Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and Another Look at the Kennedy Legacy

Robert F.  Kenned Jr.’s suspension of his third-party campaign for president and endorsement of Republican Donald J. Trump, was a development with historical resonance. RFK, Jr. has long been known as a fiercely independent and idiosyncratic lawyer and environmentalist with an eclectic collection of positions and ideas, including vaccine skepticism. But among his other actions and assertions, RFK, Jr.’s embrace of Trump and, by extension, the Republican party, stands out for its direct opposition to the Democrats, the party of his forefathers who did much to shape its values and lore, and inspire future generations of adherents. RFK, Jr. is now campaigning energetically for Trump, and given the still-potent draw of the legendary Kennedy name, his support could conceivably make the difference in a razor-tight race.

Larry Deblinger explains.

Booby Kennedy (left) with President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966.

Upon hearing of RFK’s decision, five of his eight surviving siblings released a brief statement condemning it as a “betrayal” of their family’s values and “a sad ending to a sad story.” Previously,  at least 15 Kennedy family members had shunned RFK Jr.’s candidacy and endorsed Joe Biden for president, before Biden dropped out. These relatives appear to view RFK, Jr. as a black sheep of the family, an aberration whose actions should be lamented and dismissed.

It might be tempting to view RFK, Jr’s “sad story” through the operatic lens that the Kennedy family saga has typically been chronicled, replete with tragic and untimely deaths, noble ideals, soaring oratory, and unrealized dreams. Indeed, RFK, Jr. hinted of his move to come on the basis of a high-minded principle, befitting a Kennedy. In April, RFK, Jr. asserted on CNN that President Joe Biden was a greater threat to American democracy than Trump, even though he called Trump’s attempts to subvert the 2020 election and other of his actions “appalling.” He argued that social media websites had blocked him from espousing his vaccine conspiracy theories under pressure and weaponization of government agencies by the Biden administration, thus violating his Constitutional right to freedom of speech, and threatening the most important pillar of democracy.

But it serves to note that RFK, Jr’s complaint was also of a direct and personal nature. And in this context, it must also be considered that among their traits of good looks and charisma, drive, wit, brilliance, eloquence, and idealism, prominent Kennedys have shown a capacity to act out of sheer spite: personal, petty, mean-spirited, and hateful vindictiveness. Both RFK, Jr.’s father, Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy, and his uncle Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy, evinced this marked tendency in the political arena at key moments in American history. Through this lens, RFK, Jr.’s action appears not so much a “betrayal” of Kennedy family value as another familiar recurrence of a Kennedy failing, and his allegiance with Trump, little more than a personal and vindictive swipe against the Democratic party.

Youth

From his youth, Bobby Kennedy was a kind of family attack dog, keen to perceive and avenge any slights to himself or his family members. The “runt” of Rose and Joseph Kennedy’s storied litter, Bobby made up for his small size and limited talents (at least compared with his brothers) with tenacity and scrappiness in sports and academics, often spoiling for fights. It did not take much; as a student at Harvard, RFK once smashed a beer bottle over a young man’s head, sending him to the hospital for stitches, simply because he had the temerity to celebrate his birthday at the same Cambridge bar and same time as Bobby.1  And he held a grudge. “When Bobby hates you, you stay hated,” Joe Kennedy once said of the son who seemed most to take after him.2 As an adult, armed with a law degree from the University of Virginia, RFK became an assistant counsel to US Republican Senator Joseph V. McCarthy’s infamous investigative committee that during 1953-54 recklessly and often spuriously alleged Communist influence in the US government and media.

It was during this period that RFK first met then-Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson, a Democrat from Texas, and for Bobby, it was hatred at first sight. He had known of Johnson as a protégé of former President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the man who had recalled his father as US Ambassador to England in 1940 and fired him; Johnson was at FDR’s side during much of the humiliating process, and that, apparently, was enough for Bobby.3  FDR had clear and substantive reasons for his action, including Joe Kennedy’s early support for appeasement of Adolf Hitler in the late 1930s; publicly expressed pessimism over the survival of Great Britain and of democracy in Europe (and privately expressed antisemitism); suspicion of his being a Nazi sympathizer; and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s calls for Kennedy’s dismissal. Nonetheless, son Bobby saw the firing as a family offense not to be forgiven.

So, when Majority Leader Johnson entered the Senate cafeteria with two assistants one day in 1953 and passed a table where McCarthy was meeting with his staff, Bobby sat glowering in his seat while the rest of McCarthy’s team jumped up to shake the hand of the “Leader,” in keeping with Senate decorum. 3 Not to be deterred, the towering, almost 6 foot 4-inch tall, LBJ stood over RFK and stuck out his hand, waiting for a long, awkward moment before Bobby finally rose and shook it without looking at Johnson.

Feud

The epic LBJ-RFK feud was on. There were Johnson’s repeated attempts after the first to squeeze handshakes out of Bobby Kennedy just to torment him, and a few disparaging comments from Johnson about Joe Kennedy’s ambassadorship in England. There was the incident in 1959 on Johnson’s ranch, where RFK was sent by his brother John to sound out Johnson on his intentions of running for president, when LBJ insisted on some deer hunting and Bobby was thrown flat on his back by a rifle recoil. “Son, you’ve got to learn how to handle a gun like a man,” Johnson said as he helped him up.4  

Beyond the insults, RFK despised Johnson as a man who in his opinion exhibited all the worst traits of the classic politician: an unprincipled and conniving lust for power, loose regard for the truth, rampant egoism, and selfish vanity. To RFK’s Northeastern elite sensibilities, Johnson’s rude and crude Southwestern-dirt-poor, working-class manners, physically overbearing political style, and segregationist past were repugnant and worthy of withering scorn, something Johnson fully recognized and resented.

But the true measure of RFK’s pettiness emerged with the ascendance of LBJ to Vice President in his brother John’s administration, and to the presidency after his brother’s death: an inability to respect the office however much he detested the man. Even though JFK had offered LBJ the VP post, considering him vital to his electoral prospects, and LBJ had accepted, during the Democratic convention, Bobby repeatedly visited Johnson in his hotel room to get him to decline the offer. RFK later insisted his attempts were at his brother’s behest, a contention that historians view with skepticism.5,6 It was during this episode that Johnson began calling RFK “that little shitass” and “worse” names, according to a close associate.7

The ill-will continued through JFK’s tragically shortened presidency, under which RFK served as Attorney General. JFK knew that the vice presidency was an extremely confining office for an accomplished power broker like Johnson, and he was determined that LBJ be treated with dignity, if only to assuage his massive ego. In general, JFK and Johnson enjoyed cordial, gentlemanly, and mutually respectful relations.8,9 Yet, RFK radiated disrespect towards Johnson, barging into his meetings without a word of apology and treating him like an underling9; indeed, for all practical purposes, Bobby was the number two in the JFK administration. The tight-knit Kennedy staffers called LBJ nicknames like “Uncle Cornpone” behind his back.10

Out of Office

It was even worse out of the office. Bobby and his wife Ethel held frequent parties for “Kennedy people” (Johnson called them “the Harvards”) at their home, Hickory Hill in Virginia, where the ridicule of LBJ turned kind of sick, according to historian Jeff Shesol in his 1997 book on the RFK-LBJ feud, Mutual Contempt:

Johnson jokes and Johnson stories were as inexhaustible as they were merciless. Those that percolated during the campaign had been humorous, but this new material betrayed a real bitterness, a mean-spiritedness that was hard to explain…Time (magazine)’s Hugh Sidey, a frequent visitor to Hickory Hill was appalled by the gang’s ridicule of LBJ, which he described as “just awful…inexcusable, really.” In October 1963, friends gave Bobby Kennedy an LBJ voodoo doll; “the merriment,” Sidey later reported, “was overwhelming.”11

The frivolity likely vanished after the assassination of JFK in Dallas, Texas, but not the feud between RFK and LBJ, exacerbated by the fact that the shooting occurred in Johnson’s home state. RFK, overwhelmed with grief, resolved to stay on as Attorney General, but without letting go of his animosity. “From the moment Air Force One (bearing JFK’s body) landed in Washington, and progressively in the days and weeks that followed, Bobby was ready to see slights to his brother, his brother’s widow, or himself in whatever Lyndon Johnson did or didn’t do,” wrote LBJ biographer Merle Miller.12         

Although Johnson performed faithfully and admirably in honoring JFK’s legacy and advancing his policy agenda, according to contemporary journalists and historians, his personal attempts as President to show respect and sensitivity to the Kennedys were all rudely rebuffed. “Overtures from Johnson to the Kennedy family after the Kennedy assassination were rejected in a manner that was thoroughly offensive and insulting,” observed contemporary Clark Clifford, an eminent Washington DC attorney and veteran Democratic party insider.12

And the hostility did not stop at mere personal gestures.  As historian Shesol explains of Johnson’s early days as president:

Johnson desperately needed affirmation, and in the hour of his greatest burden, it came from unlikely sources—from the Congress, which had spurned and mocked him for a thousand days; from the cabinet, appointed by his predecessor; from the American people, who cherished John Kennedy in death as they had not in life. All rallied to the new president. They gave him their patience and their trust.

Bobby Kennedy was not among them, and in Bobby’s absence Johnson felt the suspicion and rejection he feared from the rest.13  

Ironically, a book that the Kennedy family members had commissioned expressly to control the narrative of the JFK assassination and aftermath, and protect their image, publicly exposed the intense antagonism towards LBJ, which shocked reviewers. Entitled “The Death of a President,” by William Manchester, who was given extensive and exclusive access to the Kennedys and their records, the book was, in the words of Time magazine, “seriously flawed by the fact that its partisan portrayal of Lyndon Johnson is so hostile that it almost demeans the office itself.” It is impossible to parse exactly what proportion of this hostility might have come independently from the author, rather than the Kennedys (although the author was handpicked and vetted by the family). At any rate, the Kennedys were unhappy with the book for various reasons and sued to stop general publication of it before changes were made. “Bobby worried that the book might make it appear that the Kennedys had not given Johnson a chance to succeed in the Presidency and that their opposition was nothing more than a personal vendetta,” wrote Michael W. Schuyler, an historian at Kearny State University, New Mexico.14

Bobby Kennedy

LBJ went on to win election in his own right in 1964, by one of the largest landslide victories in American history. He then successfully pushed through epochal Civil Rights legislation and social welfare programs like Medicare and Medicaid, anti-poverty initiatives and other legislation ranging from the arts to immigration, environmental protection, education, and gun control, compiling a domestic record that, on the whole, remains a landmark achievement of American progressivism. But his controversial and disastrous Vietnam war policies rapidly undermined his presidency, compelled him to decline to run for re-election, and ended his political career. Bobby Kennedy left the Johnson administration to run for US Senator from New York, which office he won in 1965. He was assassinated while campaigning for president on an anti-war platform in 1968.                                            

It might be reassuring, in terms of the Kennedy legacy, to think that the LBJ-RFK feud was entirely a one-off, generated by the forced proximity and interaction of two dynamic personalities who were almost uniquely born to clash. But that is not the case. A mere 12 years after Bobby’s violent death, a relatively brief but all-too-familiar spectacle of petty and personal spite and resentment involving a Kennedy took center stage in American politics.

1980 convention

The setting was the Democratic party convention of 1980, a presidential election year. The intraparty combatants were the incumbent US president James Earl Carter, son of a peanut farmer from Georgia and Ted Kennedy, US Senator from Massachusetts, scion of the wealthy, celebrated, star-crossed political family, which some Americans viewed like royals in exile. Although Carter had won the party’s nomination handily after a bitter battle, he stood awkwardly at the podium, having completed his acceptance speech, waiting for Kennedy to arrive and, in effect, certify his candidacy as though he were a higher authority.

The contest itself was inherently anomalous, and humiliating for Carter. “Never before had a sitting President, an elected President, with command of both houses of Congress and the party machinery, been so challenged by his own people. What was even more remarkable was the nature of the challenge—a charge of incompetence,” wrote contemporary journalist and historian Teddy White.15

By 1980, Carter’s presidency was foundering, beset on all sides by crises foreign and domestic. The economy was struggling with the combination of persistent inflation, slow economic growth, and high unemployment, called “stagflation.” A revolution in Iran to replace the US-backed Shah with an Islamic theocracy in 1979 spooked Americans who remembered the Arab oil embargo of the early 1970s, and drove them to hoard gas. This resulted in long gas lines, dwindling gas supplies, and mounting hysteria, including killings and riots. The infamous Iran hostage crisis of 1979 erupted when Iranian militants captured over 50 Americans at the US embassy in Tehran and kept them for 444 days, prompted at least in part by Carter’s decision to allow the exiled Shah to enter the US for cancer  treatment.

Ted Kennedy

Despite some landmark achievements such as his forging of the Camp David Peace Accords between Israel and Egypt, Carter failed to convince the American people that he had a sure grip on the helm of state. He had a curiously stiff personal style, despite his ever-present wide smile, and a technician’s approach to solving national problems that was uninspiring to the public and did not always work. Like Carter, his closest advisers were from Georgia, and the team, including the President, came to office with a regional chip on their shoulders, bristling with peevish hyperawareness, if not combative pride, in being outsiders to the Washington establishment. As Carter’s approval ratings began to plunge, sinking to 28% in June of 1979, a bit of that Southern defiance appeared to flare when Carter was asked at a gathering of Congressmen whether he planned to run for re-election (a question insulting in itself), particularly given the possibility that Ted Kennedy might challenge him for his party’s nomination.

“I’m going to whip his ass,” Carter replied, referring to Kennedy, and then repeated it, when asked (in disbelief) if that was what he meant.16 When confronted with the widely reported statement, Kennedy smoothly responded that the president must have been misquoted.

It was the first publicly overt expression of tension between Carter and Kennedy. Later in 1979, further signs of tension and rivalry were palpable at the opening of the John F. Kennedy Library,  in Boston, where they both spoke. The event started out inauspiciously for Carter when he leaned in to kiss Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis on the cheek in greeting, “just as a matter of courtesy,” and “she flinched away ostentatiously,” as Carter remembered decades later.17In their speeches, ostensibly in honor of JFK., both Carter and Kennedy slyly inserted warnings, or shots across the bow, to each other.

