery chief, the outstanding young artillerist, Col. Edward Porter Alexander, who had effective command of the field.

Confederate authority dictated that artillery remain under the control of their corps command. As a result, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective. When Lee reorganized after Chancellorsville and Jackson’s mortal wounding, creating 3 Corps instead of 2, the army’s reserve artillery was disbanded and its batteries reassigned to the infantry corps. This provided each corps with five artillery battalions and the flexibility of assigning battalions to the infantry divisions or keeping them under corps command. This seemingly trivial command structure change had huge implications on July 3rd.

Note that the Confederate configuration is based on the corps location. The artillery stayed with their commander. The Union placement is based on intuitive defense. Aside from the command arrangement, geography factored in: the Confederates were occupying a wider area and many of their artillery placements were based on the needs of the previous two days and what grounds they had suitable for artillery placement.

Alexander did not have full confidence that all the enemy's guns were silenced and that the Confederate ammunition was almost exhausted. Longstreet ordered Alexander to stop Pickett, but the young colonel explained that replenishing his ammunition from the trains in the rear would take over an hour, and this delay would nullify any advantage the previous barrage had given them. The infantry assault went forward without the Confederate artillery close support that had been originally planned. When the Union artillery died down, General Alexander believed that the time to charge had arrived.

The Union Artillery Organization and Position

Were it not for General Henry J Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, the Union might have lost the battle and perhaps the war.

Before the war, General Hunt was a member of a team that had revised the drill and tactics for the artillery arm of the US Army. He was the lead proponent of a radical organization concept: instead of allowing artillery batteries to be commanded by the infantry command, where they were used only to protect troops, he proposed strategic control by artillery commanders. The idea was that artillery could do much more than protect: they could attack, both on offense and defense.

On the morning of July 3, while inspecting the Union lines, he found an elevated vantage point from which he observed something whose importance only an expert in artillery tactics would grasp: the Rebel batteries were forming in line or going into position along a line that stretched from the Peach Orchard to the edge of town to the north. He alone knew what that meant. He also observed hurried activity in the Confederate infantry lines.

General Hunt understood that these were signs of an impending enormous attack. And, he knew from Colonel Sharpe of BMI that General Pickett commanded a division that had not yet seen action. Convinced that a massive infantry assault was imminent, Hunt rode back along the Union position, directing his battery commanders to reserve fire and avoid an artillery duel, which would simply exhaust the ammunition supply before the infantry’s appearance.

He lined the artillery up to catch the invasion in a crossfire. His idea was to create enfilading fire along the lines of the invading troops rather than face-on. Consequently, when he fired, entire lines of men disappeared. Hunt had only about 80 guns available to conduct counter-battery fire; the geographic features of the Union line had limited areas for effective gun emplacement. He also ordered that firing cease to conserve ammunition but to fool Alexander, Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt was also saving his ammunition for the infantry charge rather than long-distance firing.

But Pendleton ran out of ammunition; Longstreet inquired if this should delay the attack, but Pendleton’s supply wagons would have required over an hour delay, by which time all of the firing benefits from the bombardment already undertaken would have been lost.

Hunt, the best-known artillerist of his day, had argued for years that a single commander of artillery should be in charge. The Confederates never accepted Hunt’s command ideas, so each division and regiment had their own artillery under the division leader’s command. Hunt had full authority over his army's artillery while the ANV's artillery was directed by the three corps artillery chiefs (note- Alexander at this time was not the 1st corps artillery chief, he was technically just a battalion commander. Putting him in charge of the bombardment was a huge breach of protocol).

This caused the flanks of the attack to be pushed toward the center of the Union line: The Angle. Note how Alonzo Cushing’s battery just north of the Copse of Trees becomes the central focus. He was at the center not by intentional design but rather because the two Confederate flanks converged on his position to escape the crossfire.

Next, he ordered the last four batteries of the artillery reserve to start moving toward the Union battle line. He arranged his lines of fire from the sides of the line to aim toward the center, creating crossfire and plunging fire lanes. And he insisted that the batteries hold their fire when the Confederate batteries began their barrage – to conserve ammunition for what he knew was coming. And, he could so order, despite General Hancock ordering them to fire because he was the artillery commander independent of the Infantry. His theory of command was proven in practice.

He also ordered that firing cease to conserve ammunition, but to fool Alexander, Hunt ordered his cannons to cease fire slowly to create the illusion that they were being destroyed one by one. By the time all of Hunt's cannons ceased fire, and still blinded by the smoke from battle, Alexander fell for Hunt's deception and believed that many of the Union batteries had been destroyed. Hunt was also saving his ammunition for the infantry charge rather than long distance firing. The diminishment in US artillery fire was intentionally designed by Hunt (CO of the Artillery reserve) to create the impression among the rebels that the US artillery had been silenced and therefor would be unable to respond effectively to Pickett's charge. There was actually a substantial row between Hancock, who wanted the artillery firing to boost the morale of his troops, and Hunt who wanted to gull the rebels.

As the barrage continued, Hunt gave orders that deceived the Confederates; he directed several batteries to withdraw near the center of the line, causing the Confederates to think the batteries were destroyed. However, Hunt replaced the withdrawn batteries with artillerymen and cannons from the reserve, making sure the artillery line stayed strong along the ridge.

When the Confederate infantry broke the Union lines at The Angle, Hunt rushed forward, directly into the fray, firing away with a pistol at the advancing Rebels until his horse was shot, pinning him to the ground, but with no serious injury.

Hunt’s artillery knowledge, determination, and brilliant tactics ensured the Union line’s cannons had ammunition to fire when the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Charge began. Trusted by Meade and forceful enough to inspire his artillerymen to obey his orders rather than Hancock’s, General Hunt garners huge admiration from those who understand his contributions. Hunt was able to control the Union artillery as a single force which Pendleton could not do on the Confederate side Because Hunt was in charge of all of the artillery separate from Corps command, he was able to create this deception. Hunt had to resist the strong arguments of Hancock, who demanded Union fire to lift the spirits of the infantrymen pinned down by Alexander's bombardment.

General Hunt anticipated the infantry attack across the field connecting Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge in the afternoon of July 3. As the map shows, he lined the artillery up to catch the invasion in a crossfire and plunging fire. His idea was to fire along the lines of the invading troops rather than face-on. Consequently, when he fired, entire lines of men disappeared. See the map which shows the lines of fire Hunt placed the Union artillery in position for, while the Confederate line of fire was straight ahead.

The Infantry Charge

Approximately 12,500 men in nine infantry brigades advanced over open fields for three-quarters of a mile under heavy Union artillery and rifle fire.

The charge was made by 3 divisions. Pickett’s division led the charge. General Pettigrew led Heth’s division (of Hill’s Corps), who had been injured on Day 1. General Trimble led Pender’s division, who had been killed on Day 2. Two brigades from Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division (Hill's Corps) was to support the attack on the right flank: Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox and Col. David Lang (Perry's brigade). Hill’s illness precluded him from selecting who would attack from his corps; surprisingly, his troops who had fought heavily on Day 1 were chosen but those lightly used were not.

During the assault, the Confederates started to bunch up towards the center of the line. This was precisely at a bend in the Union line called the Angle.  At this location, the Union line formed a 90-degree angle behind a stone wall. The 71st and 69th PA Regiments were positioned on this wall, with support from the 1st NY Battery. Under Gen. Armistead, the Confederates overran the 71st and 69th PA before reaching the 1st NY Battery

What was the landmark that was the objective of the attack?

Although traditionally the Copse of Trees near the Angle has been cited since Bachelder as the visual landmark of the attack, this is probably mythical. Lee’s objective was very likely on July 3 exactly what his original objective on July 2 was: the actual focus of the attack was Cemetery Hill and the trees they were keying on were those of Ziegler’s Grove, which was much more prominent then. Lee’s attacks on both days were intended for the Union center. It was much more strategically significant than the open area where the Copse of Trees was. It was more elevated and a perfect artillery platform (hence why the Union had artillery there) and it would command the road network.

Cemetery Hill was the key to the fishhook position. Lee saw this July 1 from Seminary Ridge and his goal never wavered for 3 days. The fundamental problem was that the town of Gettysburg is right beneath that hill, and there remains no direct route even today, you have to go by Culps Hill or Cemetery Ridge. Today’s Steinwehr Avenue runs close but perpendicular to where you’d need to go. The only possible staging area would be the old Cyclotron site, and imagine that with artillery blasting the whole time from there. Washington Street does get near, but it goes directly into the center of the town. So, Lee either has to get his army up Emmitsburg Road onto Steinwehr, then make a right turn onto Washington Street or nearby, or take Culps Hill or Cemetery Ridge.

If Ziegler’s Grove was the intended focus of the attack to crush Cemetery Hill, how did the attack end up at the Angle at Cemetery Ridge instead? Hunt’s placement of his weapons forced the charge to go south. This caused the flanks of the attack to be pushed toward the center of the Union line: The Angle. Note how Alonzo Cushing’s battery just north of the Copse of Trees becomes the central focus. He was at the center not by intentional design but rather because the two Confederate flanks converged on his position to escape the crossfire.

The fences on Emmitsburg Turnpike

To cross from their positions on Seminary Ridge, the infantry had to cross Emmitsburg Turnpike about 100 yards before Cemetery Ridge. Witnesses noted that Pickett’s men crossed the road without problem from the southern end of the attack and were the ones who made it to Cemetery Ridge.  However, Trimble and Pettigrew’s men were caught in the road and very few moved further east. Hess first identified that a significant part of the problem was that the fences on either side of the road posed an obstacle to cross. Many were killed trying to get over the fence. But on the southern part of the road, these fence posts had been removed the day before during the July 2 battle, so they didn’t pose a problem for Pickett.

The fences on both sides of the road on the south part of the field were down from the action of July 2nd but not on the north side and this proved to be a huge obstruction. After crossing Emmitsburg Road, Kemper’s brigade was hit by flanking fire, driving it to the left and disrupting the cohesion of the assault. General Hunt had arranged his artillery to create crossfires and plunging fires on the south end. On the north part of the field, the Emmitsburg Pike was lined with fences which became huge obstacles to cross during the battle. The casualties piled up where men attempted to cross, only to be shot in the act. Many of the troops just took cover in the road.  Pettigrew’s men were in a similar situation although at least some of his men were caught in artillery at the start of the battle, and panic developed. Meanwhile, those fence posts had been removed on the South part of the field in the Rebel attack on July 2. There was no problem for Pickett to get to the wall, but then Stannard and artillery units opened up firing on the flank, forcing the attack to the north.

Hancock

Winfield Scott Hancock was one of the heroes of the Battle of Gettysburg, Hancock's leadership and bravery were conspicuous during Pickett's Charge. As the Confederate forces prepared for Pickett's Charge, Hancock rode along the Union lines, boosting the morale of his troops. He famously told his men, "There is no reason why any man should be nervous...I shall lead you through this battle!"

Hancock was himself wounded during the Charge and needed to be assisted off the field after the attack was over. It was a severe wound caused by a bullet striking the pommel of his saddle, entering his inner right thigh along with wood fragments and a large bent nail. He was helped from his horse by aides, and with a tourniquet applied to staunch the bleeding, The nail wasn’t removed for over a month despite repeated attempts. A surgeon finally was able to remove it by having him assume the position he was in when wounded sitting on his horse. He suffered from its effects for the remainder of the war and for the rest of his life, carrying a cane.

On July 3rd, his Corps was positioned on Cemetery Ridge and therefore commanded the Union center. Hancock recognized the Confederates' intentions to launch a major assault and anticipated that the Confederate attack would focus on Cemetery Ridge and made preparations to defend against it. He coordinated with other Union generals to reinforce the defensive line and prepare for the Confederate assault.

Hancock was himself wounded during the Charge and needed to be assisted off the field after the attack was over. It was a severe wound caused by a bullet striking the pommel of his saddle, entering his inner right thigh along with wood fragments and a large bent nail. He was helped from his horse by aides, and with a tourniquet applied to staunch the bleeding, The nail wasn’t removed for over a month despite repeated attempts. A surgeon finally was able to remove it by having him assume the position he was in when wounded sitting on his horse. He suffered from its effects for the remainder of the war, and for the rest of his life.

He almost died. Although he was wounded during the assault, he remained on the field until the Confederate attack was repulsed. When the fighting ended, the general was taken by stretcher and ambulance to a field hospital. He journeyed through Pennsylvania to Philadelphia and then Norristown to convalesce. His wound gave Hancock enough trouble, especially when riding a horse, that he was forced to give up active command at Petersburg in 1864, and it bothered him for the rest of his life. 

General Gibbon, who had been warned the night before, commanded the 2nd Division, II Corps. Gibbon's division bore the brunt of Pickett's Charge, where Gibbon was wounded. His leadership at the Angle was instrumental in the victory.

Alexander S. Webb was the brigade leader at the Copse of Trees. The 71st PA stopped the Confederate advance and forced the Confederates to seek cover behind a stone wall. Hand-to-hand fighting began in the Angle, and 2 companies fell back. Webb ordered a charge by the neighboring 72nd to drive the Confederates back, but the regiment refused the order. He then went to lead the 69th PA but was wounded in the thigh and groin. By this time, Col. Devereux's 19th MA Regiment and the 42nd NY Regiment rushed in and drove the Confederates out. He received the MOH in 1891.

Armistead

Brig Gen Lewis Armistead is esteemed as leading Pickett’s Division on the south end of the attack. He led his brigade from in front, through the artillery attack, hat on his sword, toward the Angle, over the stone wall, before being mortally wounded. Armistead embodied every positive attribute a courageous American military leader could display in a desperate moment.

Armistead of course was pre-war friends with General Hancock, his opponent that day. Armistead was the older man by seven years, so their paths never crossed at West Point, but army records show they met for the first time while serving on the frontier in 1844. After working together for 16 months in the remote outposts of modern-day Oklahoma, they fought in the same regiment and experienced some of the same battles in the Mexican War, where both were breveted for gallantry. Then, for a brief period after the war, as the U.S. Army occupied Mexico, Armistead commanded a small company and Hancock was one of his lieutenants. Captain Armistead was in command of the small garrison at the New San Diego Depot in San Diego, which was occupied in 1860. He was a close friend of Winfield Scott Hancock, serving with him as a quartermaster in Los Angeles, before the Civil War.  He was However, during the Battle of Gettysburg, they found themselves on opposing sides of Pickett's Charge, with Armistead leading Confederate forces and Hancock defending the Union position.

It is reported that he was struck by multiple bullets as he and his men reached the stone wall. Traditionally, it is said that he was shot with 3 bullets. Armistead's wounds were not believed to be mortal; he had been shot in the fleshy part of the arm and below the knee, and according to the surgeon who tended him, none of the wounds caused bone, artery, or nerve damage. Other accounts suggest the wounds were located in the upper thigh or groin area. The exact details of his wounds may vary in different accounts, but it is generally agreed upon that he suffered injuries to his lower body.

He was then taken to a Union field hospital at the George Spangler Farm where he died two days later. Dr. Daniel Brinton, the chief surgeon at the Union hospital there, had expected Armistead to survive because he characterized the bullet wounds as not of a "serious character." He wrote that the death "was not from his wounds directly but from secondary bacterium, fever, and prostration.”  One hears frequent discussions of Stonewall Jackson’s death from non-mortal wounds, but rarely Armistead’s. Infection and sepsis were the main causes of battlefield death if the initial wound was not itself mortal. Although this death would not have happened after penicillin was discovered in the mid-1930s, it was a common story in this war. Hancock wasn’t at Gettysburg long enough to see his friend and was in sufficient distress that it wouldn’t have been possible anyway. He might not even have known at the moment.

How many would have been needed to carry the position?

Longstreet ordered nine infantry brigades to make the charge on July 3. Five more brigades were held in reserve, which Longstreet never ordered to advance. Longstreet states in his autobiography that he estimated that it would have required 30,000 men to take Cemetery Ridge.

Mathematical modeling based on the Lanchester equations developed during the First World War to determine the numbers necessary for successful assaults demonstrates that with the commitment of one to three more infantry brigades to the nine brigades in the initial force, Pickett’s Charge would probably have taken the Union position and altered the battle’s outcome.  If he had put most of those reserves into the charge, the model estimated it would have captured the Union position. However, the Confederates would have been unable to exploit such a success without the commitment of still more troops.

Calculations based on the Lancaster Formula which was developed in World War I suggest that 20,000 men would have been needed to make a lodgment, but perhaps 5-10,000 more would have been needed to defeat the inevitable counterattack, which is not far off from the number Longstreet hypothesized.  The authors do not include Wilcox’s and Lang’s brigades in the initial force.  If these troops and Anderson’s entire division had attacked with the initial force, this would have supplied five additional brigades and around 5,000 more men, making the attack force fourteen brigades and from 15,000 to 18,000 men. These numbers would have guaranteed a lodgment at the Angle.  Another five brigades and one regiment scheduled for the second wave of Pickett’s Charge from Pender’s and Rodes’ divisions, as well as at least another brigade from McLaws’ division, were also available.  Had all of these men been brought into the attack column, the total would be nearer to the 30,000 men Longstreet thought necessary.

However, assuming the same rate of casualties, the cost would have been about half, or 15,000 casualties. There would have been insufficient fresh troops left to take advantage of that success. And what about the next hill and the next one? Various regiments might have been recruited for this effort: essentially, all of Longstreet and all of Hill’s Corps. But, assuming the 50% casualty rate on this additional number, and realizing that Lee only had 60,000 men at this point, while it’s theoretically possible they might have held this line, the cost would have been intolerable. Add another 10,000 casualties and it’s hard to see how Lee could have continued the war after taking that ridge.

This illustration shows the Union line kneeling and firing, with only the officers standing. The destroyed artillery from earlier bombardment is seen in the foreground. The rebel attack is coming from the southern or left side, very accurate since Armistead was originally placed far in that direction. It shows a large contingent of southern troops in the Emmitsburg Road just as suggested by Hess in his book and as I noted in my Pickett’s charge challenges. It shows the heavy smoke from the weaponry and seminary ridge in the background.  Note also the Codori Farm at the top left.

Casualty Rate

Between 10-15,000 infantry made the charge. The duration of Pickett’s Charge was 50 minutes. Total Confederate losses during the attack were 6,555, of which 1,123 Confederates were killed on the battlefield, 4,019 were wounded, and 3750 were captured including many of those listed as wounded. Many of the “wounded” died over the next days to weeks. Do the math: that’s 22 killed and 80 wounded per minute; about 1.7 casualties per second.

The casualty rate of Pickett’s Charge is typically given as 50-60%, with 10% killed on the

battlefield and 30% wounded with another 30% captured, many overlapping the wounded category. The Union loss is thought to be 1500 casualties. Pickett's division suffered 2,655 casualties (498 killed, 643 wounded, 833 wounded and captured, and 681 captured, unwounded). Pettigrew's losses are estimated to be about 2,700 (470 killed, 1,893 wounded, 337 captured). Trimble's two brigades lost 885 (155 killed, 650 wounded, and 80 captured). Wilcox's brigade reported losses of 200, Lang's about 400.