Observing with growing disgust Carter’s faltering efforts to be the president the American people wanted and needed, Kennedy became convinced that he could fill the void of leadership, and announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination.

Contest

But the matchup was a contest of weaknesses. While Carter had acquired the image of a bumbler, Kennedy was a deeply flawed and inept candidate. Grave doubts about his character relentlessly shadowed him over the 1969 incident in Chappaquiddick, Massachusetts, an island off Martha’s Vinyard, when he drove a car off a bridge and into a pond, causing the death of Mary Jo Kopechne, a young woman who was a passenger in the car. Although Kennedy swam to safety, he failed to call the police for 10 hours during which Kopechne’s life might have been saved. Kennedy further undermined himself with a one-on-one interview on prime-time, network television, in which he was unable to answer the direct question of why he wanted to be president, responding  with an incoherent stream of hesitations and pointless phrases, i.e. an epic word salad. Mirroring this ambivalence, Kennedy campaigned with inconsistent energy and conviction, championing an old-line liberalism that many thought outdated.

By a month before the convention, Carter had won enough primaries and delegates to secure his renomination, with a commanding lead over Kennedy; as promised, Carter had “whipped” Kennedy. And yet, Kennedy refused to bow out, having adopted a “kamikaze-like state of mind,” according to Jon Ward in his 2019 book about the Carter-Kennedy rivalry, Camelot’s End. “Many in the Kennedy camp were disgusted by Carter,” wrote Ward. “They felt he was no better than (Republican presidential nominee Ronald) Reagan, and almost preferred to see Reagan win,”18

The Kennedy camp insisted on an “open convention,” meaning that delegates could be free to vote for whom they wished regardless of the choice of the rank-and-file primary voters they were supposedly pledged to represent. In the meantime, a poll showed Carter with a 77% national disapproval rating.19 The Democrats agreed to the open convention format.

When the open vote was over, Carter had finally won the nomination with almost two-thirds of the vote. Kennedy conceded but he was not done fighting. His camp insisted on a party platform vote, including liberal planks far to the left of Carter’s policies, which would defy and embarrass the President, and would take place right after Senator Kennedy was scheduled to speak, so as to set the most favorable atmosphere for their approval.

The Carter people knew exactly what was planned and were losing patience. “If you have any wisdom and judgment at all, you know you don’t get carried away by personalities and pettiness in a political fight,” recounted Carter’s campaign  manager, Bob Strauss, to The New Yorker. “Politics is tough enough…that you don’t cut each other’s throats.” Carter’s Press Secretary, Jody Powell, later wrote, “We neglected to take into account one of the most obvious facets of Kennedy’s character, an almost child-like self-centeredness,” in his memoir of the election. 

Kennedy’s speech        

In the event, Kennedy’s convention staff did behave childishly, like a bunch of drunken frat-boys, on the day of his speech. Kennedy floor manager Harold Ickes invoked an obscure procedural rule to stop the afternoon convention activities, “in a gesture done purely out of spite,” wrote Ward in a 2024 Politico article.  “We just said, ‘Fuck ‘em,’” explained Ickes in an interview. “I mean, we weren’t thinking about the country. We weren’t even thinking about the general election. It was, ‘Fuck ‘em.’ You know? To be blunt about it.”

Fistfights almost broke out the convention floor when outraged Carter staffers confronted Ickes, who responded with “Go fuck yourself, I’m shutting this convention down.” The fisticuffs were luckily averted by a phone call from Kennedy at his hotel room, curious to know what had stopped the proceedings he was watching on television. When told the convention would be stalled for two hours, Kennedy, after a long pause, told Ickes to allow it to go forward.

Perhaps relieved from the burden of pursuing a losing cause, Kennedy gave a thoughtful, eloquent, stem-winding speech later that night, which is still remembered as one of the best speeches in American political convention history. Kennedy invoked the Democratic party’s heritage of support for the common man, and the wisdom of 19th century poet Alfred Lord Tennyson, with pleas to re-unite the country and the party, lyrically concluding, in a paean to big-hearted, big-spending liberalism, "the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives, and the dream shall never die."

And yet, the good vibes and elevated, Camelot-like aura were shattered by another Kennedy-driven spectacle before a prime-time national TV audience on the last, climactic night of the convention. Carter did not help his cause by starting off his acceptance and campaign kick-off speech with a shouted tribute to Democratic Senator and former VP, Hubert Horatio Humphrey, whom he misnamed as Hubert Horatio Hornblower (Horatio Hornblower was a fictional, Napoleonic-era, British naval officer in a popular 20th century series of stories and novels) before hastily correcting himself. When he had finished his speech, almost 20 minutes ticked by as various party luminaries (and some not so luminary) joined him on the stage for a desultory show of unity, waiting for the final moment, and leaving bored TV news commentators to mutter derisive comments to their audiences.

The Kennedy team had orchestrated that final moment by insisting that Kennedy would not watch the speech at the arena but in his hotel room, and would then make his way to the convention, thus having the dramatically delayed, final appearance of the show, like the top star of a rock concert, or a champion boxer.  

Handshake

When Kennedy did appear, to a roar of excitement, it was obvious to almost everyone watching, or made clear to them by the TV journalists on the scene, that Carter was looking for one thing: the classic political handshake of the party’s top politicians, former rivals, standing together in full view of the spotlights and cameras, their interlocked hands thrust high in the air, in a thrilling and triumphant show of unity, strength, and expectation of victory, of party over personal interest, bitterness, and division. He never got it. Kennedy did shake Carter’s hand five times by Ward’s count, but each time in a crowd, with the brief and perfunctory manner a campaigner might take the hand of someone in a rope line. The TV commentators duly noted each, increasingly embarrassing, failure. As Carter followed him around, Kennedy began to “smirk” and “chuckle,” according to Ward; he finally patted Carter on the back before leaving the arena to cheers.

Two months later, a peripheral, nonofficial member of the Kennedy campaign staff, but with longstanding ties as a helper to the Kennedy family, named Paul Corbin, stole Carter’s briefing books for a general election debate with Reagan and gave them to the Reagan campaign, 20 according to information gathered in a Congressional  investigation and a 2009 book by political consultant and author Craig Shirley.20

After the 1980 election

Carter went on to lose the election to Reagan, but thereafter has led one of the most active, productive, and distinguished post-presidential lives in  American history.  Ted Kennedy, who died in 2009, remained US Senator from Massachusetts for decades, compiling a highly distinguished legislative career, featuring his steadfast advocacy for a national health care system, which was finally realized in at least some form in 2010, under the Obama administration.

With regard to health care reform, however, Carter has charged in his presidential memoirs that his administration’s proposal for a national health plan, which was devised over a two-year period by an array of economic experts and government leaders, including Ted Kennedy, and had support from key Congressional leaders, was scuttled by Kennedy in 1979 when he opposed it “at the very end,” which ultimately resulted in a 30-year delay in national health care.21  Carter repeated the charge in 2010 in TV interviews with 60 Minutes and Larry King, alleging that Kennedy acted “out of personal spite,” and his ambition to run for president and enact his own health care plan. In his own writings, Kennedy had counter-charged that it was Carter who delayed the plan (https://www.cbsnews.com/news/time-has-not-cooled-jimmy-carter-ted-kennedy-feud/).

RFK, Jr.

And so, we arrive at RFK, Jr., son of Bobby and nephew of Ted, choosing to support Republican Donald J. Trump, a convicted felon facing dozens of additional criminal charges, in his campaign for re-election as president. RFK, Jr. appears to justify his stance at least partly as a defense of freedom of speech. But he has yet to explain how supporting a candidate whose relentless abuse and corruption of that very right, by knowingly spewing lies that have sown chaos, threatened the democratic system, and endangered public safety, could possibly serve to protect freedom of speech and democracy. Then again, RFK, Jr.’s stance might have little to do with anything so grand as ideas, principles, and the national interest. After all, he is a Kennedy.  

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Print References

1.     Caro, Robert A. (2012). The Years of Lyndon Johnson. The Passage of Power. Alfred A. Knopf; New York, NY: pg. 63.

2.     Ibid, pg. 66.

3.     Ibid, ppg. 61-3.

4.     Shesol, Jeff. (1997). Mutual Contempt. Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy, and the Feud that Defined a Decade. W.W Norton & Company; New York, NY: pg.10.

5.     Caro, Robert A. (2012). The Years of Lyndon Johnson. The Passage of Power. Alfred A. Knopf; New York, NY: ppg. 122-40.

6.     Shesol, Jeff. (1997). Mutual Contempt. Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy, and the Feud that Defined a Decade. W.W Norton & Company; New York, NY: ppg.48-57.

7.     Caro, Robert A. (2012). The Years of Lyndon Johnson. The Passage of Power. Alfred A. Knopf; New York, NY: pg. 139.

8.     Ibid., pg. 177-195.

9.     Shesol, Jeff. (1997). Mutual Contempt. Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy, and the Feud that Defined a Decade. W.W Norton & Company; New York, NY: ppg.77-79.

10.  Caro, Robert A. (2012). The Years of Lyndon Johnson. The Passage of Power. Alfred A. Knopf; New York, NY: pg. 198.

11.  Shesol, Jeff. (1997). Mutual Contempt. Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy, and the Feud that Defined a Decade. W.W Norton & Company; New York, NY: pg.104.

12.  Ball, Moira Ann. The phantom of the oval office:  The John F. Kennedy’s assassination’s symbolic impact on Lyndon B. Johnson, his key advisors, and the Vietnam decision-making process.  Presidential Studies Quarterly. 1994;24(1):105-119.

13.  Shesol, Jeff. (1997). Mutual Contempt. Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy, and the Feud that Defined a Decade. W.W Norton & Company; New York, NY: pg.119.

14.  Schuyler M.W. Ghosts in the White House: LBJ, RFK, and the assassination of JFK. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 1987; 17(3):503-518.

15.  Ward J. (2019).  Camelot’s End. Kennedy vs. Carter and the Fight that Broke the Democratic Party.  Hachette Book Group;  New York, NY: pg. 146.

16.  Ibid., pg. 126.

17.  Ibid., pg. 152.

18.  Ibid., pg.230.

19.  Ibid., pg.251.

20.  Ibid.,  pg.284-5.

21.  Carter J. (2010). White House Diary. Farrar, Strous and Giroux. New York, NY: pg. 325.

The British Labour Party and Welfare: The Legacies of the Attlee and Wilson Governments

The British Labour Party won the 2024 British general election. With that in mind, Vittorio Trevitt looks at the past Labour governments of Clement Attlee and Harold Wilson. He considers how these governments handled welfare policy.

Clement Attlee with John F. Kennedy in 1961.

The UK General Election held in July 2024 was a truly historic event, with Labour returning to office after more than a decade in opposition. The fact that Labour did so with such a massive majority means that they have a strong mandate to transform Britain into a fairer nation. Although the state of public finances has resulted in Labour removing universal Winter Fuel Allowances for most pensioners (ironically reversing a policy implemented under the Blair Government in 1997) and more cuts likely to follow, it is highly probable that as economic conditions improve there will be greater leeway for Labour to expand social provisions, such as fulfilling its proposals for extending rights to statutory sick pay and introducing free breakfast clubs in all English primary schools. In the past, Labour has encountered severe financial difficulties but has still managed to establish a broad array of social security grants that have done much to ameliorate the quality of life for ordinary households. Two former Labour administrations that Starmer and his ministers can look to for guidance are the Attlee Government of 1945-51 and the 1964-70 and 1974-76 Wilson Governments.

Attlee Government

The Labour Government that came to power in the first election following the end of the Second World War has long been held in high esteem not only by historians but also by Labour Party activists and politicians. Led by veteran Labourite Clement Attlee, it was by far the most radical and successful that Britain had experienced by that time. Although the country Labour inherited was in a parlous financial state (the legacy of World War II), Attlee and his ministers would not disappoint an electorate hungry for change after years of strife and sacrifice. Over the next 6 years, they drastically changed Britain for the better. One way it achieved this was through the construction of a comprehensive and universalistic welfare model. Although Britain had a long history of welfare provision, the Attlee Government greatly built on the existing framework by setting up a system that covered all citizens. One of the pillars of this new solidaristic edifice, the National Health Service, was notable in making free access to every form of healthcare (such as medical and dental care, eyeglasses and hearing aids) a right for every citizen; one that the service has continued to uphold despite frequent cuts and overhauls in the decades since its “birth.” The 1946 National Insurance Act set up a broad network of cash payments incorporating a range of risks such as old age, widowhood and funeral costs. Apart from the normal rates, increases could be made in national insurance paymentsfor particular cases. Also, where employers had failed to meet the contribution requirements of the Act, resulting in recipients losing partly or entirely the maternity, sickness or unemployment benefits that were theirs by right, such individuals could retrieve a civil debt from said employers representing the lost amounts. A Five Year Benefit Reviewwas also included, aimed at ensuring the adequacy of allowances in helping beneficiaries to meet their basic needs. Additionally, groups such as trade unions were enabled to set up their own schemes if they so wished.

The equally far-reaching Industrial Injuries Act passed that same year bestowed various cash grants upon workers suffering from work-related injuries such as disablement gratuities and special hardship allowances (aimed at workers unable to carry out their current lines of work or equivalent due to their injuries). Five distinct benefits were also made for dependents of workers who tragically lost their lives, while allowances were given in cases of approved hospital treatment, constant attendance and unemployability; the latter geared towards disability pensioners unable to take on any form of employment. In addition, the National Assistance Act introduced two years later established a non-contributory social safety net for those in need; providing support such as shelter and nutritional assistance.

The Attlee years also witnessed the passage of other welfare measures affecting different strata of British society.Dockworkers became entitled to pay in cases of unemployment or underemployment, while a state scheme for mature university students was set up. Regulations provided numerous pension entitlements for NHS employees while the National Insurance and Civil Service (Superannuation) Rules, 1948 provided for preserved pension rights with a compensation award in cases where individuals experienced the impairment or loss of opportunity to earn a further pension. As a means of helping people reach their potential, a special scheme was instituted in 1947 whereby individuals with a gift for skilled crafts became eligible for grants to undertake training in other locations if no suitable facilities existed near where they lived.