These figures are similar to the famed Charge of the Light Brigade (Crimean War, 1854) where, a British cavalry unit attacked Russian forces. The casualty rate was exceptionally high, with around 40% killed or wounded. These rates surpass the Assault on the Great Redoubt (Battle of Borodino, Napoleonic Wars, 1812), where The French Grand Army's assault on the Russian Great Redoubt during the Battle of Borodino resulted in high casualties; estimates suggest casualty rates of around 30%, and also the Assault on Marye's Heights (Battle of Fredericksburg, 1862), where the casualty rates for the Union troops were estimated to be around 15-20%.

The Confederate Army lost many of its top officers. Brigadier General Armistead was mortally wounded and captured. Garnett was killed in action; his body was never recovered and is believed to be buried with his men in Richmond, Virginia. Kemper was wounded and taken prisoner by the Union. Although the newspapers reported he was killed in the battle, his family did not believe it and were able to free Kemper from the Union prison.

Was Pickett’s Charge a Bad Decision?

The criticisms often directed at Lee for Pickett’s Charge are unwarranted. What else could he do under the circumstances? He had tried both flanks. He couldn’t go left because it led further away from any viable target. He couldn’t go right because it lengthened his supply line and he was out of artillery ammunition. If he turned around and declared victory, he wouldn’t have changed anything in the trajectory of the war and he’d be right where he started.

The Gettysburg campaign was a roll of the dice at a crucial moment.. You have to see it as a desperate final try to win the war on the battlefield. Despite all of Lee’s victories, the Union had not given up and in fact, were winning in the Western theater. The west was being lost and the confederacy was running out of time. Resources are dwindling. Davis and Lee know that things aren’t looking promising. He was a riverboat gambler who rolled the dice in every battle. From that perspective, it starts to make sense.

One hears suggestions that General Lee was ill and that he had heart disease, weakening his judgment. A contemporary analysis shows no reason for this suspicion. Heart attacks do not lead to poor judgment 2 months after they occur.

Faced with circumstances on July 3, Lee had no other options but to attack, and no other place to attack than the center.  If he retreated then the campaign would be a failure. The salient on Cemetery Hill is the obvious place to attack. Ewell is stalled on the left. Longstreet tried on the right the day before. He wants to go further to the right but there is no road there and no supply line. Hill is sick. Longstreet is being obstinate. Stuart had gotten nowhere that morning. General Lee is all alone. Where Lee miscalculated is that Hunt had created a deadly crossfire with artillery that had never been done like that before. Lee had not anticipated as devastating an artillery defense and indeed, none like it had ever been organized. Lee lost that day but look at all the other gambles he won.

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Further Reading:

·       Hess, Earl, Pickett's Charge--The Last Attack at Gettysburg.  UNC Press, 2010.

·       J David Petruzzi, The Complete Gettysburg Guide. SavasBeattie, 2009.

·       Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels: The Classic Novel of the Civil War (Civil War Trilogy).Modern Library, 2004.

·       Stephen W Sears, Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.

·       Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People. University of North Carolina Press, 2017.

·       William A. Frassanito, Gettysburg: A Journey in Time. Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975.

·       https://theconversation.com/picketts-charge-what-modern-mathematics-teaches-us-about-civil-war-battle-78982

·       Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

·       James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. 2nd edition, Lippincott, 1912. Accessed at: http://www.wtj.com/archives/longstreet/

·       Michael J. Armstrong and Steven E. Soderbergh, “Refighting Pickett’s Charge:  mathematical modeling of the Civil War battlefield,” Social Science Quarterly 96, No. 4 (May 14, 2015), 1153-1168. 

·       Richard Rollins, “The Second Wave of Pickett’s Charge,” Gettysburg Magazine, No. 18, July 1998, 104-110.

·       Lloyd W Klein and Eric J Wittenberg, “Did General Lee’s heart attack impact the conduct of the Battle of Gettysburg?” Gettysburg Magazine 67:July 2022; 62-75.

·       James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

·       Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volumes 1-3. Random House, 1963.

·       https://emergingcivilwar.com/2018/06/26/artillery-henry-j-hunt-chief-of-artillery-for-the-army-of-the-potomac/

·       https://militaryhistorynow.com/2022/11/27/armistead-and-hancock-rethinking-the-storied-friendship-between-opposing-generals-at-gettysburg/amp/

·       Lloyd W Klein,  “Why Pickett’s Charge Failed”. The Civil War Center. https://thecivilwarcenter.com/2022/06/29/why-picketts-charge-failed-analysis-and-significance/

General Benjamin Butler and Runaway Slaves During the US Civil War

In late May 1861, slaves began fleeing to the Union outpost of Fortress Monroe, Virginia. When arriving, they were given sanctuary by the post’s commander, Major General Benjamin Butler. Richard Bluttal explains.

General Benjamin Butler during the US Civil War.

Newly arrived at Fortress Monroe, on May 23, 1861, Butler was confronted by the arrival of three fugitive slaves from the Confederate defensive works project across Hampton Roads. Faced with the looming prospect of being shipped to North Carolina to work on fortifications, Goodheart writes “the three slaves decided to leave the Confederacy and try their luck, just across the water, with the Union.”

As Civil War Emancipation has chronicled, they were they were not the first slaves to seek sanctuary in a Union military post. Soon after Lincoln’s inauguration in early March, slaves in separate incidents had presented themselves at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor and Fort Pickens near Pensacola, Florida. Consistent with the Fugitive Slave Act the slaves in both instances had been rebuffed and turned over to local authorities. The post commanders at Sumter and Pickens took this action on their own initiative and it was accepted by the Lincoln administration, still hopeful at that point for reconciliation with the slave states.

However, by the end of May the situation was very different. Confederate forces had attacked Fort Sumter on April 12 and forced its surrender. In response, Lincoln called for volunteers to restore federal authority in the South. Lincoln’s actions led four of the remaining eight slaves in the Union to secede, including Virginia. On the same day the three slaves appeared at Fortress Monroe, May 23, the Commonwealth’s voters had ratified secession.

Taking action

In this atmosphere of uncertainty, Benjamin Butler had to decide what action to take. His hand was forced by the arrival of a Confederate officer at Fortress Monroe under flag of truce demanding the slaves return. Adam Goodheart relates the encounter between Butler and the Virginian, Major John Baytop Cary.

Cary got Cary got down to business. “I am informed,” he said, “that three Negroes belonging to Colonel Mallory have escaped within your lines. I am Colonel Mallory’s agent and have charge of his property. What do you mean to do with those Negroes?”“I intend to hold them,” Butler said. “Do you mean, then, to set aside your constitutional obligation to return them?”Even the dour Butler must have found it hard to suppress a smile. This was, of course, a question he had expected. And he had prepared what he thought was a fairly clever answer.“I mean to take Virginia at her word,” he said. “I am under no constitutional obligations to a foreign country, which Virginia now claims to be.”“But you say we cannot secede,” Cary retorted, “and so you cannot consistently detain the Negroes.”“But you say you have seceded,” Butler said, “so you cannot consistently claim them. I shall hold these Negroes as contraband of war, since they are engaged in the construction of your battery and are claimed as your property.”

If anyone was qualified to devise, on short notice, a solid justification to hold slaves who had escaped Confederate custody, it was Benjamin Butler. A crafty litigator and politician from Massachusetts, Butler was a recently commissioned Major General who owed his appointment to Lincoln’s desire to solidify the support of Democrats like him that favored military action against the South. Butler would prove a dismal battlefield commander, but in this incident showed him to be a gifted administrator.

By declaring the three slaves “contraband of war,” Benjamin Butler did not challenge their status as property and by extension call into question of slavery’s legality. At this stage of the conflict, most political leaders in the North were eager to depict the developing conflict merely as a rebellion against legitimate government authority which had nothing to do with slavery. However, officers on the ground like Butler quickly realized the slaves were a significant military asset to the Confederacy, acting not only as laborers, teamsters, and in other support roles for the army, but also by keeping southern agriculture functioning allowing a much larger portion of the white male population to be available for military service than might otherwise have been the case. Hence, as property being used in support of a rebellion against the government, Butler’s “contraband of war” formulation legally justified the seizure of the slaves without immediately undermining their status as property. The Lincoln administration quickly acquiesced to Butler’s policy and Congress gave it the force of law in early August through the Confiscation Act of 1861.

Impact

What neither Butler nor leaders in Washington, D.C., reckoned on was the slaves’ response to his contraband policy. Soon other slaves began seeking sanctuary with Union forces, over 500 at Fortress Monroe alone by June 1861. The northern press soon dubbed these escaped slaves as “contraband,” a name initially resisted by some black leaders and abolitionists, but which even they eventually accepted.

But if the episode at Fortress Monroe demonstrated anything it was the fierce determination of the slaves to be free. A few slaves seeking sanctuary quickly became hundreds and then even more. As Adam Goodheart writes:

Within weeks Within weeks after the first contrabands’ arrival at Fort Monroe, slaves were reported flocking to the Union lines just about anywhere there were Union lines: in Northern Virginia, on the Mississippi, in Florida. It is unclear how many of these escapees knew of Butler’s decision, but probably quite a few did. Edward Pierce, a Union soldier who worked closely with the contrabands, marveled at “the mysterious spiritual telegraph which runs through the slave population,” though he most likely exaggerated just a bit when he continued, “Proclaim an edict of emancipation in the hearing of a single slave on the Potomac, and in a few days it will be known by his brethren on the gulf.”Within little more than a year, the stream of a few hundred contrabands at Fort Monroe became a river of tens — probably even hundreds — of thousands. They “flocked in vast numbers — an army in themselves — to the camps of the Yankees,” a Union chaplain wrote. “The arrival among us of these hordes was like the oncoming of cities.”

Undermining slavery

So the arrival of Union forces in a locality in the South, or even the prospect of their arrival, quickly began to undermine the institution of slavery, as slaves now had a place to escape from slavery with little fear of recapture. Yet without the initiative of the slaves this situation likely would have never arisen. Certainly, the slaves could not gain freedom on their own, but they determinedly pried at the tiniest fissure in the slave system made by the arrival of northern troops and the peculiar institution began to crumble under the weight of countless individual slaves fleeing it.

As Adam Goodheart relates, Lincoln administration policy about the contrabands quickly began to lag behind the reality on the ground. So much so, that the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which was announced in September 1862, in many ways was merely playing catch up. Goodheart ends his story with an anecdote that captures that situation well. He writes:

On the On the September day of Lincoln’s edict, a Union colonel ran into William Seward, the president’s canny secretary of state, on the street in Washington and took the opportunity to congratulate him on the administration’s epochal act.Seward snorted. “Yes,” he said, “we have let off a puff of wind over an accomplished fact.”“What do you mean, Mr. Seward?” the officer asked.“I mean,” the secretary replied, “that the Emancipation Proclamation was uttered in the first gun fired at Sumter, and we have been the last to hear it.”

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What if Abraham Lincoln had not been Assassinated?

Few figures loom as large as Abraham Lincoln, the 16th President of the United States. His leadership during the Civil War, his commitment to the abolition of slavery, and his enduring legacy of unity and equality have solidified his place as an icon of American democracy.

What if history had taken a different turn on that fateful April evening in 1865? What if Abraham Lincoln had not been assassinated?

Terry Bailey considers.

An 1860s painting of President Abraham Lincoln. By George Peter Alexander Healy,

To ponder such a scenario is to delve into the realm of historical conjecture. However, by examining the political landscape of the time and Lincoln's own aspirations, it is possible to glean insight into what might have transpired had his life not been cut short by events.

Firstly, it's essential to consider Lincoln's vision for post-Civil War America. He was deeply committed to the principles of reconciliation and reconstruction, aiming to heal the nation's wounds and forge a path towards unity. In the aftermath of the Civil War, Lincoln sought to reintegrate the Southern states into the Union with leniency and compassion, prioritizing national healing over punitive measures.

Had Lincoln survived, it's plausible that his approach to reconstruction would have been markedly different from that of his successor, Andrew Johnson. Lincoln's conciliatory stance toward the South may have led to a smoother and more inclusive reconstruction process, potentially mitigating some of the deep-seated animosities that lingered in the aftermath of the war and potentially still do today.

Moreover, Lincoln's leadership style and political acumen would likely have played a pivotal role in shaping the post-Civil War era. His ability to navigate complex political terrain and build consensus across ideological divides could have paved the way for a more stable and harmonious transition from war to peace.

Race relations

One of the most intriguing questions surrounding a hypothetical continuation of Lincoln's presidency is its impact on the trajectory of race relations in America. As a staunch advocate for the abolition of slavery, Lincoln recognized the need for fundamental changes in the status of African Americans in society. While his Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 marked a significant step forward, Lincoln understood that true equality would require sustained effort and political will.

Had Lincoln lived to see the fruition of reconstruction, it's conceivable that his administration would have prioritized the advancement of civil rights for African Americans. He may have championed policies aimed at ensuring their full participation in the social, economic, and political life of the nation, laying the groundwork for a more equitable society.

Furthermore, Lincoln's continued presence on the national stage could have influenced the course of American politics in subsequent decades. His leadership and moral authority might have shaped the direction of the Republican Party, steering it towards a more progressive stance on issues of racial justice and equality.

Post-war Period

However, it's essential to acknowledge the challenges and obstacles that Lincoln would have faced had he survived. The post-Civil War period was fraught with complexities and tensions, and the path to reconciliation was far from straightforward. Lincoln's ability to navigate these challenges would have been tested, and the outcome remains uncertain.

Moreover, the specter of assassination would have loomed large over Lincoln's presidency, casting a shadow of fear and uncertainty over the nation. The five earlier failed attempts on his life served as a stark reminder of the continued dangers inherent in political leadership, therefore, Lincoln would have to contend with the constant threat of violence.

In considering the hypothetical scenario of Lincoln's continued presidency, it's impossible to predict with certainty the course of history. Countless variables and contingencies would have influenced the trajectory of events, and the outcomes could have been vastly different from those we know today.

However, what remains clear is the enduring legacy of Abraham Lincoln and the profound impact of his presidency on the course of American history. Whether through his leadership during the Civil War, his commitment to the abolition of slavery, or his vision for a more perfect union, Lincoln's contributions to the fabric of American democracy are indelible.

In the final analysis, the question of what if Abraham Lincoln had not been assassinated invites the reflection of not only on the past but also on the present and future of the United States. It prompts the consideration of pivotal moments and decisions that shape the course of history and contemplate the enduring legacy of leadership, courage, and conviction. While it is impossible to ever know with certainty what might have been, it is possible to draw inspiration from Lincoln's example and strive to uphold the values that he held dear: freedom, equality, and the pursuit of a more perfect union.

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Philadelphia’s Civil War Hero

George E. Stephens was a Civil War hero from Philadelphia. He was outraged at not initially being able to fight as he was an African America, so took other roles until free African Americans could join the war.

The 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regimentat the Second Battle of Fort Wagner in July 1863. By Kurz & Allison.

When It came to the cause of freedom, George E. Stephens was the first to step up.

It’s been 160 years since the last of George E. Stephens correspondence letters were sent to the New York Weekly Anglo-African, and 35 years since the Civil War movie Glory hit movie theaters around the country. The film depicts the formation of the 54th Massachusetts who bravery led the attack on the Confederate defenses at Fort Wagner in Charleston Harbor in July of 1863.

He is even loosely based on a character in the 1989 film.

Stephens was born in Philadelphia in 1832, the son of William Stephens, worked who would eventually become a lay preacher in the First African Baptist Church, which became extremely active in the abolitionist movement and ultimately in the Underground Railroad.

Although we don’t know much about Stephens’ education, it is probable that he received an education through the Quakers and possibly the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.

Honoring African American Mathematician Benjamin Banneker, he joined a group of fifteen to form The Banneker Institute (a literary society.) Ironically, he was nearly enslaved between 1857–1858 around where the 54th Massachusetts would make their galant charge on Fort Wagner in 1863.

During the Civil War, he initially signed on as a cook and began sending war correspondences to the New York Weekly Anglo-African. 

Stephens was a driving force in enlisting men to join the 54th in Philadelphia and would himself signup with the regiment in April 1863 as a Sergeant.

During the brave attack on Fort Wagner on July 18, 1863 the 54th Massachusetts emerged after 7:30 P.M. and advanced up the sandy beach. By the time that the regiment’s charge arrived at the parapet of Wagner, they had withstood immense casualties. Among the 272 men killed from the regiment was commander Colonel Shaw, whose sword was taken from his body after the battle. 

Fellow Sergeant William H. Carney, upon seeing that the United States flag was faltering and about to drift into the sand, grabbed it and moved forward despite being wounded. After being pulled to safety, he refused to let go of the colours saying that he had not let them touch the ground.

Stephens was at the center of the 54th’s advance on Fort Wagner. He was wounded but managed to survive and escape without being captured.

After the Civil War, he spent time as a cabinet maker and upholsterer and also as a sailor and also educated newly freed slaves.

Stephens died in Brooklyn, New York in April 1888.

In 1997, editor Donald Yacovone released “A Voice of Thunder: The Civil War Letters of George E. Stephens.”

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Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington Township, Pennsylvania.

Two Forgotten Aspects of the U.S. Civil War

In the historical novel Rebel Falls, author Tim Wendel focuses on two often forgotten aspects of the US Civil War - how widespread the conflict actually was and the way women played an integral role. He explains more in this piece.

Tim’s book is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Sarah Emma Edmonds (married name Seelye), a woman who who fought as a man during the US Civil War.

In schools and class textbooks, the Civil War is usually taught as strictly a southern struggle. Certainly, major battles like Vicksburg, Bull Run, the siege of Petersburg and others occurred below the Mason-Dixon line. But we forget that when major conflicts erupt, the struggle and damage can extend well beyond borders and the lines on a map.

Widespread

Few realize that the Civil War nearly ignited an international conflict because of the keen interest of Great Britain and other European powers. In the last months of the war, the South was desperate to ignite an incident that would draw England and other countries into the fray.

The Confederacy sent spies to the northern border with British Canada, from Halifax to Detroit. The most audacious of such plans was to seize the U.S.S. Michigan, the lone Union warship left on the Great Lakes in 1864. (Similar vessels were utilized to blockade the South.)

An unlikely pair – John Yates Beall and Bennet Burley – headed the rebel effort to capture the Michigan. Born in Jefferson County, West Virginia, Beall was a loyal Southerner and had studied law at the University of Virginia. Along the way, he appears to have crossed paths with John Wilkes Booth, who, of course, would later assassinate President Abraham Lincoln.

Burley was Beall’s partner in the so-called Northwest Conspiracy. From Glasgow, Scotland, Burley was a soldier of fortune -- joining the fight for the thrill of it. Unlike Beall, he would survive the war, escaping back to the United Kingdom and become a celebrated foreign correspondent for The Daily Telegraph in London.

(Beall and Burley are mentioned briefly in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s Team of Rivals and Carl Sandburg’s Abraham Lincoln: The War Years.)

And what would have happened if Beall and Burley had seized the iron-hulled Michigan, with its 30-pounder parrot rifle, half-dozen howitzers and additional firepower? They first planned to free Confederate prisoners on Johnson’s Island near Sandusky, Ohio. These POWs included more than 20 rebel generals.

From there, with no opposing warships in the region, it would have been easy to bombard Cleveland, Buffalo, and other targets along the southern shore of Lake Erie. All of this was planned to unfold shortly before the presidential election. Even though Lincoln handily regained office (212-21 in the electoral college), in the weeks before the vote a Republican victory was far from a foregone conclusion. The nation had been at war since spring of 1861, and many were tired of the long struggle. Lincoln and members of his cabinet feared that he might lose to challenger George McClellan due to war fatigue. This result could have led to the formation of a separate nation, the Confederate States of America.

The role of women

Though often overlooked, women played important roles on both sides of the Civil War, especially when it came to espionage. Elizabeth Van Lew was a member of Richmond high society and appeared to be a loyal Confederate. Yet she gathered information from the rebel capital and sent it across the lines to Ulysses Grant and the Union command by using her servants as couriers.

Actress Pauline Cushman was a Union spy and was in uniform by the end of the war. She was buried with full military honors at the Presidio National Cemetery in San Francisco in 1893. “Union Spy,” reads her simple gravestone.

In function and treachery, Rose O’Neal Greenhow was the mirror image of Richmond’s Van Lew. A longtime fixture in Washington, she was a staunch supporter of the Confederacy and stayed in D.C. when the war broke out, sending valuable information to the rebels. Confederate President Jefferson Davis credited information she supplied for the South winning the first Battle of Bull Run.

Then there’s Belle Boyd, nicknamed the “Cleopatra of the Secession.” She was arrested a half-dozen times for sending military secrets to the south. Eventually, Boyd was banished to Canada and became a well-known actress after the war.

While both sides forbade women from serving in the combat units, that didn’t stop many on both sides from joining combat units in disguise. According to the National Archives, for example, Sarah Edmonds Seelye (originally Sarah Emma Edmonds) served two years in the Second Michigan Infantry under the pseudonym Franklin Thompson. She eventually earned a military pension.

When we reach the fringes of public record, novels can sometimes lead us to a better understanding of what happened and what was at stake. When I began Rebel Falls, I decided I wanted my protagonist, the one who would seek to outwit the rebel spies Beall and Burley, to be a woman. This was partly because I needed a strong connection with the Seward Family. During the Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward was the most powerful man in the North after President Lincoln. Seward’s daughter, Fanny, was one of his closest confidants. So how to move inside that family circle? How about with a character named Rory Chase, a childhood friend of Fanny’s?

Rory is a composite of women who knew Fanny in Auburn, New York, where the family home still stands, as well as in Washington, where the Sewards were center stage during the war years.

Here again, the historical record can be a great starting point. After the war, Fanny Seward died of tuberculosis and was buried with other family members at Auburn’s Fort Hill Cemetery. Soon afterward family friend Olive Risley began to accompany Secretary Seward on his travels. To quell gossip (there was a 43-year difference in their ages), the politician eventually adopted her. A statue of Olive Risley Seward was erected near Capitol Hill in Washington in 1971. My goal with Rebel Falls was to have Rory Chase be emblematic of the resourceful, ambitious women who fought and spied for both sides during the Civil War.

Conclusion

Place and participants. Even with a conflict that has been written about as much as the war between the North and South, such important factors and characters can be overlooked. No wonder Ken Burns calls this clash “our most complicated of wars.”

In focusing upon what took place along our northern border and how women played a key role, I’ve not only tried to tell a forgotten story, but deliver a bit more clarity as well. Only by considering more factors of our nation’s history, hearing about all the factors of the Civil War, can we better understand what occurred and determine how best to move forward.

Tim Wendel is the author 16 books, most recently the novel ‘Rebel Falls’ (Three Hills/Cornell University Press):

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The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 2: July 1, Day 1

The Battle of Gettysburg has been described as a “meeting engagement”, meaning that the battle there was an accident, which was unplanned by the command on either side.  That the largest battle of the war originated from a desire for the acquisition of shoes for the Confederate troops seems preposterous, yet Maj Gen Henry Heth himself reported it that way in his official report on the campaign. But this isn’t the complete story: Lee had ordered his widely scattered army, which spanned from Chambersburg to Harrisburg, to converge at Cashtown & Gettysburg when he was informed by a spy on the evening of June 29th that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. Cashtown is located at the eastern base of South Mountain, about 8 miles from Gettysburg, and was selected as being close to his wagon-based supply line.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

If you missed it, part1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here.

John Buford, a Unionist who played a major role on day 1 at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Generals Heth & Pettigrew Move

We don’t know what Lee thought of Hill sending 2 of his 3 divisions into Gettysburg on July 1, a reconnaissance in force; he never said, but it seems inconsistent with his desire to ”not bring on a general engagement” until all of his troops were up. Lee knew he was outnumbered, and what he wanted ideally was to find an isolated Union army group to attack. But neither Buford nor Pettigrew was much surprised to find the other there in force on July 1. After all, they had seen and skirmished on June 30. If this was a meeting engagement from the standpoint of the army commanders, it was only because of a lack of communication with those who were there. Buford clearly understood: he knew the meaning of what he had seen the day before, and had informed his superior, Major General John F. Reynolds.

On the morning of July 1, Heth’s division marched down the Chambersburg Pike. If he and Pettigrew thought there might be Union troops on the road to town, their line of march wasn’t appropriate: there were no cavalry vedettes or other skirmishers in front. The troops were deployed in columns when they should have been deployed in line. While this kept the movement faster initially, it caused Pettigrew to continually redeploy his men into line to fight the Buford’s men on the flanks of his column. The front of the line was Pegram’s artillery, followed by Brig Gens Archer and Davis’ infantry brigades. This was another error since they were not the optimal front line to be deployed in an emergency. Moreover,  Archer’s brigade had sustained heavy casualties at Chancellorsville and was undersized, and Davis was the least experienced brigade in Hill’s Corps.

The first contact was with Union vedettes. Then they reached dismounted cavalry from the brigade commanded by Col William Gamble. At about 7:30 am, 3 miles outside of town near the McPherson barn, the first shots of the battle were fired. The First Shot Marker at the Wisler House is placed on the corner of Chambersburg Pike and Knoxlyn Road. Lt. Marcellus Jones fired the shot with a borrowed Sharps carbine.

Although this has been celebrated as the first shot for decades, it’s not exactly true. A union corporal is known to have been shot and killed in a skirmish earlier that morning. Corporal Cyrus James of the 9th New York Cavalry was killed on vidette duty at daybreak on the Hunterstown Road – east of the town. This is the exact opposite direction of the actual attack. He was killed in a skirmish with the Virginia 14th Cavalry. We know the time of 4:30 am for a fact since his horse dragged his body back into the town, creating a commotion.

John L. Burns, age 69, was the Constable of Gettysburg. After being arrested by General Early in his first pass through town he was released and then arrested by Confederate stragglers. At daybreak on July 1, he stopped the horse dragging Corporal James’s body in the street. Angered at the kerfuffle brewing in his quiet town, he volunteered to General Buford to fight at McPhersons Woods with the Iron Brigade. He received wounds in the arm, leg, and minor chest wounds after falling in with the 24th Michigan. He escaped capture by hiding his weapon and telling the Confederates he had been caught in the crossfire. He later became a national hero.

Buford

General Buford resisted the approach of two Confederate infantry brigades on the Chambersburg Pike until the nearest Union infantry, Reynolds' I Corps, began to arrive. His light cavalry held off more than twice their number of veteran Confederate infantry for 5 hours. In the morning alone, his two dismounted cavalry brigades held off two divisions of Hill’s Corps for 3 hours. Buford’s tactical strategy defined a covering force action, in which space is traded for time. Buford traded 3 ridges for the time for Reynolds and the First Corps to come up.

Having only enough strength to post one man per yard of ground, Buford instructed one of his brigades, under Colonel William Gamble, to dismount to impede the advance of A.P. Hill’s Confederate III Corps along the road from Cashtown. He deployed all 6 guns of Calef's battery (battery A, 2nd US) of Tidball's battalion. The guns were 3" ordinance rifles. Besides being prepared and in excellent defensive position, Buford’s men had weapons that gave his men an advantage: breech-loading carbines, which allowed a 2-3 times faster fire than muzzle-loaded rifles, although sometimes it is incorrectly stated they had multi-shot repeating carbines, they did not, as these only became available that Fall.

Reynolds rode out ahead of the 1st Division, met with Buford about 9 am, and then accompanied some of his soldiers, probably from Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade, into the fighting at Herbst's Woods.

Reynolds

General John Reynolds was the Union commander on the morning of July 1. President Lincoln had offered Reynolds command of the Union Army before Meade, but he had insisted on no political oversight if he accepted the position, which was rejected. Nevertheless, Meade respected and trusted him greatly, making him Left Wing Commander; which as fate would have it, is exactly where General Lee was congregating.

The Pipe Creek Circular was dated July 1, written early that morning well before the battle began. In it, Meade ordered his forces to start pulling back to this line to await Lee’s expected advance once Lee is found and begins his attack. George Meade had no intention of fighting in Pennsylvania on the eve of battle. That much is beyond dispute. On the morning of July 1, Pipe Creek was The Plan rather than a contingency. Meade intended to rest his forces where they were on July 1.

The night before the battle, both Reynolds and General OO Howard had received myriad reports by scouts, residents, and of course Buford the night before. Reynolds informed Meade at around midnight, whose headquarters was in Taneytown MD, of Hill massing apparently at Cashtown. Early in the morning of July 1, they received a response from Meade, giving them orders to advance to Gettysburg, and telling them that Longstreet was located around Chambersburg and Ewell near Carlisle. These were highly accurate intelligence reports, but they seemed to conflict with the Pipe Creek Circular. Whether or not Reynolds ever received that order isn’t known, nor do we understand how either general understood the two orders, one to advance and one to fall back simultaneously. Meade had given Reynolds, the man he had full confidence in, independence to do what he thought warranted. Reynolds commanded the 1st Corps and, as a wing commander, also had operational control of the 11th and 3rd Corps.

Buford is known to have pointed out Cemetery Ridge to Reynolds, the heights at the south part of town, as the best position ultimately for the Union defense. Reynolds ordered him to resist as long as possible to keep the Rebels out of the town. He then sent word to his Corps to hurry.  He sent couriers to Meade and his commanders about what was going on. We do know that the courier he sent to Meade, Captain Weld, did tell Meade that a stout defense was underway.

Reynolds had three options: Deploy into a defensive position near Emmitsburg, occupy the high ground south and southeast of Gettysburg, or occupy the ridges west of the town. Reynolds decided to place his corps on the march and ordered the other two corps to Gettysburg. Another possibility is that Reynolds was organizing a fighting retreat, the correct terminology being covering force action/advance guard operation, consistent with Meade’s Pipe Creek Circular.

Abner Doubleday

After Reynolds’ death, Major General Abner Doubleday, the ranking officer on the field, assumed command of the Union defenses at 10:50 am. Doubleday was at the front as division commander of the second infantry division on the field. For the next 5 hours, he defended the ridges west of Gettysburg as increasing numbers of Confederate soldiers appeared, eventually outnumbering him by about 16,000 to 9,500. The 1st Corps arrived in time to take over the fight from Buford and hold Confederate forces west of Gettysburg until late afternoon.

Reynolds’ death and Doubleday’s decision to make a stand west of Gettysburg scuttled Meade’s plan. It is entirely unknown if Reynolds had told him his orders; if he was aware that he was supposed to fight a covering action, he certainly never tried. If a planned withdrawal was the plan, it wasn’t communicated to Buford nor Doubleday, nor did they have any experience in undertaking this kind of maneuver. Gettysburg might have been simply the product of what transpired on the field and no one actually ordered it.

But where was the plan lost? Did Reynolds not convey to Doubleday the overall plan to move as a covering force action or was Doubleday unable to make this happen, or did he simply change the plan on the fly? We don’t know exactly what Reynolds thought Meade had ordered. Doubleday was quoted after the war as saying, ”It was General Reynolds’s intention to dispute the enemy’s advance, falling back, however, in case of a serious attack, to the ground already chosen at Emmitsburg” That, of course, was precisely what Meade instructed Reynolds to do.  

As infantry reinforcements arrived under Reynolds from the I Corps, Confederate assaults down the Chambersburg Pike were repulsed. The periodic arrival of Hill’s divisions on the Cashtown Pike, and then later on that morning on the more northerly Mummasburg Road required Buford and Doubleday to increasingly extend the Union line as Confederate infantry arrived. As Union troops entered from the south, they had to be routed to the constantly moving front. The roads go through town, so they needed to cross fields to bypass it and get to the place they were needed.

Fighting took place on both the north and south sides of Chambersburg Pike.  The intense fighting occurred on McPherson Ridge. North of the Pike, an unfinished railroad bed created three sections of depressed ground. To the south, fighting centered on Willoughby Run and Herbst or McPherson Woods. The main forces engaged were Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade opposed by brigades of James J Archer and Jefferson R Davis. Three of Cutler's regiments were positioned north of the Pike and two to the south. The Iron Brigade directly opposed Archer. The Union infantry forces were commanded by Maj Gen James J Wadsworth.

For a few hours, Confederate regiments entered the battlefield from the west and northwest, as Union troops arrived from the south and then moved west to the sound of the guns. Because of the roads and distances involved, there was a temporary advantage in number of troops for the Confederates. Fresh troops were sent to battle as they arrived, to face other troops that also just arrived. The arrival of Confederate units was dictated by the position that morning. Hill’s 2nd corps, under Heth and Rodes, were on the western roads, and they arrived in the morning from Chambersburg.

The Railroad Cut

The engagement at the railroad cut, an incomplete railway excavation near the McPherson farmhouse, witnessed a series of brutal assaults and counterattacks. Although lacking actual railroad tracks, the cut provided a deep entrenchment that was utilized by both Union and Confederate forces. The Union Army stationed multiple units near the site to fend off the Confederate attacks, managing to hold their ground until the Confederates, with superior numbers, eventually forced them to retreat.

During a crucial moment around 10 am, the Confederates, overwhelming the Union defenders, flanked their right side and launched an attack. Three regiments strategically positioned themselves at the railroad cut, with one half of the brigade utilizing the cut as a trench while the other half remained at the northern edge. In response, Union forces, led by division commander James Wadsworth, organized a counterattack that exploited the terrain advantage provided by the depression of the cut. This tactic allowed the Union troops to flank the Confederate positions and secure a significant number of Confederate prisoners

A lull in the fighting ensued as both sides awaited reinforcements. Maj Gen OO Howard arrived before his XI Corps did, and assumed command from behind the town of Gettysburg. He communicated with Maj Gen James Slocum of XII Corps and Maj Gen Daniel Sickles of III Corps  to come to the field immediately.

In the afternoon, Ewell’s Corps appeared on Oak Ridge from the north, beginning a massive assault. With Rodes’ division attacking from Oak Hill, the Union lines were under heavy pressure. The CSA 3rd Corps, under Early and Gordon, came from the north and arrived later in the afternoon from Carlisle. This sequence provided a clockwise en echelon pattern that was unintentional but devastating, as the Union Corps were further away in Maryland that morning.

On June 28, Ewell's corps, consisting of three divisions, was strategically positioned at Carlisle and York, Pennsylvania. However, upon receiving orders to concentrate in the Cashtown-Gettysburg area, Rodes made the decision to move his division south from Carlisle, while another division led by Jubal Early marched southwest from York. Simultaneously, Edward Johnson's division was sent back down the Cumberland Valley towards Chambersburg under Ewell's command.

In the early afternoon, the Union XI Corps arrived under General Howard, who deployed his men to the right of the already existing line. The Union position was shaped in a semicircle from west to north of the town

Iverson

Brigadier General Alfred Iverson’s brigade fell victim to a well-executed ambush around 2:30 pm, resulting in devastating losses. The lack of skirmishers screening their advance left the Confederates vulnerable to the Union army positioned behind a stone wall at Oak Ridge. The sudden attack caught Iverson’s men off guard, leading to over 900 casualties out of the 1,384 soldiers in his brigade.

The aftermath of the ambush saw the Union forces counterattacking and flanking the Confederate position, leading to further surrenders and retreats. The communication breakdown within the Confederate ranks, exacerbated by the linear landmark of the field, contributed to the disastrous outcome. Iverson’s ineffective leadership, compounded by personal issues such as alcoholism, further worsened the situation, ultimately resulting in his reassignment and leaving a bitter legacy among the survivors of his regiment.

Rodes

When Rodes' division reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on July 1, they could hear the sounds of intense fighting between Harry Heth's division of A.P. Hill's corps and the Union's 1st Corps. Believing that he was positioned on the right flank of the Union forces, Rodes deployed his division on Oak Ridge after marching south. At this critical juncture, Rodes faced a crucial decision. He could either wait for the army to fully concentrate, as per Lee's instructions, or take the initiative and launch an attack.

Despite the significant impact of Rodes' Division on the outcome of the battle, his contributions are often overlooked. The losses suffered by his division, despite being fully engaged only on the first day of the battle, were among the highest of all Confederate divisions. Ramseur was held in reserve. Rodes’s Division suffered the second-highest losses of all Confederate divisions.

Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes played a pivotal role in the initial day of the battle, with his division being a key factor in the success of the Confederate forces. The aggressive attack launched by Rodes' troops on the Union's I Corps resulted in the pushing back of Union forces, compelling them to retreat through Gettysburg and towards Cemetery Hill. Rodes strategically positioned his division at the junction of the Union First and Eleventh Corps, preventing their link-up on Oak Hill and enveloping the Union right flank.

Despite Lee's directive to avoid a general engagement, Rodes, in agreement with Ewell, decided to ignore this order and launch an assault. Following the initial unsuccessful attack, Rodes persisted and led a second assault. These actions resulted in Early's division joining the battle and forced Hill's corps to deploy an additional division. While the Confederate forces did eventually achieve victory, it was not without consequences. The premature commitment of four divisions from Lee's army in a disjointed manner hindered Lee's ability to effectively utilize the full strength of his forces.

After the failure of the first assault, Rodes proceeded with a second attack, which ultimately led to Early's Division entering the fray and the subsequent deployment of another division from Hill's Corps. Although the Confederate forces were successful in the end, the premature involvement of four divisions from Lee's army in a fragmented deployment prevented Lee from fully harnessing the power of his forces.

Howard and Hancock

General Howard arrived 2 hours before his divisions did. Searching for a place to observe the battle, he found Cemetery Hill and recognized it as being the best place to fight a defense, just as Reynolds and Buford had. He tried to find a place to observe in town but could not. When he was informed of Reynold’s death, he became the senior officer on the battlefield. As 11th Corps arrived, starting around 12:30 pm, he gathered them on top of the hill. He observed and was informed of Rodes’s arrival on Oak Ridge and then Ewell’s arrival further west. He rode through the town of Gettysburg with Barlow, then met with General Wadsworth and General Doubleday behind the lines. He then returned to Cemetery Hill.