In 1946, certain pensioners with disabilities that added to wear and tear became entitled to a new clothing allowance, while a couple of years later greater eligibility for special education allowances for children was introduced. The 1948 Local Government Act generalised various powers to pay subsistence and travelling allowances to members of local authorities while also providing payments in cases where council business attendance led to financial loss. The 1947 Agriculture Act incorporated several forms of compensation, such as for disturbance and improvement, while the 1948 Criminal Justice Act provided for the enforcement of payments of compensation or damages. Under the 1948 Children Act, local authorities were empowered to care for children who were orphaned, deserted or unable to be looked after by their parents due to circumstance. Amongst its many provisions included accommodation for children reaching 3 years of age, along with grants for students to help them with the costs of maintenance, training or education. A year later, a system of legal assistance was inaugurated that entitled most people to free legal support in both civil and criminal cases.

Impact of the Attlee Government

The extent to which the social security legislation of the Attlee Government dramatically improved people’s lives can be gauged from a poverty study conducted in York in 1950 by the legendary researcher and humanitarian Seebohm Rowntree; using that location as a representative sample. A follow up to a previous survey carried out in the same area in 1936, it estimated that the percentage of working-class people in York who lived in poverty stood at 2.77% in 1950, compared with 31.1% 14 years earlier. Although the study undoubtedly overestimated the extent to which poverty fell during that period, it nevertheless highlights the fact that the Welfare State established under Attlee did much to diminish the numbers experiencing hardship. G.R. Lavers, who co-authored the report, argued that the largest improvement since 1936 had come about as a result of the welfare reforms instituted since 1945, going as far as to claim that the Welfare State had greatly overcome poverty. This assertion gave Labour a positive message to convey to the public during the 1951 election campaign, but despite their efforts would be voted out of office; not returning to power until 1964 under the leadership of former minister Harold Wilson.

Wilson Governments

Like Attlee’s Administration, Harold Wilson and his ministers inherited a nation in a difficult economic position; one that eventually resulted in the currency being devalued. This culminated in detestable austerity policies including higher charges for school meals. Also, In a dubious move, one that undoubtedly reflected exaggerated perceptions of welfare fraud that persist to this day, a “four-week rule” was instituted in July 1968 in certain places. This involved social assistance benefits being removed from recipients after this time if it was believed that there was suitable work available. Assessing the impact of this measure, one study edited by the anti-poverty activist and future cabinet minister Frank Field provided the estimate that 10% of those affected by the rule subsequently ventured into crime as a consequence of their losing their benefits. Despite a ministerial claim that this policy had been a success in tackling benefit fraud, Field’s study suggests that it was a misguided decision that caused unnecessary hardship.

Nevertheless, for most of its period in office Labour not only boosted public spending but also rolled out a programme of radical welfare reform that did much to lessen inequality. New benefits were introduced concerning risks that previously had been left uncovered by the Attlee welfare laws. Redundancy pay was set up, along with income supplements for beneficiaries such as unwell, injured and jobless persons; the latter to lessen the impact of unemployment for skilled employees. New allowances for partially incapacitated men were also established, with increased amounts were permitted in certain cases.

The 1965 Solicitors Act allowed for grants to be paid in hardship situations, while other laws introduced varying forms of compensation for those affected by compulsory land purchases and damage. National Assistance was superseded by a new Supplementary Benefits Scheme; an overhaul carried out partly to prevent detailed individual enquiries. Reflecting this philosophical shift, changes were made, for instance, to rent allowance payments for non-householders (previously, these had been dependent upon a household’s make-up). Although not without its faults, it was a definite improvement over the previous social assistance arrangements. Higher benefit rates were provided and, although the allowances under the new scheme were mostly the same as under National Assistance (with exceptions such as an additional allowance for long-term claimants), what differed was the fact that the new scheme sought to ensure that benefits would be given as a right to those who met the means-tested conditions, while seniors were entitled to an income guarantee. Measures were also carried out with the intention of enabling widows and women whose marriages had dissolved to receive higher pensions, while regulations established improved levels of financial assistance for disabled people (such as an allowance for severe disabilities), and allowed for Christmas bonuses to be disregarded in the estimation or calculation of earnings when determining national insurance payments. Local tax rebates were created to assist less well-off ratepayers, and the 1965 Matrimonial Causes Act was designed to helpwomen by means of ordering alimony and other forms of payment to the concerned parties. Additionally, measures were undertaken to tackle homelessness and deliver residential services to persons who are ill and living with disabilities.

The social security record of Wilson’s first administration can be justified by the impact its policies had on those living on low incomes. In 1970, the amount that benefits and taxes added to the incomes of those earning £315 annually was more than twice the equivalent amount from 1964. Measurements have also suggested that the number of individuals living in poverty was far lower in 1970 than in 1964; further justification of Labour’s welfare record from the Sixties. One such benchmark, utilising a 1970-based absolute poverty line, has suggested that the percentage of poor Britons fell from around 20% to around 15% by the end of Wilson’s first premiership. Wilson’s last government from 1974 to 1976 would also see further landmarks in social security, with various laws passed that established new entitlements including invalidity pensions and mobility and invalidity care allowances for the disabled, earnings-related pensions, and Child Benefit; a universal payment which for the first time included financial support to families with at least one child and enhanced the amount of assistance allocated to low-income families.

The administrations in context

In a way, both administrations reflected the spirit of the times that they governed in. In the decade or so following the end of the hostilities, several war-torn nations in Europe came under the leadership of left-wing coalitions that expanded their social aid systems, while even poorer nations led by progressives including Burma (Myanmar), Guatemala, Iran and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) undertook reforms in this field. Similarly, during Wilson’s first stint as prime minister several developing nations led by reformers throughout the Sixties like India, Turkey, Honduras and the Philippines also embarked upon their own programmes of welfare innovation. The revolutionary social security reforms implemented under Attlee and Wilson therefore reflected broader geopolitical trends during their incumbencies.

The record of the Attlee and Wilson administrations shows that even under dire economic circumstances there is much that can be achieved in strengthening the social security structure that has done much throughout the decades to prevent and mitigate poverty in the United Kingdom. Like their forebears, the Starmer Government must never lose sight of Labour’s goal to make Britain a nation free of injustice. A more generous welfare system is a prerequisite to this. Although it is likely that it will take time until the financial situation improves to the point that Labour will be able to pursue looser, more expansionary fiscal measures to attain its reformist vision, the Starmer Government must nevertheless reinforce the Welfare State as an effective tool against the scourges of poverty, as most Labour governments have done so in the past. The welfare records of the Attlee and Wilson ministries are ones that the new Labour administration can learn greatly from today.

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The History of America’s Love Affair with Hot Air Balloons

Every October for the past 52 years, the International Hot Air Balloon Festival takes place in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This event is the world's largest hot air balloon festival, with over 500 hot air balloons and nearly 1 million people in attendance. The hot air balloon made its first American flight in 1793, yet it still captures our attention and imagination. So, what is the history behind these magnificent flying balloons?

Angie Grandstaff explains.

A depiction of an early balloon flight in Annonay, France in 1783.

The Origins of Hot Air Balloons

The idea of flying is something that humans have fantasized about for centuries. Many have theorized about how this could happen. English philosopher Roger Bacon hypothesized in the 13th century that man could fly if attached to a large hollow ball of copper filled with liquid fire or air. Many dreamed of similar ideas, but it wasn’t until 1783 that the dream became a reality.

French brothers Joseph-Michel and Jacques-Etienne Montgolfier were paper manufacturers who observed that a paper bag would rise if hot air was put inside it. Many successful experiments proved their theory. The Montgolfier brothers were to demonstrate their flying balloon to King Louis XVI in September 1783. They enlisted the help of a famous wallpaper manufacturer, Jean Baptiste Réveillon, to help with the balloon design. The balloon was made of taffeta and coated with alum for fireproofing. It was 30 feet in diameter and decorated with zodiac signs and suns in honor of the King.

A crowd of 130,000 people, including King Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, watched the Montgolfier brothers place a sheep, rooster, and duck in a basket beneath the balloon. The balloon floated for two miles and was safely returned to the ground with the animals unharmed. This successful flight showed what was possible, and they began planning a manned trip into the sky.

There was much concern about what the high altitude may do to a human, so King Louis XVI offered a condemned prisoner to be the first to fly. But Jean-Francois Pilatre de Rozier, a chemistry and physics teacher, asked and was granted the opportunity to be the first. The Montgolfier brothers sent de Rozier into the sky on several occasions. Benjamin Franklin, the Ambassador to France at the time, witnessed their November 1783 flight. Franklin wrote home about what he saw, bringing the idea of hot air balloons to American visionaries.

An American Over the English Channel

Advances were being made with different fabrics and gases, including hydrogen, to keep the balloon aloft. Many brave individuals were heading into the skies. Boston-born Dr. John Jeffries was eager to fly. Jeffries offered to fund French inventor Jean-Pierre Blanchard’s hot air balloon expedition to cross the English Channel if he was allowed a seat. Dr. Jeffries was a medical man interested in meteorology, so this trip into the clouds fascinated him.

The two men headed into the air from the cliffs of Dover, England in January 1785. Blanchard’s gear and a boat-shaped gondola carrying him and Jeffries weighed down the hydrogen-filled balloon. The balloon struggled with the weight as it headed across the channel, so much so that they had to throw everything overboard. Their desperation to stay in the air even led them to throw the clothes on their backs overboard. The pair landed safely in France minus their trousers but were greeted by locals who thankfully clothed them.

First Flight in America

Blanchard’s groundbreaking achievements in Europe brought him to America in 1793. He offered tickets to watch the first manned, untethered hot air balloon flight. The first flight was launched from the Walnut Street Prison yard in Philadelphia. George Washington was in attendance with other future presidents, such as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, James Madison, and James Monroe. Blanchard, who did not speak English, was given a passport by Washington to ensure safe passage wherever he landed. Blanchard ascended 5,800 feet into the air and landed 15 miles away in Deptford, New Jersey. 

Europe dominated the field of aeronautics, but Blanchard’s first American flight demonstrated the possibilities of flight to America and its leaders. It inspired American inventors and explorers to take to the skies. It was a significant step in the global progress of aviation. An interesting side note about Blanchard: his wife Sophie was also an avid balloonist, a woman ahead of her time. They both died in separate ballooning accidents.

Early American Balloonists

The Montgolfier brothers' ballooning adventures led to balloon madness in America. There was much interest in the science of flying balloons as well as how balloons can be used as entertainment.

Philadelphia doctor John Foulke was fascinated with the science of ballooning. He witnessed the Montgolfier brothers’ successful manned hot-air balloon flights in Paris with Benjamin Franklin. Foulke returned to his Philadelphia home and conducted experiments, sending small hot air balloons into the sky. He lectured at the University of Pennsylvania on ballooning, even inviting George Washington to one. Washington could not attend but was keenly interested in hot air balloons and saw their potential for military use. Foulke began raising funds to build America's first hot air balloon but never reached his goal.

While Foulke was lecturing about the science of ballooning and attempting to raise funds, a Bladensburg, Maryland tavern owner and lawyer, Peter Carnes, was ready to send a balloon into the air in June 1784. Carnes was a very ambitious man with an entrepreneurial spirit. He saw American’s enthusiasm for the magnificent flying balloons as a way to make money. Interestingly, Carnes had very little knowledge about how to make a balloon take flight, but against all odds, he built a balloon. His tethered unmanned balloon was sent 70 feet into the air. Carnes set up a more significant event in Baltimore, selling tickets to a balloon-mad city for a manned flight. Unfortunately, Carnes was too heavy for the balloon, but a 13-year-old boy, Edward Warren, volunteered to be the first. Warren ascended into the sky and was brought back safely to the ground, becoming the first American aviator.

Cincinnati watchmaker Richard Clayton saw ballooning as an opportunity to entertain the masses. In 1835, he sold tickets to the launch of his Star of the West balloon. This 50-foot high, hydrogen gas-fueled balloon carried Clayton and his dog. Once a mile above the city, Clayton, wanting to put on the best show for his crowd, threw his dog out of the balloon. The dog parachuted to the ground safely. Clayton’s nine-hour trip took him to present-day West Virginia. This voyage, Clayton’s Ascent, was commemorated on jugs and bandboxes, some of which are part of the Cincinnati Art Museum’s collection. Clayton traveled to many American cities with his balloons and entertained thousands. Clayton used his connections with the press to help bring in the crowds.

Thaddeus Lowe was a New Hampshire-born balloonist and inventor who was primarily self-educated. He began building balloons in the 1850s, traveling the country, giving lectures, and offering rides to paying customers. Lowe believed hot air balloons could be used for communication and was devising a plan to build a balloon that could cross the Atlantic Ocean when the Civil War began.

Balloons in the Civil War

President Lincoln was interested in finding out how flying balloons could gather intelligence for military purposes. In June 1861, Lowe was summoned to Washington D.C., where he demonstrated to President Lincoln how a balloon's view from the sky combined with telegraph technology could give the Union Army knowledge of the Confederate troop movements. President Lincoln saw how this could help his army. So, he formed the Union Army Balloon Corps. Thaddeus Lowe was the Corps' Chief Aeronaut. Lowe used a portable hydrogen gas generator that he invented for his seven balloons.

The Peninsula campaign gave Lowe his first chance to show how his balloons could contribute positively to the Union Army. In the spring of 1862, he was able to observe and relay the Confederate Army’s defensive setup during the advance on Richmond. Lowe’s aerial surveillance gave the Union Army the location of artillery and troops during the Fredericksburg campaign in 1862 and the Chancellorsville campaign in 1863.

The Balloon Corps made 3,000 flights during the Civil War. The surveillance obtained from these flights was used for map-making and communicating live reports of battles. The balloon reconnaissance allowed the Union to point their artillery in the correct direction even though they couldn’t see the enemy, which was a first. The Confederates made several attempts to destroy the balloons, but all attempts were unsuccessful. The balloons proved to be a valuable tool in war. 