Operationally, Buford, Reynolds, and Doubleday thought the high ground south of town was a good place for defense and worth fighting for. It’s controversial whether Reynolds made an actual decision when he arrived at the scene and agreed with Buford that this was an excellent place to make a defensive stand. OO Howard suggested that it was his decision, and was credited with delaying the Confederates long enough to ensure the rest of the federal army was concentrated on the heights south of the town. Howard did leave a reserve division and artillery on Cemetery Hill and used this area to collect those retreating from the front line. Others give Hancock credit for that choice. Convinced of the strength of this position, Hancock expressed his belief to Howard, stating, "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." With Howard's agreement, Hancock solidified the decision, declaring, "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Although Howard received Congressional commendation for his actions, Hancock did not receive similar recognition.  It may be that no one actively chose Cemetery Hill at this stage of the conflict, but its obvious merits were plain to all.

When Meade learned of Reynold’s death, he immediately sent for Hancock. Unable to leave his army at that moment and undecided about the course of action regarding Pipe Creek, Meade entrusted Hancock with written orders to assume command, despite his junior rank compared to Howard. Hancock arrived at Cemetery Hill at approximately 4:30 pm. Hancock urged Meade to swiftly bring the entire army to the strategic position on Cemetery Hill. Additionally, Hancock decided to gather the scattered soldiers from various battles around the town and relocate them to the elevated hills south of Gettysburg, with the existing cemetery at its center. Hancock positioned his artillery there, enabling them to target the north over Culps Hill or the west over Cemetery Ridge.

During this critical juncture, Doubleday was in retreat, prompting a meeting between him and Hancock on the field. Recognizing the importance of the situation, Hancock ordered Wadsworth to position his troops at the base of Culp's Hill. This maneuver proved crucial and probably saved the field that day.

Barlow’s Knoll

The arrival of Ewell’s Corps from the north changed the entire dynamic of the battle to that point. To the east, the threat to Doles’ position had been reduced by the appearance of Early’s division. He had arrived at about 3 p.m. but paused for half an hour so that his infantrymen could catch their breath after their hard march to the field. Early then charged out of the northeast, sending the brigades led by Brig. Gens. John B. Gordon, Isaac E. Avery, and Harry T. Hays against the Union line.

Upon the arrival of Gordon's division on the far right, only Barlow's division stood as a barrier against an attack. Recognizing the imminent danger posed by the arrival of Ewell's 3rd Corps from the north, which threatened the Union's right flank, General Francis Barlow decided to advance his division of the 11th Corps to a knoll along the Harrisburg Road. At the time, the area now known as Barlow's Knoll was called Blucher's Knoll.  The Confederate brigades led by Gordon and Doles converged, overpowering Barlow's forces. Outnumbered by Gordon's division, Barlow and his men were unable to maintain their position, which was positioned as a vulnerable salient. Barlow was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Howard’s XI Corps were overwhelmed and forced to fall back As the Union line collapsed, XI Corps retreated back through town and assumed a defensive position on Cemetery Hill.

As Rodes launched a renewed assault from the north and Dorsey Pender attacked from the west, the Union line crumbled. The road system played a significant role in determining the outcome, favoring the Confederates who ultimately emerged victorious as Union troops retreated through the town in a disorganized manner. Subsequently, Union troops hastily withdrew through the town's streets.

Ultimately, of course, the Union lines were overrun as 2 Confederate corps arrived in just a few hours. Doubleday fought an outstanding controlled retreat back to the new lines on Cemetery Ridge. General Howard told Meade that his line had collapsed and it was Doubleday’s fault, because his line faltered first. This incorrect report led to his removal from command and ultimately, in his leaving active service.

Ewell Advances

At about 4:30 p.m., the Confederate superiority in numbers of Ewell’s Corp began to tell, and although Union fire opened gaping holes in their ranks, Hill’s men finally pushed the Federal I Corps off Seminary Ridge. With the Yankees in full retreat, both Rodes and Early called a halt to their pursuit, following the instructions issued by Ewell at the onset of the battle per Lee’s order.

With the collapse of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps fell back on Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were stationed to protect the retreat. Wadsworth’s division raced to Culps Hill to defend the right flank, and other reinforcements were also arriving. 500 troops from the 7th Indiana came forward, and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps arrived. The 1stDivision, led by Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger began filing into position behind Cemetery Hill at about 4:30 p.m. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm. These 8,000 fresh troops brought the Union strength to about 20,000 soldiers mixed with the XI Corps. In addition to the reinforcements, the Federals had most of their artillery pieces, which they had salvaged during their retreat. Almost 40 guns had joined Smith’s six guns, and the entire array was emplaced, unlimbered, and ready to fire, atop Cemetery Hill.

Ewell, of course, saw the enemy digging in on Cemetery Hill. Although he no doubt suspected that the Union soldiers would be impossible to dislodge, he knew that sooner or later he would have to charge the heights.

Culp’s Hill & the “If Practicable” Order

Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill /Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often considered one of the great missed opportunities of the battle. Ewell had to decide about whether to make an attack. Rodes’ Division had already incurred heavy casualties and two brigades of Early’s Division had been sent east to block a rumored enemy force on the York Pike, and Maj. Gen. “Allegheny” Johnson’s Division was still marching toward Gettysburg.

Ewell insisted that Lee must approve an attack and Hill had to provide reinforcements. When he asked A.P. Hill for assistance, Hill contended that his divisions were not capable of further offensive action that day, leaving Ewell with only two brigades of Early’s Division for an attack on Cemetery Hill, where the Federals had already established a strong defensive position. James Power Smith, an aide who had spent the afternoon with Lee and had just now come to Gettysburg (without bringing any orders from Lee to Ewell), was dispatched back to Lee with those two requests. Colonel Walter Taylor delivered the message. According to his post-war recollection, Lee was told of Ewell’s movements by Major G. Campbell Brown of Ewell’s staff. He then instructed Brown:

‘To quote Lee’s own words, “General Ewell was…instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army…” ‘

From Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenant’s: A Study in Command, One volume abridgment by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 p.571.

Smith returned, where he found Ewell and gave him Lee’s instructions. Ewell saw at once that his new orders were paradoxical. He could not drive the enemy from the heights without reinforcements. The force at hand, 4,000 men, was no match for the large group of Federals, backed by cannons, atop Cemetery Hill. To attack would bring disaster to his corps. And even if Ewell mounted the suicidal assault, how could he assure Lee that reopening the battle would not bring on a general engagement? Consequently, Ewell dropped his plan for a direct charge against Cemetery Hill.

What did Lee Expect?

Lee did not directly order Ewell to mount a charge against Cemetery Hill. Had Lee wanted to deny the enemy the heights, he could have given a peremptory order for Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson’s division, just now arriving and ready to fight, ahead to Cemetery Hill. After Barlow was defeated at the base of Culp’s Hill and XI Corps retreated through the town, Ewell was given discretionary orders to take the hill. He did not immediately try, and when later he sent Johnson’s Division, they ran into the Union line digging in.

Ewell felt, correctly by reports of those who were there, that his men were exhausted and disorganized. Most military students of the battle have concluded that Ewell made the right call under the circumstances. He was a professional soldier who had to make a split-second decision in the heat of the moment. The failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk suggests that any opportunity, if it ever existed, was fleeing. The question will always remain if the Union was as well dug in at 5 pm.

Ewell had at least 6 rational reasons not to make the attack:  a) His men had been through a huge firefight after marching many hours and were fatigued. b) Assaulting the hill through the streets of Gettysburg was not an easy task since the narrow passageways prevented massing the troops for an attack. c) Lee’s ambiguous order resonates through history. Any dispassionate reading of that phrase in the context of battle is more confusing than anything else. And it should be noted that Early himself was reluctant at that moment. d) Ewell requested assistance from AP Hill, who declined due to the condition of his corps, which had taken the brunt of the first day. e) There was intelligence that Union troops were approaching from the east on the Hanover Road. This was the vanguard of the XII Corps under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. If those troops had arrived at the wrong time, Ewell's flank would have been turned. f) This was Ewell’s first Corps command. He was hesitant given these issues. Ewell was never the same after the loss of his leg and marriage.

Ewell did not get that message until after his forces were heavily committed, noting in his report “that by the time this message reached me….It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up.” In fact, at that moment, although victorious, his corps had suffered approximately 3,000 casualties, leaving him with about 8,000 men under arms. The charge into Gettysburg had also left Ewell’s two divisions badly disorganized, and thousands of prisoners had to be rounded up and secured. The third division, under Edward Johnson, was rushing to the scene, but no one knew when it would arrive.

On the hill at that hour and shortly afterward was the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth's division, linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. The XII Corps in George Greene’s brigade of John Geary’s division would soon arrive.

When Ewell’s third division, under Maj. Gen.Edward "Allegheny" Johnson, arrived on the battlefield, Johnson was ordered to take the hill if he had not already done so. Johnson did not take Culp's Hill. He sent a small party to reconnoiter, and they encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Wadsworth's division, which had been in the rear guarding the corps trains and was now linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. Johnson's party was taken by surprise and almost taken prisoner before fleeing. Culps Hill at 7 pm when the reconnaissance occurred was far from empty. Was it empty at 5 pm? No but less well defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, Gordon said in his memoirs he was ready, but he’d seen significant action. Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. And the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.

Ewell, after assessing the situation and considering various factors such as the approaching darkness, the strength of the Union defenses on Culp's Hill, and the absence of clear orders from Lee to attack, decided against launching an immediate assault. Instead, he chose to consolidate his positions.

Casualties

About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged. Union casualties were almost 9,000; Confederate slightly over 6,000. In itself, Day #1 of Gettysburg would rank among the top 25 battles of the war, even though most of both armies hadn’t even arrived yet.

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References

•    James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

•    Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volume 2. Random House, 1963.

•    Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.

·      Harry W Pfanz, Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill. The University of North Carolina, 1993.

•    Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

•    Stephen Sears, Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

•    Eric J Wittenberg, The Devils to Pay: John Buford at Gettysburg. Savas-Beattie, 2014.

• Mackowski, Chris, and Kristopher D. White. "Second Guessing Dick Ewell: Why Didn't the Confederate General Take Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863?" Civil War Times, August 2010.

• Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009.

·      https://gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/confederate-headquarters/rodes-division/

·      https://gettysburgcompiler.org/tag/alfred-iverson/  

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/20-fateful-decisions-at-gettysburg/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=hnt-hnn-theme

·      https://thecivilwarcenter.org/2023/07/04/general-lees-if-practicable-order-to-general-ewell-on-july-1-at-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/richard-ewell-at-gettysburg/#:~:text=On%20the%20first%20day%20of%20the%20Battle%20of,new%20Federal%20position%20on%20Cemetery%20Hill%20%E2%80%9Cif%20practicable.%E2%80%9D

·      https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/general-ewells-dilemma/

·      https://padresteve.com/2014/06/03/gettysburg-day-one-lees-vague-discretionary-orders-and-lack-of-control/

The Battle of Gettysburg - Part I: General Lee’s Advance to Pennsylvania

In late May 1863, the Confederacy was facing a challenging situation. Despite General Robert E Lee's success in defeating the Union forces in almost every major battle, the war's progress remained stagnant along the Rappahannock River. The Confederacy had not made significant gains despite the intense fighting. On the other hand, the Western Theater had experienced substantial territorial losses, particularly in Louisiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The fall of Vicksburg and western Mississippi seemed imminent. It was evident that a dramatic shift was necessary to alter the course of the war while maintaining the people's confidence in the government and military. The war had already surpassed the South's expectations in terms of duration, and resources were depleting rapidly.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Confederate troops battling Union forces in the first day at the Battle of Gettysburg. On the left background is the Railroad Cut; on the right is the Lutheran Seminary. In the background is Gettysburg.

The Rationale

Recognizing the urgency of the situation, President Davis invited General Lee to Richmond for a three-day meeting with his cabinet on May 26. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss their plans and devise a strategy to turn the tide of the war. It is crucial to understand the significance of the Battle of Gettysburg within the broader context of the war. It was seen as a final attempt to secure victory on the battlefield. General Lee aimed to provoke a large-scale battle that could potentially be decisive. The intention was to divert attention from the Western Theater and instigate a battle in the East that could alter the war's trajectory. Building on his previous victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Lee proposed taking the war into Northern territory. While General Grant was closing in on Vicksburg, there were discussions about detaching General Longstreet's corps and sending them to assist General Pemberton. However, it was increasingly apparent that Vicksburg was already lost. Lee suggested the alternative: retain Longstreet in his army and launch an invasion of Pennsylvania, hoping to achieve a breakthrough.

There were two main objectives in mind for this operation. Firstly, it aimed to remove the war from central Virginia during the summer months. Additionally, the hope was to secure a victory in a battle north of the Mason-Dixon Line, which would potentially lead to the recognition of the Confederacy by France and Britain. Another crucial objective was to provide the Army of Northern Virginia with essential resources such as food, forage, horses, and other supplies from the fertile farmlands of Pennsylvania. This was necessary as the Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments were struggling to meet the increasing demand due to the blockade's significant impact. Alongside these objectives, there were several other goals to be achieved. These included diverting the Union Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock River line, disrupting any offensive plans General Joseph Hooker may have had, driving Union occupation forces out of Winchester and the lower Shenandoah Valley, drawing Union forces away from other theaters, and ultimately dealing a decisive blow to Northern morale.

Lee's unwavering confidence in his army led him to believe that if he could secure advantageous terrain, the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) would triumph over the Army of the Potomac (AoP). This perception fueled his hope that such a victory would compel the war-weary North to seek peace, potentially serving as a decisive military maneuver to showcase the Southern will for independence to Great Britain and France.

However, Lee's strategic approach was marred by a series of misconceptions regarding the state of morale in the North, which ultimately shaped his flawed strategy and resulted in miscalculations. One of these misinterpretations was his misunderstanding of Northern sentiment, as he mistakenly believed that the general public in the North was fatigued by the ongoing conflict. Consequently, he failed to grasp the unwavering determination of the Lincoln Administration to persevere in the face of adversity. This misjudgment of the North's resolve played a significant role in shaping Lee's flawed assumptions and strategic decisions.

Reorganization

Following Chancellorsville and the mortal wounding of Stonewall Jackson, General Lee undertook a significant reorganization of his forces. To strengthen his army, Lee decided to create three Corps instead of the previous two. As part of this restructuring, he promoted AP Hill to command the newly formed 3rd Corps, while Richard Ewell assumed leadership of the 2nd Corps. James Longstreet remained in charge of the 1st Corps.

Before the Battle of Gettysburg, Lee's army had suffered significant losses in terms of both brigade and regimental commanders. Out of the 28 brigades that participated in the Chancellorsville campaign, a staggering nine of them lost their commanders during the battle. Furthermore, three of these brigades experienced the loss of multiple commanders. Additionally, the ANV lost 64 out of its 130 regimental commanders. Consequently, many of Lee's brigades entered the Gettysburg campaign with inexperienced unit commanders, which would have a noticeable impact on the outcome of the battle.

As part of the reorganization efforts, Lee made a crucial decision to disband the army's reserve artillery and redistribute its batteries to the infantry corps. This adjustment allowed each corps to have five artillery battalions at its disposal, granting them the flexibility to assign these battalions to the infantry divisions or retain them under the command of the corps. Although this change in the command structure may have appeared insignificant at first glance, it would prove to have significant implications on July 3rd, during the Battle of Gettysburg.

Was the ANV Designed for a Northern Invasion?

Lee's Army was not designed to leave the confines of Virginia due to several factors. Firstly, Lee had limited intelligence operations compared to his Union counterparts. Instead of having a dedicated intelligence service like the Bureau of Military Intelligence, Lee relied on three main sources for information: the civilians of Virginia, Stuart's Cavalry, and his staff. However, when Lee moved north, he left behind his most valuable intelligence source - the civilians of Virginia. These civilians not only provided crucial information but also aided in the communication and navigation of local roads and geography. This decision may have been influenced by the fact that Lee heavily relied on his cavalry for intelligence and did not trust information from other sources. This deficit in intelligence gathering put Lee at a significant disadvantage. The CSA had very few covert operatives in the north. Lee primarily used individual undercover agents to provide intelligence, usually assigned to one of his subordinate generals, most famously Henry Harrison. Lee depended strongly on his cavalry and never trusted actual intelligence from other sources.

Lee may have overlooked the political landscape of the areas he intended to invade. While there were a significant number of KGC operatives and Copperheads in Baltimore, western Maryland, and southern Pennsylvania, these regions were predominantly pro-Union. This meant that Lee would face strong opposition and limited support from the local population in these areas. Overlooking this factor could have further contributed to the challenges Lee encountered when attempting to expand his operations beyond Virginia.

Another limitation was that his staff was too small to plan and coordinate a foray into enemy territory. Lee had a very small staff to manage his corps movements, so when he needed them to regroup, it took several days.  These 6 men comprised all of Lee’s staff

·      Chief of Staff, Inspector General: Col. Robert H. Chilton

·      Chief of Artillery: Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton

·      Aide de Camp, Asst. Adjutant General: Lt. Col. Walter H. Taylor

·      Aide de Camp, Asst. Military Secretary: Maj. Charles Marshall

·      Aide de camp, Asst. Inspector General: Maj. Charles S. Venable

·      Engineer Officer: Capt. Samuel R. Johnston

This would repeatedly be a limitation: his command and control at critical moments was inadequate, and he lacked sufficient staff to maintain communications with corps leaders.

Lee faced significant logistical challenges during the Pennsylvania Campaign due to his lack of adequate supply support. Unlike the Union forces, who had the advantage of utilizing railroads and rivers for transportation, Lee had to rely on a primitive system. With no railroads or rivers available to him, Lee's only option was to transport his supplies over land using horse and mule-drawn wagons. This resulted in a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, which posed a major hindrance to his operations.

One of the key issues that Lee encountered was the dependency on a long supply line that relied on horse and mule-drawn wagons. This meant that his forces had to cover a significant distance to transport essential provisions and equipment. The reliance on such a method of transportation not only slowed down the movement of supplies but also made them susceptible to attacks and disruptions along the way.

Lee's forces suffered from a shortage of long-range artillery ammunition, which severely limited their ability to sustain multiple attacks during the campaign. This deficiency became evident during Pickett's charge, where the lack of sufficient ammunition hindered their offensive capabilities. Lee also lacked the availability of pontoons over the Potomac River, which provided a crucial emergency crossing point. This would become evident in his retreat after the battle.

Lee’s heavy reliance on horse and mule-drawn wagons led to a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, insufficient long-range artillery ammunition, challenges in transporting captured goods, and limited emergency crossing options. These logistical challenges significantly impacted Lee's ability to sustain his offensive campaign and ultimately contributed to his setbacks in the Pennsylvania Campaign.

Lee faced significant logistical challenges in transporting supplies to Gettysburg and Harrisburg. The route spanned 125 miles from Winchester, and even more to Harrisburg, requiring wagons pulled by either four horses or six mules. These wagons had a carrying capacity of 2000-2500 pounds but moved at a slow pace of about 3 miles per hour, which could be further reduced by unfavorable road conditions. The animals themselves had substantial needs, with mules requiring 9 pounds of grain, 10 pounds of fodder, and 12 gallons of water daily, while horses needed 14 pounds of grain, 14 pounds of fodder, and 10 gallons of water. Additionally, the animals required horseshoes, which required manpower to apply. The waste disposal issue was also daunting, with each animal producing 10 pounds of manure and 2 gallons of urine daily. Failing to properly care for the animals would result in decreased efficiency, as they would move more slowly and carry less until they eventually broke down, rendering the army immobile. The sheer size of Lee's trains, stretching for dozens of miles, further complicated matters as infantry and artillery had to share the same roads as the wagons, leading to traffic congestion and delays. The meticulous administration of the order of march was necessary to prevent pile-ups at crossroads, requiring significant labor. Overall, these logistical challenges posed a nightmare for Lee, impacting the timing of Longstreet's arrival on the field, the availability of weapons and armaments, the organization of the three corps in battle, and the retreat after the battle.