Unfortunately, Thaddeus Lowe faced significant challenges from Union Army leaders who questioned the cost of his balloons and his administrative skills. Lowe was placed under stricter military command, a difficult situation for him. Ultimately, Lowe resigned from his position in the Balloon Corps, and the use of balloons during battle ceased. Lowe's journey led him back to the private sector, where he eventually settled in Pasadena, California, and continued his inventive pursuits, eventually holding 200 patents.

Modern Hot Air Balloons

Hot air balloons lost their popularity as America entered the 20th century. But in the 1950s, Ed Yost set out to revive the hot air balloon industry. Yost is known as the Father of Modern Hot Air Ballooning. He saw the need for the hot air balloon to carry its own fuel, so he pioneered the use of propane to heat the inside of the balloon. Yost also created the teardrop balloon design. He experimented with balloons, including building his own, and made the first modern-day hot-air balloon flight in 1960. Yost was strapped in a chair attached to a plywood board beneath a propane-fueled balloon traveling for an hour and a half in Nebraska. His improvements made hot air balloons safer and semi-maneuverable. Yost crossed the English Channel and attempted to cross the Atlantic Ocean solo. His attempt across the Atlantic failed, but he built a balloon for Ben Abruzzo, Maxie Anderson, and Larry Newman to try again. The Double Eagle II was the first balloon to cross the Atlantic in 1978.

Yost’s achievements and those of many other American hot air balloon enthusiasts helped the sport of hot air ballooning take flight in the second half of the 20th century. Hot air balloon festivals now take place around the country year-round and are major tourist attractions. The Albuquerque International Hot Air Balloon Festival is the world's biggest hot air balloon festival. Hot air balloons have become big business for travelers who want a bird’s eye view of America.

Humans have always wanted to conquer the skies. The curiosity and ingenuity of people like the Montgolfier brothers laid the foundation for Americans to push the boundaries of aviation. The early experiments of scientists and entertainers helped 20th-century inventors and adventurers build safer hot air balloons. Today, there is a vibrant hot-air balloon culture in America. Millions of Americans celebrate the scientific milestones and the sheer joy of flight every year. The history of hot air ballooning shows us the power of imagination and dreams.

Angie Grandstaff is a writer who loves to write about history, books, and self-development. 

References

https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/presidential-writings-reveal-early-interest-ballooning

https://balloonfiesta.com/Hot-Air-History

https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/thaddeus-sobieski-constantine-lowe

https://fly.historicwings.com/2012/06/the-first-american-aviator/

https://ltaflightmagazine.com/the-first-aerial-crossing-of-the-english-channel/

https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/george-washington-and-ballooning

https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/us/04yost.html

https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/ed-yost-father-of-ballooning-subject-of-new-albuquerque-balloon-museum-exhibit/article_917c38b2-6138-11ee-9a3d-4786ca2ea0c6.html

https://www.space.com/16595-montgolfiers-first-balloon-flight.html

https://www.wcpo.com/news/insider/history-richard-clayton-balloon

Admiral Nimitz’s Plan for the Battle of Midway – Formulated, but Forgotten

The naval victory at Midway on June 4, 1942 has rightly been recognized as one of the greatest in the history of the US Navy, and one of the most significant victories in the history of armed conflict. However, events did not follow the plan formulated by US Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz, and the battle was very nearly lost by Pacific Fleet forces. Conspicuously missing from earlier accounts of the Battle of Midway is a description of the Nimitz plan to confront the Japanese carrier fleet.

Dale Jenkins explains. Dale is author of Diplomats & Admirals: From Failed Negotiations and Tragic Misjudgments to Powerful Leaders and Heroic Deeds, the Untold Story of the Pacific War from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Chester Nimitz while Chief of Naval Operations.

The actions taken by Pacific Fleet forces during the Midway battle deviated significantly from the Nimitz plan. But, despite the deviation, the battle was won. What occurred at Midway was essentially a broken play, but positive action from a junior task force commander, astute calculations from an air group commander, and intrepid, skilled flying from carrier pilots saved the day. 

The intelligence team at Pearl Harbor had decrypted sufficient Japanese messages by May 27 to advise Nimitz of expected Japanese fleet movements on June 4. Nimitz’s intelligence staff, headed by LCdr Edwin Layton, informed him that the Japanese carrier fleet, or Striking Force:

“would probably attack on the morning of 4 June, from the northwest on a bearing of 325 degrees. They could be sighted at about 175 miles from Midway at around 0700 (0600 local) time.”(1)

Layton expected four or five Japanese carriers steaming from the northwest at 26 knots. There were four: Akagi(flagship of carrier Striking Force commander Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo), Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. Nimitz had a week to plan a defense of the attack, formulate a counter-attack, and continue to assemble forces on Midway to carry out the plan. He issued Operation Order 29-42 that detailed the forces that were to be employed, including the scouting operation of PBY amphibious planes and a picket line of submarines.

Additional Japanese forces included an amphibious Occupation Force operating south of the carrier force, a separate force to attack the Aleutian Islands, and a battleship force trailing 300 miles astern of the carriers. The battleship force included super-battleship Yamato with Combined Fleet commander Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto embarked.

The Japanese planned to launch 108 planes, half the total air complement of the four carriers, against the shore defenses of Midway Island at 0430 on June 4 when approximately 220-240 miles from Midway,. The remaining reserve force would be armed with anti-ship bombs and torpedoes to combat any unexpected Pacific Fleet forces. The Japanese command expected the Pacific Fleet carriers to rush to the scene from Pearl Harbor, and the Japanese would destroy them with their carrier planes and battleships in a showdown confrontation.

To counter the Japanese carrier force, Nimitz had planes on Midway Island and three Pacific Fleet carriers, Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown, under the overall command of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Fletcher, embarked on Yorktown, was in direct command of Task Force 17. A more junior rear admiral, Raymond Spruance, embarked on Enterprise, commanded Task Force 16 of Enterprise and Hornet.  

Operating range

A particular problem was the difference in operating ranges between the Japanese carrier planes and those of the Pacific Fleet. The Japanese operating range was 240 miles, and the equivalent for the Pacific Fleet planes was just 175 miles.  That difference meant the Japanese planes could attack the Pacific Fleet carriers when the Pacific Fleet planes were out of range of the Japanese carriers. Nimitz had to have a plan that would get the carriers through the band between 240 miles and 175 miles without being spotted and attacked. The difference, 65 miles, meant that a carrier covering that distance, averaging 25 knots, would have to steam for 2 ½ hours to cross the band where they were vulnerable to attack without being able to return it.

Nimitz designed an attack on the Japanese carrier fleet by moving the Pacific Fleet carriers through the night of June 3-4, under cover of darkness, to arrive at a position where they had the best chance to launch an attack before they were discovered by Japanese scouts. He planned to use PBY amphibious planes from Midway as scouts because the Japanese could sight the PBYs without being alerted to the presence of carriers. The light wind coming out of the southeast meant that the Japanese carriers, steaming into the wind, would launch and recover planes without changing course. Layton based his calculations on the PBYs taking off from Midway at 0430, plus plane and ship speeds, to arrive at his calculation that the PBYs should encounter the Japanese at about 0600, 175 miles from Midway.  The planes on Midway would launch immediately upon receipt of the scouting report.  Japanese carriers would move about 35 miles after the PBY report until the Midway planes intercepted them about 0720, 140 miles from Midway.

Nimitz formulated a plan for a concentration of force of Midway planes and carrier planes. To accomplish this, he determined that the Pacific Fleet carriers were to be at a position 140 miles northeast of the interception point at 0600. That position also was 200 miles directly north of Midway Island and was designated as the navigation reference point for the carrier force. When the report from a PBY was received at approximately 0600 the planes from both Midway and the three carriers would launch their planes. In a successful execution, all the Pacific Fleet planes would arrive over the Japanese carriers at approximately 0720 in a concentration of force. The goal was a victory by 0800-0815.

Because the Japanese planes attacking Midway would not return before 0830, the Pacific Fleet attack would be against just half of the Japanese air defenses. In addition, if the flight decks of the Japanese carriers were heavily damaged, even if the carriers themselves were not sunk, the planes returning from Midway would have to ditch in the ocean.

A graphic of Nimitz’s plan at the Battle. Copyright Dale Jenkins. Printed with permission.

After-action report

The after-action report of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher confirms the intended movements of the carrier force in conformity with the Nimitz plan:

ENTERPRISE and HORNET maintained their air groups

In readiness as a striking force. During the night of June 3-4

both forces [TF-17 and TF-16] proceeded for a point two

hundred miles North of Midway. (Emphasis added) Reports of enemy forces to the Westward of Midway were received from Midway and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. These reports indicated the location of the enemy Occupation Force but not the Striking Force.(2)

The ComCruPac (Fletcher) report refers to PBY scouts on June 3, when the Occupation Force was sighted and the carrier Striking Force was still under heavy clouds. It confirms Fletcher’s knowledge of the plan and his intended movements. Further confirmation of the Nimitz plan and the ordered position of the carriers to be 200 miles north of Midway at 0600 on June 4 is contained in published accounts of at least three contemporary historians who had the opportunity to interview participants during and after the war: Richard W. Bates, Samuel Eliot Morison, and E. B. Potter. (3)

On June 3 the PBYs took off from Midway at 0430 and contacted the Japanese occupation force. This contact confirmed that the Japanese were proceeding with the plan as previously decrypted by Layton’s intelligence unit. The carrier force was still under a heavy weather overcast and was not discovered on June 3.

On June 4 the PBYs launched again at 0430. At 0534 a sighting of enemy carriers was transmitted to Admirals Fletcher and Spruance, and to the forces on Midway. At 0603 the earlier report was amplified:

“2 carriers and battleships bearing 320 degrees, distance 180, course 135, speed 25 knots.” (4)

Immediately after receiving the latter report the planes on Midway took to the air.  Fighters rose to defend Midway, and six Avenger torpedo planes and four B-26s fitted with torpedoes flew to attack the Japanese carriers.  Two more carriers were in the Japanese formation but were not seen by the PBY pilot.

However, Pacific Fleet carriers were not in position to launch planes at 0603 because Fletcher, while heading southwest overnight June 3-4 toward the designated position 200 miles north of Midway, decided that the scouting as ordered in Operation Order 29-42 might not be sufficient. At first light, he ordered Yorktown carrier planes to conduct a separate sweep to the north and east. To do this the carriers had to change course to the southeast to launch planes into the wind, and to be on that course to recover the planes. These course changes took the carriers away from the interception point. When the 0603 message from the scout arrived, the carriers were 200 miles east and north of the interception point and 25 miles beyond their operating range of 175 miles. 

At 0607 Fletcher sent a message to Spruance:

“Proceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers when definitely located. I will follow as soon as planes recovered.”(5)

Spruance, detached with Enterprise and Hornet, proceeded southwest at all possible speed to close the range, but at an average speed of 25 knots it would take an hour to cover 25 miles.  Meanwhile, the planes from Midway arrived separately over the Japanese carriers and attacked. The plan for a concentration of force had failed.

The Avengers and B-26s, arriving at 0710, flew into the teeth of the Zero fighter defenders. They attempted valiant torpedo runs against two of the four carriers, but the inexperienced pilots were hopelessly outclassed by the fast, agile and deadly Zeros. There were no hits or even good chances for hits, and the Zeros sent five of the six Avengers flaming into the ocean. The B-26s hardly did better, but one pilot, with his plane on fire and probably knowing he was never getting home, dove at the bridge of the Japanese flagship. He missed by a few feet and crashed into the ocean.

B-26 pilot

The B-26 pilot may have done as much as anyone that day to turn the tide of the battle.  At 0715 the shocked Admiral Nagumo, already notified that the Midway attack had run into heavy resistance, decided that a second attack on Midway was required. He ordered the armaments of the standby force to be changed from anti-ship bombs and torpedoes to point detonating bombs for land targets.  All of this would require over an hour to complete, and not before the Midway attack force would be returning to land about 0830, low on fuel.

Admiral Spruance, ready to launch planes from his two carriers at 0700, plotted courses to a new interception.  Ranging closely together between 231 degrees and 240 degrees, but delayed at the launch, the planes expected to arrive at the new interception at 0925 – almost 2 1/2 hours after the launch time.

At 0917, with the Midway force landed, Admiral Nagumo turned northeast to confront the Pacific Fleet carriers that a Japanese scout had discovered earlier. Decisions he had made, including landing the Midway planes, had delayed any attack on the American carriers. The Americans were still making attacks, but the Zeros swept them aside easily. Now Nagumo was supremely confident. Rearming and refueling the entire air complement on all four carriers would be completed by 1045. They would launch a massive, coordinated attack of over 200 planes and sink the American carrier fleet.

The Enterprise and Hornet planes crossed the revised intercept point at 0925 but found nothing but open ocean. The Hornet air group commander took his squadrons southeast to protect Midway.  The Enterprise air commander realized that the Japanese carrier force probably had been delayed by earlier actions.  He took two squadrons of dive bombers on a northwest course to retrace the Japanese movements, then began a box search that came upon a Japanese destroyer, and that led to the Japanese carriers.  Diving out of the sun at 1025 caught the Japanese defenders by surprise, and in five minutes Akagi and Kaga were destroyed. The Yorktown planes suddenly appeared and destroyed Soryu.

Hiryu, the remaining Japanese carrier, launched dive bomber and torpedo plane attacks which led to the loss of Yorktown. Later in the day on June 4 Enterprise dive bombers destroyed Hiryu. The greatest victory of the US Navy had been realized.

Aftermath

In the aftermath of the Midway victory no one was going to complain about not following the Nimitz battle plan, least of all Admiral Nimitz.  Consequently, the existence of the plan has been overlooked until now. Whether following the plan would have resulted in the same victory by Pacific Fleet forces, or the same victory without as many losses in ships, planes and personnel, has never been explored and is left to speculation.