General Lee relied on an incomplete map during the Battle of Gettysburg, as he did not possess a detailed map of the town itself. The map he had was a product of the efforts of Jedediah Hotchkiss, a topographical engineer, who had been tasked with creating a small-scale map of the region encompassing northern Virginia, central Maryland, and south-central Pennsylvania. Due to the vast scope of the project and limited time, Hotchkiss had to rely on Pennsylvania county maps to complete the map. He meticulously penciled a grid on a heavy watercolor paper and transcribed the map onto this grid, resulting in a visually appealing yet incomplete representation of the area.

The map used by General Lee was crafted on cream-colored paper and featured red pencil lines to denote roadways, blue markings for rivers and streams, and black ink for the names of towns, mills, blacksmith shops, and major topographical features. The attention to detail extended to including the names of every rural resident in impeccable handwriting. However, despite its aesthetic appeal, the map lacked crucial information such as mild declivities, small hillocks, woods, road surfaces, and fording sites. Additionally, it failed to depict the now-famous landmarks of the battle, including Seminary Ridge, Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, and Little Round Top.

The absence of comprehensive maps placed the ANV at a significant disadvantage, particularly when a thorough understanding of the local geography was crucial. These omissions had consequences during the battle. On July 1, two regiments from Confederate Brigadier General Joseph R. Davis's brigade were lost when his soldiers unexpectedly jumped into an unmapped twenty-foot-deep railroad cut and were subsequently captured by Colonel Rufus R. Dawes's 6th Wisconsin Regiment. On July 2, as Lee strategized to encircle Meade's left flank, his engineer, Captain Samuel R. Johnston, claimed to have ridden to Little Round Top and found it unoccupied. However, the area was teeming with Union troops. Likely, Johnston had mistakenly identified Warfield Ridge or Houck's Ridge as being vacant. Furthermore, when Johnston was tasked with guiding Hood's and McLaws's divisions to the southern end of the battlefield in preparation for an early afternoon assault on the Union left, he had to retrace his steps and march in the opposite direction due to his lack of a map and his misunderstanding of the area's topographical features. Lastly, the map itself did not accurately depict the Round Tops, nor did it adequately represent the undulating and wooded regions east of the Emmitsburg Road, including the terrain surrounding Weikert's and Trestle's farms, Rose's Woods, the Wheat Field, and the valley between Houck's Ridge and Little Round Top.

The Invasion Begins

On June 3rd, the ANV initiated their departure from Fredericksburg, marking the beginning of their movement. The initial phase of their march led them to Culpeper Court House, to advance further to the Shenandoah Valley while being shielded by the cavalry division under the command of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. However, the Union cavalry, led by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton detected Stuart's concentration. Believing that Stuart was planning a raid towards Washington from his right flank, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, the commander of the AoP, instructed Pleasonton to cross the Rappahannock River and eliminate the Confederate cavalry.

The Battle of Brandy Station

Taking place on the 9th of June, 1863, the Battle of Brandy Station emerged as the largest cavalry engagement of the Civil War. In a surprise attack at dawn, Pleasonton launched columns across the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford and Kelly's Ford. Following the successful crossing at Beverly Ford, the Union troopers launched an assault on Stuart's camp near a rail station known as Brandy Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. The Confederate forces swiftly regrouped, and the Union troops encountered fierce resistance at St. James Church and the Richard Cunningham farm. Simultaneously, the Union cavalry divided, with one division advancing towards Brandy Station and the other heading to Stevensburg. The arrival of Union cavalry at Brandy Station posed a threat to Stuart's rear position, prompting him to skillfully maneuver his brigades. The ensuing clash between the two sides occurred in mounted combat on a lengthy, undulating ridge named Fleetwood Hill, situated near the station. Meanwhile, Pleasonton's forces at Stevensburg faced obstacles from Confederate horsemen and were unable to penetrate Stuart's defenses. After enduring fourteen hours of intense fighting, Pleasonton ultimately withdrew from the field.

The Union suffered a total of 907 casualties, including 69 killed, 352 wounded, and 486 missing or captured, out of approximately 11,000 troops. The Confederates had 523 casualties out of about 9,500 troops. Consequently, the battle can be considered inconclusive. Union forces withdrew without discovering Lee's infantry camped near Culpeper, which was the mission assigned to Stuart. Nevertheless, Hooker deduced that if Stuart had ventured that far north, Lee must be planning a further northward movement into Maryland. Consequently, Hooker promptly initiated the movement of the AoP across the Potomac River, well before Stuart commenced his ride around the Union Army. Therefore, many argue that it was a strategic victory for the Union. Stuart, however, contended that the battle constituted a tactical victory for the Confederates since they had fewer casualties, held the field at the end of the day, and successfully repelled Pleasonton's attack. Nevertheless, General Stuart suffered a significant blow to his reputation in the Court of Public Opinion. He fell victim to two surprise attacks, which the cavalry was expected to prevent. The Southern press generally expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome, and subordinate officers criticized Pleasonton for not aggressively defeating Stuart. Although Hooker had ordered Pleasonton to "disperse and destroy" the Confederate cavalry near Culpeper, Pleasonton justified his actions by claiming that he had only been instructed to conduct a "reconnaissance in force toward Culpeper." Consequently, Pleasonton did not gain much reputationally from this battle. It is worth noting that this battle marked the end of the Confederate cavalry's dominance in the Eastern theater of the war. From this point onward, the Federal cavalry grew stronger and more confident. Therefore, from this perspective, it can be considered a limited operational victory for the Union.

The Early Stages of the Campaign

To maintain the illusion that he was still at Marye's Heights in Fredericksburg, Lee had to ensure that Hooker remained unaware of his northward movement. To achieve this, Lee left AP Hill behind and protect Richmond, effectively holding back Sedgwick and the VI Corps. Although Hooker was aware that Lee was on the move, he lacked precise information regarding its route and destination.

Lee's strategic position was precarious, as his forces were dangerously spread out. On June 12th, the Confederate army extended over a vast expanse of 70 land miles, with no direct roads connecting its wings. If Hooker had been privy to Lee's position on that day, the Confederate general would have been highly vulnerable. However, Stuart, the Confederate cavalry commander, skillfully concealed this vulnerability. A series of battles with Union cavalry prevented them from ascertaining the location and strength of Lee's army, thus obscuring its direction and ultimate objective:

Battle of Winchester (Second Battle of Winchester) (June 13–15, 1863): This battle occurred in Winchester, Virginia, which was a strategic town in the Shenandoah Valley. Confederate General Richard Ewell's forces defeated Union General Robert Milroy's garrison, securing control of the area.

Battle of Aldie (June 17, 1863): The Battle of Aldie was part of the wider cavalry engagements known as the Battle of Middleburg, which occurred as part of the Gettysburg campaign. Union and Confederate cavalry clashed in fierce fighting as they vied for control of key positions.

Battle of Middleburg (June 17–19, 1863): The Battle of Middleburg took place near the town of Middleburg, Virginia. It involved both mounted and dismounted actions between Union and Confederate cavalry forces.

Although the movement north is often portrayed as a display of Lee’s cunning while Hooker was deceived, both sides were screened from the other. Both sides were effectively screened from each other. Moreover, it was widely known that Lee intended to invade, prompting Hooker to make numerous attempts to locate the ANV. Maj Gen Sharpe of the BMI had early on suggested that Lee would move in a northwesterly direction, a prediction that proved to be accurate. In light of this information, Hooker dispatched several cavalry patrols in search of Lee. On June 5, Brig Gen John Buford reported Confederate cavalry presence in Culpepper, which led to Sharpe's one error in intelligence assessment, suggesting that the northward movement might only be a cavalry raid. Despite the efforts of brigades led by Gregg, Munford, and Duffie to locate Lee, the Rebel cavalry remained elusive. It is important to acknowledge that Hooker did what he could, but his cavalry ultimately failed to outmaneuver Stuart. With this phase of the campaign concluded Lee was now prepared to cross the Potomac River and proceed into Maryland.

JEB Stuart gets lost

One of the most controversial aspects of the Gettysburg Campaign was Jeb Stuart’s absence after crossing the Potomac until July 2nd. His absence had significant consequences, as it left Lee without crucial cavalry reconnaissance and intelligence. The lack of information regarding the Union Army's strength, positions, and intentions greatly impacted Lee's decision-making process and contributed to the uncertainties he faced in the initial stages of the battle. Many historians speculate that if Stuart had effectively screened the front of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee would not have been caught off guard by the proximity of the AoP, and the Battle of Gettysburg might have unfolded differently. Stuart's desire to redeem himself after the surprise attack at Brandy Station and his eagerness to outmaneuver the Union army led him to attempt to circumnavigate the enemy once again. However, his plans were hindered by encounters with Union troops, forcing him to deviate from his intended path and ultimately leaving him unable to effectively screen General Ewell's right flank.

The orders given by Lee to Stuart on June 22 have sparked controversy ever since. Stuart, upon separating from the main force on June 23, was granted permission by Lee to ride around the Union army unhindered, cross the Potomac River, and provide cover for the right flank of Ewell's Corps as it marched north. However, Stuart's movement on June 25 was met with opposition from the Union 2nd Corps near Haymarket, Virginia, preventing him from advancing northward. Despite this setback, Stuart decided to press on. His original intention was to circumvent the Union army by starting from its rear, but to his surprise, the Union army shifted northward, turning his position into its eastern flank. Encountering more Union troops near Fairfax Court House, Stuart was forced to move further eastward and could not turn north until reaching Rowser's Ford on the Potomac River. As a result, Stuart found himself positioned to the east of the Union army, unable to effectively screen Ewell's right flank.

Stuart had taken his three most capable cavalry brigades, leaving the remaining two brigades without strong leadership. Approximately 5000 cavalry troops were left behind with Lee, and the commander of this force was aware that Hooker had crossed the Potomac River between June 25 and 27. However, this crucial information was not relayed to Generals Longstreet and Lee, leaving them without reliable reconnaissance. Stuart did send a dispatch to General Lee on June 27, informing him of Hooker's crossing, but it never reached him. A copy of the dispatch did reach Richmond, but no one there took the initiative to confirm this information with the Commanding General.

Lee specifically instructed Stuart to move northward, protect the Confederate army's right flank, and maintain communication with Lee's forces. It was crucial for Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) informed about the movements and activities of the Union Army, as well as act as a screen to prevent the Union forces from gathering intelligence on Lee's army. Lee emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information, and he also wanted Stuart to leave enough cavalry behind to cover the mountain passes in the army's rear and protect Ewell's advance with the rest of his force. However, beyond these instructions, Stuart had considerable discretion in how he accomplished these objectives.

Stuart's interpretation of the orders differed from Lee's intentions due to his ambitions and the allure of bypassing the AoP. Instead of maintaining close contact with Lee's army, Stuart embarked on an extensive raid around the Union forces. Lee had specifically directed Stuart to safeguard the mountain passes with a portion of his force while the ANV was still positioned south of the Potomac River. Subsequently, Stuart was supposed to cross the river with the remaining troops and protect the right flank of Ewell's Second Corps. However, Stuart opted for an alternative route, choosing to lead his three best brigades between the AoP and Washington. He proceeded northward through Rockville to Westminster and eventually into Pennsylvania, to seize supplies and cause disruption near the enemy capital. Instead of taking a more direct path north near the Blue Ridge Mountains, Stuart decided to reach Ewell's flank by taking his three best brigades, namely those commanded by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, and Col. John R. Chambliss (who replaced the injured Brig. Gen. W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee), between the Union army and Washington. This strategic choice was made in the hopes of capturing supplies along the way and creating chaos near the enemy capital.

Furthermore, despite Stuart's direct orders for Brigadier General Beverly Robertson to join Lee's forces when General Hooker advanced, Robertson displayed a lackadaisical approach to his duties. Instead, Robertson focused on guarding the mountain gaps and the baggage train, ultimately failing to arrive at the battle. The brigades that Stuart left behind included Imboden's Valley brigade, which was temporarily attached to the army and more accustomed to partisan activities, as well as the two "regular" brigades of Robertson and Jones. Robertson was regarded as the outcast of the ANV's cavalry command, having previously been dismissed, while Jones, although competent, earned the nickname "Grumble" due to his difficult nature. Lee did not place as much trust in these brigades or their commanders compared to Stuart and the three brigades he chose to accompany him.

Stuart and his three brigades at 1 a.m. on June 25. Unfortunately for Stuart's plan, the Union army's movement to defend Washington and Baltimore was underway, so his proposed route was blocked by columns of Federal infantry, forcing him to veer farther to the east than either he or General Lee had anticipated. This prevented Stuart from linking up with Ewell as ordered and deprived Lee of the use of his prime cavalry force, the "eyes, and ears" of the army while advancing into unfamiliar enemy territory.

Stuart's decision to seize a wagon train at Rockville, Maryland on June 28, 1863, was motivated by various factors. Stuart believed that capturing the wagon train would provide the Confederate army with valuable supplies and provisions, such as food, ammunition, and other resources necessary for their operations. Additionally, Stuart may have seen this as an opportunity to disrupt the Union's supply lines, causing panic and confusion among their forces. By inflicting damage and depriving the enemy of vital supplies, Stuart aimed to weaken the Union's logistical capabilities and potentially hinder their ability to respond effectively. Moreover, capturing such a significant wagon train could have boosted Confederate morale and showcased Stuart's cavalry as a formidable force. It could have been a way for Stuart to demonstrate his effectiveness as a commander and restore his reputation, which had been tarnished by earlier criticisms in southern newspapers. However, it is important to note that Stuart's decision to prioritize capturing the wagon train over gathering critical intelligence on the Union army's movements further delayed his reunion with General Robert E. Lee's forces. Although this train would have posed a logistical hindrance to Stuart's advance, he interpreted Lee's orders as emphasizing the importance of acquiring supplies. This interpretation aligns with Lee's campaign objectives and goals, justifying Stuart's actions.

Part of the reason for Stuart’s tardiness was that he was caught up in the rear and flank of the Union army.  From the time he crossed the Potomac to arriving at Gettysburg required nearly 8 days of non-stop marching for over 200 miles and fighting nearly every day.  Stuart engaged in 4 skirmishes and 3 actual battles trying to make his way to find Ewell. Skirmishes included Thoroughfare Gap June 25, Fairfax Courthouse June 27, Rockville June 28, and Westminster June 29; Battles at Hanover June 30, Hunterstown July 2, and Carlisle July 2. Few accounts of Stuart’s ride note that he faced genuine challenges and required astute tactics to ensure the preservation of his command.

On June 30, General Jubal Early, who would later blame other Confederate generals for the loss at Gettysburg, including Stuart, heard the sounds of battle at Hanover. Despite being aware that Stuart was supposed to be locating him, Early made no effort to ascertain the identity of the combatants. Remarkably, Early was within a mere 5 miles of the battle, and had he made contact, Stuart could have arrived at Gettysburg on July 1.

The Plan of Invasion

The ANV traversed the Blue Ridge Mountains and advanced north through the Shenandoah Valley, capturing the Union garrison at Winchester, in the Second Battle of Winchester, June 13–15, 1863. After crossing the Potomac at Falling Waters, Lee made the strategic decision to divide his forces during their march northward to maintain secrecy regarding their exact location and to sow confusion among the occupied areas. Lee aimed to demonstrate to the people of the North that he held the advantage in the conflict. Additionally, the division of forces was necessary for the procurement of supplies and helped to prevent traffic congestion. It also hinted at Lee's intention to engage in open battle rather than launching a direct assault on a fort or initiating a siege of a city. However, the chosen western route seems indirect if Lee's ultimate goal was to target Baltimore, Washington, or Philadelphia. It is often suggested that Harrisburg was his intended objective, but if so, he was planning on its capture with just one corps. Ewell had swiftly advanced northward towards Harrisburg, while Longstreet remained concealed behind South Mountain until their exit at Cashtown.

However, the AoP was in pursuit and had reached Frederick, Maryland, before Lee realized his opponent had crossed the Potomac. General Hooker had to anticipate a potential attack on Washington or Baltimore. He took measures to defend these crucial locations by mobilizing as many troops as possible. In the absence of concrete information, Hooker made the prudent decision to concentrate his forces and secure the roads leading to the capital to thwart any potential assault. Given the circumstances, Hooker's decision to remain centrally located was the correct course of action.

Meade takes over

After Chancellorsville, calls for Hooker to be replaced were widespread. With Lee on the move, somewhere, and realizing that a major battle was soon to take place, a decision had to be made by Lincoln and Stanton. Darius Couch, as second in command, would have been the obvious choice to replace Hooker, and Lincoln offered him the position. Couch instead resigned his post to create the Department of the Susquehanna, where he brilliantly held off General Gordon with the militia at Sporting Hill on June 30. He recommended Meade instead.

Following Couch's refusal, President Lincoln held a private meeting with Major General John Reynolds on June 2, during which he reportedly inquired about Reynolds' willingness to assume command of the Army of the Potomac. Reynolds, however, expressed his readiness to accept the position only if he could operate independently and free from the political influences that had plagued previous commanders. Understandably, Lincoln could not agree to such a condition, leading to an impasse in their discussion.

The lack of confidence in General Hooker expressed by his senior officers, as well as by General-in-chief Henry Halleck, further exacerbated the situation. Hooker suggested the evacuation of Harper's Ferry and the consolidation of his forces, but his demand to regain control of the garrison or else resign provided Secretary of War Stanton and President Lincoln with the perfect opportunity to accept his resignation. In a moment of impulse, Hooker tendered his resignation, which was promptly accepted. Subsequently, when General Meade assumed command, he immediately made the same request and was granted the authority over the garrison.

Stanton dispatched a civilian engineer, Herman Haupt, his chief of railroads, to oversee the management of the railroads, including the civilian lines. This individual possessed extensive knowledge of the area and coincidentally owned a house in Gettysburg.. On June 30, he informed General Halleck that the Confederates were planning to gather near that vicinity. On July 1, he strategically utilized a single-track line and organized the operation of 5 or 6 10-car trains, one after another, to swiftly transport goods from Baltimore to Westminster. He also instructed Meade's quartermasters to have troops prepared to unload the cargo upon arrival and promptly send the trains back. To ensure effective communication in the absence of functioning telegraph lines, he established a communication line resembling a pony express system that followed the tracks. By July 3, this well-coordinated operation had successfully transported 1500 tons of cargo to the battlefield and returned 2000 wounded soldiers to hospitals in Baltimore. Notably, when President Lincoln delivered his address in November, he traveled by train from Baltimore to Gettysburg on the same line.