As a reminder, Dale is author of Diplomats & Admirals: From Failed Negotiations and Tragic Misjudgments to Powerful Leaders and Heroic Deeds, the Untold Story of the Pacific War from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

References

(1) Layton, Edwin T., And I Was There, Konecky & Konecky, Old Saybrook, CT, 1985, p. 430

(2) Report of Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet (Adm. Fletcher), To: Commander-in-Chief,

United States Pacific Fleet, Subject: Battle of Midway, 14 June 1942, Pearl Harbor, T.H., Para. 3, included as Enclosure (H) in United States Pacific Fleet, Advance Report – Battle of Midway, 15 June 1942

(3) Bates, Richard W., The Battle of Midway, U.S. Naval War College, 1948, p. 108; Morison, Samuel Eliot, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, Naval Institute Press, 1949, p. 102; Potter, E.B., Nimitz, Naval Institute Press, 1976, p. 87.

(4) Morison, p. 103.

(5) Morison, p.113

Abranham Lincoln Versus a Polish Count: Slavery, War, and the President in the Eyes of Adam Gurowski

Unlike many other Poles who took part in the Civil War on the Union side, Count Adam Gurowski was not a soldier or a commander, and his actions had no influence on the shape of the Civil War. He was primarily a publicist whose sharp views on the actions of Abraham Lincoln's government were so violent and uncompromising that the US president even treated him as a potential assassin. Rafal Guminski explains.

Adam Gurowski.

Count Adam Gurowski: History and Political Activity in Europe

Adam Gurowski was born on September 10, 1805, into a family of noble origins and a count's title. He was the oldest of seven siblings. His sister, Cecilia, was married to Baron Frederiks, general adjutant of Tsar Nicholas I, and his brother, Ignacy, married the Spanish Infanta Isabella de Borbón, daughter of the Duke of Cadiz, and became a Spanish grandee. As the oldest son, he received a good education. After completing his education at the provincial school, he began his studies in Berlin, Leipzig, Göttingen, and Heidelberg. He studied law, philosophy, history, and classical philology.

After his studies, Gurowski returned to the Kingdom of Poland and joined a political party from the western part of the country, which sought to maintain the status quo and preserve the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland. The count quickly left the organization, and in January 1829 he was supposed to take part in preparations for the so-called coronation plot, the aim of which was the death of the Russian Tsar Nicholas I. After the outbreak of the November Uprising, Gurowski became involved in organizing the insurgent administration and civil authorities, which, however, ended in failure. The count became a staunch critic of the insurgent dictatorship, and after its fall, he became a member of the Patriotic Society, on behalf of which he demanded the dethronement of Tsar Nicholas I as the King of Poland.

Despite being blind in one eye, he joined the insurgents as an ordinary soldier and took part in battles, for which he was promoted to officer and received the Silver Cross of Virtuti Militari. After leaving the army, he became an envoy of the Patriotic Society to Paris, where in French magazines such as Trubine, François, National, Reformateur, La Révolution de 1831 and Le Globe, he undertook to criticize the authorities of the November Uprising. After the fall of the Uprising, Gurowski struggled with the instability of his political views and a tendency to sharp disputes, through which he quickly alienated people from his closest surroundings.

The year 1834 was special for the Pole because of the radical change in his views and ideas. His statements began to include comments of a pan-Slavic nature with Poland as the unifier of the Slavic world. He also viewed the Polish emigration differently, whose activities for the liberation of the country he had previously assessed negatively. The change in the count's views is best seen in his interest in the postulates of French utopian socialism. The changes in Gurowski's worldview reached even such basic assumptions as nation and patriotism.

The count's new views conflicted him with his family and Polish patriotic circles, but it was only the request for amnesty addressed to Tsar Nicholas I and the recognition of Russia as the country that was to lead the unification of Slavic nations that made Gurowski a national apostate. His stay in Russia turned out to be difficult. The state apparatus of the Tsarist regime forced him to reassess his views once again, and the complete isolation from his family and countrymen began to weigh heavily on him.

A Polish Count on American Soil

In 1840, Gurowski returned to the Kingdom of Poland to sort out his property and family affairs. The attempt to recover his confiscated property ended in failure. Finding himself in a hopeless situation, the count decided to emigrate. In April 1844, he left the border of the Kingdom of Poland forever and went to the West. For some time, he lived in Bavaria, Hesse, and then in Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy. Unable to settle down permanently, the Pole decided to leave the Old Continent and emigrate to the United States of America. On December 2, 1849, Count Gurowski found himself in New York.

The Pole's situation in America was quite stable at first. He had brought a supply of cash with him from Europe, and thanks to letters of recommendation, he had access to intellectual circles from the very beginning. After half a year, the count's financial situation began to deteriorate, which forced him to seek a source of support outside New York. In Boston, he was even offered a chance to lecture on law at Harvard University, but due to poor attendance, his lectures were quickly suspended. During this time, the Pole became keenly interested in the issue of slavery and took an active part in the life of the local intellectual social elite. He managed to get to know the leaders of American literature and poetry: Henry W. Longfellow and James R. Lowell, who, together with Gurowski, had in common a particular aversion to slavery and criticism of that institution.

Eventually, the Pole returned to New York and in 1852 took a job at the New York Daily Tribune. He wrote a column on European affairs, criticizing the rule of Tsar Nicholas I. Despite his continued interest in European affairs, the Pole was fascinated by his new homeland, which he admired in many ways. He traveled extensively in the northern and southern states, and published his observations in “America and Europe”, which was warmly received by critics and praised for its impartiality and insightful observations. The Pole was greatly impressed by his new homeland and in many ways recognized its superiority over European countries. He paid special attention to the unique relationship between power and freedom. In his opinion, in Europe, these two forces competed with each other, while in America, they cooperated for the common good and development. The count was equally impressed by the class structure of American society. In his opinion, the superiority of the American system was the lack of class division dominated by the aristocracy. He noted with admiration that the law was created on the initiative of the people and for the people, and not by a privileged ruling group.

Gurowski's relations with the New York Daily Tribune began to deteriorate significantly, and as a result, the count lost his job. From then on, for four years he supported himself by publishing articles in various magazines. During this time, he continued to write a book on the history of world slavery, which was published in 1860 under the title “Slavery in History”.

Abraham Lincoln under harsh criticism from Adam Gurowski

The Pole, who was increasingly vocal in his criticism of slavery, decided to move to the US capital, Washington, where he hoped for greater understanding of his views. He wanted to seek support from politicians from the radical wing of the Republican Party. Thanks to his work in the New York Daily Tribune and his authorship of the books: “America and Europe” and “Slavery in History”, the Pole was already a well-known person in Washington. He quickly established important acquaintances, including Salmon P. Chase, the future chief justice of the United States, and John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts. After the outbreak of the Civil War, he joined a volunteer unit under the command of Cassius M. Clay, which was to protect and patrol the capital. After the threat had passed, the Pole got a job at the State Department. His duties included reading the European press and preparing reports on articles of interest to the department. However, Gurowski lost his job after his diary, in which he criticized the government, the president, and the Union generals, fell into the wrong hands. Ultimately, he published the contents of the diary in December 1862. Thus began his crusade against Abraham Lincoln.

Adam Gurowski should be considered the most ardent critic of the federal government and the president at the time. Although the Pole spoke positively about Lincoln's inaugural address, the government's lack of decisive action in the event of the attack on Fort Sumter and the riots in Baltimore ultimately confirmed his dislike of Abraham Lincoln. Gurowski stated that the current Union government "lacked the blood" to defeat the Confederacy, and calling up 75,000 volunteers was definitely not enough to defeat the Confederacy. He also believed that the situation overwhelmed Abraham Lincoln, who had no leadership skills and could not compare to George Washington or Andrew Jackson. He considered the president's greatest flaw to be his lack of decisiveness, and he saw it as the cause of the Army of the Potomac's defeats. Gurowski also criticized Lincoln's personnel decisions, especially the delay in dismissing General George McClellan from the position of commander of the Army of the Potomac. However, Gurowski was able to appreciate Lincoln. He praised the president's behavior after the defeat at Chancellorsville. The count accused Lincoln of manipulating election promises and making military decisions through the prism of politics, which was to result in the deaths of many soldiers. However, in the face of the president's re-election, Gurowski showed a shadow of support for him, fearing for the election of the hated McClellan and his pro-slavery lobby.

There is no doubt that Gurowski's criticism of the president was often exaggerated, but in some aspects the Pole's opinion coincides with the contemporary opinion of historians. The count's attitude towards the president was dictated by his views and difficult, uncompromising personality. The Pole's most positive opinion of Lincoln was expressed after the president's death. In Gurowski's eyes, the murdered president became a martyr close to sainthood, who will go down in world history as a great and noble man.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

References

·       Carter R., Gurowski, „The Atlantic Monthly” 1866, t. 18, nr 109.

·       Derengowski P., Polacy w wojnie secesyjnej 1861-1865, Napoleon V, Oświęcim 2015.

·       Fisher L.H., Lincoln’s Gadfly, Adam Gurowski, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1964.

·       Garewicz J., Gracz. Rzecz o Adamie Gurowskim [1805-1866], „Res Publica”, 2 (1988), nr 5,

·       Głębocki H., „Diabeł Asmodeusz” w niebieskich binoklach i kraj przyszłości: hr. Adam Gurowski i Rosja, Arcana, Kraków 2012.

·       Łukasiewicz W., Gurowski Adam, Polski słownik biograficzny, V.  9, Wrocław 1960-1961.

·       Stasik F., Adam Gurowski 1805-1866, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN ,Warszawa 1977.

Anne of Cleves – The Survivor Wife of King Henry VIII

Because she played her cards right, Anne of Cleves, as the fourth wife of King Henry VIII of England, managed to escape the wrath he inflicted on two of his previous wives and lived a privileged life on good terms with the king after their separation.

C. M. Schmidlkofer explains.

Anne of Cleves. Painitng by Barthel Bruyn the Younger.

It seems unfair that Anne of Cleves, the fourth wife of King Henry VIII, is known throughout history as the “ugly” wife (out of the six total he had) when in reality, it was her wit and intellect that makes her remarkable.

Born in Dusseldorf in 1515, Anne of Cleves was the daughter of Maria of Julich-Berg and Johan III, Duke of Cleves. Her marriage to Henry in Jan. 6, 1540, right from the start was fraught with disappointment and misunderstanding.

First, at the tender age of 24, she was invited to become Henry’s fourth bride based on a painting the king commissioned of her countenance which he later said looked nothing like her. But that came a bit later.

The marriage was a political arrangement fostered by Henry’s “fixer,” Chief Minister Thomas Cromwell who sought to temper the power plays of Spain and France while boosting Protestant influence with the union.

First meeting

The first meeting between the king and his bride was a massive fail, as Anne rejected Henry’s surprise meeting wearing a disguise and the relationship went downhill from there.

The complaints began in earnest then as the king complained she did not look like the commissioned portrait.

He called her a “Flanders Mare,” said she smelled, and reportedly refused to have marital sex with her.

Anne was a fish out of water in Tudor Court. Her upbringing did not include dancing and music, the heart of Tudor life, but was focused on learning duties of a noblewoman she was expected to become along with household skills.

In an attempt to integrate herself into life with Henry, perhaps nervous over what lay ahead, she had the foresight to socialize with her English travelers to learn customs and social skills as well as learning the king’s favorite card games during her voyage to meet him.

There is little known about Anne’s feelings about the marriage but she was keenly aware that two of Henry’s first three wives were either banished or beheaded and that the purpose of any union was to produce a male heir for the king.

And although Henry had his coveted son through his third wife, Jane Seymour, who died shortly after giving birth, he was forging ahead with the fourth marriage to secure another.

End of marriage

Seven months after his marriage to Anne, who served as queen consort, Henry notified his bride their marriage was to be annulled three days hence. His reasoning was the marriage was never consummated and for good measure threw in questions about Anne’s relationship years ago with her brief engagement to Francis the Duke of Bar in 1527.

Wisely, Anne knew that arguing or pleading to continue the marriage would not be successful and instead fully cooperated with the king’s wishes. Certainly, she had nothing to lose and as it turned out she gained beautifully.

Henry, possibly relieved over Anne’s cooperation, awarded her with a generous settlement, granted her the title of “the King’s Sister” as long as she remained in England and bestowed upon her large tracts of properties, such as Hever Castle – the former childhood home of Henry’s second wife, Anne Boleyn, whom he had beheaded in 1536.

Unlike Henry’s first wife, Catherine of Aragon, who resisted the king’s demand for annulment on religious grounds, ending up banished from court until her death in 1536, Anne was allowed to keep her jewels, her metal plate and her dresses, and received a generous annual stipend along with revenue from other properties.

She willingly turned over her wedding ring to Henry, asking that it be destroyed “as a thing which she knew of no force or value.”

Henry seemed to value Anne’s counsel after their separation and continued a cordial relationship with her until he died in 1547.

Later years

At that point Anne lost her title of the “King’s Sister” and she moved away from court, leading a quiet life until Mary I, Henry’s daughter with his first wife, Catherine of Aragon, and Anne’s stepdaughter, took the throne in 1553. Anne briefly came under suspicion when a plot to depose the queen and place Elizabeth I on the throne was investigated because Anne also had a close relationship with Elizabeth I, the daughter of the king and Anne Boleyn.

She escaped a charge of treason and remained cordial with Mary I until her death in 1557 at the age of 41 after a brief illness in Chelsea Old Manor, her home and former home of Catherine Parr, Henry’s sixth and last wife.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

References

https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/sixwives/meet/ac_handbook_children.html

https://www.theanneboleynfiles.com/the-death-of-anne-of-cleves/

https://www.historytools.org/stories/anne-of-cleves-the-unwanted-queen-who-survived-and-thrived

https://www.english-heritage.org.uk/visit/inspire-me/blog/blog-posts/henry-viii-and-anne-of-cleves/

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anne-of-Cleves-queen-of-England

Operation Frankton: The Most Daring Raid of World War 2

Operation Frankton was a covert military operation carried out by the Royal Marines during the Second World War and was one of the most audacious and daring raids in military history. The raid was executed in December 1942 and targeted the German-occupied French port of Bordeaux, a crucial hub for the Axis powers, which facilitated the movement of supplies critical to the German war effort. The operation, led by a small group of commandos, was remarkable not only for its boldness but also for its significant impact on the war effort. Delving into the main reasons behind the mission, the key figures involved, and the importance of the operation, it is also possible to lightly explore the separately planned parallel mission by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) against the same targets.