Henry Thomas Harrison

On the evening of June 28th, Lee was informed by a spy that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. The spy, a diminutive actor who worked with General Longstreet, was known to provide highly accurate information. General Lee had to swiftly adapt his strategies. Recognizing that Meade was a cautious and meticulous commander who was unlikely to make any major errors, Lee needed to devise a more careful plan. The immediate priority was to ensure the concentration of his widely dispersed army, which extended from Chambersburg to Harrisburg. The initial step in this process was to gather his army in a centralized location. Consequently, Lee directed his troops to converge around the crossroads towns of Cashtown and Gettysburg.

Pipe Creek Circular

Meanwhile, Meade decided that his best course of action was to stop looking for Lee and instead let Lee look for him. On June 30, Meade relocated his headquarters to Taneytown, MD, and issued two orders. The first order, known as the Pipe Creek Circular, outlined the construction of a defensive perimeter, while the second order directed a general advance toward Gettysburg starting on July 1. Gettysburg was located between 5 to 25 miles away from each of Meade's seven infantry corps. The Pipe Creek Line served as a defensive barrier to protect against potential attacks on Baltimore and Washington D.C. It also acted as a reserve line in case a retreat from Gettysburg became necessary for the Union forces.

The Pipe Creek Line was positioned just north of Westminster, Maryland, and held strategic importance for the AoP.: the Western Maryland Railroad had its terminus in Westminster, making it the primary supply line for the army in the region, including Gettysburg. Safeguarding this crucial supply route was of utmost importance. The Pipe Creek Line followed Parr Ridge, a significant ridge that stretched from Manchester in the east to Middleburg in the west, running on an east/west axis. Except for some lower ground near Middleburg, the entire position was situated on high ground that was easily defensible. It was believed that this strong position would be nearly impregnable unless Lee could successfully flank it.

The Day Before. Brig Gen John Buford arrived in Gettysburg on the morning of June 30, accompanied by 2 cavalry brigades and approximately 3000 soldiers. Upon his arrival, he was informed by residents that Confederate soldiers were in the vicinity. One of AP Hill's brigades, led by Brig Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured towards Gettysburg. According to the memoirs of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, Pettigrew was sent to search for supplies, particularly shoes, in the town. With a brigade of 2700 men, Pettigrew conducted a scouting movement. During this movement, he encountered a physician named Dr John O'Neal, who was on a house call. After inspecting O'Neal's medical equipment, Pettigrew inquired about the presence of Union troops, to which O'Neal responded negatively. However, as they approached the town, Pettigrew spotted what he believed to be Union cavalry in the distance. He did not bring on an engagement, as he had been ordered, and returned to Generals Heth and Hill to report.

Confederate Response: When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth about what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. It is perplexing to consider why neither General Heth nor General Hill placed trust in Pettigrew's observations. One possible explanation is that both Heth and Hill were relatively new to their positions and had reputations for impulsive decision-making. In terms of practical experience, Heth did not possess significantly more than Pettigrew.

Furthermore, Pettigrew's background as a non-West Pointer from a wealthy family, coupled with his lack of military experience before the war, may have contributed to the skepticism towards his report. Additionally, the fact that Pettigrew's men were freshly outfitted with new uniforms and rifles, and his staff consisted of fellow aristocrats, may have given the impression that they were inexperienced and unfamiliar with the realities of battle. Consequently, Hill may have discounted Pettigrew's interpretation due to these factors, leading to a failure to take his report seriously.

Union Response: In contradistinction, Buford had also spotted Pettigrew’s men. He recognized that he was facing a sizeable force of rebels because they had moved without vedettes as a screen. Buford's identification of a significant enemy presence in the area was taken seriously by his superior, Gen Reynolds. Buford was the ideal individual in the ideal location at the opportune moment. He had attended West Point, was acquainted with many of the generals as school friends, had served in the US First Dragoons, had commanded infantry, and had recently led his cavalry division at Brandy Station and Upperville. His military expertise was highly regarded; Buford and Reynolds had trust and confidence in each other, and their shared experiences at Second Manassas had demonstrated the consequences of disregarding accurate reports from a subordinate. Therefore, when Buford requested close support, Reynolds promptly initiated the advance. The outcome of battles hinges on such intricate details; these specifics determine the victor and the vanquished.

Recognizing that the Confederate movement was originating from the northwest, Buford strategically positioned his men along the roads in this vicinity. Anticipating that any engagement involving his division would serve as a delaying tactic, he dismounted his troopers and stationed them on the low ridges to the north and northwest of the town, aiming to buy time for the army to arrive and secure the advantageous positions to defend McPherson and Seminary Ridges.

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References

·      James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988; and

·      https://www.historynet.com/conquer-peace-lees-goals-gettysburg-campaign/

·      https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/workspace/handleMediaPlayer?qvq=&trs=&mi=&lunaMediaId=RUMSEY~8~1~26945~1100244

·      https://www.historynet.com/were-maps-lees-real-enemy-at-gettysburg/

·      Eric J Wittenberg and J David Petruzzi, Plenty of Blame to Go Around. SavasBeattie, 2006.

·      Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.

·      Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

·      Kent Masterson Brown, Meade at Gettysburg. A Study in Command. University of North     Carolina, 2021.

·      Lloyd W Klein, https://www.rebellionresearch.com/why-did-lee-want-gettysburg-2?fbclid=IwAR3BX-K30era80r4YbpIK7akPaYj4JauC3XoaHZYFtvj8lTQzuQ3v1rfD5c&fs=e&s=cl ;

·      https://www.rebellionresearch.com/what-were-robert-e-lees-goals-for-invading-pennsylvania-in-1863?fbclid=IwAR02kXsGHSKe992kDLtyFQy41v5igLfai3YrNN6Fb8v9SDFPDJxywT9zKZ0 ; and

·      https://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/8/24/logistics-challenges-of-the-army-of-northern-virginia-in-the-gettysburg-campaign

·      John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. Louisiana State University Press, 1993.

·      Scott L Mingus and Eric J Wittenberg, If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania.Vol1. SavasBeattie 2022.

The Connections between the U.S. Civil War and the Wild West

The Civil War and the American conquest of the West were two of the most important events of the nineteenth century. However, these events are often treated as separate occurrences, even though the end of the war played a crucial role in stimulating westward expansion. It is important to acknowledge that the expansion of slavery played a prominent role in the power struggles for control over the territories, which would eventually become the Old West. Indeed, what we now perceive as the Old West saw itself as the New South during that period.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Buffalo Bill, around 1880.

Following the defeat of the Confederacy, numerous men who had fought for a cause found themselves suddenly without employment, money, or prospects. Many returned home to find their families and farms devastated, facing circumstances beyond their worst nightmares. In response, those who had the means chose to migrate westward in search of a fresh start. However, their anger, experiences, and familiarity with guns and violence accompanied them on their journey.

The popular perception of the Old West, largely influenced by Hollywood depictions, revolves around lawlessness, gunfights, and violence. In these portrayals, lawmen are depicted as heroes, distinguished by their badges and white hats, while the "bad guys" are characterized by black hats, unshaven appearances, and a tendency to draw their weapons first. However, the reality was far more nuanced. Violence was rampant, and law and order were virtually nonexistent. Interestingly, those who carried badges typically hailed from the northern states, while outlaws were often from the Border States and the old South. And those who wore the badges were of a specific background.

The Border States

It is crucial to recognize that the western frontier in the 1850s and 1860s encompassed Missouri and Kansas, known as the Border States. Kansas, in particular, had a history steeped in violence, which was deeply ingrained in the lives of its inhabitants. While we may not commonly associate the Old West with the consequences of the Civil War, those who lived during that time held no such distinction. When we envision the Old West today, we often think of states like Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado. However, during the 1860s, the frontier was primarily located in Kansas. Whether we refer to it as a result of the Civil War or as Old West-related, those who actively participated in that era did not make such distinctions. It was the frontier in many different ways: between North and South, for sure, but also the West vs. East, whites vs. Native Americans, and Republicans vs. Democrats. It was a place of violence and lawlessness precisely because it was the border of all of these cultural shifts.

Bushwhacking and Western Gangs

Bushwhacking is a form of guerrilla warfare common during conflicts in which there were large areas of contested land and few governmental resources to control these tracts. This tactic was particularly prevalent in rural areas during the Civil War where there were sharp divisions between those favoring the Union and Confederacy in the conflict. The individuals responsible for these attacks, known as bushwhackers, utilized ambushes as a means of attrition. Attrition warfare, a military strategy aimed at wearing down the enemy through continuous losses in personnel, material, and morale, was the underlying objective of these guerrilla tactics.

Bushwhackers were typically affiliated with irregular military forces on both sides of the conflict. While they occasionally launched well-coordinated raids against military targets, their most devastating attacks involved ambushing individuals and conducting house raids in rural communities. These actions were especially inflammatory as they often pitted neighbors against each other, serving as a means to settle personal scores. Due to their lack of proper insignia, the Union considered these attackers as terrorists. Notable figures such as William Quantrill, Bill Anderson, and John Singleton Mosby exemplified the bushwhacker profile. Partisan Rangers, essentially land-based privateers, also fell under the category of bushwhackers.

The association of bushwhacking became particularly strong with the pro-Confederate guerrillas in Missouri, where this form of warfare reached its peak intensity. Guerrilla activities also extended to regions like Kentucky, Appalachian Tennessee, northern Georgia, Arkansas, and western Virginia. In Kansas, pro-Union guerrilla fighters were referred to as "Jayhawkers" and frequently engaged in cross-border raids into Missouri.

Jesse & Frank James

The James Brothers, along with their partners the Youngers, can be traced back to their involvement in the Civil War. Understanding the James–Younger Gang solely as outlaws in the Wild West would be incomplete, as their formation can be traced back to the bushwhackers of the Civil War era who engaged in partisan warfare in Missouri during the Civil War.

After the war ended, their motives shifted from fighting for the Confederacy to pursuing personal profit through acts of plunder and murder. Jesse James, a prominent member of the gang, began his insurgent activities in 1864. Throughout the war, he primarily fought against fellow Missourians, including Missouri regiments of U.S. Volunteer troops, state militia, and unarmed Unionist civilians. Although there is only one confirmed instance of him engaging in combat with Federal troops from another state, which occurred after Appomattox, he faced numerous hardships during the war. His mother and sister were arrested, his stepfather was tortured, and his family was temporarily banished from Missouri by Unionist Missourians.

The James–Younger Gang eventually disbanded in 1876 after the Younger brothers were captured during a failed bank robbery in Northfield, Minnesota. It is often mentioned that Union Army veterans played a significant role in the gunfight that led to their capture. Considering the contributions of the Iron Brigade and the First Minnesota in the war, it appears that the gang had chosen the wrong town to engage in criminal activities.

Three years later, Jesse James formed a new gang and resumed his criminal career. However, his reign came to an end in 1882 when he was shot from behind by Robert Ford, resulting in his death. Interestingly, Ford, who was a member of the James-Younger Gang, had been offered a reward and full pardon by the Governor of Missouri, Thomas Crittenden, if he successfully killed James. Crittenden had been elected with the promise of bringing an end to the notorious gang.

Buffalo Bill

In 1853, a man named Isaac Cody sold his land in Scott County, Iowa, and he, his wife, and their son moved to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Territory.  The allure of the frontier and the potential opportunities it held were the driving factors behind this move. However, little did he know that he was about to find himself in a tumultuous and violent situation. As an ardent opponent of slavery, Isaac was invited to deliver a speech at Rively's Store, a local trading post known for hosting gatherings of pro-slavery individuals. Unfortunately, his impassioned antislavery rhetoric provoked such anger among the crowd that they resorted to threatening his life. In a shocking turn of events, a man leaped forward and viciously stabbed Isaac twice with a Bowie knife. Although Rively, the store's proprietor, promptly rushed him to receive medical attention, Isaac never fully recovered from the injuries inflicted upon him. 

Following their arrival in Kansas, the Cody family faced relentless persecution from pro-slavery supporters. Isaac's safety was jeopardized to such an extent that he was compelled to spend considerable time away from his home. Matters took a grave turn when his adversaries discovered his planned visit to his family and devised a sinister plot to assassinate him en route. It was at this critical juncture that his 11-year-old son, already an accomplished equestrian, rode an astonishing thirty miles to warn his father of the impending danger. In a surprising twist, Isaac decided to divert his course and journeyed to Cleveland, Ohio, where he organized a group of thirty families to bring them back to Kansas to bolster the antislavery population. Tragically, during his return trip, Isaac fell ill with a respiratory infection, exacerbated by the lingering effects of his stabbing and complications arising from kidney disease. These afflictions ultimately led to his untimely demise in April 1857.

His son, William Cody, was forced to make a living as a young teen. He first worked as a messenger, capitalizing on his exceptional horse-riding abilities. Subsequently, he embarked on a career as a scout, riding alongside the US Cavalry in Utah, where he demonstrated his marksmanship by preventing a Native American from harming his comrade. At the age of 14, he ventured into gold prospecting in California but soon abandoned this quest to become a rider for the Pony Express. In 1861, he attempted to enlist in the Union army, but was rejected (he was just 15). In 1863, at age 17, he enlisted as a teamster with the rank of private in Company H, 7th Kansas Cavalry, and served until discharged in 1865.

With the end of the war, he went to Junction City KS to enlist as a scout with an old friend named Bill Hickok. They would work for various troops and their generals, including George Armstrong Custer. The reunion of Bill Cody with Wild Bill Hickock after the war was a critical part of the Old West story. They first met when Hickok was age 18, and a Jayhawker, and Cody was age 12. They crossed paths again in 1862 when Hickock joined General James Henry Lane's Kansas Brigade, and while serving with the brigade, saw his friend Buffalo Bill Cody, who was serving as a scout.

Buffalo Bill's Wild West Shows have been the subject of much contemporary criticism, with controversy revolving around whether they exploited Native Americans or if Bill was their benefactor.

Billy the Kid

Billy the Kid’s real name was Henry McCarty, whose alias was William H Bonney – that was not his real name. He had killed 21 men by the time of his own death at age 21. His connection to the Civil War is indirect but is a fascinating reflection on the times.

McCarty was orphaned at the age of 15. His first arrest was for stealing food at the age of 16 in 1875. Ten days later, he robbed a Chinese laundry and was arrested again but escaped shortly afterward. He fled from New Mexico Territory into neighboring Arizona Territory, making himself both an outlaw and a federal fugitive. In 1877, he began to call himself "William H. Bonney".

After killing a blacksmith during an altercation in August 1877, Bonney became a wanted man in Arizona and returned to New Mexico, where he joined a group of cattle rustlers. He became well known in the region when he joined the Regulators and took part in the Lincoln County War of 1878. He and two other Regulators were later charged with killing three men, including Lincoln County Sheriff William J. Brady and one of his deputies.

Bonney's notoriety grew in December 1880 when the Las Vegas Gazette, and The Sun, in New York City, carried stories about his crimes. Sheriff Pat Garrett captured Bonney later that month. In April 1881, Bonney was tried for and convicted of Brady's murder and was sentenced to hang in May of that year. He escaped from jail on April 28, killing two sheriff's deputies in the process, and evaded capture for more than two months. Garrett eventually caught up with him and shot and killed Bonney, by then aged 21, in Fort Sumner on July 14, 1881. Garrett shot him in the chest in a dark room. Garrett and Bonney had been friends; he had a temper and had killed several men, with and without a badge. Rumors developed that Garrett never actually killed Bonney but it was a set up for him to escape. The movie in the 1970s accompanied by Bob Dylan’s lyrics made it seem as if Garrett was more of an assassin than a lawman. Certainly, a reward offered by the Governor of New Mexico was part of the incentive. And indeed, Garrett’s life story shows him seamlessly drifting among these roles.

Governor Lew Wallace, renowned for his involvement in the battles of Shiloh and Monocacy, as well as his authorship of the novel "Ben Hur," arrived in Santa Fe on September 29, 1878. His service as governor of the New Mexico Territory occurred during a time of lawless violence and political corruption. Wallace was involved in efforts to resolve New Mexico's Lincoln County War, a contentious and violent disagreement among the county's residents, and tried to end a series of Apache raids on territorial settlers.

On March 1, 1879, after previous attempts to restore order in Lincoln County had proven unsuccessful, Wallace issued orders for the arrest of those responsible for the local killings. Among the outlaws was none other than Billy the Kid. On March 17, 1879, Wallace clandestinely met with Bonney, who had witnessed the murder of a Lincoln County lawyer named Huston Chapman. Wallace sought Bonney's testimony in the trial of Chapman's alleged murderers. In return, Bonney requested protection from his enemies and amnesty for his past transgressions. During their meeting, the two struck a deal, with Bonney agreeing to become an informant in exchange for a full pardon of his previous crimes.

Wallace supposedly assured the Kid that he would be "scot-free with a pardon in your pocket for all your misdeeds." On March 20 Bonney agreed to provide grand jury testimony against those involved in Chapman's murder. Wallace arranged for a "fake" arrest and Bonney's detention in a local jail to assure his safety. Bonney testified in court on April 14, as agreed. However, the local district attorney revoked Wallace's bargain and refused to set the outlaw free. Bonney escaped and went back to killing people. Garrett set a $500 reward for his capture. That was when Garrett went after his friend. The authenticity of this bargain, however, remains questionable. It is unclear whether Wallace truly made such an offer or if it was merely a fabrication.

Garrett's early life was marked by financial hardship and tragedy. At age 3, Garrett’s father purchased the John Greer plantation in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana. The Civil War, however, destroyed the Garrett family's finances. Their mother died at the age of 37 on March 25, 1867, when Garrett was 16. Then the following year, on February 5, 1868, his father died at age 45. The children were left with a plantation that was more than $30,000 in debt. Relatives took in the children. The 18-year-old Garrett headed west from Louisiana on January 25, 1869. He became a Buffalo hunter and killed his first man in 1876. His first lawman job was as sheriff of Lincoln County during its war between 2 families after the previous sheriff was killed in a 5-day shootout. Billy the Kid was involved, so Garrett began to track him. Garrett went on to great acclaim as a Western lawman, recognized alongside Bat Masterson and Ben Daniels by Theodore Roosevelt. He would eventually be killed on the trail under still-mysterious circumstances.

An intriguing aspect to consider is the contrasting backgrounds of McCarty and Garrett. While McCarty was born in New York City, Garrett hailed from Alabama. in this regard, although an interesting switch of geographic roles, Garrett wasn’t such a good guy; Garrett's reputation as a lawman was not without blemish. On the other hand, Bonney, despite his outlaw status, had spent most of his life in the South. This pattern reveals a recurring theme where the law was often associated with the Republican and Northern states, while outlaws tended to emerge from the Border States or regions with Southern influences.

Arizona

In March 1861, Arizona territory issued an ordinance of secession. In retrospect, this is noteworthy because it wasn’t even a state at the time; it was part of a territory with New Mexico. Its stated reasons for this measure included: the need for protection from Native American raids and attacks, continued mail service, and the ties of “southern identity” although the document makes no explicit mention of slavery.  A specific passage in the secession statement says, “RESOLVED, That geographically and naturally we are bound to the South, and to her we look for protection; and as the Southern States have formed a Confederacy, it is our earnest desire to be attached to that Confederacy as a Territory.”

Black Americans in the Old West

Old Hollywood Westerns are fantastic updated examples of a Greek morality play: Evil may seem to be winning, but in the end, justice will prevail. There is of course a problem with the casting of these movies: 25% of the estimated 35,000 men who went out west and became cowboys (in the modern sense) were black.  These were former slaves who had been emancipated, went west due to limited prospects in the South, and were now looking to make a living.

And once this fact is pointed out, the reasons are not hard to discern. Former slaves had skills in cattle handling; suddenly free with no prospect of being hired for a fair wage at home, they headed West at the end of the Civil War.  While not treated exactly as equals, black men had equality to white men in terms of pay and responsibilities, A typical trail party consisted of a dozen men, of whom 7 or 8 were white men, 2 or so were Mexicans, and 3 were blacks.  These men were most often employed as wranglers or cooks, but not very often as trail bosses. The freed slaves might not be hired right away. Many came with kitchen or ranching skills but often trained under Mexican vaqueros or native Americans, and then hired by white ranchers and paid an equal wage.).

Many of the authentic characters of the Old West were former slaves who found a better life on the frontier. Here are 5 examples:

Deadwood Dick: Real name: Nat Love from Tennessee. Breaking horses and driving cattle were his specialties. He lived for a time in Deadwood and Dodge City. Later became a rodeo rider and performer.

Bob Lemmons: After being freed, he moved to West Texas and became known for his skills in capturing wild mustangs. He was so good at this that he became wealthy, bought his own ranch, and developed large herds of cattle and horses.

John Ware: Rancher freed from slavery in South Carolina, considered one of the most reliable cowboys on cattle drives from Alberta to Texas.

Bass Reeves: A freed slave from Arkansas who spoke numerous Native American languages, one of the great western lawmen, the first Black deputy U.S. marshal west of the Mississippi. Throughout Arkansas and the Oklahoma Territory, he apprehended over 3,000 criminals. Tales of his exploits are legendary, including that he once went on a posse with just a cook and an assistant and rounded up 21 wanted outlaws, who he led back on a rope. When we think of Western heroes, he really should be among the first we recognize, and the fact that we don’t is purely a manifestation of what old Hollywood thought would sell.

Bill Pickett: Legendary Rodeo performer, who invented steer wrestling, enshrined in the Rodeo Hall of Fame.

Wyatt Earp

If you think the Civil War has its myths and legends bent out of proportion to reality, well, the Old West has it beat, and the legend surrounding Wyatt Earp may be its greatest fraud. He is truly the embodiment of “the real America”, just not the ersatz one Hollywood created; the truth about the misogyny and violence of the Old West are romanticized, leading to false legends which have impacted modern views.

The story surrounding the Earps and the McLaurys and the Clantons and the facts of the Gunfight at the OK Corral and the Vendetta Ride go beyond this article. The truth is an even better story than the romanticized, sugar-coated version, and the blending of good guy versus bad guy never really ceases to amaze.

Wyatt Earp and Bat Masterson were assistant marshals in Dodge City, KS in the 1870s and 1880s. This town did not exist during the Bleeding Kansas days (it was founded in 1871), but the state’s reputation for violence predated the Old West. Earp moved to Dodge City from another Kansas boomtown, Wichita. His first wife was a prostitute who had opened a brothel there. Earp had been a pimp in Peoria. He was arrested several times while in Wichita for engaging in business with the brothel, and it was considered a conflict for a constable to be engaging in that behavior.

The Earps were northerners, from Illinois. Masterson was Canadian, from Quebec. Wyatt and Bat were Dodge City lawmen, in Kansas in the 1870s. Bleeding Kansas was still fresh in everyone’s mind. The territory west of them was Native American: Arapaho, Cheyenne, Comanche, Kansan, Kiowa, Osage, Pawnee, and Wichita.

Among the Dodge City lawmen of 1883 were Bat Masterson, Earp, and Charlie Basset, the town marshal. You would not want to mess with this group; these men were Tough. And they weren’t especially concerned with the details of the law. They applied the law with their fists and their six-shooters. What we see illustrated is that the guys wearing the star are northerners, sanctioned by Republican politicians in the post-war years by Grant or Hayes or Garfield, all Union generals serving as President; while the outlaws are originally from border states or southerners, and Democrats, who left behind a destroyed land and culture, represent the majority of the settlers. In the movies, the cliché was that the good guys wore white hats and the bad guys black ones. In reality, the lawmen were urban, wore ties, were clean-shaven, and represented society and a brand of frontier justice in the vacuum of the real thing.

Doc Holliday was from Georgia but graduated from Penn Dental School and his first dental practice was in St Louis. He moved west because his dental practice, at first successful, couldn’t survive his active tuberculosis, which was his eventual cause of death. He gambled because it was the only way an intelligent man with a persistent cough could earn a living, and his manual dexterity manifested in his gun handling.

The Clantons were from Missouri, the McLaurys from Iowa, but had become Texas and later Arizona cattle ranchers. The tension between North and South was not lost on anyone even a dozen years after Appomattox. While Hollywood has suggested that “cowboy” refers to the (white) settlers of the West it was a pejorative term suggesting cattle rustling, stagecoach robbery, and other crimes. The Clanton’s were indeed cowboys in this sense. Cowboys were poor, rural, isolated, worked with cattle and horses, worked hard, and did anything necessary to survive.

Tombstone is located in southern Arizona and was acquired as part of the Gadsden Purchase. That land was purchased from Mexico specifically to build a southern transcontinental railroad. Tombstone had its origins in the lead-up to the Civil War, and you just cannot understand the Gunfight or the Vendetta Ride without recognizing this. Tombstone was another boomtown due to silver mining. These kinds of places were infamous for loose law enforcement, perfect for the Earps. Earp’s second wife was also a prostitute. In Tombstone, his girlfriend was Josephine Marcus, a prostitute and gambler, from Brooklyn NY whose actual name was Sadie, called Sarah. She had been Sheriff Behan’s girlfriend before Earp came to town, and he was a friend with the Cowboys.

This is the foundation of the true story: Tombstone, AZ was perfectly happy with a bunch of cowboys – cattle thieves – in charge of town with their own elected sheriff in charge. Then these northerners came down uninvited, ran for office, tried to “reform” the town, stole the sheriff’s girlfriend, and carried badges from a Republican governor. They are not exactly noble: they are rough-and-tumble lawmen from Kansas and an infamous gambler, with reputations as gunfighters.

Those killed at the OK Corral famously are buried on Boot Hill. Where Wyatt Earp is buried is highly illustrative of the real America: Wyatt Earp is buried in a Jewish cemetery in Los Angeles. Despite her gambling addiction, Earp and Josephine, who was Jewish, remained together for many years after the shootout. Earp lived in LA as a movie consultant for Hollywood as one of many real-life roles including working for a time for Theodore Roosevelt. This is the real America, the melting pot, and the part that is left out because it is not the Western narrative Hollywood thrives on.

The Native American Perspective

The Civil War profoundly impacted the Native American tribes and led to what followed for the next 30 years. One-third of all Cherokees and Seminoles in Indian Territory died from violence, starvation, and war-related illness. Elite tribal members’ enslavement of African Americans motivated Southern allegiance. It turns out that the Native Americans fought for all the same reasons, influenced by the same economics and politics, as the white man.

It is estimated that over 20,000 Native Americans actively participated in the Civil War, fighting on both sides of the conflict. Approximately 3,500 Native Americans served in the Union Army. While exact numbers don’t exist for the CSA, it is believed to be much higher. It is crucial to recognize that some of the territories that were at the center of the slavery debate in 1850 eventually became the Indian territories in the 1870s. This historical context sheds light on the complex dynamics at play during this period.

Native Americans held complex aspirations during the war, perhaps naively hoping that aligning themselves with the white man would grant them a voice and consideration for their views. A close examination of the geographical distribution reveals that certain Indian territories, such as Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, lay below the Missouri Compromise line, indicating the presence of Native American slave owners. Ultimately, what the tribes truly desired was tribal sovereignty, but their concerns were overshadowed by the larger, more devastating destruction of indigenous ways of life. Oklahoma was the primary site of Indian Territory in 1861, housing at least nine tribes, with the Cherokees being the largest among them. The tribes faced internal divisions and conflicting opinions on the best course of action, both within and between their respective communities. Once again, it is important to emphasize that some of the territories of 1850 where slavery was a political issue would become the Indian territories of the 1870s.

The indigenous peoples of America held complex desires during the war and may have been somewhat naive in their belief that aligning with the white settlers would grant them a platform to voice their concerns. Their primary aspiration, however, was to attain tribal sovereignty. But the war wasn’t about their issues and was just an interlude to the bigger, more chilling destruction of aboriginal ways of life.

Tribes located in Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona were situated below the Missouri Compromise line, while Wyoming and the Dakotas were located above. This indicates that certain Native American tribes did own slaves while others did not. Oklahoma today was the main location of Indian Territory in 1861, and at least 9 tribes were located there, although the Cherokees were the largest of them. Within these tribes, there were divisions in terms of loyalty and differing opinions on the best course of action to take. These divisions were not only present between tribes but also within individual tribes themselves.

Stand Watie served as Brigadier General in the Confederate States of America (CSA) during a tumultuous period in the history of the Cherokee Nation. Before his leadership, John Ross, who had guided the nation through the tragic Trail of Tears, advocated for neutrality and unity as the secessionist movement gained momentum in and around Indian Territory. Ross, supported by a significant majority, aimed to maintain the nation's sovereignty while also advocating for the abolition of slavery. However, Watie represented a wealthy minority within the Cherokee Nation who owned slaves. He was the most prominent figure of the Treaty Party, a group that defied the majority's wishes and illegally signed a treaty that resulted in the forced removal of Cherokees from their ancestral lands.

In a move that bypassed Ross, Watie formed a Cherokee cavalry by recruiting members from within the nation. Consequently, the Cherokee Nation found itself embroiled in its own civil war. When the CSA eventually surrendered, Watie lost his rank, and Ross resumed his position as chief. Watie actively participated in significant battles such as Wilsons Creek, Pea Ridge, and Cabin Creek. Notably, he became the last Confederate general to surrender. However, the Cherokee Nation suffered immense devastation both internally and externally. The absence of support from the Union army made it clear that their loyalty would not be rewarded. This summary only scratches the surface of a complex narrative filled with ruthless decision-making, self-centered actions, and violence.  

Ely Parker, a Seneca (Iroquois) and a colonel on Grant's staff played a significant role in the Civil War. Unlike Stand Watie, Parker strongly opposed slavery. Before the war, he had served as a civil engineer and diplomat for the Seneca, even contributing to the construction of the Erie Canal. As the war drew to a close, Parker was entrusted with the task of drafting the final terms of surrender for the Confederacy. At the time of surrender, General Lee "stared at me for a moment," said Parker. "He extended his hand and said, 'I am glad to see one real American here.' I shook his hand and said, 'We are all Americans.' After the war, he served in many government capacities including as Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

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References

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Arizona_Territory_Ordinance_of_Secession

https://listverse.com/2016/04/04/10-african-american-cowboys-who-shaped-the-old-west/

https://historycollection.com/the-little-known-history-of-american-indians-during-the-civil-war/

https://historycollection.com/the-little-known-history-of-american-indians-during-the-civil-war/

https://www.history.com/news/civil-war-native-american-indian-territory-cherokee-home-guard

https://americanindian.si.edu/static/why-we-serve/topics/civil-war/

Charles Francis Adams Sr: America’s Man in London During the US Civil War

Naturally, we get taken in by imagining the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield; our books describe in detail what that experience must have been like. This article will concentrate on battles fought in fancy conference rooms by men wearing expensive clothes. And especially those of one man, who in his own peculiar way, won bigger battles with more important implications than Grant or Lee. Adams came from perhaps the most storied family in the north. But he didn’t get an easy out. Several early defeats in life despite a sterling family pedigree forged a tough diplomat who didn’t let things dissuade him when frustrating, difficult things happened later on.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Charles Francis Adams Sr. As painted by by William Morris Hunt in 1867.

Charles Francis Adams Sr was the youngest of 3 sons of John Quincy Adams and the grandson of John Adams, which is about as illustrious a family tree as one could imagine. As you’d expect of a northern elite family, he attended Boston Latin and Harvard, then studied law with Daniel Webster. He opened a law practice, was elected 3 times to the Massachusetts House and once to the Massachusetts Senate.

But politics was not really his game, and he knew it. Instead, he purchased and edited the Boston Whig, a newspaper for the common people, who were more liberal minded than those he grew up with and wanted to see change faster. His initial successes came as an editor. This paper went from obscurity to national acclaim under his editorship, so much so that he was offered a national candidacy at the age of 41. He edited his grandmother’s, Abigail Adams, letters; then finished his father’s incomplete biography of his grandfather, including a highly acclaimed collection of his letters, which ultimately became the first Presidential Library.

Many of his relatives found the burden of carrying on the family tradition of public service impossible to live up to. Many retired to private life, while others broke under the strain.  Charles Francis Adams was the youngest of 3 brothers; his older brothers were George Washington Adams (1801–1829) and John Adams II (1803–1834). All 3 were rivals for the same woman, their cousin Mary Catherine Hellen, who lived with the Adams family after the death of her parents. In 1828, John married Mary in a White House ceremony, and both Charles and George declined to attend. John was the father of an out-of-wedlock child born later that year to a woman who was the chambermaid to the family’s physician. The child died in infancy.  John was a reputed alcoholic who is believed to have committed suicide the next spring.

Charles Francis Adams

Instead, Charles Francis married Abigail, the daughter of Peter Chardon Brooks, a Boston millionaire and one of the richest men in Massachusetts. Her father insisted that they wait several years before getting married, as they were too young when they met. Later, Charles Francis Adams said that if not for Abigail Brooks, he would never have accomplished anything in life. After experiencing his brother's death, his marriage to Abigail Brooks, and his reconciliation with his father, Charles Francis became a more focused and goal-oriented person.

Charles opened his own law office but was careless about its operation, and his father criticized Charles for being aimless and irresponsible. Charles and his father had never been close but after Charles' oldest brother died in 1829, John Quincy seemed to show more interest and affection for his two remaining sons. After his father’s presidency, he spent eighteen years representing the Quincy district; Charles Francis assumed the care of the property the elder Adams possessed.

The controversy over slavery, however, propelled Charles Francis into prominence. In the Massachusetts legislature, where he served from 1840 to 1845, Adams became a leader of conservative antislavery members who concentrated on resisting the encroachments of "slave power." With the issue of the annexation of Texas, Adams became one of the leaders of the "conscience Whigs," that wing of the Whig Party that demanded guarantees that slavery would not be expanded westward. The Conscience Whigs in Massachusetts merged with the broader "Free Soil" movement in 1848.

Adams unsuccessfully ran for vice president as that party's candidate alongside Martin Van Buren. Adams disapproved of the Free Soil tendency to ally with other parties in order to achieve election. He became unpopular in the south for his abolitionist views and unpopular in the north for his strict adherence to supporting abolition over elected office.

In 1848, he was the unsuccessful nominee of the Free Soil Party for Vice President of the United States, running on a ticket with former president Martin Van Buren as the presidential nominee. That same year, his father died from a stroke at age 80. He spent most of the 1850s rehabbing the family home in Quincy, today a national park.

In 1859, Adams was elected to the US House of Representatives. He became chair of a northern committee studying how to work for conciliation with the South. Suddenly, the intransigent abolitionist was looking for a solution: the very definition of diplomacy. He supported Seward – not Lincoln – for the presidential nomination.  But on his election, Lincoln asked him to serve as US minister to Great Britain, which Adams accepted. This became the work of a lifetime. Give Lincoln props for an amazing recognition of talent.

US Minister to the Court of St James

The US Minister to the Court of St James (Great Britain) was a crucial post. As the U.S. Minister to the United Kingdom from 1861 to 1868, Adams played a crucial role in preventing British recognition of the Confederacy during the Civil War. Through skillful diplomacy and advocacy, he successfully conveyed the Union's perspective and counteracted Confederate efforts to gain international support. Through firm but skillful negotiations, Adams was influential in persuading the British, and by extension the French, not to recognize the Confederacy.

Britain issued a proclamation of neutrality at the beginning of the Civil War on May 13, 1861. The imposition of the blockade forced Britain to take a position on which side it would support. Southern cotton was critical to the textile industry in western England, especially Liverpool. The United States Secretary of State, William Seward, threatened to treat as hostile any country that recognized the Confederacy. Instead, the Confederacy was recognized as a belligerent, but it was premature to recognize it as a sovereign state.  Britain remained neutral officially and waited to see how things would develop before making a commitment. Adams did incredible work to keep Britain neutral and prevent the British from going any further in their recognition. Both his father and his grandfather had served in this diplomatic post, and so he was immediately accepted by the British as speaking for the new administration with a wise voice.

Official recognition was tied to the idea of the Union blockade being against a belligerent power rather than an insurrection. Adams managed to navigate this by getting the British to respect the blockade officially while still not recognizing the Confederacy as an independent entity. Because of his own family legacy, he managed to form a friendship with Prince Albert.

One of his main accomplishments was leveraging his friendships to prevent the British from supplying Confederate ironclads. A strong element in Britain wanted to intervene on behalf of the Confederacy.  Both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had strong sympathies with the South and believed it would win independence. The Prime Minister in particular had a lifelong hostility to the US, and despite opposition to the slave trade and slavery, he believed that dissolution of the Union would benefit the British.

Adams played a key role in preventing the recognition of the Confederacy by the United Kingdom through diplomatic efforts and effective communication. Adams skillfully engaged with British officials, politicians, and influential figures, presenting the Union's case and countering Confederate propaganda. Support of the Confederacy in Britain was popular for several reasons. The primary one was the availability of cheap cotton for English mills.

Adams in London

Britain had lost 2 wars to this fledgling primitive country on the other side of the pond. Further, the idea of a successful democracy remained unappetizing to a government based on a monarchy. Moreover, southern trade especially cotton was very important to British manufacturers. Finally, they knew that if they helped this new country win independence, it would be forever in its debt; which is precisely what empire is about.

He emphasized the Union's commitment to upholding international law, the abolition of slavery, and the economic benefits of maintaining trade relations with the North. Adams emphasized the military and industrial power of the Union, which was vital in dispelling the perception that the Confederacy could achieve a quick and decisive victory. He provided accurate and timely information about Union victories, the strength of the Union army, and the North's ability to sustain the war effort.

Adams warned that meant war with the United States, as well as the cutting off of American food exports, which comprised about a fourth of the British food supply. ”The English people can't eat cotton” was his strong argument, and the Union supplied too much necessary food to England to make war with the United States a realistic action. Losing grain and meat shipments from the United States would mean a huge fall in food supply. It’s fascinating that the Jefferson Davis government believed King Cotton would be decisive, yet it was corn that really was.

Also, the American Navy, increasingly strong, would try to sink British shipping. Britain depended more on American corn than Confederate cotton, and a war with the U.S. would not be in Britain's economic interest.

Adams recognized the significance of public opinion and worked to shape it in favor of the Union. He engaged with the British press, wrote articles and letters to influential publications, and delivered speeches to counter Confederate narratives and generate sympathy for the Union cause.