Terry Bailey explains.

Tannenfels, a German blockade runner which was sunk.

The Strategic Importance of Bordeaux

Bordeaux, located in southwest France along the Garonne River, was a vital port for the Axis powers during the Second World War. Following the fall of France in 1940, the German military took control of the port and used it to facilitate the movement of supplies utilizing blockade runners. The port was especially important for the transit of rubber, which was essential for manufacturing tires and other military equipment. The loss of Bordeaux would disrupt the supply lines and put a significant strain on the German war machine, making it a prime target for Allied forces.

The British Admiralty recognized the strategic value of targeting Bordeaux early in the war. However, conventional bombing raids were deemed too risky to the civilian population and ineffective due to the heavy defenses surrounding the port. The need for a more unconventional approach led to the conception of Operation Frankton, a mission designed to strike at the heart of the German supply chain with minimal resources.

The Planning of Operation Frankton

The idea for Operation Frankton was conceived by Major Herbert "Blondie" Hasler, a Royal Marines officer with a background in unconventional warfare and small boats. Hasler, who had previously served as a fleet landing officer in Scapa Flow, was then sent to Narvik in support of the French Foreign Legion in the Norwegian campaign, for which duties he was appointed an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE), mentioned in dispatches, and awarded the French Croix de Guerre.

He was known for his innovative thinking and determination and believed that a small, highly trained team could infiltrate the heavily guarded port using kayaks, plant explosive charges on the ships, and escape undetected. The operation would rely on stealth, surprise, and the ability to navigate the treacherous waters of the Gironde estuary.

Hasler's plan was initially met with skepticism by some members of the Admiralty, who viewed it as too risky and unlikely to succeed. However, Hasler's persistence, coupled with the lack of viable alternatives, eventually won over his superiors. The operation was given the green light, and Hasler was put in charge of selecting and training the men who would carry out the raid.

The men Hasler recruited became part of the Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment which was part of combined operations. The group who carried out the raid consisted of 13 Royal Marines, including Hasler himself, 6 two-man teams plus one reserve. The men were chosen for their physical fitness, mental toughness, and ability to operate under extreme conditions. They underwent rigorous training in kayaking, explosives, and navigation, practicing initially in the waters in southern England, and eventually in the cold and treacherous waters off the coast of Scotland.

The operation was set to take place in December 1942, during the winter, when the long nights would provide the cover of darkness needed for the raid. The men would use specially designed folding kayaks, nicknamed "cockles," to navigate the Gironde estuary and reach the port of Bordeaux. Once there, they would attach limpet mines to the hulls of the German blockade-running ships and then attempt to escape through France to Spain, with the help of the French Resistance.

The Execution of the Raid

The operation began on the night of the 7th of December, 1942, when Royal Navy submarine HMS Tuna sailed from Holy Loch in Scotland with the six kayaks and raiders on board, where the men were dropped off the coast of France, near the mouth of the Gironde estuary. The plan was for the men to paddle their kayaks up the estuary, cover a distance of around 70 miles, and reach the port of Bordeaux within four nights.

The hull of Cachalot was damaged while being passed out of the submarine hatch, leaving just five kayaks to start the raid. The reserve member of the team, Colley, was not needed, so he remained aboard the submarine with the Cachalot crew Ellery and Fisher.

The first night of the mission was fraught with difficulties. The strong currents and freezing temperatures took a toll on the men, fighting against strong cross tides and cross winds, Coalfish became separated. The remaining kayaks then encountered 5 ft (1.5 m) high waves and Conger capsized and had to be scuttled, once it became apparent that it would not be possible to bail it out, Sheard and Moffatt held on to two of the remaining kayaks, which carried them as close to the shore as possible, then had to swim for it, the remaining kayaks then came across the separated Coalfish.

As the conditions deteriorated Mackinnon and Conway in Cuttlefish became separated from the other kayaks in the group. After reaching the shore, MacKinnon and Conway evaded capture for four days but were betrayed and arrested by the Gendarmerie and handed over to the Germans at La Reole hospital 30 miles southeast of Bordeaux, while attempting to make their way to the Spanish border.

The 3 remaining kayaks, Catfish, Crayfish and Coalfish, covered 20 miles in five hours landed near St Vivien du Medoc, and laid up through the day, however, while resting during the day and unknown to the others, Wallace and Ewart in Coalfish had been captured at daybreak near the Pointe de Grave lighthouse where they had come ashore, now they were only 2.

The second night, 8/9 December, the two remaining kayaks Catfish and Crayfish paddled a further 22 miles in six hours. On the third night, 9/10 December, they paddled 15 miles and on the fourth night, 10/11 December, because of the strong ebb tide they only managed to cover 9 miles.

Hasler's original plan was for the raid to be carried out on the 10th of December, but now Hasler had to change his plan, due to the strength of the ebb tide they still had a short distance to paddle, so the remaining commandos laid up for another day, setting off to and reach Bordeaux on the night of 11/12 December.

On the night of the 11th of December, 1942, after four grueling nights of paddling, avoiding German patrols, the surviving commandos reached the port of Bordeaux. The men split into two teams, with Hasler and Marine Bill Sparks in the kayak Catfish taking one side of the port and Corporal Albert Laver and Marine William Mills in the kayak Crayfish taking the other side of the port. Using limpet mines, the teams successfully attached explosives to the hulls of six German ships. The explosives were set to detonate in the early hours of the morning, ensuring the commandos had time to extract themselves from the immediate area.

The raiders then made their escape, splitting up into pairs and heading in different directions to avoid capture. Hasler and Sparks managed to make contact with the French Resistance and began their journey south towards Spain. Laver and Ellery, however, were not as fortunate. They were captured by the Germans a few days later and executed, as part of Hitler's infamous commando order. Hasler and Sparks, after a harrowing journey through occupied France, eventually reached Spain and were repatriated to the United Kingdom via Gibraltar in April 1943.

The Aftermath and Impact of Operation Frankton

Operation Frankton was a tactical success, with 2 ships sunk, 2 ships several damaged and a further 2 ships slightly damaged. The damage to the ships and the resulting disruption to German supply lines had a significant impact on the war effort. The raid also had a profound psychological effect, demonstrating that even heavily guarded ports were vulnerable to small, highly trained commando units.

However, the mission came at a high cost. Of the 10 men who set out on the raid, only 2 survived, Hasler and Bill Sparks, 6 were captured and executed by the Germans, while 2 were lost at sea. Despite these losses, the bravery and determination of the Royal Marines became a symbol of courage and ingenuity.

Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, later praised the operation, stating that it shortened the war by six months. While this claim is difficult to verify, there is no doubt that Operation Frankton had a significant impact on the course of the war, both strategically and symbolically. The Germans defined the raid as the most daring raid of the Second World War.

The Parallel Mission by the Special Operations Executive (SOE)

While Operation Frankton is the most well-known raid on Bordeaux, it is important to note that the SOE had also planned a 2 part parallel mission against the same targets. The SOE, a British organization responsible for conducting espionage, and sabotage in occupied Europe, recognized the importance of disrupting German supply lines in Bordeaux.

A team led by Claude de Baissac of the Special Operations Executive were preparing to take explosives onto the ships when he heard the explosions of Hasler's limpet mines. The loss of the opportunity for Hasler and de Baissac to work together to strike a harder blow against the Germans was a hard lesson.

The other aspect of the SOE's plan was codenamed "Operation Josephine B," which involved a sabotage mission aimed at destroying the electricity supply to the port of Bordeaux. The mission was to be carried out by a team of SOE and French resistance, who would infiltrate the power station and plant explosives to disable the facility. The objective was to cut off electricity to the port, rendering the German ships and facilities inoperable.

Operation Josephine B was planned to take place around the same time as Operation Frankton, this aspect of the SOE mission was delayed due to difficulties in securing the necessary explosives and logistical support. By the time the mission was ready to go ahead, Operation Frankton had already been executed.

Despite the delay, Operation Josephine B was eventually carried out in June 1943, and the power station was successfully sabotaged. The mission achieved its objective, but the impact was somewhat mitigated by the fact that the ships in the port had already been severely damaged by Operation Frankton. The SOE's mission, while important, is often overshadowed by the daring and dramatic nature of the Royal Marines' raid.

The SOE was aware of the Royal Marines' mission, but the Royal Marines were unaware of the SOE mission due to SOE's secrecy policy. However, after Operation Frankton a clearing and controlling house was set up that would coordinate all special operations in the future ensuring that missions did not clash, this process is still in place today.

In conclusion, Operation Frankton stands as a testament to the courage, ingenuity, and determination of the Royal Marines during the Second World War. The raid on Bordeaux, carried out by a small team of commandos using unconventional methods, dealt a significant blow to the German war effort and demonstrated the vulnerability of even the most heavily defended targets.

The operation also highlighted the importance of coordinated efforts in warfare, as the separately planned SOE mission against the same targets showed. While both missions were successful in their own right, the lack of coordination between these missions is a reminder of the challenges faced by Allied forces in executing complex operations during the Second World War and the loss of a greater blow to the Germans.

The legacy of Operation Frankton lives on, not only in military history but also in the broader narrative of the Second World War. The bravery and sacrifice of the Royal Marines continue to inspire generations of military personnel and serve as a powerful example of what can be achieved through courage, ingenuity, and determination in the face of overwhelming odds.

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Notes:

The Bordeaux raiding team consisted of:

A Division

Blondie Hasler and Marine Bill Sparks in kayak Catfish.

Corporal Albert Laver and Marine William Mills in kayak Crayfish.

Corporal George Sheard and Marine David Moffatt in kayak Conger.

B Division

Lieutenant John Mackinnon and Marine James Conway in kayak Cuttlefish.

Sergeant Samuel Wallace and Marine Robert Ewart in kayak Coalfish.

Marine W. A. Ellery and Marine E. Fisher in kayak Cachalot.

A thirteenth man was taken as a reserve, Marine Norman Colley.

Blockade runner

A blockade runner is a light fast merchant vessel used to evade a naval blockade of a port or strait. In addition to, speed it uses stealth, blockade runners transport cargo, such as food or arms to a blockaded city.

The Special Boat Service

The Special Boat Service (SBS) is a special forces unit of the United Kingdom under the control of Royal Navy admiralty and part of the Royal Marine Commando.

The SBS traces its origins back to the Second World War when the Army Special Boat Section was formed in 1940 as a sub-unit of the Special Air Service, (SAS). However, after the Second World War, the Royal Navy through the Royal Marines commando formed the SBS special forces, initially as the Special Boat Company in 1951 then re-designated as the Special Boat Squadron in 1974—until on the 28th of July, 1987 the unit was formally renamed as the Special Boat Service, bringing it inline from a naming point of view with the army special forces unit the Special Air Service, (SAS), warranting the SBS its own budget.

The reformation of the SBS after the Second World War as part of the Royal Marine Commandos is in part due to Operation Frankton by the Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD).

Words of Lord Mountbatten, the commander of Combined Operations

Mountbatten's words are carved into a stone at the Royal Marine Commando base in Poole, Dorset, (the current headquarters of the SBS).

"Of the many brave and dashing raids carried out by the men of Combined Operations Command none was more courageous or imaginative than Operation Frankton".

Point of interest:

The reader may be interested to know that the author of this article personally met and knew both Blondie Hasler and Bill Sparks in the early 1980s.

Herbert George "Blondie" Hasler, DSO, OBE

Herbert George "Blondie" Hasler, DSO, OBE (27 February 1914 – 5 May 1987) served as an officer in the Royal Marines and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel.

He was recommended for the Victoria Cross, for Operation Frankton, however, he was not eligible as his actions were not "in the face of the enemy" as required for that decoration.

William, (Bill), Edward Sparks DSM

William, (Bill), Edward Sparks DSM (5 September 1922 – 1 December 2002) was a British Royal Marine Commando in the Second World War.

He volunteered for hazardous service as a way of avenging his brother Benny who had died on the cruiser HMS Naiad.

One of his three sons Terry Sparks, became a Captain in the Royal Marine Commandos

Corporal Albert Laver and Marine William Mills

Corporal Albert Laver and Marine William Mills in the kayak Crayfish were also recommended for the DSM which at the time could not be awarded posthumously, so instead were mentioned in dispatches.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement: The Agreement that Haunts the Modern Middle East

During the First World War, the Triple Entente was faced with the very real prospect of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Eager to secure their interests in the Middle East, the British and the French drew up the Sykes-Picot Agreement to divide the region in the case of victory against the Central Powers. Although the Sykes-Picot Agreement was never enacted, it set the framework for the Middle East’s current borders and the name Sykes-Picot has since become synonymous to many with an era of colonial misrule.

Holly Farrell explains.

Sir Mark Sykes.

Francois Georges-Picot.

During the First World War, the Triple Entente was faced with the very real prospect of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Eager to secure their interests in the Middle East, the British and the French drew up the Sykes-Picot Agreement to divide the region in the case of victory against the Central Powers. Although the Sykes-Picot Agreement was never enacted, it set the framework for the Middle East’s current borders and the name Sykes-Picot has since become synonymous to many with an era of colonial misrule.

Holly Farrell explains.

‘The Sick Man of Europe’: Why did the Allies anticipate the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire?

By the turn of the 20th century the Ottoman Empire, which controlled areas across North Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, was struggling both economically and militaristically. The Ottomans became unable to maintain such an extensive bureaucracy and a vast decentralized political structure. Although reforms attempted to modernize the Empire, these measures were of short-lived success and contributed to a growing debt crisis in the late 19th century. The Ottoman Empire also lost many territories in the decades preceding the First World War. France gained control of Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881, Italy took Libya in 1911, and Britain took control of Oman in 1861, the Arabian Gulf Chiefdoms in 1820, Kuwait in 1899, Egypt in 1882 and Sudan in 1899. In October 1914 the Ottoman Empire joined the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, hoping to confront Britain and France, and benefit from German aid.