Adams conveyed to the British government that recognition of the Confederacy would likely strain relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. He made it clear that such recognition would have negative consequences for British trade and international standing, creating a disincentive for British officials to support the Confederacy.

By employing these diplomatic strategies, effectively countering Confederate propaganda, and highlighting the Union's strength, Charles Francis Adams played a crucial role in preventing the recognition of the Confederacy by the United Kingdom. His diplomatic efforts helped to maintain the international isolation of the Confederacy and ultimately contributed to the Union's victory in the Civil War.

Had Britain recognized the Confederacy, and given its aid and assistance, the Civil War would have had an entirely different result. Charles Francis Adams took on this exasperating and vexing assignment. Recognition was a fear of the Union and a pipe dream of the Confederacy. In retrospect, it was never really likely to happen without multiple major successes on the battlefield by the Confederacy.  This reality was based on the political situation in Britain more than the circumstances we Americans think the Civil War was about.

Trent Affair

The “Trent Affair” in November 1861 produced public outrage in Britain and a diplomatic crisis. The British predicted a war and Seward threatened to fight. Only Abraham Lincoln kept the crisis in perspective.  Ambassador Adams played a crucial role in resolving it, and for a time, things looked bleak. Adams almost single-handedly calmed British anger.

The "Trent Affair” was initiated when an American warship seized two Confederate agents bound for Europe from the British mail ship Trent.A U.S. Navy warship stopped the British steamer Trent and seized two Confederate envoys en route to Europe. On November 8, 1861, the USS San Jacinto, commanded by Union Captain Charles Wilkes, intercepted the British mail packet RMS Trent and removed, as contraband of war, two Confederate envoys: James Murray Mason and John Slidell. The envoys were bound for Britain and France to press the Confederacy's case for diplomatic recognition and to lobby for possible financial and military support.

Public reaction in the United States was to celebrate the capture and rally against Britain, threatening war. In the Confederate states, the hope was that the incident would lead to a permanent rupture in Anglo-American relations and possibly even war, or at least diplomatic recognition by Britain. Confederates realized their independence potentially depended on foreign intervention.

In Britain, there was widespread disapproval of this violation of neutral rights and insult to their national honor. The British government demanded an apology and the release of the prisoners and took steps to strengthen its military forces in British North America and the North Atlantic. PM Palmerston called the action "a declared and gross insult", demanded the release of the two diplomats and ordered 3,000 troops to Canada. In a letter to Queen Victoria on 5 December 1861 he said that if his demands were not met: "Great Britain is in a better state than at any former time to inflict a severe blow upon and to read a lesson to the United States which will not soon be forgotten."  In another letter to his foreign secretary, he predicted war between Britain and the Union.

President Abraham Lincoln did not want to risk war with Britain over this issue. “One war at a time” Lincoln told Seward. After some careful diplomatic exchanges, Lincoln admitted that the capture had been conducted contrary to maritime law and that private citizens could not be classified as "enemy despatches”, which was the only possible legal argument. After several tense weeks, the crisis was resolved when the Lincoln administration released the envoys and disavowed Captain Wilkes's actions, although without a formal apology.  Slidell and Mason were released, and war was averted. Mason and Slidell resumed their voyage to Europe. Adams basically brokered this resolution, by recognizing the British right to engage in diplomacy as it saw fit while maintaining the Lincoln administration’s position that the war was an internal domestic conflict not an international one.

The resolution of the Trent affair dealt a serious blow to Confederate diplomatic efforts. First, it deflected the recognition momentum developed during the summer and fall of 1861. It created a feeling in Great Britain that the United States was prepared to defend itself when necessary, but recognized its responsibility to comply with international law. Moreover, it produced a feeling in Great Britain and France that peace could be preserved as long as the Europeans maintained strict neutrality in regard to the American belligerents.  Lincoln, through Adams, turned a potentially explosive event into a huge net positive. (See more at https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/trent-affair)

Slidell was the designee to represent the Confederacy in France.  He failed to bring France into the war, which would not change its position unless Britain made the first move. His major success in the war was negotiating a loan of $15,000,000 from Emile Erlanger & Co. and in securing the ship "Stonewall" for the Confederate government. Slidell, Louisiana is named after him. After the war, he remained in Paris.

Mason was the grandson of George Mason. He was a strong secessionist and white supremacist who strongly favored slavery, wrote the fugitive slave act, and before the war was the chair of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. You’d think he would have been tough competition for Adams, but in fact his views were so extreme that he was ineffectual as a diplomat and he moved to Paris in 1863 where he hoped he would find a more sympathetic ear. After the war, he lived in exile in Canada, eventually purchasing a huge estate in Alexandria VA with white servants as he believed free blacks to be worthless.

The British Government

In retrospect, Both the Union and the Confederacy overestimated the potential of British recognition. Not only the Queen and Prince, but also the Church, the Commons, and working people adamantly opposed slavery. Still, faced with both a PM and a ruling party that favored the enemy, you can understand the fears.

Lord Palmerston was the Prime Minister and William Gladstone the Chancellor. Their relationship lasted 35 years, both as allies and as political enemies, exchanging jobs several times. Together they dominated British foreign policy, and If they were in agreement, the US was in trouble. With very little cotton reaching Europe except through Union channels, a strong element in Britain, including both Palmerston & Gladstone, wanted to intervene to help the Confederacy.

Palmerston's sympathies in the Civil War were with the Confederate States of America. Although a professed opponent of the slave trade and slavery, he held a lifelong hostility towards the United States, and believed dissolution of the Union would enhance British power. Additionally, the Confederacy "would afford a valuable and extensive market for British manufactures". He expected the Confederacy to achieve its independence.

The British government pulled back from talk of war when the Confederate invasion of the North was defeated at Antietam, and Lincoln announced that he would issue the Emancipation Proclamation.  Palmerston then noted that the only thing positive that had been accomplished by the war was the killing off of thousands of “troublesome Irish and Germans”.

Palmerston and his government were careful to avoid any actions that could be interpreted as favoring either the Union or the Confederacy. While there were debates within his government and among politicians regarding the recognition of the Confederacy, Palmerston ultimately adhered to a policy of non-recognition and neutrality.

Palmerston's government closely monitored the progress of the war, sought to gather accurate intelligence, and maintained diplomatic channels with both sides. However, the British government did not extend official recognition to the Confederacy as an independent nation during Palmerston's tenure.

Overall, Palmerston's approach was one of careful neutrality, prioritizing British interests and avoiding actions that could disrupt relations with either the Union or the Confederacy. The neutrality policy pursued by Palmerston was influenced by the efforts of Charles Francis Adams, the United States Minister to the United Kingdom, who effectively conveyed the Union's perspective and countered Confederate attempts to gain international recognition.

Gladstone believed in the principle of self-determination and viewed the Confederacy's struggle for independence as a valid cause. He saw the war as a conflict between two parties, and he argued that the British government should remain neutral and extend recognition to the Confederacy if it appeared likely to achieve independence.

Gladstone's public statements and speeches, such as his Newcastle speech in October 1862, expressed sympathy for the Confederacy and called for British recognition. His views caused controversy both in the United Kingdom and in the United States, where they were seen as potentially detrimental to the Union cause. Gladstone owned a home on Abercrombie Square in Liverpool, and was very likely a confidential member of the Southern Club.

The British government did not officially recognize the Confederacy as an independent nation. The British government, led by Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, adopted a policy of neutrality throughout the conflict and maintained trade relations with both the Union and the Confederacy. The official recognition of the Confederacy as an independent nation did not occur, largely due to diplomatic efforts by Charles Francis Adams and concerns over the potential consequences of such recognition on British trade and international relations.

Queen Victoria, the reigning monarch of the United Kingdom during the American Civil War, generally remained neutral and refrained from publicly expressing her opinions on the conflict. As the constitutional monarch, her role was largely ceremonial, and she did not have direct involvement in formulating or implementing government policies.

Queen Victoria's stance on the American Civil War was influenced by the prevailing British policy of neutrality. She, along with her husband Prince Albert, closely followed the developments of the war, but she did not publicly take sides or officially recognize the Confederacy as an independent nation.

It is worth noting that there were some instances where Queen Victoria's sympathies seemed to lean towards the Union cause. In 1861, she wrote a private letter to Charles Francis Adams, the United States Minister to the United Kingdom, expressing her hopes for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and her admiration for President Abraham Lincoln.

James Russell Lowell said, "None of our Generals, nor Grant himself, did us better or more by trying service than he [Charles Francis Adams] in his forlorn outpost in London." As we ponder strategy and battles and generals, we ought to keep in mind that Charles Francis Adams won a huge diplomatic victory of greater value than is ever described in books or articles. The battle of Antietam is usually credited with keeping England neutral, but the question is never asked why that was.

Imagine being Adams, who had to be diplomatic yet persuasive with Palmerston, an obviously arrogant and racist man who made decisions purely on the basis of value to his personal political future. Imagine being able to converse directly with Queen Victoria, the most powerful monarch in Europe, in such a convincing manner as to maintain her views, despite a government whose leaders tended the opposite way. The struggle to keep Palmerston and Gladstone officially neutral despite their evident slant toward the South required someone of experience, who could play the “long game”, and who could unemotionally remind these headstrong men of the consequences of choosing the wrong side. Lincoln needed a man whom the British would immediately take seriously; Adams had his family background (both his father and his grandfather had been Ambassadors to the Court of St. James as well) and the recognition of non-political accomplishments to bolster the power of his argument. And, he had had the taste of failure and frustration in his life, and knew that calmness and composure, not superciliousness, was the right path.

After the War

Minister Adams publicly supported moderation toward the South during the last year of the war and at the start of the Andrew Johnson administration after Lincoln's assassination. The British recognized him as a steady hand at the wheel. But support for Johnson's conciliatory policies, particularly his opposition to radical reconstruction of the South, was unpopular at home, and this injured Charles's future political prospects. He gladly resigned his post in 1868 with the election of the new Grant administration and returned to his home in Quincy. He turned down an offer to be president of Harvard.

But in 1871-1872 he returned to Europe with his youngest son Brooks. There, he would win his biggest victory, one that all of the frustrations and setbacks in life he had experienced, all of the diplomatic skills he had acquired, had prepared him for; and no other American of his era could have accomplished it.

As Minister to Great Britain, Adams was quite aware that although the British government was officially neutral, its citizens were taking sides anyway. And that those who supported the South, like the Southern Club, were having critical effects on the war. In particular, he knew exactly how Confederate agents were working to arrange armament shipments through the blockade. He knew that Liverpool shipbuilders were creating commerce raiders and blockade runners. He uncovered how ships were being built on the Mersey, sent off to the Caribbean under the British flag, then its crew & captain changed in port and the ship was renamed as a Confederate ship.

For example, he convinced British authorities to confiscate two ironclad warships from the Laird shipyards that were destined for use by the Confederates. But many others he could merely document. He wrote myriad letters to Secretary of State Seward with documentation of the British private sector working with the Confederacy while the official government looked the other way.

The Alabama Claims

Adams and his staff at the Embassy, including his son, collected details on the shipbuilding issue, showing how warships built for the Confederacy caused widespread damage to the American merchant marine. They documented everything in real-time: Who were the agents, where the money came from, who the British citizens were, everything. For the 4 years of the war, he collected the evidence, knowing the British weren’t going to do anything about it, and if he mentioned it, it would be a serious impediment to working with those he had to keep neutral. And so, he waited. He held onto all of these documents and they collected dust.

When Palmerston died in late 1865, Benjamin Disraeli, who for his own political purposes had no interest in getting involved after the war, took his place. Disraeli had maintained a truly neutral position during the war, but he did criticize the Lincoln administration's handling of the war and expressed concerns about the potential growth of American power if the Union were to emerge victorious. He believed that a strong United States could pose a challenge to British interests in the future. Overall, Disraeli's approach during the American Civil War was one of caution and pragmatism, focusing on preserving British neutrality and safeguarding British interests. And so, Adams held onto his notes.

The evidence he collected became the basis of the postwar Alabama Claims. The Alabama Claims were a series of demands for damages sought by the government of the United States from the United Kingdom in 1869, for the attacks upon Union merchant ships by Confederate Navy commerce raiders built in British shipyards during the American Civil War. The claims focused chiefly on the most famous of these raiders, the CSS Alabama, which took more than sixty prizes before she was sunk off the French coast in 1864.

The Alabama Claims were a series of diplomatic negotiations and arbitration proceedings that took place in the aftermath of the American Civil War between the United States and the United Kingdom. The claims arose from the actions of Confederate warships that were built and equipped in British shipyards and subsequently attacked and destroyed American ships during the Civil War.

The most notorious of these Confederate warships was the CSS Alabama, a powerful raider that had a significant impact on Union shipping during the war. The British government's involvement in the construction and outfitting of the CSS Alabama and other Confederate vessels raised serious issues of international law and neutrality. Can a country declare itself neutral but its citizens aid one of the combatants?

After the end of the Civil War in 1865, the United States sought compensation from Britain for the damages caused by these Confederate warships and demanded that the British government take responsibility for its role in aiding the Confederacy. Negotiations between the United States and Britain began in 1866, but they failed to reach a satisfactory resolution.

The United States claimed direct and collateral damage against Great Britain. The United States claimed that Britain had violated neutrality by allowing five warships to be constructed, most especially the CSS Alabama, knowing that it would eventually enter into naval service with the Confederacy. For 3 years, the British denied responsibility. They claimed that officially declaring neutrality had nothing to do with businesses its private industry conducted. They said that there was no proof of American claims. American outrage grew; Sumner, still head of the US Foreign Affairs committee, demanded $2 billion in indirect costs for supplying the South through the blockade. Calls for annexation of Canada, or provinces like British Columbia, as payment for damages became common American political rhetoric. Britain continued to stall, and Canadian separatists began looking into joining the US to control the northwest Pacific Ocean.

As a result, the United States brought the case before an international tribunal known as the Alabama Claims Commission. The evidence leading to the settlement of the Alabama Claims case was collected and presented by the United States government. After the American Civil War, the U.S. State Department was responsible for compiling the evidence of British involvement in the construction and outfitting of Confederate warships, particularly the CSS Alabama and other raiders. The U.S. government conducted thorough investigations and collected documentation, testimonies, and other evidence related to British shipyards, contractors, and individuals involved in supplying arms and vessels to the Confederate Navy. This evidence was used to support the United States claims that Britain had violated its duty of neutrality during the Civil War and should be held responsible for the damages caused by the Confederate warships.

During the negotiations and arbitration proceedings, the U.S. delegation, led by chief U.S. arbiter Charles Francis Adams and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, presented this evidence to the international tribunal, known as the Alabama Claims Commission, which convened in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1871. The evidence played a crucial role in convincing the tribunal of Britain's culpability, ultimately leading to the commission's ruling in favor of the United States and the subsequent settlement of the Alabama Claims case.

Charles Francis Adams played a crucial role in collecting the evidence for the Alabama Claims case. As the U.S. Minister to the United Kingdom during the American Civil War, Adams was responsible for gathering and presenting evidence of British involvement in the construction and outfitting of Confederate warships, particularly the CSS Alabama and other raiders. The evidence collected by Charles Francis Adams was the central documentation evaluated during the arbitration proceedings. Adams had diligently collected documentation, testimonies, and other evidence related to British shipyards, contractors, and individuals who were involved in supplying arms and vessels to the Confederate Navy. His efforts were instrumental in building a strong case against Britain, showing that the British government had violated its duty of neutrality during the Civil War.

Finally, in 1871, the British agreed to a commission to resolve the dispute, and Adams unveiled the notes and documents he had collected. He showed contemporaneous notes and letters. He named names. He had the proof, because the whole time he was ambassador, he kept meticulous records and documented everything.

The commission, which convened in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1871, was composed of representatives from the United States, Britain, Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil. After a thorough examination of the evidence and arguments presented by both sides, the tribunal issued its decision in September 1872. The tribunal ruled in favor of the United States, stating that Britain had indeed violated its duty of neutrality during the Civil War by allowing the construction of Confederate warships in its shipyards. As a result of the ruling, Britain was required to pay the United States $15.5 million in damages. Today, that would be equivalent to several hundred million dollars. Nothing like that had ever happened before.

So, who actually paid for the Confederate war machine, war supplies, and naval presence? The British Government did in 1872, along with its citizens and investors who purchased Confederate Cotton Bonds. The evidence Adams had collected during his years as ambassador played a vital role in convincing the tribunal of Britain's culpability, ultimately leading to the commission's ruling in favor of the United States and the subsequent settlement of the Alabama Claims case.

The resolution of the Alabama Claims case marked an important moment in the development of international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. It also helped improve relations between the United States and Britain after a period of tension and served as a precedent for future international arbitration cases.

Treaty of Washington

A final deal was then arranged. The Treaty of Washington established for the first time a codification of international law and of international arbitration. The Treaty of Washington resolved fishing disputes with the establishment of the Halifax Commission, set up the Alabama Claim arbitration, and set up the San Juan Island territorial dispute arbitration. The Halifax Commission would order the US to pay the UK $5.5 Mil for illegal fishing practices. The Alabama Claims would order the UK to pay the US $15.5 Mil in direct damages, with $1.9 Mil deducted for illegal US blockading practices during the war. An additional $500 million in loans was the biggest part of the agreement, which the US was able to take out with British banks at low-interest rates to refinance their war debt.

 The treaty set principles of what neutrality between two warring factions meant:

1.     That due diligence "ought to be exercised by neutral governments in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed, from a failure to fulfill the obligations of neutrality on their part."

2.     "The effects of a violation of neutrality committed by means of the construction, equipment, and armament of a vessel are not done away with by any commission which the government of the belligerent power benefited by the violation of neutrality may afterward have granted to that vessel; and the ultimate step by which the offense is completed cannot be admissible as a ground for the absolution of the neutral country, nor can the consummation of fraud become the means of establishing its innocence."

3.     "The principle of extraterritoriality has been admitted into the laws of nations, not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between different nations, and therefore can never be appealed to for the protection of acts done in violation of neutrality."

And the best part of his story is that although it took many years, eventually his enemies were defeated, and his inherent refinement and intellect ultimately carried the battle. These setbacks that would have buried a lesser man had a funny way of moving him into his real calling. It’s kind of like a real-life “David Copperfield”, overcoming personal losses led to amazing success, albeit not exactly what anyone had imagined. His wife Abigail steadfastly supported him through all of his life’s trials. They succeeded in "passing the torch" to the next generation of the Adams family, which included four noteworthy sons—railroad reformer Charles Francis Adams Jr., Massachusetts politician John Quincy Adams II, celebrated writer Henry Adams, and historian Brooks Adams. His son Henry Adams would go on to become one of the first great American historians and authors. The posting influenced the younger man through the experience of wartime diplomacy and absorption in English culture. After the war, he became a political journalist who entertained America's foremost intellectuals at his homes in Washington and Boston. During his lifetime, he was best known for The History of the United States of America 1801–1817, a nine-volume work.

No, he was never elected President, like his father and his grandfather, and so he is often taught superficially as a man who failed. But his public service saved our country, documented who had assisted the enemy, and sought and obtained reparations from a foreign power for prolonging the war. He changed forever what neutrality entailed. And it turned out he was not only the right man for the job, he was in fact the only man who could have succeeded at it.

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