Drawing up the Sykes-Picot Agreement

Negotiations between the Entente Powers of Britain, France, and Russia for the division of Ottoman territories began in November 1915. They were initially between Mark Sykes, a scholar and guard in the British military during the Boer War, and Francois Georges-Picot, a lawyer-turned-delegate for the French government. However, the eventual agreement was also up to the assent of Russia. All three powers aimed to secure territory, trade routes, and oil wealth, but also had their own ambitions for particular areas. Russia hoped to gain ports in the Dardanelles, including Constantinople, to access trade routes to the Black Sea. Britain wanted to control Palestine due to its proximity with the Suez Canal, and secure access to India through the Persian Gulf. France, meanwhile, was the largest investor in the Ottoman Empire and sought to maintain their influence in the region to protect their investments.

The Entente Powers had already given Constantinople and its surroundings areas to Russia as part of the Constantinople Agreement in March 1915. This crucially granted Russia access to the Mediterranean Sea. Meanwhile, the Sykes-Picot Agreement sought to coordinate Britain and France’s interests in the region. On May 16 1916 a deal was secretly signed between Sykes and Picot and approved by Russian foreign minister, Sergey Sazonov.

Under the terms of the agreement, France was allocated control of Syria, Lebanon, Cilicia, and Mosul, whilst Britain was allocated Baghdad and Basra and northern Palestine (this included the ports of Haifa and Acre, and modern-day Jordan). However, as shown on the map below, these territories were divided into spheres of control and those of ‘influence’. It was decided that Palestine would be put under international administration due to its holy sites. Independent states would be created in the remaining Arab territories.

Britain’s contradictory promises: Sykes-Picot, the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, and the Balfour Declaration

Whilst Britain, France and Russia appeared to have settled their vision for the post-war Middle East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was threatened by two additional contradictory agreements which Britain had made with the Arab nationalist and Zionist movements.

In July 1915, several months prior to the beginning of Sykes’ and Picot’s negotiations, Hussein bin Ali (Arab nationalist leader and Sharif of Mecca) wrote to Henry McMahon (the British High Commissioner in Egypt) to request British support for an independent Arab state. McMahon was initially reluctant to collaborate with Hussein, believing his territorial ambitions to be ‘extravagant’, however he was eventually persuaded to offer his support. When McMahon replied to Hussein, British and French troops were suffering defeats by Turkish forces in the Gallipoli campaign. McMahon believed that an Arab uprising would distract and weaken Ottoman forces in the region, enabling the Entente troops to make a tactical withdrawal. Consequently, Britain saw an advantage in working with Hussein. Over the course of ten letters between July 1915 and March 1916 (referred to as the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence) Hussein and McMahon negotiated a plan of British support for an independent Arab state if the Arab nationalists launched a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. However, the British excluded three areas from the independent state as they claimed they were not ‘Arab enough’. This affected the provinces of Basra and Baghdad, the Turkish districts of Alexandretta and Merson, and the districts of Syria that lay west of Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and Merson. The nationalist uprising began in June 1916 and, although the Entente provided limited manpower, they provided officers, gold, and munitions to support the war against the Ottomans. However, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence lacked the formality of a treaty and its contradiction with Britain’s plans under Sykes-Picot ultimately made it an empty promise.

However, Britain’s conflicting plans for the Middle East did not end here. On November 2 1917 the British government issued an arrangement for Palestine in the Balfour Declaration. In a letter to prominent Zionist Lord Rothschild, the British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour outlined Britain’s promise to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This support was later publicized. However, the question of why the British government issued this declaration has still gone unanswered. Whilst some historians have argued that many members of the British government had Zionist sympathies, others have suggested that antisemitism increased support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Alternatively, it has been argued that Britain was trying to gain the support of Jews across the world, particularly in the US, who the British hoped would take a more active role in the war. However, this declaration was a bitter betrayal for the Arabs.

Despite initially being kept secret, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was eventually publicized by the Bolsheviks in late November 1917 following the Russian Revolution. Leon Trotsky published the Sykes-Picot Agreement in Izvestia newspaper on November 24 1917 to expose the plans which Vladimir Lenin called ‘the agreement of the colonial thieves’. This caused a political scandal for Britain and France and created a strong mistrust between the Entente and Arab nationalists. The British assured their allies in the Middle East that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was merely discussion amongst the Entente powers and that they would stand by the Arab people.

The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, Entente forces (mainly the British) occupied the former Ottoman territories. Whilst the original division of land planned in the Sykes-Picot Agreement did not materialize during peace negotiations, the borders of the newly created states were similar to those agreed upon in 1916. This was determined in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).

Before signing the Treaty of Sèvres, the former Entente powers met at the Conference of San Remo in April 1920 to determine the division of the Ottoman Empire’s territories. Under article 22 of the newly created League of Nations, certain former colonies were classed as ‘mandates’ (ranging from A to C depending on perceived levels of development) if they were deemed unable to govern themselves independently. The former Ottoman territories became Class A mandates, meaning that they had ‘reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such a time as they are able to stand alone’ (as stated in Article 22). As a result, the newly created states in the Middle East became British and French mandates rather than colonies.

Under the Treaty of Sèvres:

·       The Ottoman Empire was dismantled

·       Turkey had to relinquish claims to territories in North Africa and the Middle East

·       Greece gained Smyrna (now called İzmir), Adrianople (now called Edirne), most of the hinterland to Constantinople and the Aegean islands commanding the Dardanelles

·       Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine became British mandates

·       Lebanon and Syria became French mandates

·       Morocco and Tunisia became French protectorates

·       Hejaz became an independent kingdom (it would later unite with Najd and other districts in 1932 to form the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)

·       Armenian independence was recognized

·       The League of Nations controlled the Turkish straits

·       British, French, Italian and Greek troops occupied Turkey

·       The Turkish army could have a maximum of 50,700 men, it was forbidden to have an air force, and the navy could have a maximum of thirteen boats

·       The Allies were to control Turkish finances

The Treaty of Sèvres was resented in Turkey and popular discontent fueled an uprising against Sultan Mehmed VI. The new nationalist government under Kemal Atatürk drove the Greek and British troops out of Turkey and repudiated the Treaty of Sèvres. Consequently, the Allies agreed to renegotiate the settlement and signed the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Under the Treaty of Lausanne:

·       All the territories given to Greece were returned to Turkey

·       All foreign troops were ordered to leave Turkey

·       Turkey regained control of the Straits, but they had to remain demilitarized

·       Turkey was recognized as the successor to the Ottoman Empire

·       The Allies no longer imposed controls over Turkey’s finances or military

·       The Allies dropped demands for autonomy for Kurdistan and Turkish cession of territory to Armenia

The Legacies of Sykes-Picot and the post-WW1 settlement in the Middle East

Although the Sykes-Picot Agreement was never implemented, it set the framework for the modern-day frontiers of the Middle East. This has created a lasting resentment in the region, especially amongst Pan-Arabists who oppose the division of majority Arab-populated territories into separate states and associate Sykes-Picot with European colonial misrule. Sykes-Picot has since been targeted by various groups in the region, including by the so-called Islamic State who declared their intention to remove Sykes-Picot as they bulldozed the border between Iraq and Syria in 2014.

One of the most controversial aspects of the division of former Ottoman territories was the eventual fate of Palestine. As a British mandate, Britain called for the migration of Jews to Palestine, paving the way for region to be declared a Jewish state (known as Israel) once they ended their mandate in 1948. This led to the displacement of the Arab population and the ongoing conflict between Israeli and Palestinian groups.

The post-First World War settlement in the Middle East also lay the groundwork for sectarian conflict elsewhere in the region due to the limited regard for the ethnic, tribal, religious, or linguistic groups of the new states’ inhabitants. Although the British and French eventually withdrew from the region in the 1960s and 1970s, there has been hardly any change to national borders. Crucially, this has left the Kurdish population without a homeland as the Treaty of Lausanne failed to accommodate for Kurdish self-determination.

As sectarian conflict continues in the Middle East, the question remains as to whether the national borders created by the Treaty of Sèvres can survive into the future, or if all traces of Sykes-Picot need to be removed to ensure peace in the region.

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References:

Al Jazeera. ‘A Century on: Why Arabs Resent Sykes-Picot’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2016/sykes-picot-100-years-middle-east-map/index.html.

Al Tahhan, Zena . ‘More than a Century on: The Balfour Declaration Explained’. Al Jazeera, 2 November 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/11/2/more-than-a-century-on-the-balfour-declaration-explained.

Britannica. ‘Sykes-Picot Agreement ’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/Sykes-Picot-Agreement.

Britannica. ‘Treaty of Lausanne’, 17 July 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Lausanne-1923.

Britannica. ‘Why Was the Ottoman Empire Called “the Sick Man of Europe”? ’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://www.britannica.com/question/Why-was-the-Ottoman-Empire-called-the-sick-man-of-Europe.

Kearey, Kat. International Relations and Global Conflict C1890-1941. Oxford AQA History Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Muir , Jim. ‘Sykes-Picot: The Map That Spawned a Century of Resentment’. BBC News, 16 May 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36300224.

Oxford Reference. ‘Sykes–Picot Agreement’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://doi.org/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100546581.

Oxford Reference. ‘Treaty of Sèvres’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://doi.org/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100457377.

Rabinovich, Itamar, Robbie Sabel, and Oded Eran. ‘A Century since the Sykes-Picot Agreement: Current Challenges’. Institute for National Security Studies, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08741.

The Avalon Project. ‘The Sykes-Picot Agreement : 1916’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp.

The Economist. ‘Unintended Consequences’, 12 May 2016. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/05/12/unintended-consequences.

‘The Treaty of Sevres’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://historylearning.com/modern-world-history/treaty-of-sevres/.

United Nations Digital Library. ‘Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations’. Accessed 28 August 2024. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/829695.

Young, George. ‘Deceit in the Desert: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire’. Hohonu 17 (2019): 37–40. https://hilo.hawaii.edu/campuscenter/hohonu/volumes/documents/DeceitintheDesertThePartitionoftheOttomanEmpire.pdf.

The 1941 Battle of Cape Matapan Between Britain and Italy

The Battle of Cape Matapan, fought between March 27 and  March 29, 1941, was a pivotal naval engagement during the Second World War. Taking place off the southern coast of Greece, it marked a significant victory for the British Royal Navy against the Italian Regia Marina.

Terry Bailey explains.

The Italian Battleship Vittorio Veneto firing her guns in March 1941.

As the Second World War intensified, the Mediterranean became a critical theatre of operations for both the Axis and Allied powers. Control of the sea lanes in this region was vital for the supply lines of the British Empire and the Axis powers, particularly for Italy, which sought to dominate the eastern Mediterranean and secure its holdings in North Africa.

By early 1941, the Italian Navy had suffered several setbacks, including the British raid on Taranto in November 1940, where the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm crippled the Italian battleships Littorio, Conte di Cavour, and Caio Duilio. Despite this, the Regia Marina remained a formidable force, with superior numbers of surface ships compared to the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet.

The immediate catalyst for the Battle of Cape Matapan was the Italian desire to assert control over the eastern Mediterranean and support their forces in North Africa. Admiral Angelo Iachino, commander of the Regia Marina, was tasked with leading a significant operation to intercept British convoys bound for Greece and Crete. Unknown to the Italians, however, the British had a critical advantage: the ability to decode Italian naval communications, thanks to the work of the Bletchley Park codebreakers.

The breaking of codes by British cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park was one of the war's greatest intelligence coups. By early 1941, the British had made significant progress in deciphering German and Italian military communications. This capability allowed them to anticipate Axis movements and prepare accordingly.

In the case of Cape Matapan, Bletchley Park had intercepted and decrypted Italian naval signals, revealing the details of Admiral Iachino's planned operation. This intelligence was swiftly passed on to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, the commander of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet.

With this foreknowledge, Cunningham was able to plan a decisive counteraction. Cunningham, a seasoned and aggressive naval commander, quickly assembled a task force to intercept the Italians. His fleet included the battleships HMS Warspite, HMS Valiant, and HMS Barham, the aircraft carrier HMS Formidable, 7 light cruisers, and 17 destroyers. The stage was set for a confrontation that would decisively alter the naval balance in the Mediterranean.

On the 27th of March, 1941, Admiral Iachino set sail with a force that included the battleship Vittorio Veneto, 6 heavy and 2 light cruisers, in addition to, 13 destroyers. His objective was to intercept a supposed British convoy; however, the real target was an opportunity presented by the British Fleet, which had left its base in Alexandria, Egypt.

As the two fleets approached, the British launched air strikes from HMS Formidable. These attacks, though initially unsuccessful inflicted significant damage, forcing the Italians to alter their course and delay their advance. A subsequent air strike on the 28th of March scored a crucial hit on Vittorio Veneto, damaging her propellers and reducing her speed. This allowed Cunningham to close the distance.

The critical phase of the battle occurred on the night of March 28th - 29th. The Royal Navy had honed its night-fighting skills, a domain in which the Italian Navy was significantly less experienced. Using radar technology, which the Italians lacked, Cunningham's forces were able to locate and engage the Italian ships with deadly precision.

The Italian cruisers Zara, Fiume, and Pola, along with several destroyers, found themselves caught in a deadly rain of fire from the British battleships. In a matter of minutes, the British guns tore the Italian ships apart. The Pola, which had been immobilized by an earlier air strike, became an easy target and was finished off at close range. The Zara and Fiume were similarly destroyed, along with two destroyers, Alfieri and Carducci.

Admiral Iachino, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, ordered his remaining ships to retreat. The battle was a devastating defeat for the Regia Marina, with 3 heavy cruisers, and 2 destroyers sunk, in addition to, 1 Battleship and 1 destroyer damaged with over 2,300 Italian sailors killed and 1015 captured. The British, by contrast, suffered minimal losses, 3 killed, 1 aircraft lost and slight damage to 4 light cruisers.

Key Figures

Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham

On the British side, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was the mastermind behind the victory. His aggressive tactics and willingness to engage the enemy directly, combined with the advantage of intelligence from Bletchley Park, proved decisive. Cunningham's leadership during the battle further solidified his reputation as one of the Royal Navy's most effective commanders.

Admiral Angelo Iachino

Admiral Angelo Iachino, the Italian commander, found himself outmatched despite his competent leadership and the strength of his fleet. The lack of radar and the element of surprise lost due to the deciphering of codes left him in an untenable position. His decision to withdraw the surviving ships likely prevented an even greater disaster, but the loss of so many vessels and men was a severe blow to the Regia Marina.

The Battle of Cape Matapan was a turning point in the naval war in the Mediterranean. The defeat severely weakened the Italian Navy's ability to challenge British control of the Mediterranean sea lanes. The loss of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers, combined with the psychological impact of the defeat, meant that the Regia Marina would be hesitant to engage the Royal Navy in large-scale fleet actions for the remainder of the war.

For the British, the victory at Cape Matapan bolstered morale and reaffirmed the effectiveness of their naval tactics, particularly night-fighting and the use of radar. It also demonstrated the value of intelligence in modern warfare, with the success of the codebreakers playing a crucial role in the outcome.

In the broader context of the war, the battle helped to secure the eastern Mediterranean for the Allies, ensuring the continued flow of supplies to Malta and North Africa. It also contributed to the eventual defeat of Axis forces in the region, as control of the sea allowed the Allies to launch and support offensives in North Africa, later the landing in Sicily and mainland Italy which led to the eventual expulsion of Axis forces from continental occupation.

Legacy of the Battle

The Battle of Cape Matapan is remembered as one of the numerous important Royal Navy victories of the Second World War. It showcased the importance of technological superiority, intelligence, and leadership in naval warfare. For the Italians, it was a bitter lesson in the dangers of underestimating the enemy and the necessity of modernizing naval capabilities.

In the years following the battle, the lessons learned at Cape Matapan would influence naval tactics and strategy. The importance of radar, training ships' companies in the techniques of night-fighting, and the integration of air power into naval operations became increasingly evident, shaping the future of naval warfare.

The defeat also had political ramifications in Italy, contributing to growing dissatisfaction with the war effort and the leadership of Benito Mussolini. The loss at Cape Matapan, combined with other military failures, eroded the confidence of the Italian people and military in their leadership, setting the stage for Italy's eventual capitulation in 1943.

In conclusion, the Battle of Cape Matapan was more than just a clash of fleets; it was a confrontation between two different approaches to naval warfare. The British, with their emphasis on intelligence, technology, and aggressive tactics, emerged victorious against the Italian fleet. The battle's outcome had far-reaching consequences, shaping the course of the war in the Mediterranean and reinforcing the importance of naval power in modern warfare, in particular the use of aircraft.

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Points of interest:

Italian Admiral Iachino wrote that:-

"The battle had the consequence of limiting for some time our operational activities, not for the serious moral effect of the losses, as the British believed, but because the operation revealed our inferiority in effective aero-naval cooperation and the backwardness of our night battle technology".

Admiral Cunningham

Admiral Cunningham retired as Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Browne Cunningham, 1st Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, KT, GCB, OM, DSO & Two Bars.

Admiral, (at the time of the battle), Cunningham was so grateful for the code breaker's work in respect to his naval victory that a few weeks after the battle he dropped into Bletchley Park to congratulate the team of ladies responsible for providing him with the insightful intelligence that enabled him to execute such a one-sided victory.

World War 2 in North Africa - The Long Range Desert Group

The Second World War brought about a new dimension of warfare that saw the utilization of vast and often unforgiving terrains as strategic battlegrounds. Among the most inhospitable of these were the deserts of North Africa. The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), a special operations unit of the British Army, was formed in response to the challenges posed by desert warfare. Established in July 1940, the LRDG was tasked with conducting deep reconnaissance, sabotage, and raids behind enemy lines but reconnaissance was its primary mission.

Terry Bailey explains.

A Long Range Desert Group vehicle in the desert in March 1941.

Concept and founding of the LRDG

The concept of the LRDG was born out of necessity. In 1940, the British Army faced the daunting task of navigating and fighting in the North African desert, a vast and largely unmapped region that stretched across thousands of square miles. Conventional military tactics were rendered ineffective in this environment due to the hostile terrain and extreme temperatures, in addition to, the lack of water, which all presented significant challenges. The British recognized the need for a specialized unit capable of operating in such conditions.

The idea for the LRDG was proposed by Major Ralph Alger Bagnold, OBE, FRS, a British Army officer of the Royal Engineers who had extensive experience in desert exploration. Before the war, Bagnold had spent years studying and surveying large parts of the North African deserts, leading expeditions, and developing techniques for traversing and navigating the desert, moreover, the techniques needed to extract vehicles.

His geographic knowledge of the region, coupled with his understanding of the challenges posed by the desert, made him the ideal candidate to lead the new unit. In June 1940, Bagnold was permitted to form the LRDG. The unit was initially composed of volunteers from commonwealth countries, such as New Zealand, African commonwealth countries and Australia, individuals were chosen for their physical fitness, resourcefulness, self-reliance and ability to endure the harsh conditions of the desert. The LRDG was structured into small, highly mobile patrols, each equipped with modified vehicles capable of carrying large quantities of fuel, water, and supplies.

Training and Equipment

The training of the LRDG was rigorous and focused on survival, navigation, and combat in the desert. Bagnold emphasized the importance of self-reliance, as the patrols would often operate hundreds of miles from the nearest friendly forces. The men were trained in desert navigation using the Sun and stars, in addition to, the maintenance and repair of their vehicles under extreme conditions.

The vehicles used by the LRDG were a critical component of their success. Initially, the unit relied on Chevrolet trucks, which were modified and would carry extra fuel and water, as well as weapons and supplies. The trucks were stripped of unnecessary weight to improve their performance in the sand, and equipped with wide tires to reduce the risk of bogging down. The LRDG also used the iconic Willys Jeep, which proved to be highly effective in the desert environment.

The vehicles of the LRDG were armed with a variety of weapons, including an assortment of machine guns, including the Bren gun, in addition to, the Boys anti-tank rifles. It is worth noting that captured weapons were often utilized by the LRDG, especially the much sought-after Italian Breda 37 or the German MG34 and later the MG42. The personal weapons of patrol members included the Sten submachine guns, Lee-Enfield rifle and later the Thompson submachine gun. Patrols were heavily armed to defend themselves if necessary, but their primary focus as indicated was on reconnaissance, therefore, avoiding direct engagements with the enemy was key to success.

Operational Deployment

The LRDG's first operational deployment took place in September 1940, shortly after the unit's formation. Their initial mission was to gather intelligence on Italian forces in the Libyan Desert. The LRDG's patrols successfully penetrated deep into enemy territory, providing valuable intelligence to the British Army. This intelligence was crucial in planning the early stages of the Western Desert Campaign. The German and Italian forces were nervous about the open desert, allowing the LRDG to penetrate deep into the Axis power's flank often unmolested offering advantageous intelligence-gathering opportunities.

As the war progressed, the LRDG's role expanded. The unit conducted a wide range of missions, including assisting in sabotage, raids on enemy supply lines, and the destruction of airfields and communications infrastructure alongside the SAS and other units. The LRDG's ability to operate virtually undetected in the desert allowed them to carry out these missions with minimal interference from the enemy, however, aircraft were always a concern. Their deep reconnaissance operations were instrumental in gathering information on enemy movements, which was used to plan large-scale offensives.

One of the LRDG's most notable operations was the raid on the Italian airfield at Kufra in early 1941. The LRDG, in collaboration with Free French forces, launched a surprise attack on the airfield, destroying several aircraft and disrupting the Italian supply lines. The success of this operation demonstrated the effectiveness of the LRDG's tactics and their ability to strike deep behind enemy lines.

Close association with L Detachment, SAS, (eventually becoming the SAS regiment)

The LRDG's expertise in desert warfare soon caught the attention of other special forces units, including the newly formed L Detachment, Special Air Service (SAS). The SAS, founded by David Stirling in 1941, was a unit dedicated to carrying out raids and sabotage operations behind enemy lines. The harsh conditions of the North African desert made it an ideal testing ground for the unconventional tactics of the SAS. Recognizing the LRDG's unparalleled knowledge of the desert, Stirling sought their assistance.

The LRDG provided the SAS with vital instruction in desert navigation, survival, and vehicle maintenance. In many ways, the LRDG served as the operational mentor for the fledgling SAS, helping to shape their desert tactics to match Stirling's vision and approach to warfare.

The partnership between the LRDG and SAS soon evolved into joint operations. The LRDG's reconnaissance capabilities and knowledge of the terrain complemented the SAS's focus on direct action and sabotage.

One of the most famous joint operations took place in December 1941, when the LRDG transported a SAS detachment to raid the German airfield at Sirte. The raid destroyed several German aircraft and marked the beginning of a series of successful collaborations between the two units. The LRDG also played a critical role in supporting the SAS during Operation Crusader in November 1941. As part of the British Eighth Army's offensive to relieve the siege of Tobruk, the LRDG assisted the SAS in conducting a series of coordinated raids on enemy airfields and supply lines. These raids disrupted the Axis forces' ability to reinforce their front lines and contributed to the eventual success of the operation.

Evolution and later operations

As the war in North Africa continued, the LRDG adapted to the changing circumstances. The unit's patrols became more specialized, with each patrol focusing on specific types of operations, such as deep reconnaissance, or assistance with sabotage and direct action. The LRDG also began to incorporate elements of psychological warfare, using deception and misinformation to confuse the enemy. These deception operations were coordinated and led from Cairo by A Force under Brigadier Dudley Clarke.

In 1942, the LRDG was involved in one of the most daring operations of the war— a multifaceted large-scale operation. Working in conjunction with the SAS, SIG and the Royal Navy, and other components the LRDG conducted a series of raids on the port's defenses, paving the way for a larger assault by Allied forces. The operation, codenamed "Operation Agreement," was ultimately unsuccessful.

Working as part of the larger force undermined the efforts of the LRDG and SAS, simply because large-scale operations were not part of the modus operandi of these units, thus ignoring the concept of small-unit operations and the requirement for stealth.

The LRDG continued to play a vital role in the North African campaign until the Axis forces were defeated in 1943. Following the end of the campaign, the LRDG was redeployed to other theatres of war, including the Aegean and the Balkans. In these regions, the LRDG initially operated as traditional infantry.

However, in December 1943, the LRDG was re-organized into two squadrons of eight patrols. Patrols were then parachuted north of Rome to obtain information about German troop movements and also carry out raids.

In August 1944, two patrols parachuted into Yugoslavia. One patrol destroyed two 40-foot (12 m) spans of a large railway bridge, which caused widespread disruption to the movement of German troops and supplies.

In September 1944 a team were parachuted into Albania, their mission was to follow the German retreat and assist Albanian resistance groups in attacking them.

In October 1944, two patrols were parachuted into the Florina area of Greece. Here they mined a road used by the retreating Germans, destroying three vehicles and blocking the road. Firing on the stranded convoy from an adjacent hillside, they directed RAF aircraft in to destroy the rest of the convoy.

The Long Range Desert Group's contribution to the Allied war effort in North Africa and other theatres cannot be overstated. Their pioneering tactics in desert warfare, combined with their close collaboration with the SAS, set the standard for special operations units in the years to come. The LRDG's emphasis on self-reliance, mobility, and deep reconnaissance became the hallmark of modern special forces operations.

The LRDG's legacy is also evident in the continued importance of desert warfare training for modern military units. The techniques and strategies developed by the LRDG during the Second World War are still studied and applied by special forces units around the world. The unit's ability to operate in extreme conditions, far from conventional supply lines, remains a key element of special operations doctrine.

Moreover, the LRDG's association with the SAS forged in the Second World War provided a lasting legacy. The SAS, which would go on to become one of the World's elite special forces units, owed much of its early success to the guidance and support provided by the LRDG. This partnership laid the foundation for the development of modern special operations tactics, which continue to evolve and adapt to new challenges.

In conclusion, the Long Range Desert Group was more than just a reconnaissance unit; it was a pioneering force in the development of special operations warfare. From its formation in 1940, the LRDG demonstrated that small, highly mobile units could achieve strategic objectives far behind enemy lines, even in the most inhospitable environments. Their collaboration with the SAS not only enhanced the effectiveness of both units but also set a precedent for future special forces operations.

Reflecting on the LRDG's contributions to the Second World War, it is clear that their legacy extends far beyond the sands of the North African desert. The principles of adaptability, self-reliance, and innovation that defined the LRDG continue to inspire military units around the world. In many ways, the LRDG was a precursor to modern special forces units that play such a critical role in today's conflicts, proving that even in the harshest of environments, a determined and well-prepared force can achieve remarkable success.

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Notes:

Numerous small specialist units existed in the British forces throughout the Second World War. The LRDG and SAS were just two such units. The collective knowledge and experience of all these small specialist units laid the foundation for not only Britain's Special Forces of today but the World. Although each country trains and operates their special forces slightly differently from one another the foundation and concept of all special forces around the world can be traced back to the numerous individual units formed in the early years of the Second World War including the LRDG.

The Special Forces units formed by the USA in the Second World War worked very closely with the British Special Forces units in the latter years of the war, a practice that continues to this day.

In Great Britain today 4 special forces units and 1 special forces support unit operate:

SAS

The Special Air Service, (SAS), an independent unit of the British Army

SBS

The Special Boat Service, (SBS), is a specialization of the Royal Marine Commandos operating under the Admiralty as an independent unit.

MAWC

The Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre, (MAWC), is a specialization of the Royal Marine Commandos operating under Admiralty control.

SRR

The Special Reconnaissance Regiment, (SRR), is a unit dedicated to reconnaissance within the British Forces. It was formed to relieve the SAS and the SBS of that role.

SFSG

The Special Forces Support Group, (SFSG) consists of elite troops operating in Special forces environments alongside other special forces units.

The SFSG's primary role is to support Special Forces operations. It was formed as a Tri-service group, composed of a detachment of Royal Marine Commandos, the Parachute Regiment and the Royal Air Force Regiment.

Point of interest:

Otto Johann Anton Skorzeny a German SS-Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel), in the Waffen-SS known for the Gran Sasso raid, 12th September 1943, studied British Special Forces' tactics and operations intending to develop similar German units.